to enable appellee to alight therefrom; and, second, in failing to stand on the ground or on the platform of the coach when appellee came out, knowing at the time they started the train that she was attempting to alight therefrom.

If it appears from the evidence or answers to interrogatories that the verdict was returned on the first charge of negligence, then the giving of the erroneous instruction was harmless, as it was applicable only to the second charge of negligence. Ellis v. City of Hammond, 157 Ind. 267, 271, 61 N. E. 565; Roush v. Roush, 154 Ind. 562, 573, 55 N. E. 1017; Sievers v. Peters, etc., Co., 151 Ind. 642, 662, 50 N. E. 877, 52 N. E. 399; Putt v. Putt, 149 Ind. 30, 39, 48 N. E. 356, 51 N. E. 337.

the station platform, but was forced to jump | stop the train for a sufficient length of time by a lurch of the coach; that she was not thrown from the coach by a sudden or violent movement of the train, but was forced to jump by a lurch of the same. It is well settled that the general verdict necessarily covers the whole issue, and solves every material fact against the party against whom it is rendered. To enable the latter to successfully interpose the special findings upon particular questions of fact, as a ground for judgment in his favor, the special findings must stand in such clear antagonism to the general verdict that the two cannot coexist. McCoy v. Kokomo R., etc., Co., 158 Ind. 662, 64 N. E. 92, and cases cited; Indianapolis Union R. Co. v. Ott, 11 Ind. App. 564, 568, 38 N. E. 842, 39 N. E. 529; Harmon v. Foran, 48 Ind. App. 262, 266, 94 N. E. 1050, 95 N. E. 597; Ittenbach v. Thomas, 48 Ind. App. 420, 427-434, 96 N. E. 21. All reasonable presumptions will be indulged in favor of the general verdict and against the special answers, and if the general verdict thus aided is not in irreconcilable conflict with the answers, it must stand. City of South Bend v. Turner, 156 Ind. 418, 423, 60 N. E. 271, 54 L. R. A. 396, 83 Am. St. Rep. 200. Keeping in mind that the general verdict is a finding in favor of appellee on the whole is sue presented by this case, and indulging every reasonable presumption and intendment in favor of the general verdict, as required by the well-established rule declared in the foregoing cases, we think the special answers are not in irreconcilable conflict with the general verdict.

Appellant further urges that the court erred in overruling its motion for a new trial. The particular errors complained of and specified in the motion as grounds for a new trial relate to the giving of certain instructions and the refusal to give other instructions.

Appellant owed appellee the duty of stopping a reasonable time to enable her to alight before again putting the train in motion, and failure to perform such duty was negligence, on account of which there was a liability for injuries proximately resulting. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. v. Beals, 98 N. E. 453. By their special verdict, the jury found that the train stopped 30 seconds at appellee's destination, and that 30 seconds was not a reasonable time for appellee to alight. This was a direct finding that appellant was guilty of negligence. The jury further found specially that appellee did not jump from the car steps to the station platform, but was forced to jump by the lurch of the coach. It therefore fully appears from the special answers that the proximate cause of the injury was the starting of the train before appellee had time to alight, and the lurching of the same in starting which forced appellee to jump. The appellant was not harmed by the erroneous instruction.

[9] Complaint is also made of the refusal of the court to give certain instructions ten[5] The fourth instruction given by the dered by appellant on the issue of contribucourt pertained to the duty which appellant tory negligence. By instructions 16, 17, and owed appellee, and was in part as follows: 18, requested by appellant and refused, the "It was the duty of those in charge of the court was asked to say that, on the facts train to see and know at the time that no detailed in said instructions, appellee, as a passenger was in the act of alighting from matter of law, was guilty of contributory the train before the signal to the engineer negligence. By instruction 19, requested by and the putting the train of which he was appellant and refused, the court was asked in charge in motion." The instruction is to declare the law to be that if a reasonably clearly erroneous, in that it does not distin- prudent woman, under the circumstances deguish between the duty to do a certain thing tailed in the other instructions, would not and the care necessary to be exercised in the have undertaken to alight from the train, performance of such duty. The duty imposed then appellee was guilty of contributory negby the instruction is higher than the law ex- ligence. Instructions 21 and 23, requested acts. Louisville, etc., Traction Co. v. Korbe, by appellant and refused by the court, in175 Ind. 450, 453, 93 N. E. 5, 94 N. E. 768. volved the same principle as instruction 19[6-8] Whether the giving of this instruc- that if a prudent woman, under the same tion constitutes reversible error depends on circumstances, would not have encountered whether it was applicable to the charge of the risk that appellee did encounter in atnegligence on which the verdict was return- tempting to alight from a moving train, she ed. It will be noted that appellee's right was guilty of contributory negligence. It is to recover was predicated on two independ-insisted that the refusal to give each of said ent charges of negligence on the part of the instructions is reversible error. Appellant

struct the jury on the question of contribu- | holder and his entire estate, real and personal, tory negligence, as well as on the facts does not exceed in value the amount which he which, if shown, would constitute contribu- such judgment, may before any such sale ocis authorized to claim as exempt from sale on tory negligence; and, if the court had given curs dispose of such property, and the purchasno instruction on this general subject, re- er or other person to whom it passes will take fusal to give the instructions requested would it free from the lien of the judgment or the lien of the execution on the judgment. result in a reversal. But we think the court, [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Exemptions, by instruction 7, given on its own motion, Cent. Dig. § 111; Dec. Dig. § 88.*] fully covered the features included in the 3. EXEMPTIONS (§ 88*) PURCHASER OF EXinstructions refused. By instruction 7, the EMPT PROPERTY-TIME TO QUIET TITLE. court told the jury that it was the duty of The person receiving all the property of a the appellee to remain seated in the car un- judgment debtor which he was entitled to claim til the train was brought to a stop at the as exempt may sue to quiet title against the station, and it was then her duty to leave the real estate is sold under the judgment. lien of the judgment provided he sues before her seat with reasonable dispatch, pass out [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Exemptions, of the coach, and get off of the train at the Cent. Dig. § 111; Dec. Dig. § 88.*] place where passengers were accustomed to 4. EXEMPTIONS (§ 88*) PURCHASER OF EXgetting on and off of appellant's trains. In EMPT PROPERTY-TIME TO QUIET TITLE. this instruction the court further said: "If, Under the rule that one receiving all the when the plaintiff reached the door of the property of a judgment debtor which he was entitled to claim as exempt must, to sue to quiet coach in which she had been riding, the his title against the judgment lien, proceed betrain was in motion, it was her duty to re- fore the real estate is sold under the judgment, turn to her seat and remain on the car un- one suing to enjoin the sheriff from selling and til it was brought to a standstill, even though to quiet title against the judgment 13 days by so doing she would have been carried the hands of a sheriff, who proceeded to adafter execution has been issued and placed in past said station and beyond her home. Avertise and sell the land, is in time. passenger is as much bound to use reasonable care to avoid injury as the carrier is bound to use the greatest degree of skill and care to save passengers from harm. The passenger must think before he acts, and he is bound to think and act as a person of ordinary prudence would do under the circumstances. And if, after considering all the evidence given in this case, you find by a fair preponderance thereof that she did not observe these rules, and did all or some of the things she ought not to have done, and doing them contributed to her injury, she would then be guilty of contributory negligence, as would prevent her recovery, and your finding should be for the defendant." While this instruction bears the evidence of haste in preparation, we think it is as favorable to appellant as the law warrants. We are satisfied that the cause was fairly tried on its merits, and a correct result reached. Judgment affirmed.

KIRK et al. v. MACY. (No. 7,862.)

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Exemptions, Cent. Dig. § 111; Dec. Dig. § 88.*] 5. EXEMPTIONS (8 88*)-SUIT TO QUIET TITLE BY PURCHASER-COMPLAINT.

of a judgment debtor who had failed to file a Where a purchaser of all the real property schedule showing the property he owned and its value as required by Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 756, sues to quiet title against the judgment before the sale of the property thereunder, an not and never had been a lien on such property allegation in his complaint that the judgment is is sufficient.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Exemptions, Cent. Dig. § 111; Dec. Dig. § 88.*] 6. EXEMPTIONS (§ 88*)-CLAIM-SCHEDULENECESSITY OF FILING BY PURCHASER.

Under Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 756, requiring a debtor claiming exemptions to file a schedule of his property showing all his property and transfers thereof, a purchaser who buys the property of a judgment debtor which is less than the maximum exemption need not file such a schedule before suing to quiet title against the judgment.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Exemptions, Cent. Dig. § 111; Dec. Dig. § 88.*]

7. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 193*)-OBJECTIONS IN LOWER COURT-PLEADING.

The objection that the entire nature of a (Appellate Court of Indiana, Division No. 1. complaint is not clear will not be noticed on

March 12, 1913.)

1. APPEAL AND ERROR (§ 757*) COMPLIANCE WITH RULES.

Though a brief is subject to the criticism that it does not set out under the proper headings what the issues were in accordance with rule 22 (55 N. E. v), it is sufficient if it shows a good-faith effort to comply with the rules and is in substantial conformity with the same as to the questions presented for determination. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. § 3092; Dec. Dig. § 757.*] 2. EXEMPTIONS ($ 88*)- EXECUTION SALETRANSFER OF PROPERTY EXEMPT.

Where a judgment is founded on contract, the judgment debtor, if he is a resident house

appeal, where the defect could have been cured in the trial court by answer or motion to make more specific.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Appeal and Error, Cent. Dig. §§ 1226-1238, 1240; Dec. Dig. § 193.*]

8. EXEMPTIONS (§ 88*)-SUIT TO QUIET TITLE BY PURCHASER PLEADING ISSUES AND PROOF.

Under a complaint by a purchaser of exthat the judgment was not and never had been empt property of a judgment debtor alleging a lien on the property, proof is admissible to show the value of the property owned by the judgment debtor.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Exemptions, Cent. Dig. § 111; Dec. Dig. § 88.*]

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

9. EXEMPTIONS (§ 88*)-SUIT TO QUIET TITLE | E. v) of this court, in that it fails to set BY PURCHASER EVIDENCE.

In a suit by a purchaser of exempt property of a judgment debtor to quiet title against the judgment, where the debtor had not filed a schedule of his property as required by Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 756, proof that the debtor had no unincumbered personalty was not sufficient to show that the property purchased was not subject to the lien of the judgment.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Exemptions, Cent. Dig. § 111; Dec. Dig. § S8.*]

Appeal from Circuit Court, Henry County; Ed. Jackson, Judge.

Suit by Emma P. Macy against Henry K. Kirk and others. From a decree for complainant and from an order denying a new trial, defendants appeal. Reversed, with instructions to sustain defendants' motion for new trial.

Samuel H. Brown and Clarence H. Beard, both of Newcastle, for appellants. Robert S. Hunter, of Newcastle, for appellee.

out under the proper headings what the issues were, how decided, etc. While appellants' brief may be subject to this criticism, it shows a good-faith effort to comply with the rules of this court, and is in substantial conformity with the same as to the questions presented for determination, which is sufficient. Howard v. Adkins, 167 Ind. 184, 78 N. E. 665; Indiana Union Traction Co. v. Heller, 44 Ind. App. 385, 89 N. E. 419.

Appellants argue that the court erred in overruling their demurrers because, as shown by the record, appellant Central Trust & Savings Company obtained the judgment against Joshua Dickinson and John A. Catt on August 28, 1907, at which time said Catt was the owner in fee simple of the real estate in controversy, therefore the judgment was a bona fide lien against the same; that because appellee did not make out and file a schedule of all the property said Catt owned at the time the judgment was rendered, or when the real estate was transferred to her, showing it to be worth less than $600, she was not entitled to have the property set off to her; and that the complaint is bad because it does not allège this was done, citing section 756, Burns 1908. This section of the statute reads as follows: "Before any person shall be entitled to the benefit of the provisions of the above-recited act, he shall make out and deliver to the sheriff or other officer having the writ, an inventory of all of his or her real estate, within or without this state, money on hand or on deposit within or without this state, rights, credits, and choses in action, and all personal property of every description whatever belonging to him or in which he had any interest at the date of the issuing of the writ, and make and subscribe an affidavit to the same that such inventory contains a full and true account of all such property as required in this act to be set out in the said inventory, had or held by him at the time such writ was issued; and if any such property has been disposed of by him since the issuing of the writ, such affidavit shall show that fact and how the same has been disposed of and what disposition he has made of the proceeds; and until such inventory and affidavit shall be furnished to such officer, he shall not set apart any property to the execution defendant as exempt from execution."

SHEA, J. This action was brought by appellee to enjoin appellants from selling certain real estate described in the complaint to satisfy a judgment against same, and to quiet her title thereto. The complaint was in one paragraph, to which appellants' separate demurrers were overruled. Answer in general denial. Trial by court. Finding and judgment for appellee, quieting her title to said real estate. The errors assigned are the overruling of appellants' demurrers, and the overruling of their separate motions for a new trial. The complaint alleges that appellee is the owner in fee simple of certain described real estate in Henry county; that in August, 1907, appellant Central Trust & Savings Company, of Newcastle, Ind., obtained a judgment in the Henry circuit court for $436 against Joshua I. Dickinson and John A. Catt; that an execution issued on said judgment, at its instance, which was placed in the hands of appellant Kersey H. Kirk, the duly qualified and acting sheriff of Henry county; that under said writ appellant, on May 7, 1910, levied upon the real estate described, as the property of appellee, and advertised the same for sale on said execution; that said judgment has at no time been a lien upon said real estate or any part thereof, or any interest in same; that the sale of the property under execution would create a cloud upon appellee's title which she will be remediless at law to re- In the case of Citizens' State Bank of Nomove. Appellee prays that a temporary in- blesville et al. v. Harris, 149 Ind. 208, 48 N. junction be issued to restrain said execution E. 856, it is said: "Courts give a liberal consale and enjoining and restraining appellants struction to the law that exempts from sale from enforcing the judgment against said on execution the property of a resident real estate; that on final hearing the injunc-householder, as such an act is intended to tion be made perpetual; and that her title protect the insolvent debtor and his family to said lands be quieted and forever set at so that they may, in the language of our rest as against the claims of said Central Constitution, 'enjoy the necessary comforts Trust & Savings Company.

of life.' Guided by this principle, this court has not limited the application of our exemption statute to cases only which fall directly

[1] It is urged by appellee that appellants' brief does not comply with Rule 22 (55 N.

*For other cases see same topic and section NUMBER in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key-No. Series & Rep'r Indexes

2. DEEDS (§§ 124, 129*)-ESTATE CONVEYED | Figgings, her son, without process of law." FEE SIMPLE-LIFE ESTATE.

A deed by which the grantors "convey and warrant" to a grantee named "for life, and at her death said real estate to revert to the right, title and interest of" the grantee's son, "without process of law," conveys a life estate to the person first named, and a fee simple to her

son.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Deeds, Cent. Dig. $$ 344-355, 416-435; Dec. Dig. 88 124, 129.*]

3. LIFE ESTATES (§ 18*)-PAYMENT OF TAXES

-DUTY OF TENANT.

The taxes on real estate should be paid by the life tenant during her occupancy thereof, and her failure to do so creates a lien in the first instance upon her interest in the real es

Prior to February 12, 1906, the taxes on the real estate became delinquent, and the same was duly sold on that day by the auditor and treasurer of Greene county, Ind., to appellant Jesse Figgins, a tax title deed being delivered and executed to him by said auditor and treasurer, which was recorded in the recorder's office of Greene county. On December 29, 1908, Elizabeth Figgins, her husband, James Figgins joining, executed to appellant Figgins their quitclaim deed for the consideration of $1 named therein, which deed was duly recorded, and he has ever since been the owner of said real estate and of the interest of Elizabeth Figgins, according to the terms of said deed. Russell Figgins named in the deed from Hunter and Hunter to Elizabeth Figgins was the latter's son, and The time within which an infant or other died April 28, 1903, leaving surviving him as person suffering under legal disability may redeem from a tax sale is two years after the re- his only heirs at law his widow Ona Figgins, moval of the disability. The auditor has no and a posthumous child Russell Figgins, both authority to determine whether a landowner is appellees herein; that appellant Jesse Figgins suffering under a disability, and must when re-paid at the tax sale as and for delinquency quested issue a tax deed after expiration of two years from date of sale.

tate.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Life Estates, Cent. Dig. § 39; Dec. Dig. § 18.*]

4. TAXATION (8 699*)-TAX DEEDS-TIME FOR REDEMPTION-INFANCY OF Owner.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. §§ 1402-1405; Dec. Dig. § 699.*] 5. TAXATION (8_804*)-TIME OF ACTION TO QUIET TITLE-REDEMPTION FROM TAX SALE. If the time within which an owner of real estate by reason of disability may redeem from a tax sale has not expired, no action can be brought against him to quiet title by the holder of the tax deed.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Taxation, Cent. Dig. 88 1591, 1592; Dec. Dig. § 804.*] Appeal from Circuit Court, Greene County; Charles E. Henderson, Judge.

Action by Jesse Figgins against Elizabeth

Figgins and others. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

William L. Slinkard, of Bloomfield, for appellant. Webster V. Moffett, of Bloomfield, for appellees.

SHEA, J. This was a suit to quiet title brought by appellant Jesse Figgins against appellees. Issues were formed by a complaint in two paragraphs, answer in general denial by appellees Ona Figgins and Russell Figgins, the latter by his guardian ad litem, and a default by appellees Elizabeth and James Figgins to the complaint. A special finding of facts was made by the court, conclusion of law stated thereon, and judgment rendered in favor of appellees. Appellant assigns that the court erred in its conclusion of law on the finding of facts.

on said real estate the sum of $15.59, and afterwards at various times paid certain sums aggregating $9.49; that he has been in possession of the real estate for about one year, and Elizabeth Figgins has been living thereon ever since February 15, 1901. The deed from Hunters to Elizabeth Figgins, which is set out in the special findings, contains the following language: Grantors "convey and warrant to Elizabeth Figgins-for life-and at her death said real estate to revert to the right, title and interest of Russell Figgins, her son, without process of law."

[1] In the construction of deeds the words employed should be given their fair, usual, and reasonable meaning. Evans v. Dunlap, 36 Ind. App. 198, 75 N. E. 297; Tinder v. Tinder, 131 Ind. 381, 30 N. E. 1077. It is the duty of the court to effect the intention of the parties if it can be discovered, and does not contravene any rule of law. Elsea v. Adkins, 164 Ind. 580, 74 N. E. 242, 108 Am. St. Rep. 320.

[2] The language used in the deed is awkward, but, fairly construed, it is our judgment that it conveyed to Elizabeth Figgins a life estate, the fee simple to Russell Figgins. Evans v. Dunlap, supra; Adams v. Merrill, 45 Ind. App. 322, 85 N. E. 114, 87 N. E. 36; Burns v. Weesner et al., 134 Ind. 442, 445, 34 N. E. 10; Doren v. Gillum, Sheriff, et al., 136 Ind. 135, 35 N. E. 1101. The special findings of fact disclose: That during The facts found are substantially that on the occupancy of Elizabeth Figgins as such February 15, 1901, the title to the real es- life tenant the taxes upon the real estate tate described in the complaint was in Wil- in question became delinquent. It was sold liam Hunter and Francis Hunter, who on by the auditor and treasurer of Greene counsaid day, their wives joining, by warranty ty, and purchased by Jesse Figgins. That deed conveyed and warranted to Elizabeth Russell Figgins named in the deed from Figgins the property in question"-for life Hunters died on April 28, 1903, leaving surand at her death said real estate to revert viving him his widow, Ona Figgins, and a to the right, title and interest of Russell posthumous child, Russell Figgins, appellees