saponifying process. That requires twelve or fourteen per cent. Even if the saponifying process partly takes place, they use Tilghman's process for effecting the balance of the operation. They use water in admixture with fat, heated to a high degree, far above the boiling point, and yet subjected to such pressure as to prevent the water from being converted into steam; and though they may also use other things at the same time, which other things may facilitate the operation, or render a less degree of heat necessary than would be required when water alone is used, and thus actually improve the process of Tilghman, yet this process is included in their operation and forms the basis of it. It is idle, therefore, to say that they do not infringe Tilghman's patent. It is unnecessary to determine what precise part the lime used by the defendants plays in their process; whether, as the complainant contends, it saponifies the fat to a certain extent, leaving the remainder to be acted upon by the water alone purely after the process of Tilghman; or whether, as the defendants contend, the lime produces a more perfect and active commixture of the fat and water, or predisposes the fat to unite with the requisite elements of water necessary for producing glycerine and the fat acids, in either case the process of Tilghman, modified or unmodified by the supposed improvement, underlies the operation performed in the defendants' boilers.

ive and rapid in producing the desired result;
but suggests a trial of the apparatus employed
with different degrees of heat so as to ascertain
that which is best for each particular kind of
fat. By starting the apparatus," the language
is, "at a low heat, and gradually increasing it,
the temperature giving products most suitable
to the intended application of the fatty body
employed can easily be determined." It is prob-
ably true, as contended for by the defendants,
that by the use of a small portion of lime, the
process can be performed with less heat than if
none is used. It may be an improvement to
use the lime for that purpose; but the process
remains substantially the same.
The patent
cannot be evaded in that way. The matter may
be stated thus: Tilghman discovers a process
of decomposing fats by mixing them with water,
and heating the mixture to a high temperature
under a pressure that prevents the formation of
steam. It is a new process, never known be-
fore. The defendants seeing the utility of the
process, and believing that they can use a method
somewhat similar without infringing Tilgh-
man's patent, put a little lime into the mixture,
and find that it helps the operation, and that
they do not have to use so high a degree of heat
as would otherwise be necessary. Still, the de-
gree of heat required is very high, at least a
hundred degrees above the boiling point; and a
strong boiler or vessel is used in order to re-
strain the water from rising into steam. Can a
balder case be conceived of an attempted eva-
sion and a real infringement of a patent?

erful as the heat is increased." What can be done in minutes by the application of a very high degree of heat, requires hours to do at the temperature used by the defendant. But the process is still the same, and the defendants fail to evade the patent.

Another ground assumed by the defendants to avoid the charge of infringement is, that they do not heat the mixed mass in the manner And as to the low degree of heat used in the pointed out in Tilghman's specification; but, in- operations of the defendants, this must also be stead of heating the containing vessel by an out- said: that, with the reduction of the temperaside application of heat, they heat the contents ture, the time of perfecting the operation is by the introduction of super-heated steam. But more than proportionally increased. Tilghman we think that this does not alter the essential was aware of this result, and pointed it out in character of the process. The heating by steam his patent. He expressly says: "The decomis clearly an equivalent method to that of heat-posing action of the water becomes more powing by an external fire. The patent does not prescribe any particular method of applying the heat, except when using the pipe and coil apparatus described in the specification; and, even in the use of this apparatus, the outward application of the heat to the pipe is suggested incidentally and as a matter of convenience rather than as an essential requisite. The patentee showed one method in which the heat could be applied. That was all that was necessary for him to do. If it could be applied in any number of different methods, it would not affect the validity of the patent as a patent for a process. The method of heating the mixture by the introduction of steam may be attended with some beneficial results, in producing an agitation, or automatic circulation helpful to the perfection of the admixture of the water and fat; and so far it may be an improvement on heating from without. Suppose this to be so, as before said, the introduction of an improvement gives no title to use the primary invention upon which the improvement is based.

We pass by the fact that the defendants first took a license from the patentee, and under it and under his directions erected substantially the same apparatus which they are yet using. Receiving what they regarded as additional light, they refused to continue the payment of a royalty, and put the complainant to his legal remedy.

It is our opinion that the patent is for a process, that it is a valid patent, and that the defendants infringe it.

We have considered the case entirely upon its merits. It is unnecessary to bestow much discussion upon the technical objections that have been raised. They have not been pressed in the argument, and are probably not seriously relied on. One of them is, that no replication was Finally, the defendants argue that they only filed in the case. To this it may be answered, use a low degree of heat and pressure compared that the parties have throughout treated the with that pointed out by the patent, namely: case as though it were regularly at issue. The only about 310° Fahrenheit instead of 612. The various stipulations into which they have enprecise degree of heat, as we have seen, is not tered, with regard to the admission of evidence of the essence of the patent. The specification to be heard on the trial of the cause, are totally only claims that a high degree of heat, such as inconsistent with the idea that the case was to would be sufficient to melt lead, is most effect-be heard merely on bill and answer. Another

objection is, that the patent was dated more than
six months prior to the filing of the application
for it. But under the law then in force, 1854,
with regard to the antedating of patents where
a foreign patent had been obtained, this was ad-
missible. The 6th section of the Act of March
3d, 1839, entitled "An Act in Addition to an Act
to Promote the Progress of the Useful Arts,"
expressly declared that no person shall be de-
barred from receiving a patent for any inven-
tion or discovery * * * by reason of the same
having been patented in a foreign country more
than six months prior to his application; Pro-
vided, That the same shall not have been intro-
duced into public and common use in the Unit-
ed States prior to the application for such patent;
And provided also, That in all cases every such
patent shall be limited to the term of fourteen
years from the date or publication of such for-
eign letters-patent." Now, we know by the pro-
ceedings on the application in this case that the
attention of the Commissioner of Patents was
expressly called to the fact of the issuing of the
English patent, and that the question of the
date of the patent in suit was submitted to and
considered by him. Under the laws then in
force, he determined that the patent ought to be
antedated as of the date of the English patent.
It must be presumed that his decision was right
according to the facts of the case, at least until
the contrary is shown; and nothing has been
shown to the contrary by any evidence in the
cause to which our attention has been called.
The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed, and |
the cause remanded with directions to enter a de-
cree in conformity with this opinion.
True copy. Test:

The substance of the bill is that Joshua Woodhead was largely indebted to him for government bonds and money loaned for which he had recovered judgments that had proved unavailing; that Ann Woodhead, the wife of Joshua, held the legal title to certain valuable real estate, on which was a flouring mill and other improvements. That the land was purchased by Joshua's money, and the title made to Ann with intent to defraud the creditors of Joshua; and that valuable improvements had been placed on the land, the payment for which was made by Joshua's money. The prayer of the bill was to subject this land to sale for the payment of plaintiff's judgment.

The answer of Ann denied all this, and also set up as a bar to the relief prayed a former suit in one of the state courts concerning the same subject between the same parties. The record of the proceedings in the state court is set out in full, and much evidence on both sides as to the main allegation of fraud alleged in the bill in the present suit is found in the record, all of which, in the view we take of the case, is immaterial.

The defendant, Joshua, answered "that long before the bringing of this suit this defendant had filed his petition in this honorable court under the bankrupt law of the United States, and the said orator, the said James S. Trimble, was duly notified of the same, and the claim of the said orator was therein set forth, and after the proper proceedings as prescribed in said law, this defendant was on his petition adjudged a bankrupt, and by a judgment of this court he was finally discharged from all of his indebtedness, and the claim of the orator was one of the James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. 8. debts from which he was thus discharged; he Cited-7 Sawy., 359.

JAMES S. TRIMBLE Appt.,

v.

JOSHUA WOODHEAD ET AL.
(See S. C., 12 Otto, 647-650.)
Bankrupt law-rights of assignee.

1. Rights to property fraudulently transferred by a bankrupt, pass to his assignee in bankruptcy, and a creditor of the bankrupt cannot assert them in his own name.

2. The failure of the assignee to sue within two itor.

files herewith a copy of his judgment of discharge as part hereof."

The proceedings in bankruptcy are not found in this record, nor have we been able to find in it a copy of Woodhead's discharge; but the answer of Woodhead is sworn to. The plaintiff also filed an amended bill, in which he makes John T.Levis, a defendant, whom he alleges to be essignee in bankruptcy of the defendant, Joshua. He says in this amended bill that the judgmen recovered by him in the state court was obtained after the discharge of said Woodhead as a bankrupt.

It may, therefore, be accepted as established by the pleading that Woodhead was regularly years does not transfer his right of action to a cred-discharged of all his debts by proceedings in bankruptcy, and that in those proceedings John T. Levis was made the assignee with the usual effect of such an appointment.

[No. 127.] Submitted Dec. 8, 1880. Decided Jan. 31, 1881.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United

States for the District of Kentucky.
The case is fully stated by the court.
Messrs. J. G. Carlisle and James O'Hara, Jr.,
for appellant.

Messrs. Stanley Matthews and Wm. M.Ramsey, for appellees.

Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court:

The appellant, who was plaintiff below, brought his bill in chancery in the Circuit Court for the District of Kentucky and, after hearing on bill, answer, replication and evidence, it was dismissed.

It is as well to observe here that while the

amended bill of plaintiff made Levis a defend

ant in his character of assignee, and the record shows an order of court for process to issue against him no such process, nor any other notice to him, nor any appearance by him or for him is found in the record. As to him, therefore, and the rights represented by him, the bill is of no effect.

The case of Glenny v. Langdon, 98 U. S., 20 [XXV., 43], conclusively establishes the proposition that the rights asserted in this bill passed to the assignee in bankruptcy of Woodhead, and that a creditor of Woodhead cannot assert them in his own name.

In that case the plaintiff sought to avoid

this difficulty by alleging that he had requested the assignee to bring suit or assert the right in some other way, who had refused to do so. That made a stronger case than the present one, where no such application was made. The abortive effort to make the assignee a party without service of process or appearance for him does not help the case.

Nor can we attach much importance to the allegation in the amended bill, that two years had elapsed without suit by the assignee, for the assignee might not have discovered the frand, or if brought judicially into court might have asserted his right not only against the plaintiff but against Mrs. Woodhead, for the ben at of all the creditors.

ject this property in the hands of Ann Woodhead to the payment of the debts of her husband, which existed prior to the bankruptcy proceedings, that right is in the assignee, and such right is not divested by anything shown in this case.

The bill of the appellant was, therefore, properly dismissed, and the decree is affirmed. True copy. Test:

James H. McKenney, Clerk, Sup. Court, U. S. Cited-103 U. S., 303.

JOHN BARRETT, Piff. in Err.,

V.

We do not see on what principle the failure E. J. HOLMES, as Guardian ad litem of of the assignee to sue within two years transfers his right of action to plaintiff.

The right was certainly in the assignee. That rigat, if barred by the Statute of Limitations, would, if it had any effect on the title, make good the title of defendant. See Meeks v. Clphets, 100 U. S. 564 [XXV., 735]. It seems to be well settled that, in regard to real estate, the undisturbed possession of the wrong-doer for the time necessary to bar the action makes of itself a good title in the party holding such possession.

It would be a curious application of this principle in the present case, which concerns real estate, to hold that this same lapse of time, instead of making good defendant's title, or acting as a bar to the right to bring suit, transfers that right to another unimpaired by the lapse of time.

Nor is the creditor of a bankrupt without remedy in such case as the present. If he is aware of the existence of property or credits, which should rightfully go to the assignee for the benedit of the creditors, he should inform the assignee of all he knows on the subject, and request him to proceed, by suit, if necessary, to recover it. If he declines, a petition to the court of original jurisdiction would, if a proper case was made, compel the assignee to proceed. See Glenny v. Langdon, already cited. Indeed the whole question is so fully considered in that case that little more need be said.

We may, however, suggest consequences readily to be seen if any other doctrine were hel1.

The primary object of the bankrupt law is to secure the equal distribution of the property of the bankrupt of every kind among his creditors. This can only be done through the rights vested in the assignee and the faithful discharge of his duties. Let us suppose, however, that a Creditor of the bankrupt is aware of the existence of property of the bankrupt sufficient to satisfy his own debt, which has not come to the possession or knowledge of the assignee. He has but to keep silence for two years, and then being suit in his own name against the fraudubeat holder of this property, and make his debt really at the expense of the other creditors; or he may have an understanding with the bankript, who, after two years, and after his own discharge from all his debts may confess judgmeat to this creditor and furnish him the vidence to prove the fraud, and thus secure Lim a preference forbidden by the Act itself. In the present case, if any right exists to sub

CHARLES LOVE, ET AL.

(See S. C., 12 Otto, 651-658.)
Iowa Statute of Limitations-tax deed--valid law.
action brought by one claiming under a tax deed,
1. The Iowa Statute of Limitations, applies to an
as well as to one brought by the original owner of
the land.

within five years, either himself take actual posses-
2. The party holding under the tax deed must,
sion of the property, or bring a suit to recover pos-
session, or his action upon his deed will be barred.
3. Such law violates no contract, and deprives the
purchaser at the tax sale of no estate or property
to which he had a right.
[No. 204.]
Argued Jan. 17, 1881.

Decided Jan. 31, 1881.

IN ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State

of Iowa.

The case is fully stated by the court. Mr. George G. Wright, for plaintiff in error.

No counsel appeared for the defendant in

error.

Mr. Justice Woods delivered the opinion of the court:

This was an action for the recovery of real property, brought by the plaintiff in error on August 28, 1874, in the Circuit Court of Mills County, in the State of Iowa. He relied on a tax title based on the deed of the county treasurer to one Meads, dated January 6, 1868, and recorded on the 28th of the same month; a deed from Meads to one Callanan, dated February 1, and recorded March 12, 1873; and a deed from Callanan to himself, dated July 25, and recorded August 3, 1874.

The defendant claimed under a bond for a deed, given by those who held the patent to the land. The bond was dated February 12, 1872.

The law of Iowa prescribes how the deed of the treasurer or tax collector for lands sold for taxes shall be executed, and its effect, as follows:

'The deed shall be signed by the treasurer in his official capacity, and acknowledged by him before some officer authorized to take acknowledgments of deeds, and when substantially thus executed and recorded in the proper record of titles for real estate, shall vest in the purchaser all the right, title, interest and estate of the former owner in and to the land conveyed, and all the right, title, interest and claim of the

NOTE.-Sale of land for taxes-strict compliance with the statute, necessary. See note to Williams v. Peyton, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.), 77.