Appeal from Circuit Court, Vigo County; Charles M. Fortune, Judge. transfer and discharge," provides by section 161⁄2 that where a defense of insanity is interposed by special plea or plea of not guilty, upon the trial of any male person accused of Calvin Morgan was acquitted of murder felony, the court or jury shall find both wheth-upon the ground of his insanity. From the er be committed the act as charged and as to denial of his motion for a discharge, and his sanity at that time, and that upon a finding from a judgment committing him to the Inagainst him as to the commission of the act charged, but in his favor on his plea of insan- diana Hospital for Insane Criminals, he ity, he shall be committed to the Indiana col- appeals. ony for insane criminals, as now provided by law for the confinement of insane criminals in the state hospital for the insane. Const. art. 4, § 19, provides that every act shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in the title, and that any subject embraced therein, but not expressed in the title, shall be void. Held, that the subject of section 161⁄2 was not included in the title of the act, and was therefore void. to the hospital reversed, with direction to Judgment committing defendant the superintendent to return the prisoner to the custody of the sheriff of Vigo county, to be proceeded against under the provisions of Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 2071, and on failure to do so that he be discharged. Frank R. Miller and Robert E. Guinn, both [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Statutes, of Clinton, and Thomas F. O'Mara, of Terre Cent. Dig. §§ 158-160; Dec. Dig. § 118.*] Haute, for appellant. Thomas M. Honan 3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 224*) and Thomas H. Branaman, both of IndianPROTECTION OF THE LAW-DISCRIMINATION apolis, for the State. BY REASON OF SEX. EQUAL Section 16% of Laws 1909, c. 87, relating to the manner of holding insanity inquests in cases of convicts, and for their transfer and discharge, which provides that, where the defense of insanity is interposed upon the trial of any male person for felony, the court or jury shall find both whether defendant committed the act charged and as to his sanity at that time, and that, upon findings of guilty and of insanity, he shall be committed to the colony for insane criminals, conflicts with Const. U. S. Amend. 14, forbidding any state to deny equal protection of the law, because not applying to females. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 725; Dec. Dig. § 224.*] 4. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (§ 255*)-DUE PRO CESS OF LAW-INSANE CRIMINALS. ERWIN, J. This was a prosecution by the state of Indiana against the appellant on a charge of murder. The indictment herein was returned by the grand jury of Vermillion county, and, on an application for change of venue, was sent to the Vigo circuit court. To the indictment the defendant entered a plea of not guilty, and also filed a special plea in writing, alleging that, at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, he (appellant) was of unsound mind. Trial by a jury, which returned a verdict as folnot guilty, and find that the defendant did lows: "We, the jury, find the defendant kill Bert Hardy at the time and place charged in the indictment, and find that the defendant was insane at the time he com Burns' Ann St. 1908, § 2071, which declares that, when a person is acquitted on the sole ground that he was insane at the time of the offense, the fact shall be found by the jury in the verdict, or by the court, and that defend-mitted such act. Joseph Gilbert, Foreman." ant shall not be discharged, but proceeded against upon the charge of insanity, the verdict or finding to be prima facie evidence thereof, and that the proceedings shall conform to those prescribed for the admission of the insane, provides due process of law within Const. U. S. Amend. 14. Under Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 2071, providing that, when a person is acquitted on the sole ground that he was insane, the facts shall be found by the jury, or by the court, a verdict finding defendant not guilty, that he did kill deceased at the time and place charged in the indictment, and that he was insane at the time is a finding that he was not guilty because he was insane, and for that reason only. The defendant thereupon moved the court that he have judgment discharging him, which motion was for the following reasons, without setting it out in full: First, that the defendant is now under no charge, by reason of his acquittal. Second, that section 16% of the act of March 5, 1909, being chapter 87 of the Acts of 1909, is unconstitutional and void, both under the Constitution of the United States and this state. Third, that defendant cannot be held under section 2071, Burns 1908, for the reason that said section is unconstitutional and void, and further that the verdict found him not guilty, but failed to state it was for the sole reason that he was insane at the time of the commission of the act. This motion was overruled by the court, to which ruling the defendant at the time [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2089, 2527; Dec. Dig. excepted and assigned the said ruling as error. $93.*] 6. CRIMINAL LAW (§ 1023*) - APPEAL-ORDERS APPEALABLE-COMMITMENT TO HOSPITAL FOR INSANE CRIMINALS. An order of court for the commitment of a person to an insane hospital is essentially a judgment by which he is deprived of his liberty, and is appealable. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Criminal Law, Cent. Dig. §§ 2583-2598; Dec. Dig. § 1023.*] The court thereupon entered the following finding: "That defendant is not guilty of the crime with which he is charged in the indictment herein, and further finds that the defendant did kill Bert Hardy at the time and place charged in the indictment, and finds that the defendant was insane at the time of the commitment of such act”—and on said finding entered judgment that de fendant (appellant) be committed to and con- sanity is interposed whether upon a special fined in the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals, so long as his insanity shall continue. To this judgment the appellant excepted, and appeals to this court. plea or a general plea of not guilty, the court or jury trying said cause shall make a finding both as to the sanity of said defendant at the time so claimed and as to whether he committed the act as charged. And if it shall be found in favor of said defendant on such plea of insanity, but against him as to the commission of the act as charged, he shall, upon order of the court be committed to and confined in the Indiana colony for the insane The assignment of errors presents the question whether, after the return of a verdict of not guilty, the court has any authority to summarily commit the defendant to the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals, as provided under section 161⁄2 of the act of the General Assembly, approved March 5, 1909, | criminals in like manner and on such condior whether defendant is entitled to his discharge, unless proceedings are had under section 2071, Burns 1908, in relation to persons acquitted of crime under a plea of insanity. tions and for such terms as is now provided for by law for the confinement of insane criminals in a state hospital for the insane." It will be observed that the title of the act refers to "insane convicts," their care, manner of holding inquests, in cases of convicts alleged to be insane, for their transfer dure in criminal trials, or in what manner patients, other than convicts, may be admitfed to such institutions. Section 19 of article 4 of the Constitution of Indiana reads as follows, being section In support of his contention, the appellant insists that section 161⁄2 of the act of March 5, 1909 (Acts 1909, p. 207), is unconstitutional and discharge, but nowhere refers to proce and void, being in contravention of section 19, art. 4, of the Constitution of the state of Indiana, in that the subject-matter of section 161⁄2 is not within the title of the act; that said section 161⁄2 is void as being in conflict with the provision of the fourteenth amend- 115, Burns 1908: "Every act shall embrace ment to the Constitution of the United States in that he is now confined without due process of law; that said section 161⁄2 is void for the reason that it is in further conflict with the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States in that it denies to this defendant the equal protection of the law, in that said section includes only male and does not include female defendants; and that a verdict of acquittal entitles the defendant to his discharge. [1] It is the duty of the courts to uphold the acts of the Legislature, if it can possibly be done, without doing violence to the Constitution; and, in doing so, every reasonable presumption must be indulged in favor of the legality of the act. State v. Roby, 142 Ind. 168-184, 41 N. E. 145, 33 L. R. A. 213, 51 Am. St. Rep. 174, and cases cited; State v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 96 N. E. 340-342, and cases cited; State v. Barrett, 172 Ind. 169, 87 N. E. 7, and cases cited; Barrett v. State, 175 Ind. 112, 93 N. E. 543; Hirth-Krause Co. v. Cohen, 97 N. E. 1; Booth v. State (No. 22,224) 100 N. E. 563, decided at this term of court. but one subject and matters properly connected therewith, which subject shall be expressed in the title. But if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so much thereof as shall not be expressed in the title." We are inclined to conclude that, as the subject of section 161⁄2 is not included in the title of the act, the same is in conflict with section 18, art. 4, of the Constitution, and is therefore void. State ex rel. v. Board, 166 Ind. 163-198, 76 N. E. 986; Henderson, Auditor, v. London, etc., Co., 135 Ind. 23, 34 N. E. 565, 20 L. R. A. 827, 41 Am. St. Rep. 410; Wabash Ry. Co. v. Young, 162 Ind. 102, 69 N. E. 1003, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1091; Ex parte Knight, 52 Fla. 144, 41 South. 786, 120 Am. St. Rep. 191. [3] We are of the opinion that the most serious objection to section 161⁄2 of the act in question is the one presented by appellant, that said section is in violation of the last clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, wherein it provides: "Nor shall any state deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." Section 161⁄2 provides upon the trial of any male persons, etc., and does not include females. [2] The title of the act in question being chapter 87, p. 207, of the Session Laws of 1909, reads as follows: "An act authorizing and providing for the establishment of a hospital for insane criminals as a part of the Indiana state prison, making appropriations therefor, providing for its government and maintenance, defining the manner of holding insanity inquests in cases of convicts alleged to be insane and for their transfer and discharge, repealing all laws in conflict and declaring an emergency." Section 16% of said acts reads as follows: "After the pas- The case of Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé sage of this act, if upon the trial of any male Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 17 Sup. Ct. person accused of a felony the offense of in- |255, 41 L. Ed. 666, it being a case arising un In the case of Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S. 377, page 382, 14 Sup. Ct. 570, page 572 (38 L. Ed. 485), the court, speaking by Chief Justice Fuller, uses the following language: "Equal protection of the laws are secured if the laws operate on all alike and do not subject the individual to an arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.” * der a law of the state of Texas, wherein it [4, 5] It is contended further by appellant provided that any person having a claim that he was entitled to his discharge on acagainst any railway company shall be entitled count of the form of the verdict, and that to recover attorney's fees, etc. The courts, he could not be held under section 2071, speaking by Justice Brewer, used the fol- Burns 1908, or proceeded against or held lowing language: "But it is said that it is under this statute, for the reason that not within the scope of the fourteenth this section is also void as being in conamendment to withhold from states the pow-flict with the provisions of the fourteenth er of classification, and that, if the law deals amendment to the Constitution of the Unitalike with all of a certain class, it is not ed States in that it deprives the appelobnoxious to the charge of a denial of equal lant of his liberty without due process of protection. While, as a general proposition, law. We do not think this section is subthis is undeniably true, yet it is ject to the infirmities suggested by counsel, equally true that such classification cannot as it provides the procedure to be followed, be made arbitrarily. The state may not say and directs that: "The proceeding shall conthat all white men shall be subjected to the form to those prescribed for the admission of payment of attorney's fees of parties success- the insane; but no preliminary statement in fully suing them and all black men not. It writing shall be required." We think this may not say that all men beyond a certain section of the statute provides for due proage shall be alone subjected, or men possess-cess of law, as contemplated by the Constitued of a certain wealth. These are classifica- tion. tions which do not furnish any proper basis for the attempted classification. That must always rest upon some difference which bears a reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which classification is proposed, and can never be made arbitrarily and without any such basis." Section 2071, Burns 1908, reads as follows: "When a person tried upon an indictment or affidavit for a public offense is acquitted on the sole ground that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense, the fact shall be found by the jury in the verdict, or by the court, if tried by it, and the defendant shall not be discharged, but shall be forthwith proceeded against upon the charge of insanity; and the verdict of the jury or finding of the court shall be prima facie evidence of his insanity. The proceedings shall conform to those prescribed for the admission of the insane; but no preliminary statement in writing shall be required." In the case of Atchison, Topeka, etc., R. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 U. S. 96, on page 104, 19 Sup. Ct. 609, on page 612 (43 L. Ed. 909), the court, speaking by Justice Brewer, says: "It is also a maxim of constitutional law that a Legislature is presumed to have acted within constitutional limits, upon full knowledge of the facts, and with the purpose of promoting the interest of the people as a whole; and courts will not lightly hold that The verdict returned in this cause finds an act duly passed by the Legislature was the defendant not guilty, but does find that one in the enactment of which it has tran- he killed Bert Hardy at the time and place scended its power. On the other hand, it is charged in the indictment, and finds that the also true that the equal protection guaran- defendant was insane at the time he committeed by the Constitution forbids the Legisla- ted the act. This is sufficient to warrant us ture to select a person, natural or artificial, in concluding that the jury found him not and impose upon him or it burdens and lia-guilty because he was insane, and for that bilities which are not cast upon others similarly situated." reason only. We are of the opinion that section 2071 is constitutional and not obnoxious to the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States. In the case of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 6 Sup. Ct. 1064, 30 L. Ed. 220, a case involving the legality of an ordinance of It is to be understood by this opinion, and San Francisco, designed to prevent the Chi- we do hold, that in a proper case a defendnese from carrying on the laundry business, ant acquitted of a criminal charge, on the the court, in holding the ordinance obnox- ground of insanity, may be detained tempoious to the provisions of the fourteenth amend-rarily until proceedings may be instituted unment, uses this language: "This court looked der section 2071 authorizing an investigation beyond the mere letter of the ordinance to the condition of things as they existed in San Francisco, and saw that under the guise of regulation an arbitrary classification was intended and accomplished." We are constrained to hold that, under the authorities above cited, section 161⁄2 of chapter 87 of the General Assembly, approved March 5, 1909, is void as denying to the appellants the equal protection of the law and obnoxious to the fourteenth amendment to into the insanity of the defendant, and that a defendant having been acquitted of a criminal charge might be, by proper and lawful proceedings, confined in an insane hospital for treatment, or confined under the statutes providing for the detention of insane persons dangerous to run at large. [6] It is contended by counsel for appellee that the order of the court, committing the appellant to the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals, is not a final judgment from which error. An order for the commitment of a person to an insane hospital is essentially a judgment by which he is deprived of his liberty. In re Lambert, 134 Cal. 626, 66 Pac. 851, 55 L. R. A. 856, 86 Am. St. Rep. 296. The judgment of the Vigo circuit court, committing appellant to the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals, is reversed, with instructions to discharge the appellant from the Indiana Hospital for Insane Criminals, and the superintendent of said institution is hereby directed to return said prisoner to the custody of the sheriff of Vigo county, to be forthwith proceeded against under the provisions of section 2071, Burns Stat. 1908, and on failure to do so that he be discharged. work is independent of a covenant therein to [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal 6. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 347*)-CON TRACTORS' BONDS-BENEFICIARIES. A bond given by a sewer contractor upon the acceptance of a bid to construct sewers, pursuant to Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 8959, does not run to a subcontractor. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 876, 877; Dec. Dig. § 347.*] 7. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (8 346*)-CONTRACTORS' BOND. A sewer contractor's bond unambiguous on its face cannot be recovered on for lack of something claimed to be omitted, without showing such omission, where the statute does not require the claimed omitted terms to be inserted. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal FRY et al. v. P. BANNON SEWER PIPE CO. Corporations, Dec. Dig. § 346.*] (No. 22,114.) (Supreme Court of Indiana. March 5, 1913.) 1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 347*)-CONTRACTS FOR IMPROVEMENTS-CONTRACTORS' BONDS-CONSTRUCTION. A bond given by contractors for the construction of sewers, pursuant to Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 8959, should be construed to effectuate its purpose, so far as it is within the statute. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 876, 877; Dec. Dig. § 347.*] 2. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (8 346*)-CONTRACTORS' BONDS-CONSIDERATION. The statute itself furnishes the consideration for the conditions imposed by Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 8959, requiring a sewer contractor to execute a bond for the faithful performance of the work. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Dec. Dig. § 346.*] 3. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 347*)-CONTRACTORS' BONDS-BENEFICIARIES. The provisions of the bond of a sewer contractor, requiring payment of all claims for labor and material used, can only be for the benefit of third persons, and not of the city; Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 8712, permitting liens against public property, not having been enacted when the bond was executed. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 876, 877; Dec. Dig. § 347.*] 4. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (8 347*)-CONTRACTORS' BONDS-STATUTORY BONDS-CON STRUCTION. In view of Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 1278, providing that no official bond shall be void for want of recital or condition, nor the principal or surety be discharged, but they shall be bound to the extent contemplated by the law requiring the same, the liability under a bond given by a sewer contractor, pursuant to Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 8959, will be confined to that contemplated by the statute. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. 88 876, 877; Dec. Dig. § 347.*] 5. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 347*)-CONTRACTORS' BONDS-CONSTRUCTION. A covenant in a sewer contractor's bond for the payment for materials furnished in the 8. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 347*)-CONTRACTORS' BONDS-CONSTRUCTION. The obligations of sureties on a sewer contractor's bond, executed pursuant to Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 8959, should be liberally construed in favor of materialmen and laborers, but cannot be extended beyond the scope of the statute. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 876, 877; Dec. Dig. § 347.*] 9. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 347*)—ConTRACTORS' BONDS - DEFAULT - NOTICE TO SURETIES. Sureties on a sewer contractor's bonds must take notice of the default of their principals. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 876, 877; Dec. Dig. § 347.*] 10. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 348*)-CONTRACTORS' BONDS-ALLEGATIONS. In an action on a bond given by a sewer contractor to recover for materials furnished for construction of the sewer, allegations of the receipt by the contractor of the pipe and its distribution along the sewer lines for construction purposes made out a prima facie case without alleging that the pipe was actually used in the sewers; that being for the sureties to allege, if it were a defense. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. § 878; Dec. Dig. § 348.*] 11. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 347*)—CONTRACTORS' BONDS-DEFAULTS. pipe furnished the construction was a default A sewer contractor's failure to pay for for which the sureties on his bond were liable; the bonds being conditioned upon the payment of all claims for labor and material. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 876, 877; Dec. Dig. § 347.*] 12. MECHANICS' LIENS (§ 271*)-MATERIALMAN'S LIEN. Where material is purchased by the owner of the structure into which it is to be placed, it is not necessary, in proceedings to enforce liens against the structure, to allege its actual use therein, though such an allegation is required in case of material furnished to a contractor. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Mechanics' Liens, Cent. Dig. §§ 494-513; Dec. Dig. § 271.*] *For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes 13. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY (§ 65*)—NATURE Court under section 1405, Burns' Ann. St. OF OBLIGATION. 1908. Affirmed. The obligation of a surety on a bond is an original undertaking. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Principal and Surety, Cent. Dig. § 105; Dec. Dig. § 65.*] 14. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 347*)-CON TRACTORS' BONDS. It will be presumed that the city had the advantage of sewer pipes distributed along the line of the proposed sewer by a contractor, if the work was afterwards abandoned, so that the obligations of the sureties on the contrac tor's bonds were released to that extent. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal Corporations, Cent. Dig. §§ 876, 877; Dec. Dig. $ 347.*] 15. PRINCIPAL AND SURETY (§ 102*) -RELEASE OF SURETIES-ADDITION OF SURETY. Sureties are released by the addition of another name as surety only where such name is added after execution and delivery of the bond and its acceptance by the obligee. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Principal and Surety, Cent. Dig. §§ 181-185; Dec. Dig. § 102.*] Hord & Adams, of Shelbyville, and Bennett & Davidson, of Greensburg, for appellants. Carter & Morrison, of Shelbyville, and Davison Wilson, of Greensburg, for appellee. MYERS, C. J. Appellee sued James W. Fry and Frank Lewark, as partners and contractors under the name and style of J. W. Fry & Co., for the construction of three separate sewers in the city of Greensburg under contracts with that city, and six other persons as sureties upon three several bonds, claimed to have been executed by them as sureties for J. W. Fry & Co., for the performance of their contracts and payment for material and sewer pipe, claimed to have been ordered by the contractors for the construction of sewers contracted by them to be built in Greensburg, under the style of 16. ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS (8 16*)-J. W. Fry & Co., and shipped to Greensburg EFFECT. consigned by that style. The alteration of a written instrument after it is signed by some of the parties thereto, and before signed by others, so as to change its terms, if done with the express or implied knowledge of the obligee, discharges the nonassenting parties, where the contract is perfected; that is, without additional requirements to effectuate it. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Alteration of Instruments, Cent. Dig. §§ 114-121; Dec. Dig. § 16.*] 17. ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS (§ 12*)-IMPLIED ASSENT - CONTRACTORS' BONDS-INSERTION OF PARTIES. The complaint is in one paragraph, counting upon three separate contracts and three separate bonds executed concurrently therewith, and the complaint was challenged upon the ground of its insufficiency of facts to constitute a cause of action. In one of the contracts it is provided that the contractor will "save the city free and harmless from any and all liability that may be occasioned through any fault or negligence on their part or their agents or employés in the performance of the conditions imposed upon them herein; that they will pay for all materials and labor, and save the first party free from any and all liability from liens." Two of the contracts provide that the contractor will save said city free and harmless from any and all liability that may be oc Since Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 8959, requires two of the sureties on a sewer contractor's bond to be residents of the county and city, nonresident sureties on such a bond must be held to have impliedly authorized the principal to secure resident sureties, as required by the statute, after they had signed it, though they would not be bound by the insertion of conditions not required by the statute; the execution of the bond being in fieri until its accept-casioned through any fault or negligence on ance in compliance with the statute. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Alteration of Instruments, Cent. Dig. §§ 77-92; Dec. Dig. § 12.*] 18. ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS (§ 2*)-EF FECT. Alterations which do not change the legal effect of a written instrument do not affect the liability upon them. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Alteration of Instruments, Cent. Dig. §§ 1-4; Dec. Dig. § 2.*] their part, their agents or employés, in the performance of the conditions imposed upon them herein; that they will pay for all materials and labor, and save said first party free from any and all liability by reason thereof and free from any and all liabilities from liens, etc. Two of the bonds are conditioned that the contractor "shall well and truly perform all and severally the conditions" of the contracts, and hold and save the city harmless and free from liability or the payment of any debt or damage by reaThe name of a resident surety added to a son of the act of the contractor in the execu sewer contractor's bond in compliance with Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 8959, requiring two tion of the work, "and shall pay all claims sureties to be residents, need not be inserted for labor and material used in making such in the body of the bond. improvement." The third bond set out in the [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Municipal complaint omits any mention of payment for Corporations, Dec. Dig. § 346.*] 19. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (§ 346*)-CONTRACTORS' BONDS-CONTENTS. material and labor, but is otherwise similar Appeal from Circuit Court, Shelby Coun- in its conditions to the other two bonds. ty; Will M. Sparks, Judge. Action by the P. Bannon Sewer Pipe Company against James W. Fry and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. There were answers in general denial, and also answers of nonexecution of the bonds, verified. [1, 2] The sufficiency of the complaint is Transferred from the Appellate challenged, upon the ground that it is not |