attached, whatever they might be; and the said | Joseph Hernandez, in consequence of said transfer and sale by James E. Zunts, now claims and pretends to be the owner of said property hereinbefore fully described." After such an averment in the bill, of the purpose and effect of the act of transfer between Zunts and Hernandez, it does not lie in the mouth of Cucullu to say that the act did not convey to Hernandez the title to the Cucullu notes and mortgages. The effect of the act of transfer is not put in issue. What Hernandez claims to be its legal import is admitted by the bill, and that is the end of the controversy upon the point. We think, therefore, that the title of Hernandez to the Cucullu notes and mortgages must be considered as settled. Second. It is insisted, however, by complainant, that even should the title of Hernandez to these notes and mortgages be conceded, nevertheless it can avail him nothing, because the notes are prescribed. Article 3540 (3505) of the Civil Code of Louisiana declares: "Actions on bills of exchange, notes payable to order or bearer, except banknotes, those on all effects negotiable or transferable by indorsement or delivery, and those on all promissory notes, whether negotiable or otherwise, are prescribed by five years, reckoning from the day when the engagements were payable." By article 3551 (3516) of the same Code, prescription may be interrupted in the two modes laid down in article 3516 (3482); viz., first, by a natural interruption, as when the debtor makes acknowledgment of the debt; or, second, by the institution of a suit against the debtor. One of the Cucullu notes fell due February 1, 1851, and the other February 4, 1854. By his act of sale of the Myrtle Grove Plantation to Walker on September 28, 1857, Cucullu declared that these notes had been renewed and would fall due February 4, 1858. The complainant claims that this was the last natural interruption of the prescription on the notes by Cucullu, and that as no suit has ever been instituted against him on the notes by any person, or any demand made upon him for their payment, the notes are prescribed. pel him to pay the Cucullu notes. To this suit Walker appeared and made various defenses, and the case has been pending from that time until now, and still remains undisposed of. In our opinion this suit is a natural interruption of the prescription, for it is an acknowledgment by Ĉucullu, in the most explicit form, that the notes are unpaid and of his liability to pay them. It is an acknowledgment that continues from day to day as long as the suit remains pending, so that it is not merely an interruption but is a suspension of the prescription. Wilson v. Marshall, 10 La. Ann., 331; Furguson v. Glaze, 12 La. Ann., 665; Barrow v. Shields, 13 La. Ann., 57. The claim, therefore, that the Cucullu notes are prescribed will not hold. Third. It is next insisted by complainant that the mortgages given by him to Villavaso, not having been re-inscribed, as required by the Code of Louisiana, within every period of ten years after their date, have become prescribed, and have lost their lien upon the property described in them. It is clear from the decisions of the Supreme Court of Louisiana that this result follows only as to third persons, and not as to the parties to the mortgage. A mortgage, to affect third persons, must be inscribed in the mortgage office, and to preserve its original rank as to third persons, it must be re-inscribed before the expiration of the year from the original inscription. The policy of the law is to make an investigation of liens easy and simple, and therefore, except for legal mortgages in favor of minors and married women, no search for mortgages in the mortgage office is required for a greater period than ten years prior to the date of search. But this applies to third persons only, and not to the mortgagor or his heirs. "By the words, third persons, are to be understood all persons who are not parties to the act or to the judgment on which the mortgage is founded." Civil Code, art. 3343. "Consequently neither the contracting parties nor their heirs, nor those who were witnesses to the act by which the mortgage was stipulated, can take advantage of the non-inscription of the mortgage." Civil Code, art. 3344. the effect of the inscription and not of the mortgage itself ceases. The mortgage remains unimpaired as between the mortgagor and his heirs, and the mortgagees. By the act of sale from Cucullu to Walker of By the omission to re-inscribe a mortgage withthe Myrtle Grove Plantation, under date of Sep-in ten years from the date of the first inscription, tember 28, 1857, Cucullu acknowledged the notes given by him to Villavaso to be valid debts, and Specified the time when they would fall due. Walker agreed to pay the Cucullu notes in the place and stead of the latter, and such payment was to be in part payment of the purchase price of the plantation. The general doctrine as stated has been repeatedly declared by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. Bonin v. Durand, 2 La. Ann., 776: Haines v. Verret, 11 La. Ann., 122; Seyburn v. Deyris, 25 La. Ann., 483; Adams v. Dannis, 27 La. Ann., 323. 206. Walker made payments of interest on these notes from 1858 up to February 4, 1861. It is the settled law of Louisiana that payments made by a purchaser of property who assumes as part The rule was applied to a witness to the mortof the price a debt due by his vendor, is an in-gage in the case of Brown v. Sadler,16 La. Ann., terruption of prescription as to that debt, both as to the purchaser and vendor. Cockfield v. Farley, 21 LA. Ann., 523; Collier v. His Creditors, 12 Rob. (La.), 399. So that prescription on the Cucullu notes was interrupted as late as February 4, 1861. From these provisions of the Code of Louisiana and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the State it is clear that no inscription of the Villavaso mortgages was necessary to affect Cucullu. He being the mortgagor, the mortgages remained valid as against him, without inscription or re-inscription, and preserved their rank over a subsequent mortgage in which he was the mort But on February 2, 1860, Cucullu, as we have seen, instituted suit against Walker, to enforce the latter's contract included in the act of sale to him of the Myrtle Grove Plantation, to com-gagee. It is claimed, however, by complainant, that ent with his claim here, and his claim in this although the doctrine may apply to the original case has not been decided against him by the inscription it does not apply to the re-inscription Supreme Court of Louisiana in the case referred of a mortgage; that unless re-inscribed within to. See, Villavaso v. Walker, 28 La. Ann., 775. ten years from its date the mortgage becomes Fifth. The complainant claims that the notes prescribed and ineffectual to bind even the mort- given by Cucullu to Villavaso were novated, gagor. and Cucullu released by the extension of the time for their payment, granted to Walker by Villavaso, by the act of February 4, 1858. This claim does not seem to us to be founded in reason nor to be sustained by any decisions of the Supreme Court of Louisiana. On the contrary, that court, as will be seen by the cases above cited, makes no distinction, so far as this question is concerned, between the original inscription and subsequent re-inscriptions. We think, therefore, that neither the lien of the mortgages executed by Cucullu nor their priority as against the subsequent mortgage executed to him by Walker has been lost. The complainant claims, fourthly, that Hernandez is estopped from setting up the mortgages from Cucullu to Villavaso as superior to the mortgage from Walker to Cucullu, because, in his intervention in the case of Villavaso, Zunts, substituted, v. Walker, he had claimed that the mortgage from Cucullu to Villavaso had lost its lien for want of re-inscription, and the complainant asserts that this claim was sustained in that case by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. An examination of the petition of Hernandez in that case, and the decision of the Supreme Court, shows that the question of precedence between the mortgages was raised on a different state of facts from that on which the question arises here. Hernandez, in the suit of Villavaso v. Walker, in which Cucullu was not a party and did not in any way appear, claimed that the mortgage from Cucullu to Villavaso had, for want of re-inscription, lost its rank as against him, he being the owner of the mortgage from Walker to Cucullu. The Supreme Court of Louisiana sustained this view, and put its decision expressly on the ground that Hernandez was a third person in the act of mortgage given by Cucullu to Villavaso, which had not been re-inscribed. In the present suit Cucullu is a party, and is insisting that the mortgages given by himself to Villavaso has lost its lien for want of re-inscription, and that the mortgages given to him by Walker should have priority. The question whether the Walker mortgage, in the hands of Hernandez as owner, is entitled to priority over the Cucullu mortgages when held by Villavaso, because the latter had not been reinscribed, is very different from this question whether Cucullu, when claiming to be the owner of the Walker mortgage, can assert priority over the mortgages executed by himself to Villavaso, because the latter had not been re-inscribed. In his intervention, Hernandez claimed priority for the Walker mortgage as against Villavaso, holder of the Cucullu mortgages, because, as to the latter, he was a third person and the mortgage had not been re-inscribed. In this case it is Cucullu who claims priority for the Walker mortgage, which, he says, he owns, against his own mortgage to Villavaso, for want of the reinscription of the latter. But as to the mortgage made by himself, he is a party and not a third person, and as to him no re-inscription is neces This claim is based on article 3063 of the Civil Code, which declares: "The prolongation of the time granted to the principal debtor, without the consent of the surety,operates as a discharge of the latter." To make this article applicable, it must appear that by the act of February 4, 1858, by which Walker agreed with Cucullu to pay the notes executed by the latter to Villavaso, Walker became the principal debtor, and Cucullu the surety. It cannot, we think, be reasonably claimed that a debtor is converted into a surety by his creditor's acceptance of an additional promise from a third person to pay the debt due him by his debtor. There is no element of suretyship in such a contract; unless it be that the additional debtor might be regarded as surety for the original debtor. The relation between the creditor and the original debtor is not changed by such an arrangement. It is, however, a sufficient answer to this claim to say that the bill of complaint contains no allegation in reference to the extension of the time of payment granted by Villavaso to Walker, and no claim that Cucullu was discharged thereby, and no allusion is made to the subject in any part of the pleadings. The claim that, by the contract of Walker with Cucullu to pay his notes to Villavaso, Walker became the prin cipal debtor and Cucullu the surety, and that by the indulgence given by Villavaso to Walker, Cucullu, as such surety, was discharged, ap pears in the case for the first time in the brief of complainant's counsel. The evidence to show the facts on which this claim is based cannot be regarded, for there is no averment in the bill to which it can be applied. It is not pertinent to any issue in the case. Whitley v. Martin, 3 Beav., 226; Smith v. Clarke, 12 Ves., 477; Langdon v. Goddard, 2 Story, 267; Gordon v. Gordon, 3 Swans., 400. Lastly, It is averred by complainant that the purchase made by Hernandez from Zunts, of the notes and mortgages given by Cucullu to Villavaso, was the purchase of a litigious right; and even if the notes and mortgages are valid claims, no more can be recovered by Hernandez than he paid to Zunts, and this sum complainant avers to be $2,100. This claim is based on article 2652 of the Civil Code of Louisiana, which declares: "He against whom a litigious right has been transferred, may get himself released by paying to the transferee the real price of the transfer, together with the interest from date." The next article, 2653, ious right, as follows: litigious, whenever there testation on the same." defines what is a litigA right is said to be exists a suit or a con This claim cannot be sustained for two reasons: first, Hernandez did not purchase the Villavaso notes until after the judgment in the Supreme Court thereon. The right ceases to company with its certificate that the State held the amount as security to the holder; held, that, alfirst-mortgage bonds of the company for a like though the State was not liable upon its bonds because they were unconstitutional, this certificate that the bonds, so far as the security was concerned, was equivalent to an engagement by the company were the valid obligations of the State. 2. The case is within the rule which makes an indorser of commercial paper the guarantor of the genuineness and validity of the instrument he in dorses. 3. Under these circumstances, the company is estopped, so far as its own liabilities are concerned, from denying the validity of the bonds. 5. Where a statutory lien in the nature of a first mortgage duly registered, was given the State on the property of the company to secure the company bonds, and the State as trustee, on the request of the bondholders, commenced proceedings to enforce such lien, held, that the statute has made the mortgage of the company security for the payment of the obligations of the State. be litigious when judgment has been rendered. Marshall v. McCrea, 2 La. Ann., 79. Secondly, it has been repeatedly decided by the Supreme Court of Louisiana that the purpose of article 2652 was to prevent litigation, and therefore a defendant who, instead of paying the price of the transfer, contests the suit and prolongs the litigation, defeats the very object of the article, and cannot exercise the privilege it gives. The complainant should have paid or tendered to Hernandez the real price of the transfer with interest from date. He would then have been 4. Contracts created by or entered into under the in a position to claim the benefit of article authority of statutes, are to be interpreted accord2652. He cannot, after contesting the claiming to the language used in each particular case to express the obligation assumed. inch by inch and up to the court of last resort, cancel it by paying what it cost his adversary. Leftwich v. Brown, 4 La. Ann., 104: Pearson v. Grice, 6 La. Ann., 233; Rhodes v. Hooper, 6 La. Ann., 356; Evans v. De L'Isle, 24 La. Ann., 248. We think that the attempt of Cucullu to get rid of his notes and mortgages given by him to Villavaso, or postpone them to the subsequent notes and mortgage given to himself by Walker, must fail, and ought in equity to fail. Thirty years ago he borrowed from Villavaso $20,000, and to secure this money executed mortgages to him on the Myrtle Grove Plantation which he then owned. He has never paid that debt. He afterwards sold the plantation to Walker and took his notes for part of the purchase money, and for the residue his stipulation to pay off the Villavaso notes and mortgages. Walker has not paid them. While enforcing the lien of the Walker mortgage, and bringing the property to sale to satisfy it, equity requires that out of the proceeds the notes of Cucullu to Villavaso should be first paid, unless some reason in law exists by which they are postponed. We have been able to find no such reason. We think the decree of the Circuit Court was right, and that it should be affirmed; and it is 80 or dered. 6. Although the provision of the Act in respect to the execution and exchange of the State bonds is unconstitutional, the one in relation to the statutory lien on the property of the company is not void also. The unconstitutional part of the statute may be stricken out, and the obligation of the company including its statutory mortgage in favor of the State bondholders left in full force. 7. It cannot be said that a case is not authority on a point because, although that point was properly presented and decided, something else was found in the end which disposed of the whole matter. commercial security to pay what he in effect agreed 8. A bona fide holder can require an indorser of a the maker must pay. [Nos. 667, 668, 669.] Argued Oct. 12, 13, 14, 15, 1880. Decided Jan. 17, 1881. PPEALS from theCircuit Court of the United The cases are fully stated by the court. Messrs. James M. Baker and James Baker, for the J. P. & M. R. R. Co., appellant, in No. 668. FLORIDA CENTRAL RAILROAD COM- for the Western N. C. R. R. Co., appellant, in Messrs. S. F. Phillips and C. M. McLoud, PANY, Appt., v. J. FRED SCHUTTE ET AL. JACKSONVILLE, PENSACOLA AND MO- v. J. FRED SCHUTTE ET AL. WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA RAIL- v. GEORGE F. DREW, GOVERNOR, ETC., JACK- (See S. C., 13 Otto, 118-145.) No. 669. Mr. Joseph B. Stewart, for the Western Division of the Western N. C. R. R. Co. Messrs. Matt. H. Carpenter, C. D. Willard, Wayne McVeagh, Theo. F. H. Meyer and W. G. M. Davis, for appellees, Schutte, Drew et al. Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court: These cases, although separate in form, are so connected in their facts that they may properly be considered and decided together. The facts are these: The Florida, Atlantic and Gulf Central Railroad Company, incorporated by the General Assembly of Florida in 1853, built a railroad from Jacksonville to Lake City. The Penascola and Georgia Railroad Company, also incorpoIndorsement of state bond-effect of estoppel-rated during the same year, built a road from contracts created by statute-statutory lien Lake City through Tallahassee to Quincy in the statute partly unconstitutional and partly direction of Mobile, with a branch to Monticeltalid-case, when authority-obligation of in-lo; and the Tallahassee Railroad Company, indorser. 1. Where a railroad company put on the market and sold bonds of a State, indorsed by the railroad corporated at a somewhat earlier date, built another road from Tallahassee to St. Marks. Each of these Companies became indebted to the State of Florida under the provisions of the In-purported to convey the roads to Swepson, ternal Improvement law, and, as a consequence, "Said party of the second part, in trust for the the road of the Florida, Atlantic. and Gulf express purpose of enabling said party of the Central Company was sold, on the 4th of March, second part-which he hereby agrees and binds 1868, by the trustees of the Internal Improve- himself to do-to convey the same to that inment Fund, under the authority of law, to corporation, consisting or to consist as incorpoWilliam E. Jackson and his associates; that of rators of said F. Dibble and his associates, as the Pensacola and Georgia Company, on the soon as said Dibble and his associates shall have 6th of February, 1869 to F. Dibble and his as- granted to them such a similar relief as the Leg. sociates; and that of the Tallahassee Company islature of the said State of Florida granted to on the same day and to the same parties. Wm. E. Jackson and his associates by act for relief of Wm. E. Jackson and his associates, approved July 29th, 1868, and also for the further purpose of securing said party of the second part in all advances made as specified and agreed upon in the said agreement between these parties, executed and dated March 26th, 1869, and the advancement, as aforesaid, of said sum of four hundred and seventy-two thousand and sixty-five dollars, until such time as said relief shall have been granted and said party of the second part shall have conveyed said property to said incorporation, as hereinbefore prescribed." The road from Jacksonville to Lake City was paid for in full, and a conveyance in due form executed to the purchasers, who, on the 29th of July, 1868, were incorporated by the General Assembly of the State, under the name of the Florida Central Railroad Company, and given all the powers and franchises of the Florida, Atlantic and Gulf Central Company. They were also authorized to fix the amount of the capital stock of the Company, and the number of shares into which it should be divided. In this way the capital was put at $550,000, with five thousand five hundred shares. Of these shares George W. Swepson afterwards became the purchaser of four thousand three hundred and seventy, which he paid for with money in his hands belonging to the Western Division of the Western North Carolina Railroad Company, a North Carolina Corporation, which he fraudulently diverted from the use to which it had been appropriated by that Company. Swepson also purchased, with the funds of the same North Carolina Corporation, bonds of the Pensacola and Georgia and Tallahassee Companies to the amount of $960,000, or thereabouts, and on the 24th of April, 1869, he entered into a contract with the purchasers of the roads of those companies by which he was to deliver them these bonds to use in making their payments of purchase money; and they, as soon as they could get the necessary authority from the Legislature, were to raise money by a mortgage on the property and pay him what he had advanced to buy the bonds, with certain commissions and attorney's fees, and $100,000 in addition. The contract contemplated an incorporation of the purchasers after the manner of the Florida Central Company, with a distribution of one third of the stock to Swepson. As security for the payment of the sum agreed to be paid, the bonds issued under the contemplated mortgage were to be disposed of in a particular way, and Swepson was to be given certain privileges in the election of directors. Under this arrangement Swepson handed over $960,300 of Pensacola and Georgia and Tallahassee bonds to the purchasers; but after these bonds had been applied in the way contemplated there still remained a balance of the purchase money, amounting to $472,065, to be paid. Deeds conveying the property to Dibble for himself and his associates were executed in due form, but their delivery was withheld on account of this default in payment. Dibble and his associates being unable to raise the money, Swepson, by putting off on the trustees of the Improvement Fund a worthless check that was never paid, for the amount that was due, got possession of the deeds and had them duly recorded April 22, 1869. On the same day Dibble, for himself and his associates, party of the first part, executed a paper which on its face This instrument was never acknowledged or recorded. On the 24th of June, 1869, the proposed Act of incorporation was obtained, by which Dibble and his associates, as purchasers of the roads, were made a body corporate under the name of the Tallahassee Railroad Company, to hold, operate and enjoy the property purchased, with all the powers, privileges and franchises of the Pensacola and Georgia and the original Tallahassee companies, and with power to issue bonds secured by mortgage; "Provided, That any deed of trust, mortgage or conveyance, bond or bonds, or security which may have been executed, made, created or contracted for, as a lien on said railroad or otherwise, by said Franklin Dibble, in behalf of himself and his associates, prior to the passage of this Act, shall be valid and effectual to all intents, either at law or in equity, as a lien or a mortgage, or security on said railroad, as if the same had been made by virtue of this Act, and shall in nowise be affected by any provisions thereof." (Sec. 6.) The new Tallahassee Company was duly organized under this charter, and took possession of and operated the roads. Afterwards, to remove all doubts as to the title of the Corporation to the property of the old Companies, Dibble, for himself and his associates, at some time during the year 1870, executed a paper which purported to be a conveyance, in due form, for that purpose, by which he professed to relinquish and quitclaim to the corporation all his rights. This paper was not acknowledged, and was not in fact a legal conveyance of the property. No conveyance in form was ever executed by Swepson, neither has he at any time, so far as appears, attempted to exercise any rights under the conveyance or transfer which was made to him. On the 24th of June, 1869, an Act was passed by the General Assembly of Florida to "« perfect the public works of the State." By this Act, "In order to secure the speedy completion. equipment and maintenance of a connection by railroad between Jacksonville, on the Atlantic coast, and Pensacola, on the Gulf coast, and Mobile, in Alabama," George W. Swepson, Milton S. Littlefield, J. P. Sanderson, J. L. Re Qua William H. Hunt, their associates, successors and assigns, were constituted a body politic and corporate under the name of the Jacksonville, Pensacola and Mobile Railroad Company. This Company was authorized to build a railroad from Quincy to the Alabama state line, and there connect with any road running to Mobile, and to consolidate with the several companies owning roads from Quincy to Jacksonville, from Tallahassee to St. Marks, and the branch to Monticello. The original charter was somewhat amended on the 28th of January, 1870, after which sections 9, 10, 11 of the original charter, and section 4 of the amended charter, were as follows: "Sec. 9. In order to aid the said Jacksonville, Pensacola and Mobile Railroad Company to complete, equip and maintain its road, and to aid in perfecting one of the public works embraced in the internal improvements of the State, the governor of the State is hereby directed to deliver to the president of the said company coupon bonds of the State to an amount equal to sixteen thousand dollars per mile for the whole line of road and length of railroad owned by or belonging to said Jacksonville, Pensacola and Mobile Railroad Company, in exchange for first-mortgage bonds of said Railroad Company, of the denomination of one thousand dollars, when the president thereof shall certify upon his oath that the road or parts of road for which he asks for an exchange of bonds is completed, and is in good running order. The said bonds shall be of the denomination of one thousand dollars, signed by the governor, countersigned by the treasurer, sealed with the great seal of the State; shall bear eight per cent interest, payable semi-annually, and shall be payable to bearer. They shall be dated on the first day of January, A. D. 1870, and shall be due thirty years thereafter, and principal and interest shall be payable at such place in the City of New York as the governor shall designate. The coupons for interest shall be payable to bearer, and shall be authenticated by the written or engraved signature of the treasurer: Provided, hometer, That when the Jacksonville, Pensacola and Mobile Railroad Company shall or may determine to pay the interest in gold for or upon their bonds or the bonds designated in the 10th section of an Act entitled 'An Act to Perfect the Public Works of the State,' approved June 24, 1969, upon giving notice to the governor of such intention, then the State bonds aforesaid and the coupons for interest on said bonds shall be payable in gold, notice of which shall be given by the governor in some paper published in the City of New York, and at the capital of this State, to be designated by the governor. est of the said company bonds, the State of Florida shall, by this Act, have a statutory lien, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as a first mortgage duly registered, on the part of the road for which the state bonds were delivered, and on all the property of the Company, real and personal, appertaining to that part of the line which it may now have or may hereafter acquire, together with all the rights, franchises and powers thereto belonging, and in case of a failure of the Company to pay either principal or interest of its bonds or any part thereof for twelve months after the same shall become due, it shall be lawful for the governor to enter upon and take possession of said property and franchises, and sell the same at public auction, after having first given ninety days' notice by public advertisement in at least one newspaper published in each of the following places: the City of New York, in the State of New York, the City of Savannah, in the State of Georgia, and the City of Tallahassee, in the State of Florida, for lawful money of the United States, and for nothing else, except that the State, for its own protection, may become the purchaser at said sale, and may pay on said purchase any evidences of indebtedness the State may hold against said roads, which purchase money or said evidences of indebtedness shall be paid on the day of sale into the Treasury of this State, or within ten days thereafter; and all moneys arising from said sale and paid into the Treasury of this State, as heretofore prescribed, shall be promptly and exclusively applied to the payment and satisfaction of the bonds issued by the State of Florida, under this Act; and in case the holders of said bonds do not present them for redemption within ninety days after said sale, the treasurer shall invest the same, or any part thereof which may be remaining in his hands, in the securities of the United States, to be held by the State of Flori da, as trustee for the bondholders, until said bondholders shall demand the same, upon which demand the treasurer shall immediately turn over or pay said securities to the bondholders. The purchaser or purchasers of said road shall be by said sale possessed of all the rights, privileges and franchises of said defaulting Company, together with the franchise of use and being a body politic, and the governor shall, upon the payment of said purchase money into the Treasury of this State, as above provided, immediately cause the purchaser or purchasers of said road at said sale to be placed in the actual possession, use and enjoyment thereof, and cause all the books, papers and real and personal property of said Company, of every description, together with its franchise of use and Sec. 10. In exchange for the bonds of the being a body politic and corporate, to be turned State above described, the president of the Com- over to said purchaser or purchasers, and the pany shall deliver to the governor of the State purchaser or purchasers of said road shall be by coupon bonds of the company, bearing a like said sale possessed of all the rights, privileges rate of interest, payable to the State of Florida, and franchises of said defaulting company, tosigned by the president, sealed with the corpo-gether with the franchise of use and being a rate seal; coupons payable to State of Florida, body politic and corporate, and may use any thenticated by the written or engraved signa- new corporate name they see fit, and make and ture of the president. The bonds shall be of ch denominations, not less than one thousand dollars, as the said Company may choose, and principal and interest shall be payable at the sime time and place as the aforesaid state bonds. "Sec. 11. To secure the principal and inter use a new seal upon signifying their action in writing to the governor, and thereafter may exercise all the rights of a body corporate and privileges thereof, and of said defaulting Company, under said new name, for the term of thirty-five years, to date from the time of pur |