...psychology). But this is not the sense of psychological state that is at issue in the above assumption (i). When traditional philosophers talked about psychological...other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed. (In fact, the assumption was that no psychological state presupposes the existence of the subject's...

...psychology). But this is not the sense of psychological state that is at issue in the above assumption (I). When traditional philosophers talked about psychological...other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed. (In fact, the assumption was that no psychological state presupposes the existence of the subject's...

...defend that truth. The term ' methodological solipsism ' was introduced by Putnam ( 1 975 : 220) for the assumption that ' no psychological state, properly...than the subject to whom that state is ascribed'. As Putnam goes on to say, to make this assumption is to adopt a restrictive programme - a programme...

...states according with the assumption of "methodological solipsism." Such a state does not presuppose "the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed" (p. 220). The idea is that narrow psychological states are entirely supervenient on the intrinsic inner...

...has been identified by Putnam with the assumption that 'no psychological state, properly so-called, presupposes the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed'.6 Putnam adds: 'Making this assumption is, of course, adopting a restrictive program —...

...Putnam, methodological solipsism is "the assumption that no psychological state, properly so-called, presupposes the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed."4 Fodor characterizes it, somewhat more broadly, as the "Cartesian" view that "there is an...

...von Hilary Putnam. Da findet man eine erste Charakterisierung des Methodologischen Solipsismus (MS): „When traditional philosophers talked about psychological...than the subject to whom that state is ascribed." (Putnam 1975, 220) Ein psychischer Zustand ist unter der Auflage des MS also dadurch gekennzeichnet,...

...kritischer Absicht so betitelte) Annahme des methodologischen Solipsismus subsumieren,59 welche besagt "that no psychological state, properly so called,...other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed. " (Putnam 75c, S. 220.) Reichen nun die obigen Überlegungen aus, um das Zuordnungsproblem zu entschärfen?...

...made when talking about psychological or mental states. Putnam defines methodological solipsism as "the assumption that no psychological state, properly...existence of any individual other than the subject to whom the state is ascribed" (1975: 220). On the basis of this definition Putnam distinguishes between two...

...that psychology ought to concern itself only with narrow psychological states, which do not presuppose 'the existence of any individual other than the subject to whom that state is ascribed' (Fodor 1980a:244).' The sense in which psychological states don't presuppose the existence of other...