nor can fees be charged for such inspection to those having the right to examine and inspect such files and records.

But the broad ground is also taken that the relator has no lawful right to inspect these sales books without recompense to the respondent, because he is an abstract maker, and his business may be, and is, in most cases, to sell to some person the information gained by such examination; that he does not come under the statute, because he does not have "occasion to make examinations of them for a lawful purpose;" and that this case is covered, and against relator, by two former decisions of this Court: Webber v. Townley (1880), 43 Mich. 534; Diamond Match Co. v. Powers (1883), 51 Id. 145.

If I understand the latter case, the writ of mandamus was denied because the Diamond Match Company was not a citizen, nor an inhabitant, nor even a domestic corporation. It did not show its charter, nor give any evidence of its powers or artificial capabilities. This Court say:

"We have no reason of knowing that it has capacity to buy lands, or hold them, or deal in titles anywhere, or to carry on the business in which its petition alleges it to be engaged; or to apply itself to such an enterprise as making a system of abstracts of all the titles of all the real property in a county. The case is bare of information in regard to the true legal status of the relator, and as to whether it is other than a mere intruder in what it demands."

The petition of the relator alleged that it was incorporated under the laws of the State of Delaware; that it had become the purchaser of about thirty thousand acres of pine land in the county of Ontonagon, had erected extensive saw mills and invested nearly two hundred thousand dollars, and was cutting large quantities of pine and constantly purchasing more land, and to provide against acquiring defective titles, desired to protect its rights and interests by providing for itself an abstract of all the lands in the county. The relator was permitted opportunity to examine and make abstracts as far as its own ownership or interest was concerned, present or prospective, but the dispute was whether it had the right to go further and insist on having office accommodations and the handling of all the records, to make an abstract of title to all the lands in the county. While the writer of the opinion, Chief Justice GRAVES, paused to make some practical suggestions of obsta

cles in the way of proper relief being afforded by mandamus, the ground of the denial of the writ was that the relator had failed to show any title to the right it claimed, because the authority given to it by the State by which it was created was not disclosed, and could not be assumed. See Diamond Match Co. v. Powers (1883), 51 Mich., at pages 147, 148. In the view of the case above cited, I do not think that it is any authority bearing against the relator's claim in this case.

And I cannot agree with the opinion of this Court, or the reasons given for it, in Webber v. Townley, supra. Nor do I anticipate that hardly any, if any, of the results imagined by the writer of that opinion, would ever occur, if the holding were otherwise. If any of them should happen, the law is powerful enough to remedy them, and "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof."

I do not think that any common law ever obtained in this free government that would deny to the people thereof the right of free access to and public inspection of public records. They have an interest always in such records, and I know of no law, written or unwritten, that provides, that before an inspection or examination of a public record is made, the citizen who wishes to make it must show some special interest in such record. I have a right, if I see fit, to examine the title of my neighbor's property, whether or not I have any interest in it, or intend ever to have. I also have the right to examine any title that I see fit, recorded in the public offices, for purposes of selling such information, if I desire. No one has ever disputed the right of a lawyer to enter the register's office and examine the title of his client to land as recorded, or the title of the opponent of his client, and to charge his client for the information so obtained. This is done for private gain as a part of the lawyer's daily business, and by means of which, with other labors, he earns his bread. Upon what different footing can an abstractor-can Mr. Burton-be placed within the law, without giving a privilege to one man, or class of men, that is denied to another?

The relator's business is that of making abstracts of title and furnishing the same to those wanting them, for a compensation. In such a business it is necessary for him to consult and

make memoranda of the contents of these books. His business is a lawful one, the same as is the lawyer's, and why has he not the right to inspect and examine public records in his business as well as any other person? If he is shut out because he uses his information for private gain, how will it be with the dealer in real estate, who examines the records before he buys or sells, and buys and sells for private gain? Any holding that shuts out Mr. Burton from the inspection of these records, for this reason also shuts out every other person, except the buyer, seller, or holder of a particular lot of lands, or one having a lien upon it, or an agent of one of them, acting as such agent without fee or reward. It cannot be inferred that the Legislature intended that this statute should apply only to a particular class of persons, as, for instance, those only who are interested in a particular piece of land. "Any person means all persons.

I can see no danger of great abuses, or inconveniences, likely to arise from the right to inspect, examine, or inake note of public records, even if such right be granted to those who get their living by selling the information thus gained. The inconvenience to the office is guarded against by the statute, which authorizes the incumbent to make reasonable rules and regulations with reference to the inspection. And when abuses are shown, there will no doubt be found by the Legislature, or the courts, a remedy for them.

It is plain to me that the Legislature intended to assert the right of all citizens, in the pursuit of a lawful business, to make such examination of the public records in public offices as the necessity of their business might require, subject to such rules and restrictions as are reasonable and proper under the cir

cumstances.

The respondent in this case is the lawful custodian of these sales books, and is responsible for their safe keeping. And he may make and enforce proper regulations, consistent with the public right, for the use of them. But they are public property, for public use, and he has no lawful authority to exclude any of the public from access to and examination and inspection thereof at proper seasons. It follows that he has no right to demand any fee or compensation for the privilege of access

to the records, or for any examination thereof, not made by himself or his clerks or deputies. He has no exclusive right to search the records, as against any other citizen: Lum v. McCarty (1877), 39 N. J. L. 287; Boylan v. Warren (1888), 39 Kan. 301; Cole v. Rachac (1887), 37 Minn. 372; German Loan and Trust Co. v. Richards (1885), 99 N. Y. 620; Hanson v. Eichstaedt (1887), 69 Wis. 538.

It follows, in my opinion, that the prayer of the petitioner must be granted, and the writ issue as prayed, the relator asking in this writ no more than the statute gives him.

CAMPBELL, J.: I think relator has such an interest as entitles him, under the law of 1889, to see the book in question, and confine my opinion to that point.

SHERWOOD, C. J., and LONG, J., did not sit in this case.