"§ 115. The State of Wyoming and the Yellowstone National Park shall constitute one judicial district, to be known as the district of Wyoming. Terms of the district court for said district shall be held at Cheyenne on the second Mondays in May and November; at Evanston on the second Tuesday in July; and at Lander on the first Monday in October; and the said court shall hold one session annually at Sheridan, and in said national park, on such dates as the court may order. The marshal and clerk of the said court shall each, respectively, appoint at least one deputy to reside at Evanston, and one to reside at Lander, unless he himself shall reside there, and shall also maintain an office at each of those places: Provided, That until a public building is provided at Lander, suitable accommodations for holding court in said town shall be furnished the Government at an expense not to exceed three hundred dollars annually. The marshal of the United States for the said district may appoint one or more deputy marshals for the Yellowstone National Park, who shall reside in said park." 102 "The District court for the district of Wyoming shall have jurisdiction of all felonies committed within the Yellowstone National Park and appellate jurisdiction of judgments in cases of convictions before the commissioner authorized to be appointed under section five of an Act entited 'An Act to protect the birds and animals in Yellowstone National Park. and to punish crimes in said Park, and for other purposes,' approved May seventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-four.'' 103 It seems that the territorial limits of these districts, as fixed by the statute, are unaffected by any subsequent State legislation authorizing new counties and changing county lines.104 § 66a. Jurisdiction over ceded territory. The Federal Constitution gives Congress power to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever "over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock Yards. and other needful Buildings."1 It has been held that this clause of the Constitution does not 102 36 St. at L. 1130, Comp. St. § 1106. 103 36 St. at. L. 1087. 104 Hyde v. Victoria Land Co., 125 Fed. 970. § 66a. 1 Article 1, section 8. 3 apply to territory acquired otherwise than by purchase; 2 nor to land leased to the United States for a camp. But it is settled that apart from this express grant the United States have power implied by the Constitution to accept a cession of jurisdiction made by a State for use for Federal purposes and that the acceptance by Congress of such a cession will be presumed in the absence of action to the contrary. The State may reserve the right to tax public lands 5 and to serve process within such a cession.6 It has been said: "This jurisdiction cannot be acquired tortiously, or by disseisin of the State; much less, can it be acquired by a mere occupancy, without implied or tacit consent of the State, when such occupancy is for the purpose of protection. 7 It has been said, that the consent of a State Convention is not equivalent to the consent of the State Legislature. The consent of the Legislature may be given after as well as before the purchase. The inhabitants of such places are not citizens or electors of the States by the consent of which they were purchased.10 The cession by the State includes judicial as well as legislative jurisdiction.11 Such cession does not deprive the State court of jurisdiction. by service made beyond the ceded territory of process in an action for tort or other transitory causes of action which arose within the district which is the property of the United States. 12 Otherwise, it was held that process of the State court could not be served in such ceded territory, when the right to make such 2 People v. Godfrey, 17 Johnson (N. Y.) 225. 3 U. S. v. Tierney, 1 Bond 571, Fed. Cas. 16, 517. 4 Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 528, 5 Sup. Ct. 995, 29 L. ed. 264; Chicago & Pac. Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S. 542, 5 Sup. Ct. 1005, 29 L. ed. 270; Benson v. U. S. 146 U. S. 32. 5 Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 528, 5 Sup. Ct. 995, 29 L. ed. 264. 6 Ibid. 7 People v. Godfrey, 17 Johnson (N. Y.) 225, 233, per Spencer, C. J. 8 12 Op. A. G. 428. But see Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 540, 5 Sup. Ct. 995, 29 L. ed. 264. 9 U. S. v. Tucker, 122 Fed. 518. 10 Sinks v. Reese, 19 Ohio St. 306. See opinion of Justices, 1 Metcalf (Mass.) 580; 6 Op. A. G. 577. 11 Re Lad, 74 Fed. 31; Steel ▼. Halligan, 229 Fed. 1011, 1017. 12 Ohio River Contract. Co. v. Gordon, 244 U. S. 268. service had not been reserved.13 It is customary in the act of cession to include a clause stating that the State reserve the right to serve civil and criminal process in the ceded territory.1 14 "The reservation which has usually accompanied the consent of the States that the civil and criminal process of the State courts may be served in the places purchased, is not considered. as interfering in any respect with the supremacy of the United States over them; but is admitted to prevent them from becoming an asylum for fugitives from justice. And Congress, by statute passed in 1795, declared that cessions from the States of the jurisdiction of places where light-houses, beacons, buoys, or public piers were or might be erected, with such reservations, should be deemed sufficient for the support and erection of such structures, and if no such reservation had been made, civil and criminal process issued under the authority of the States or of the United States might be served and executed within them." 15 An action for a tort committed within such a district arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States although the liability of the defendant is determined by the principles of the common law and is not affected by any Federal statute.16 A suit brought in a State court against a Federal officer for acts committed within the district may be removed to a Federal court.17 It has been held that in such a case the plaintiff's statement of his cause of action need not show that it is based on the Constitution or laws of the United States. 18 Whether the ceded territory was purchased by the United States 19 or not 20 the criminal laws of the State have no force v. Clary, 8 Mass. 72; Mitchell v. Tibbitts, 17 Pick (Mass.) 298. 20 Re Lad, 74 Fed. 31, 40; Steele v. Halligan, 229 Fed. 1011, 1017; see U. S. v. Meagher, 37 Fed. 875; U. S. v. Lewis, 111 Fed. 630; Lasher v. State, Tex. App. 17 S. W. 1064. Contra, Re Kelly, 71 Fed. 545; Re O'Connor, 37 Wisc. 379; both of which cases arose from crimes committed in a Soldiers' Home, a Federal corporation which held the title to the property, although jurisdiction over the land had been ceded to the United States there after the cession unless adopted by legislative enactment of the United States. The laws regulating private rights, if not in conflict with the laws of the United States or the purposes for which the land is acquired, remain there in force until changed by Congress.21 A subsequent State statute has no effect. there; 22 except it has been held, as to such part of the land as the United States permits to be used for purposes not governmental and other than those for which it was ceded.23 21 Chicago & P. R. R. Co. v. McGlinn, 144 U. S. 542, 5 Sup. Ct. 1005, 29 L. ed. 270; Steele v. Halligan, 229 Fed. 1011, 1017; Cf. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, 298, 21 Sup. Ct. 770, 45 L. ed. 1088. 22 W. U. Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U. S. 274, 29 Sup. Ct. 613, 53 L. ed. 994 (imposing penalty for failure to deliver a telegram), Kaufman v. Hopper, 220 N. Y. 184 (a labor law). 23 Crook, Horner & Co. v. Old Point Comfort Hotel Co., 54 Fed. 604, 610, 611. "It is plain that the resolution of congress of March 3, 1887, relating to the Chamberlin Hotel, and the act of assembly of Virginia of March 30, 1887, on the same subject, both treat this hotel and its site as a diversion of that part of the cession obtained from Virginia by the United States from the purposes for which it was ceded. If so, what is the jurisdictional status of that hotel? Has it not reverted to the State, to remain under its jurisdiction so long as it continues to be used for other than military purposes, subject to such laws of the State as do not interfere with or conflict with the free and full use by the United States, for mili tary purposes, of the rest of the land ceded to and held by them at Old Point Comfort? If this be not the true jurisdictional status of the Chamberlin Hotel and its site, it would be very difficult to conceive and to define what their status is. It seems to me to be a necessary and an inevitable conclusion that the Chamberlin property has reverted jurisdictionally to Virginia, subject. to such continued control by the United States as may be necessary to the discipline of the military purposes. Subject to these limitations, it results that the laws of Virginia of a general character such as do not conflict with the purposes for which the United States hold the land at Fortress Monroe, are in force there, especially in the places like the Chamberlin Hotel, which have been appropriated to other than the military purposes for which only they were ceded by Virginia. If these conclusions be not true, then, except State laws more than half a century old, the hundreds of inhabitants engaged in civil pursuits and residing at Old Point Comfort are living in a No Man's Land, and, except in a criminal sense, are as complete outlaws as if they were at Botany Bay. "I am aware that the argumentum ab inconvenienti cannot be held to enact laws if they do not actually exist; but when reason and Congress has enacted a Criminal Code which applies to offenses committed within the territory thus acquired.24 § 67. Jurisdiction of District Court of Alaska. In Alaska there is a District Court with general jurisdiction in civil, criminal, equity and admiralty cases. This court is not a District Court of the United States.2 It has been considered as a Supreme Court of a Territory.3 The court consists of three divisions, each of which is held by a different judge with a separate clerk, district attorney and marshal. "The jurisdiction of each division of the court shall extend over the district of Alaska, but the court in which the action is pending may, on motion, change the place of trial in any action, civil or criminal, from one place to another place in the same division or to a designated place in another division in either of the following cases: First. When there is reason to believe that an impartial trial can not be had therein; Second. When the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change; Third. When from any cause the judge is disqualified from acting; but in such event, if the judge of another division will appear and try the action, no change of place of trial must be made; Fourth. By the court, on its own motion, when, considering available means of travel, it appears that the defendant will be put to unnecessary expense and inconvenience if summoned to legitimate statutory construction show that State legislation is in force in places where, if not, there would be no law at all, the inconvenience of holding otherwise comes in aid of the adopted construction. Let me emphasize the fact that this decision goes no further than to hold that the general laws of Virginia, other than criminal, which are not in conflict with those of the United States relating to forts, and which do not interfere with the military control, discipline, and use by the United States of Fortress Monroe as a mili tary post are in force at Old Point Comfort, and are especially in force in those parts and places at Old Point Comfort which have been appropriated to other than the military purposes of the United States.'' 24 Act of March 4, 1909, 35 St. at L. 1088, Comp. St., §§ 1016510519. $ 67. 123 St. at L. 24; 30 St. at L. 545; 31 St. at L. 321. The boundaries of these divisions are described supra, § 66. 2 Summers v. U. S., 231 U. S. 92. 3 Ibid. |