adjudge him to be imprisoned with or without hard labour for any term not exceeding six months.

If, on the other hand, the prisoner does not plead guilty, whatever he says in answer is to be taken down in writing and read over to him, signed by a Justice present, and transmitted with the depositions in the case, and may be given in evidence against him at his trial without further proof.

A previous conviction does not necessarily disentitle a person to the advantage of the Act; but (sec. 14) no adult person is to be thus dealt with if it appear to the court that his offence is one which owing to a previous conviction on indictment is punishable with penal servitude.

A summary conviction for any of the above offences is to have the same effect as a conviction for the same offence upon indictment (sec. 27 (3)), and the court may make the like order for the restitution of property as might have been made by the court before whom the person convicted would have been tried, had he been tried on indictment: see RESTITU

TION.

Finally (sec. 28) where an indictable offence in which the prosecutor's expenses would otherwise have been payable out of the local rate, is summarily dealt with as above, the court may, if it seem fit, grant to the prosecutor a certificate of the compensation which may seem reasonable for his time, trouble, and expenses, including fees, and such other expenses as are by law payable when incurred before a commitment for trial; and such certificate is to have the effect of an order of court, in the case of a prosecution for felony, under the 7 Geo. IV., c. 64.

CHAPTER VI.

SUMMARY JURISDICTION UPON COMPLAINT.

SUMMARY Jurisdiction, as has been mentioned already, is applicable in two distinct classes of cases. First, where Information is laid that some person has committed an offence for which he is liable, under this process, to be imprisoned, fined, or otherwise punished. Secondly, where complaint is made to any Justice or Justices, upon which he or they have authority to make any Order for the payment of money or otherwise.

Hitherto we have spoken exclusively of cases of the former description, all of which involve charges of a criminal nature. It may be as well to remark that this epithet includes, in its wider aspect, a good many acts of disobedience or neglect for which, in ordinary conversation, we should certainly find a different name. A man who drives the wrong side of the road for example, or forgets to have his child vaccinated, would naturally object to it. But in either case he is liable to be proceeded against by Information, convicted, fined, and imprisoned in default of payment. And it is in these penal consequences that he must be content to discern the true nature of his conduct. The distinction is not unimportant. In cases of a criminal or quasi-criminal character, for instance, he is debarred, it may be recollected, from giving evidence on his own behalf. On the other hand there is a legal presumption in his favour, which would not belong to him as a mere civil defendant.

Cases of the second class, matters of complaint as they are called, stand upon a very different footing. They imply no sort of criminality, either actual or constructive. No conviction is asked; no punishment is in the air. All that is wanted is an Order upon the party complained against, to pay a sum of money, or to perform a particular act-to do in short some duty which it is within the power of Justices to compel. A Complaint accordingly takes the place of an Information. It need not necessarily be in writing: it is not supported upon oath: and its peaceful nature is testified by the fact that no warrant can, under any circumstances, be issued upon it in the first instance. Otherwise the subsequent proceedings, as regulated by Jervis' Act, are similar to those upon Information, leading up, however, to an Order in place of a conviction.

We frequently, indeed, find it provided in statutes that some penalty, or sum in its nature penal, may be recovered upon 'Complaint' before Justices. But the word is here used in its broad and general acceptation, and not in the special and technical sense which we are now considering. The penalties in question will really be recovered upon Information, the form of which, in fact, runs 'The Information and Complaint of A. B.,' &c.

When we speak of an Order for the payment of money, it will be understood that Justices do not hold a small-debts court, and that the enforcement of demands of this description forms no part of their general duty. Their cognisance of such matters is limited to cases where, as under the 'Employers and Workmen Act,' and in other instances, they are specially required to entertain them. Certain Rates, and other payments of a periodical description, are statutably recoverable upon Complaint. But no mere claim for money due is within the provisions of the Summary Jurisdiction Acts, unless the actual judicial Order of a court of summary jurisdiction is necessary to enforce it. In the case of Poor rates, for example, no such Order is asked or needed. The Justices

merely issue their warrant in respect of a sum already ascertained and payable under statutory authority, and exercise no discretion as to the validity of the demand.

Complaints, as we have said, may be either as regards the non-payment of money, or may point to the doing of some act which Justices have authority to enforce. Thus, upon Complaint that an apprentice has enlisted for a soldier, Justices may order his commanding officer to deliver him up; upon Complaint that a dog is savage or dangerous, they may order that it be either destroyed or kept under proper control; and on Complaint that a tree overhangs a railway so as to endanger the trains, they may issue the equally judicious Order to cut it down.

The power of a court of summary jurisdiction to bind a person over to keep the peace, or to be of good behaviour, is in future to be exercised upon the Complaint of the person desiring this precaution. No wrong, requiring vindication, is supposed to have been done; and the necessary Order, which is simply intended to prevent wrong, is obtained in peaceful form :-See SURETIES OF THE PEACE.

Of course disobedience to an Order entails punishment, and exposes the defendant to the calamities provided by the statute under which proceedings are taken. These will take the form of a warrant of commitment or distress, according to the circumstances of the case. No such warrant, however, can issue until the defendant has been served with a minute of the Order itself.

It is provided by the Summary Jurisdiction Act (sec. 6) that where, under any other Act, whether past or future, a sum of money claimed to be due is recoverable upon Complaint, and not upon Information, such sum shall be deemed to be a 'civil debt.' And (sec. 35) that any sum declared by the Act itself, or by any future Act, to be a 'civil debt,' recoverable summarily, or in respect of the recovery of which jurisdiction is given to a court of summary jurisdiction, shall be deemed to be a sum for payment of

which an order may be made upon Complaint. It is further provided that no warrant shall be issued for apprehending any person for failing to appear to answer any such Complaint; and that no order for the payment of any such 'civil debt,' or for the payment of any costs in the inatter, shall, in default of distress or otherwise, be enforced by imprisonment, unless it be proved to the satisfaction of the court that the person making default has withheld payment when the means of making it were in his power. In such case, the court has the same power of imprisonment as a county court would have under the Debtors' Act, 1869 (32-3 Vict. c. 62, sec. 5), which extends to a maximum sentence of six weeks.

Proof of the means of a person making default as above may be given in such manner as the court shall think just; and for the purpose of such proof, the person himself and any witnesses may be summoned and examined upon oath. And under the Summary Jurisdiction Rules, 1880 (18-28), the ultimate power of imprisonment cannot be exercised unless a 'judgment summons,' i.e., a summons to appear for the above purpose, has been served two days in advance upon the debtor. It is not necessary, as a preliminary to such summons, that a distress warrant should have been applied for.

The scale of imprisonment (page 21) in respect of nonpayment of money adjudged to be paid by a conviction, or in default of a sufficient distress, applies equally (sec. 47) to the period to be imposed in respect of money adjudged to be paid by an Order, where such sum is not a civil debt, nor enforceable as such. The owner of the dangerous dog above noticed, for example, is liable to be adjudged to pay 208. per day, in default of complying with an Order to chain him up. This penalty, if incurred, would not be a sum of money claimed to be due upon complaint,' and consequently would not be a civil debt.

Any sum which may become due from a surety, in pur