United States v. Mann.

cient to follow the words of the statute are quite numerous, and they show that many of the exceptions are as extensively recognized and as firmly settled as any other rule of pleading in such cases. Views of a corresponding character are expressed by this court in another case, where the opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice STORY: Having stated the rule that it is in general sufficient to allege the offense in the very terms of the statute, he proceeds to remark. We say in general, for there are doubtless cases where more particularity is required either from the obvious intention of the legislature or from the known principles of law, both of which exceptional requirements are applicable in this case.

Known principles of law require greater particularity to be observed in order that all the ingredients which constitute a violation of the statutory offense may be accurately and clearly alleged, and it is equally clear that the intention of Congress requires the same thing, as it is obvious that Congress never could have intended that paid bank checks, duly and sufficiently stamped at the time they were made, signed and issued, should be regarded as articles or objects subject to taxation within the meaning of the provision in the act of Congress under consideration. The Caroline, 7 Cr. 500; The Anne, id. 571; Conkl. Treat. (5th ed.) 546.

Authorities other than those already referred to are not necessary to show that an information to recover a penalty created by statute must state all the material facts and circumstances which constitute the offense, so as to bring the party impleaded precisely within the provision of the statute defining the offense; but should it be desired to consult other authorities, it will be found that the following fully support the propositions: 2 Colby's Cr. Law, 114; People v. Wilbur, 4 Park. C. C. 21; Com. v. Cook, 13 B. Monr 149; Steel v. Smith, 1 Barn. & Ald. 99: Conkl. Treat. (5th ed.) 518.

Viewed in the light of these suggestions it is clear that the right conferred upon the officer to enter the building or place of business of another in such a case is strictly limited to a building or place of business in which articles or objects subject to taxation are, at the time of the proposed entry and examination, made, produced, or kept, and that paid bank checks, unless it is alleged and proved that they were not duly and sufficiently stamped at the time they were made, signed and issued, are not articles or objects subject to taxation within the meaning of the act of Congress on which the information is founded. Nothing is admitted by the

160 UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1877.

United States v. Mann.

demurrer except what is well pleaded in the information, and inasmuch as the only charge of the information in that regard is that paid bank checks were then and there kept in the said building or place of business described, the court is of the opinion that the information does not set forth any legal offense against the defendant, as defined by the said act of Congress.

Judgment affirmed.

A National bank located in one State may bring an action in the Circuit Court of the United States sitting within another State against a citizen thereof.* In such action it will be presumed, so far as the question of jurisdiction is concerned, that the stockholders of such bank are citizens of the State where the bank is located.

(Circuit Court, Second Circuit, Southern District of New York, January, 1871.) PPLICATION for an injunction and receiver. The opinion states the case.

A'

Francis C. Barlow, for the motion.

C. A. Seward and P. C. Talman, opposed.

*See Main v. Second National Bank, post. The act of Congress of March 3, 1875, coufers upon the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of suits "in which there shall be a controversy between citizens of different States"- so that it is no longer essential that one of the parties to a suit in that court shall be a citizen of the State where the suit is brought. See Osgood v. Chicago, etc., Railway Company, 6 Biss. 330.

Manufacturers' National Bank v. Baack.

BLATCHFORD, J. The bill in this case describes the plaintiffs as "Manufacturers' National Bank of Chicago, Illinois, a banking corporation, incorporated and existing under and by virtue of an act of the Congress of the United States, entitled "An act to provide a National currency secured by a pledge of United States bonds, and to provide for the circulation and redemption thereof, approved June 3, 1864, and having capacity to sue by the above title, and a citizen of the State of Illinois, and located and residing and doing business in the city of Chicago, in said State." It describes the defendants as citizens of the State of New York. The allegations of the bill as to the incorporation and location of the plaintiffs are admitted by stipulation. The plaintiffs move for an injunction, and the appointment of a receiver in the case; and the question arises whether, on the allegations of the bill thus admitted, with the fact that the allegation of the bill as to the citizenship of the defendants is not denied by the answers, this court has jurisdiction of the suit.

The eighth section of the act of June 3, 1864 (13 Stat. at Large, 101), under which the plaintiffs are incorporated, provides that every association formed pursuant to the provisions of the act shall be a body corporate, and may have a corporate seal, and shall have succession by the name designated in its organization certificate, and may, by such name, "sue and be sued, complain and defend, in any court of law and equity, as fully as natural persons." The effect of this provision is not to give to the corporation the right to sue, or the capacity to be sued, in every court within the United States, whether State or Federal, or to give to every such court jurisdiction over every suit which may be brought in it, wherein the corporation is plaintiff or defendant. Its only proper effect is to provide that the corporation, when it has come or been brought as a suitor into a court which has jurisdiction of the suit, shall stand in court, in all respects, in the same position, as regards its own rights, or the rights of others against it, as to the subjectmatter of the suit, in which a natural person who is a suitor in such court can stand. The question as to the proper court in which the suit is to be brought, in respect of jurisdiction, is left to be determined by other provisions of law. If a natural person had brought this suit in this court against the defendants, as citizens of New York, he would have been obliged to aver himself to be a citizen of some State other than New York, the bill being what

Manufacturers' National Bank v. Baack.

is known as a creditors' bill, founded on a judgment at law and praying for equitable relief. Therefore, so far as the provisions of section 8 of the act are concerned, the plaintiffs must show,.by the averments of their bill, jurisdiction of this suit by this court by showing proper citizenship in the parties.

There is no other provision of the act which can be cited as giving to this court jurisdiction of this suit. Section 57, even if under the dictum of Mr. Justice SWAYNE, in Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498, 506, it be held to refer to suits by National banks as well as to suits against them, relates only to suits to be brought in courts of the United States held within the district in which the bank is established, and does not affect the question of the jurisdiction of this court in this suit. Such jurisdiction, in order to be sustained, must, therefore, appear, by the averment of the bill, to be brought within that provision of section 11 of the Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789 (1 Stat. at Large, 78), which gives to this court original cognizance of all suits of a civil nature in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the suit is between a citizen of the State where the suit is brought and a citizen of another State.

The averment in the bill that the plaintiff corporation is a citizen of the State of Illinois is, in and of itself, not sufficient to show jurisdiction, as a corporation cannot be a citizen of a State, in the sense in which that word is used in the Constitution of the United States. Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404; Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 20 id. 227, 233, 234. The substance of the averments in the bill in regard to the status of the plaintiffs is, that they are a banking corporation, incorporated under the act of Congress named; that their members are authorized to sue by the title given to the corporation; that the corporation is located and does business at Chicago, in the State of Illinois; and that, therefore, the real plaintiffs, the members of the corporations, must be regarded, on such averments, as citizens of the State of Illinois.

The various decisions of the Supreme Court, in cases of suits in the Federal courts by and against corporations created by the laws of the States, where the jurisdiction depended on the citizenship of the parties to the suit, are reviewed in the opinion given by that court, in the case of Ohio & Mississippi R. R. Co. v. Wheeler, 1 Black, 286. The law is there stated to be settled, that where a