the law. Let them understand that any failure to produce satisfactory results must be their own failure. Their professional pride will be aroused, and the best results may be expected. Even with the best of civil service regulations, the good faith with which they are carried out will very largely determine their efficiency. Heads of departments. who recognize them as aids in accomplishing desired results are likely to obey them in spirit, as well as in letter, much more than some man who sees in them only obstacles to his political ambition.

Let the Mayor have the power of removal of the heads of depart· ments, upon giving the reasons therefor. Let the heads of departments have the power of removal upon the same conditions, and the power of appointment, subject to the provisions of the law. The general manager of a railroad does not hire the train crew or the section hands.

My idea is that the administrative service of a municipal corporation should be organized upon the best models evolved by large and successful business concerns. I do not believe these succeed without giv-. ing to the heads of departments the right to remove and appoint their immediate subordinates under proper regulations.

This matter has doubtless been carefully considered by the Committee, and their recommendation made upon reasons which seem to them controlling. This discussion has been suggested from a firm conviction of the wisdom of a different course, and from the desire to hear the reasons of the conclusion of the Committee.

MR. PALMER: After preparing the paper just read, I submitted the question to an ex-city counsellor, who filled his office with ability; to our city engineer; to the engineer of our Park Board. I do not wonder that when the members of this Leaguecome together year after year, and when they think of the great multitude of cities affected, that they feel that the way may be long before the desired results are reached; but it seems to me that the report from Evansville, Indiana, was very encouraging. When the plan is carried out, so that the different cities can see what they are getting for their money, and other cities can see what they are getting, then the change will come about. It is natural that the metropolitan journals should notice this meeting; but yesterday, as I came through Sedalia, Missouri, I found that the editorial page of the "Evening Democrat," of that place, contained an editorial on this meeting, the closing words of which were as follows:

"That the national movement for municipal reform is steadily gaining strength should be a source of general satisfaction.

The wise, progressive and honest management of the

large cities is earnestly to be desired for the public good. Proper municipal government is a plain business proposition, and the sooner the people at large steadily regard it from a purely business point of view, the better it will be for the many interests vitally concerned.

"The annual Conference for Good City Government is accomplishing a great work. It is educating the people to a knowledge of the importance of the problem and the necessity for a wise solution. When the people are educated, political parties will have to recognize their intelligent demand for the nomination of the best material on city tickets, and for the practical and business-like administration of municipal affairs. When this shall have been accomplished, the Conference for Good City Government may rest content with an achievement of the greatest promise to American cities and American municipal politics."

With this evidence that the country newspapers have begun to take notice of the meeting here carried on, I believe we may look forward with hope and know that the day is not far distant when men from the city and country will come together and elect the proper people to the Legislature.

Mr. Deming : I wish, Mr. Palmer, to know why the Committee adopted some parts of the report. Mr. Palmer suggests that the Mayor appoint the heads of city departments, and that the heads of city departments should appoint subordinates, on the analogy of a business house.

The Mayor, under our scheme, appoints and removes the heads of city departments at pleasure, so that if you have the kind of Mayor that is feared and is described, he would indirectly appoint every subordinate in those departments, or off would go the head of the department if he did not follow the Mayor's will.

Experience has shown that, unlike private business, the head of a great department of public business is the last man to appoint his subordinates. Experience has shown that that man is put under pressure, as they call it, to such an extent that he does not follow his business judgment in naming his subordi

nates.

Our proposed Charter makes, as an integral part of it,

the subordinate civil service of the city, so far as appointment is concerned, independent both of the Mayor and of the heads of departments. It throws it open to the free competition of every citizen who wants employment. There is a civil service which makes rules which the Mayor cannot unmake, and which prescribes the examinations under which the competition shall take place; and so far as the appointment is concerned, neither the Mayor nor the heads of departments appoint according to their personal predilections, be they for ill or good, but take the best man found by the competitive test for that place.

And lastly: While the Mayor has this power to remove, he has it under this restriction: He must file his reasons; the reasons must not be political; the removed appointee has a chance to give his answer, and if he wishes, both the reason for the employe's removal and his defense are made a matter of public record known of all citizens of the city.

We think, under those circumstances, it is a wiser, more long-headed scheme for all the cities of the country than a scheme which attempts to distribute responsibility instead of concentrating it. At the same time, we recognize that this is a suggestive charter, and if any city should get so far along as to desire to consider a municipal charter of this kind and prefers to divide its responsibility without an efficient civil service law, no doubt the method suggested by Mr. Palmer would be the best under those circumstances.

THE CHAIRMAN: Edward J. McDermott, Esq., Louisville, Ky., will follow Mr. Palmer in the general discussion.

MR. MCDERMOTT: I must express my sincere admiration for the work of the gentlemen who have prepared the Constitutional Amendments, the Legislative Act for the Government of Cities, and the masterly essays that have been presented. While I was acting as Chairman of the Commission that prepared the Charter of Louisville, a few years ago, I had to spend many months in studying municipal affairs, both practically and theoretically. Hence, in writing upon the same topic which Professor Goodnow has so ably treated, I wish to be as direct and practical as possible, and I shall go into details. His paper is lucid and strong, and to nearly all of it I give my hearty assent.

PAPER OF EDWARD J. MCDERMOTT, ESQ.

Many men lay the blame of our failures in municipal affairs on our immigrants, although municipal government is no worse in the North than in the South, where there are few immigrants. Others attribute municipal evils to the nomination of municipal officers by political parties; and yet in Louisville, for many years, we had no political nominations whatever, and Republicans were even elected from the city at large, though it had then a big Democratic majority; but, in spite of this absence of political nominations, the municipal government was little better then than it has been since political parties have made nominations. Some students of municipal affairs attribute all our evils to ignorance on the part of voters; but, though education, in the past thirty years, has been made almost universal in the cities, and the percentage of those who cannot read and write is small, there has been no commensurate improvement in the government of cities.

Many thoughtful men hoped that merely fixing responsibility on the Mayor for the administration of municipal affairs would bring great improvement, and it has undoubtedly accomplished much, but not what we hoped, and for this obvious reason: He is usually sought out and nominated and elected by self-seeking men whom he cannot control or resist after his election. He finds himself so hampered by the acceptance of favors from selfish or corrupt men during his canvass, and so bound by promises made for him explicitly or impliedly by his ardent supporters, that he cannot do freely or at all what he knows is best. Besides, he is generally ineligible for the succeeding term, and can not at once feel the effects of public opinion; and, even after his weakness or unfaithfulness has been plainly demonstrated and he has been clearly condemned by the judgment of the people, there is very little satisfaction to the public in knowing that he will not soon trouble them again. If he keeps in accord with men who live upon the public, he will have ardent, loud, loquacious champions; and, if he is shrewd, he can get the support of a newspaper or two. Under such circumstances, it is hard to control or hurt him.

A Mayor and the Aldermen around him are usually of the same type. General he gets his experience and his political influence while in the Council. His talents or aptitudes, if he has any, are substantially like any they may have, but he usually excels most of them around him at least a little in ability and character. It is said that the people are not good judges of measures, but that they are good judges of men. I doubt it. A good "mixer" of ordinary standing is hard to beat in any race. By reason of this he is often trusted in high places without any record of important services in the past; and two or three years may elapse before it is known that he is deficient in ability or character, and when the discovery is made, what is it worth? Another perhaps as bad or worse succeeds him, and the procession goes on without end, like the ghosts that rose before the troubled vis

ion of Macbeth. Mayors alone, however independent or autocratic, cannot save us from bad government.

It is clear that a municipal government is not like a State government; that the legislative work of the State is more difficult and probably more important than the executive work; but in a municipality legislation is much less important than administration; the administrative officers are much more important than the law-making officers. In fact, nearly all legislation is suggested, if not prepared, by the Mayor and his assistants. A city has really nothing to do with national policies and ought to be conducted like a private corporation, but with greater skill and economy. In so far as the city, for the benefit of the State, is allowed, within its boundaries, to provide for the general health, to care for the poor and the sick, to educate the young and to prevent crime, it should be under the supervision of administrative officers of the State at the capital, and should be compelled to observe State laws; but in all other matters it should be free to collect and to spend the money of the taxpayers with as much honesty, skill and judgment as possible and according to their directions alone.

The greatest complaints against municipal governments have been due to the inefficiency, favoritism or corruption of their officers. The people have been too indulgent or too indifferent as taskmasters. A tarnished name cr a poor head has not been a bar to great preferment. Inefficiency has produced corruption; and corruption has produced inefficiency. One of the great sources of corruption has been the free gift of franchises for which private persons and corporations were willing to pay openly or secretly large sums of money. That source of corruption can be stopped by a public sale of franchises under rigid and well considered regulations for the public good. Corruption has appeared also in the acceptance of public contract-work by officers who either had not the skill to protect the citizens from imposition or who had not the honesty to resist bribes or flattery or who had not the courage to reject imperfect work when done by influential contractors or personal friends. This source of evil can be partly stopped by the selection of competent officers who bave been thoroughly tried in advance by rigid tests based on scholarship and experience and who are made secure in their places so long as they do good work and guard the city from plunderers. Corruption again has been caused (1) by the distribution of offices among personal friends and political supporters or (2) by the making of such contracts or public improvements or purchases as may be desired by influential men. A well-guarded civil service system can, to a great extent, prevent the abuse of public offices for private or political purposes. The control of public improvements and their location by the Mayor or his responsible subordinates at places where they will contribute most to the general good will not stop all abuses as to this matter, but Councilmen who want to pave the way for re-election ought not to be allowed to compel the spending of public money on un