during his management of the vessel.16 That the seizure of a boat owned by a partnership upon a libel in admiralty to recover damages caused by a collision and the giving of security by one partner to free the boat from custody does not prevent another member of the firm, while the procedure in admiralty is pending, from suing in a State court for an accounting of profits.17 § 60. Property in the custody of another Federal Court of Equity. The different District Courts of the United States, acting upon the principle of judicial comity, usually, when property has been taken into the custody of another District Court, or when proceedings have been instituted therein for such a purpose, refuse to interfere with the same. Thus, where proceedings to cancel a mortgage had been instituted in one district, the Federal Court of another district stayed proceedings upon a bill therein filed for the foreclosure of such mortgage until the determination of the first suit. So, where a receiver has been appointed to take possession of certain property, such as a railroad, which is situated in several districts, it is the usual practice for the District Courts in the other districts to appoint the same person as ancillary receiver of the property within their territorial jurisdiction: 2 to treat the court in which the proceedings were first instituted as that of primary jurisdiction and of principal decree, and to make the administration of the property in the latter court ancillary thereto.3 Accordingly, the court of ancillary jurisdiction refused to direct the payment of a judgment against the corporation recovered in a State court within its district where an account of the funds in its receiver's hands was necessary, and referred the petitioner to the court of primary jurisdiction for relief. This rule. however, is largely within the discretion of each District Court, 16 The Willamette Valley, C. C. A., 66 Fed. 565; s. c., Chandler v. The Willamette Valley, 63 Fed. 130. 17 Alexina C. S. Dowd, respondent, v. James E. Hughes, appellant, 173 N. Y. App. Div. 118. $ 60. 1 Hurd v. Moiles, 28 Fed. 897. 2 Williams V. Hintermeister, 26 Fed. 889; Parsons v. Charter Oak 3 Farmers' I. & T. Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 72 Fed. 26, 30, 31; Clyde v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 65 Fed. 336. 4 Central T. Co., v. East Tenn., Va. & G. R. Co., 30 Fed. 805. and cases have arisen in which each court has administered the assets within its jurisdiction independently of the administration of the court of primary jurisdiction.5 Where the trustees of a second mortgage on a railroad had begun a foreclosure suit, making the trustee of the first mortgage a party, and receivers had been appointed and taken possession, it was held that the first mortgagee should not be allowed to bring an independent foreclosure suit, but must seek the relief he wished in the suit instituted by the second mortgagee. Where the evidence, affecting the decision of an application made to one of the courts of ancillary jurisdiction, was within the custody of another court of ancillary jurisdiction; the former denied the motion, without prejudice to an application to the latter. Where a controversy arose out of transactions in the ancillary jurisdiction, it was held: that the court there should determine the same.8 Where a Federal Court in another district, in a suit between other parties, had refused an injunetion against a railroad merger and consolidation, the motion, for substantially the same relief, was denied.9 The court in which a trustee has begun a foreclosure suit should not enjoin the trustee from suing in a Federal Court in another district to enforce a guarantee of the bonds by a person who is a stranger to the foreclosure suit and held no interest in the mortgaged property.10 When the Federal Court in one district has forbidden certain acts, the party enjoined cannot by filing a bill in another district be granted permission to perform the acts enjoined.11 5 The Wabash Cases: Atkins V. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 29 Fed. 161; Central T. Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 29 Fed. 618; U. S. T. Co., v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 42 Fed. 343. See also Mercantile T. Co. v. Kanawha & O. Ry. Co., 39 Fed. 337; Central T. Co. v. East Tenn., Va. & G. Ry. Co., 69 Fed. 658; N. Y. Security & T. Co. v. Equitable Mtg. Co., 71 Fed. 556; Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U. S. 254, 272, 35 L. ed. 464; infra, § 304. 6 Mercantile Tr. Co. v. Atlantic & P. R. Co., 70 Fed. 518. 7 Bowker v. Haight & Freese Co., 140 Fed. 797. 8 Jones v. Central Trust Co., C. C. A., 73 Fed. 568. 9 Daly v. Georgia & A. Ry., 112 Fed. 838, 840. 10 Ex parte, Equitable Tr. Co., C. C. A., 231 Fed. 571. 11 Louisville & N. RR. Co. v. W. U. Tel. Co., C. C. A., 233 Fed. 82. § 60a. Conflicting jurisdiction of the Federal Courts in Bankruptcy and Equity. After an adjudication of bankruptcy in the same or another district the Federal Court sitting in equity has no jurisdiction to interfere with the custody of the property, or with the administration of the estate by setting aside the adjudication 2 or sale in the bankruptcy proceeding or by staying the bankruptcy proceedings 3 or by enjoining suit by the trustees in bankruptcy.4 § 60b. Conflicting jurisdiction of Federal Courts of Admiralty and Equity. Before the abolition of the Circuit Courts it was held that a District Court could not seize property by process in admiralty, in order to apply it upon a claim that arose before the appointment of a receiver by the Circuit Court in the same district unless the Circuit Court gave permission to such taking and application,1 and that a Federal Court, which had, through its receiver, sold vessels subject to maritime liens and liens under the State laws for supplies, had no jurisdiction when sitting in equity to determine and enforce such liens, but that those matters belonged exclusively to the admiralty jurisdiction.2 § 60c. Conflicting jurisdiction of Federal Courts in bankruptcy and in admiralty. It has been held, that where a court of admiralty acquires jurisdiction by the filing of a libel in rem against a boat before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy against the owner in the same or another district, although within four months before the institution of the proceedings in bankruptcy; it may retain the possession for the purpose of determining all questions concerning maritime liens even when the boat was not seized in admiralty before the institution of the bankruptcy proceedings; 2 but that a court of bankruptcy should not direct that a boat in the possession of its receiver belonging to an estate in bankruptcy, be surrendered to a court of admiralty to be subject to the suit of a libelant, who seeks to enforce a maritime lien against it for a liability which arose before or after the bankruptcy.3 A court in admiralty when distributing the proceeds of a sale may grant priority to the claims for fees and disbursements of a receiver in bankruptcy not a party to the admiralty proceedings.* § 61. Limitations upon jurisdiction by residence. Statutory provisions. The Judicial Code provides: "§ 51. Except as provided in the five succeeding sections, no person shall be arrested in one district for trial in another, in any civil action before a district court; and, except as provided in the six succeeding sections, no civil suit shall be brought in any district court against any person by any original process or proceeding in any other district than that whereof he is an inhabitant; but where the jurisdiction is founded only on the fact that the action is between citizens of different States, suit shall be brought only in the district of the residence of either the plaintiff or the defendant. "§ 52. When a State contains more than one district, every suit not of a local nature, in the district court thereof, against a single defendant, inhabitant of such State, must be brought in the district where he resides; but if there are two or more defendants, residing in different districts of the State, it may be brought in either district, and a duplicate writ may be issued against the defendants, directed to the marshal of any other district in which any defendant resides. The clerk issuing the duplicate writ shall indorse thereon that it is a true copy of a writ sued out of the court of the proper district; and such original and duplicate writs, when executed and returned into the office from which they issue, shall constitute and be proceeded on as one suit; and upon any judgment or decree rendered therein, execution may be issued, directed to the marshal of any district in the same State." 1 "§ 53. When a district contains more than one division, every suit not of a local nature against a single defendant must be brought in the division where he resides; but if there are two or more defendants residing in different divisions of the dis 3 The Casco, 230 Fed. 929. 4 Hudson Oil & Supply Co. v. Booraem, 216 U. S. 604, 54 L. ed. 636; affirming Re Hughes, 170 Fed. 809; s. c. in C. C. A. The Falcon, C. C. A., 177 Fed. 916. $61. 1 St. at L. 1087. trict it may be brought in either division. All mesne and final process subject to the provisions of this section may be served. and executed in any or all of the divisions of the district, or if the State contains more than one district, then in any of such districts, as provided in the preceding section.2 All prosecutions for crimes or offenses shall be had within the division of such districts where the same were committed, unless the court, or the judge thereof, upon the application of the defendant, shall order the cause to be transferred for prosecution to another division of the district. When a transfer is ordered by the court or judge, all the papers in the case, or certified copies thereof, shall be transmitted by the clerk, under the seal of the court, to the division to which the cause is so ordered transferred; and thereupon the cause shall be proceeded with in said. division in the same manner as if the offense had been committed therein. In all cases of the removal of suits from the courts of a State to the District court of the United States such removal shall be to the United States District court in the division in which the county is situated from which the removal is made; and the time within which the removal shall be perfected, in so far as it refers to or is regulated by the terms of United States courts, shall be deemed to refer to the terms of the United States District Court in such division. "§ 54. In suits of a local nature, where the defendant resides in a different district, in the same State, from that in which the suit is brought, the plaintiff may have original and final process against him, directed to the marshal of the district in which he resides.3 66 "§ 55. Any suit of a local nature, at law or in equity, where the land or other subject-matter of a fixed character lies partly in one district and partly in another, within the same State, may be brought in the district court of either district; and the court in which it is brought shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide it, and to cause mesne or final process to be issued and executed, as fully as if the said subject-matter were wholly 2 It has been held that where defendants reside in different districts of the same State, an injunction may be served therein another dis trict from that in which the court sits. Babbitt v. Burgess, 2 Dillon, 169. Fed. Cas. No. 693. 3 See infra. § 64. |