THE

REGISTER OF PENNSYLVANIA.

DEVOTED TO THE PRESERVATION OF EVERY KIND OF USEFUL INFORMATION RESPECTING THE STATE.

EDITED BY SAMUEL HAZARD, NO. 51, FILBERT STREET.
PHILADELPHIA, JANUARY 26, 1828.

private to have retired to indulge in sleep in a farmhouse.

ward and tell him to preserve it." I do not know what was the precise idea, which at that moment struck the mind of the General. I can only conjecture that he was apprehensive that Sullivan, after meeting the enemy in the front, kept up his brisk and incessant fire, when the haziness of the air, and its increased obscurity, from the burning of so much powder, prevented his troops having such a distinct view of the enemy, as would render their fire efficient. Be that as it may, the instant I received the General's orders, I rode forward, and in the road, three or four hundred yards beyond Chew's house, met Sullivan, and delivered to him the General's orders.

2. General Washington, in his letter to Congress of October the 5th, the day after the battle says, "that the army marched about seven o'clock in the evening of the 3d; and that General Sullivan's advanced party attacked the enemy's picket at Mount Airy, or Mr. Allen's house, about sunrise the next morning, which presently gave way; and his main body, consisting of the right wing, following soon, engaged the light infantry and other troops encamped near the picket, which they forced from their ground. Leaving their baggage, they retreated a considerable distance, having previously thrown a party into Mr. Chew's house." The term here applied to these advanced corps of the enemy, that they were "forced from the ground," shows that they were in arms, and resisted the assailants; and the previous brush with the picket, a guard always posted in advance on purpose to give notice of an enemy's approach, roused "the light infantry and other troops," who had time enough to take their arms and form for action. They retreated, of necessity, before the greatly superior force of the whole right wing of our army. But the "leaving of their baggage" authorises the inference, that they had no knowledge of the march of the American army, until the firing in the engagement with the picket guard gave the aların. If then these advanced corps of the enemy were not, in the strict sense of the word surprised, that is, "caught napping," unprepared for action, much less could the main body, posted in the centre of Germantown, two miles farther off, have been surprised. This distance gave them ample time to prepare for ac-house stood. I found they were discussing in Washingtion, in any manner which the attack of their enemy should require.

3: You ask, "at what distance from Chew's house the attack commenced?" At that time I was a stranger to that part of the country. From my subsequent acquaintance with it, during my residence in Pennsylvania, I should estimate the distance of Mount Airy from Philadelphia to be eight miles, Chew's house seven miles, and the centre of Germantown six miles. And these I think are the distances, as I have occasionally heard them mentioned.

4. You ask, "how long a pause was made at Chew's house; and what space of time probably intervened between the beginning of the action, and the general engagement at the head of the village?" The pause at Chew's house in the manner I shall presently mention, probably delayed the advance of the rear division of our army into action for half an hour. And taking the attack of the picket at Mount Airy, as the beginning of the action, it was probably near half an hour before it became general as to the whole of Sullivan's column; and this general engagement must have commenced after he had passed Chew's house; for I saw not one dead man until I had passed it, and then but one, lying in the road where I fell in with General Sullivan. presume that, following close on the heels of the British battalion of light infantry, and the fortieth regiment, which were retiring before him, Sullivan, with his column, had passed Chew's house without annoyance from it. For it must have taken some time for Colonel Musgrave, who entered it with six companies of the fortieth regiment, to barracade and secure the doors and windows of the lower story, before he would be ready to fire from the chamber windows; and it was from them that the firing I saw pro

ceeded.

"In the march of the army, General Washington, following Sullivan's column, kept in the road leading to and through Germantown to Philadelphia. When he had entered the northern part of the village, we heard in advance of us, (I was riding by the General's side) a very heavy fire of musquetry. General Sullivan's divisions, it was evident, were warmly engaged with the enemy; but neither was in sight. This fire, brisk and heavy continuing, Gen. Washington said to me; "I am afraid Gen. Sullivan is throwing away his ammunition; ride for

'At this time I had never heard of Chew's house; and had no idea that an enemy was in my rear.-The first notice I received of it was from the whizzing of the musket balls, across the road, before, behind, and above me, as I was returning, after delivering the orders to Sullivan. Instantly turning my eye to the right, I saw the blaze of the muskets, whose shot were still aimed at me, from the windows of a large stone house, standing back about a hundred yards from the road. This was Chew's house. Passing on, I came to some of our artillery, who were firing very obliquely on the front of the house. I remarked to them that in that position their fire would be unavailing, and that the only chance of their shot making any impression on the house, would be by moving down and firing directly on its front. Then immediately passing on, I rejoined General Washington, who, with General Knox and other officers, was in front of a stone house (nearly all the houses in Germantown were of stone) next northward of the open fields in which Chew's ton's presence this question: Whether the whole of our troops then behind should immediately advance, regardless of the enemy in Chew's house, or first summon them to surrender? General Knox strenuously urged the sending of a summons. Among other things he said, "It would be unmilitary to leave a castle in our rear." I answered, "Doubtless that is a correct general maxim; but it does not apply in this case. We know the extent of this castle (Chew's house;) and to guard against the danger from the enemy's sallying, and falling on the rear of our troops, a small regiment may be posted here to watch them; and if they sally, such a regiment will take care of them. But,' I added, to summon them to surrender will be useless. We are now in the midst of the battle; and its issue is unknown. In this state of uncertainty, and so well secured as the enemy find themselves, they will not regard a summons; they will fire at your flag." However, a flag was sent with a summons. Lieutenant Smith of Virginia, my assistant in the office of adjutant general, volunteered his service to carry it. As he was advancing, a shot from the house gave him a wound of which he died.

'Whatever delay in the advance of the division in our rear, was occasioned by the pause at Chew's house, I am satisfied that Sullivan's column did not halt there at all, as mentioned by Judge Johnson. The column was certainly not in sight, when the General sent me with the orders already noticed; and it is alike certain that it was then beyond Chew's house. Nor were the enemy form. ing under cover of the house, or I must have seen them. When the orders were sent to our troops in the rear to advance, I do not know; but it must have been subsequent to the sending of the flag; and, I should think, twenty minutes, at least, after it was found that an enemy was in the house. The general did not pass it at all. I had remained near him until our troops were retreating when I rode off to the right, to endeavor to stop and rally those I met retiring in companies and squads; but it was impracticable; their ammunition, I suppose, had generally been expended.

5. In the aforementioned letter from General Washington to Congress, he says, "the attack from our left column, under General Greene, began about three quar ters of an hour after that from the right." You ask the cause of this. The answer is obvious. The right column,

1828.]

BREAKWATER.

51

under General Sullivan, which Washington accompanied, pen." For these an estimate was made hy Wm. Jones, marched on the direct road to Germantown, Greene, esq. at the request of the Chamber of Commerce, and with his column, was obliged to make a circuit to the left, to gain the road which led to his point of attack. in March 1822, Congress appropriated upwards of The columns being thus entirely separated, and at a $22,000 towards this object, to take effect, if upon a distance from each other, no calculations of their com- survey had, the Secretary of the Treasury should be samanders could have insured their arriving at the same tisfied as to the eligibility of the plan. But as in the time at their respective points of attack. opinion of W. Jones and the surveyors appointed under the authority of the Secretary, piers constructed upon the proposed plan would be soon demolished, either by the force of the surge or by worms, this plan was abandoned. In the mean time, W. Jones suggested the plan of substituting a section of a stone Breakwater to the extent of the appropriation, which might be thereafter extended until a secure aud capacious harbour should be formed. The design and estimates were furnished, an application was made to the Secretary of the Treasury by the Chamber of Commerce, for an examination, and in June 1823, Gen. S. Bernard, Lieut. Col. J. G. Totten and Com. Bainbridge were appointed a board of Engi neers for the purpose, whose report we now publish.In 1824 and 1825 memorials were presented to Congress by the Chamber, and in 1825 by the citizens, agreeably to resolutions of a town meeting held Dec. 28, at which H. Binney, esq. presided and S. Jaudon acted as sec'ry. The attention of Congress was given to the subject, but the application failed of success. The present one we cannot but hope will be more effectual, strengthened as it will be by new facts, evincing the importance of the trade of the Delaware, and the necessity of the adoption of some plan to diminish the risk of property and sacrifice of life, and supported by memorials from other cities; which will share largely in its benefits. We will hereafter publish the memorial and some other documents which have been collected by the committee of the Chamber of Commerce on the subject. REPORT

*Judge Johnson, in his 'Life of Greene," has represented as almost ludicrous' the 'scene' exhibited by some writers, of the discussion near Chew's house, in the presence of General Washington, in which it is hinted that opinions were "obtruded;" and that even field. officers may have expressed their opinions; but,' he adds, "General Washington was listening to the counsels of his own mind and of his general officers.' I know, however, that he did listen to the discussion: and Lee, commanding a troop of horse, on that day on duty near the General's person, accounts for his determination to send the summons. 'Knox,' he says, being always high in the General's confidence, his opinion prevailed.' Further I must remark, that the general officers, whom the Judge supposes to have been present, and advising the commander in chief, were then in their proper places, with their divisions and brigades. Knox alone of the general officers was present. Commanding in the artillery department, and the field pieces being distributed among the brigades of the army, he was always at liberty, in time of action, to attend the commander in chief Some two or three years since, I wrote to Judge Johnson, informing him of his mistakes in the matter noticed in this paragraph. Others of his details of this battle, which are inconsistent with the statements I have here given to you must be incorrect. The truth is, that Gen. Washington, not sanguine in his own opinions, and his diffidence being probably increased by a feeling sense of high responsibility, as Commander in Chief, was ever disposed, when occasions occurred, to consult those officers who were near him, in whose discernment and fidelity he placed a confidence, and certainly his decisions were often influenced by their opinions. This is within my knowledge. I am, &c.

T. PICKERING.

BREAKWATER.

Bainbridge, on the subject of

A BREAKWATER IN THE DELAWARE.

Philadelphia, July 14th, 1823. In obedience to instructions from the War and Navy Departments of the 7th of June last, the undersigned, having made such personal examinations as they found necessary, and collected all the information within their reach, as to the utility, the practicability, the situation, the magnitude, and the cost of a projected pier or breakwater, near the Capes of the Delaware, for the protection of vessels against ice, and against tempests, have the honour to submit the following report.

1st. On the utility of a pier or breakwater near the Capes of the Delaware, which will protect vessels against floating ice and wind.

As the subject of the Breakwater is about engaging Of the Engineers of the United States, and of Captain the attention of Congress, and is one of great importance to the commerce of this and the adjoining states, as well as to that of every Atlantic state in the union, we this day publish the report of the Engineers, exhibiting the plans proposed and the estimates made by them. In the ⚫ year 1822 the attention of the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce was called to the subject of the "perils and difficulties of the winter navigation of the Delaware," in an interesting communication by Wm. Jones, esq. late Secretary of the Navy, which was published in a pamphlet by directions of the Chamber. Four plans were proposed by him at that time: "1st, the construction of two ice-boats to be propelled by steam. 2d, the excavating to the required depth, or otherwise improving the ice harbours formed by the existing public piers. 3d, the construction of new harbours at the confluence of the Christiana and Cohanzey creeks with the Dela4th, the construction of small intermediate harbours in the channel side of the river where the tides are strong, and sweep alternately the same ground in a direction parallel to the shore." In the same year an application was made to Congress for the "erection of two piers, to be framed of timber and filled in with stone, on the tail of the shoal called the shears, near Cape Henlo

ware.

The Delaware bay is not only obstructed by fixed ice during a part of the winter, but it is without a harbour near its mouth, in which vessels can secure themselves either against winds blowing from the northwest to the southeast, round by the north, or against floating ice. It is frequently the case, that the navigation of the bay is impeded by the ice, as early as the month of December, and it is often open for eight or ten days, and sometimes longer, between the 20th of December, and the 15th of January, yet it closes again, and remains shut until the 20th of February, or even the 1st of March. For two March, vessels bound up the bay will be uncertain as to months at least, therefore, between December and their passage to the city; and, being without shelter when they arrive at the Capes, will be exposed to the

greatest dangers, should they find the passage obstruct. ed. As to the vessels departing from this port, it is true, they can choose a favourable moment for descending the river; but should they be met by adverse winds at the capes, they also will be exposed to be driven ashore by the winds or destroyed by the ice.

These general considerations show how important it is, that something be done to secure, if possible, a safe anchorage near the mouth of this great communication with the ocean; but it is proper by some details, to show more fully in how high a degree this subject merits the attention of government.

ter, they would engage with enterprise and confidence, in all the chances of commercial speculation.

Although it is difficult to specify the amount of the losses sustained, although the annual amount has been decreasing with the reduction of the tonnage, and the greater precaution on the part of the merchants; still, some idea may be formed of it from the circumstance, that a single East India or China ship is often worth half a million of dollars; that is to say, two or three times as much as would be the cost of a Breakwater near the capes, to shelter a dozen vessels.

We have thus far examined the advantages to result From information received through the Chamber of from an artificial harbour, with reference only to the Commerce, it appears that the tonnage exclusively be-commerce of the Delaware; but they will be found of longing to, and registered in the port of Philadelphia in 1810, when the population of the city and county amounted to 111,210, was 124,430; and in 1820, when the population amounted to 137,097, was 78,837.

Now if the tonnage had increased in the same ratio as the population, it would have been in 1820, 153,394 instead of 78,837: consequently the tonnage of the port of Philadelphia in 1820, may be said to have been but

about half of what it was in 1810.

scarcely less moment to the coasting navigation of the nation at large. The great number of shipwrecks upon the coasts of Jersey and Delaware proves that the winter navigation of that coast is attended with imminent peril, and we may safely affirm, that a project which shall place a secure harbour at the mouth of the Delaware, lying as it will, about midway between the distant harbours of New York and the Chesapeake, and being always acces sible, with the winds which are most dangerous, will produce a result of incalculable value, whether we consider the saving of property, or of human life.

2d. On the practicability of constructing a Pier or Breakwater, which will afford shelter for vessels, and have, in itself such stability as to resist the most violent efforts of floating ice and gales of wind.

Though this great diminution is to be ascribed to various causes, there is no doubt that the want of a good harbour at the mouth of the bay, is one of very great influence. Owing to this want, many vessels postpone their departure from foreign ports, thereby incurring very great expense; or arriving off the capes at the unpropitious season, are obliged to bear away for some The commission have ascertained that the ravages of neighbouring port. As to those which run the risk of the worm, in the lower part of the bay, would soon dethe passage up the bay, many are much damaged, and stroy any wall in which timber entered as an essential others entirely lost. In the winter of 1809-10, a large part; and they are convinced, were it otherwise, as renumber of vessels in attempting this passage, were either spects timber, no dependence could be placed in the destroyed in the bay by the ice, or wrecked upon the stability of a work having an envelope of timber, unless shore, or lost at sea, while in pursuit of a harbour of such a form were given to it as would, in fact, make the safety. Since that period, the captains have orders not to envelope a very expensive, and at the same time a nearincur the like risk; and the winter arrivals are compara- ly useless appendage. The form here spoken of has tively few. The regular packet-ships which come upon reference to the profile or traverse section, and is one the coast in winter, are often obliged to bear away for in which the breadth at bottom, being very great comNew York, there to land their cargoes, the transporta-pared with that at the top, the slopes of the sides are so tion of which, owing to the badness of the roads at that season, is both tedious and costly.

If there were a harbour at the mouth of the bay, vessels could drop anchor within it to wait for the first favourable chance to reach New Castle, whence they could easily proceed to Philadelphia, by taking advantage of the openings in the river, between those two places, which occur two or three times every winter. In like manner, vessels despatched from Philadelphia would descend to New Castle, and thence to the mouth of the bay, there to wait, if necessary, until the proper moment to proceed to sea.

Besides the embarrassment to commercial intercourse, the loss of time, and the increase of expense which are consequent upon the present state of things, the premium of insurance is greatly increased by the dangers to which vessels in winter are exposed at the mouth of the Delaware. This premium is from one-half to one and a half per centum above the customary rate; and in cases which become desperate from the casualties to which vessels are exposed, in the attempt to enter the Delaware, insurance is either refused, or an exorbitant premium demanded.

As to the losses of vessels which have actually happened for want of a proper shelter, it is difficult, though they have unquestionably been numerous, to determine the number, or to state the amount of property. They can only be ascertained by research among the journals of the period, and amongst the records of the several insurance offices both in this city and elsewhere, to which research the commission does not feel warranted to devote the time it would require: but this much appears to be certain, that the ship-owners in Philadelphia, in consideration of the trouble, risk, expense, and loss of the navigation, do not order one in ten of their vessels to this port in winter; and also, that if there were suitable shel

gentle, that the stones composing the mass are retained firmly in place by their own weight: to this form of structure has been applied, in a memorable example, where the objects in view were similar to the present, the term of Breakwater.

With the complete success which has attended the stupendous works of the Jette of Cherbourgh and the Breakwater of Plymouth, (just alluded to,) the commission cannot hesitate as to the practicability of constructing a breakwater in the Delaware, which will be lasting in itself, and secure permanently the advantages which are sought. This confidence is founded on a comparison of the exposure of the works above cited, with the exposure of the situation which may be selected in this bay, on a comparison of the nature of the bottom, and the direction and force of the tide; and on the advantages we shall derive from a knowledge of the difficulties encountered, the manner in which they were overcome, and the very faults of design and execution in those great works.

3d. On the situation which the projected Breakwater should have.

As the dangers from which the breakwater is to be a guard, are to be encountered at the very mouth of the Delaware, it is obvious that a situation for it must be se lected as near the Capes as possible; and it must be here added, that its utility, as respects the coasting navigation, depends on this condition. Over all the broad expanse of water which separates the Capes of the Delaware, but two situations occur where an artificial harbour could be constructed, with any hope of advantage; and the first of those, namely, the roadstead under Cape May, is too shallow; its access is attended with too much danger; and it is too much aside from the main channel, up and down the bay, to require further mention.

The other situation is the roadstead between the Shears

and Cape Henlopen; and referring to the chart herewith

1828.1

BREAKWATER

to illustrate the subject more in detail, we will now describe this roadstead.

properly situated there, to protect it against all enter
prises of an enemy.

In the selection which under all circumstances, the

A shoal called the Shears lies just within the Capes of Delaware, and about three miles from the Cape Hen-commission make of this last position B, for this artificial lopen shore though it is so delineated upon existing harbour, they adopt the hypothesis, that the expense, maps, it is by no means an insular shoal; but it is the though great, will not be disproportioned to the magniseaward part of an extensive bank, making out from the tude of the benefits to result in common to the commerce Delaware shore, at and near the mouth of Lewistown of the nation, and to that of the Delaware; and the comcreek. The ridge, or shoalest part of this bank, runs mission cannot hesitate as to the correctness of the hyfrom Low-Plumb-Point, first north-easterly two miles pothesis. But it often happens that works of the utmost and a half, then easterly two miles and a half, and lastly national importance, are necessarily postponed or nesouth-easterly three miles and a quarter, making the glected, for want of means in the government, or that length of the bank from Low-Plumb-Point, following the they are for the same reason, or because their success course of the ridge, about eight miles. Its breadth is is half problematical, carried on slowly, or attempted variable. Of that part called the Shears, the extreme but partially. From these considerations, in connection with the breadth is nearly two miles; from the tail of the Shears to Cape Henlopen is two miles and a half. Considering great expense of a complete Breakwater, the commisthe shoal limited, as in the chart herewith, by three fa- sion have been induced to seek for some mode of securthoms and a half at low water, the soundings upon it ing a partial benefit, at a cost so moderate, as, under any vary from that depth to one foot. South of the tail of circumstances, to warrant the undertaking. They the the Shears, and separated from it by a narrow channel of rather infer this to be their duty from the small approfour and a half to five fathoms, lies a small shoal, having priation to the object in view, in the law of Congress about eighteen feet water. It is between the great bank which accompanied their instructions: The commission or shoal and the Delaware shore, and having for its are not, however, to question the ability, nor to judge outline the opposite concavities of the shoal and the of the disposition of the nation, in this respect; but furshore, that the roadstead above mentioned is found. The nishing the best information they can obtain, and their average depth within the road is about four fathoms and own deliberate opinion, in reference both to a complete a half, and at the mouth about six fathoms at low water. and a partial work, to lay the matter fairly before the Though highly important and valuable in many re-government for its decision. Two projects will, therespects, this road is nevertheless much exposed to certain winds, and entirely so to floating ice. On consulting the chart herewith, it will be seen that easterly winds blow directly through the chaps of the roadstead, and that the direction of the ebb tide sweeps into and through it a large part of the ice of the bay; it was to guard against this latter danger chiefly, that the project now before the commission was first conceived.

We come now to the consideration of what particular part of this roadstead is most suitable for the creation, by means of a Breakwater, of an artificial harbour, which, at a minimum expense, will fulfil all the essential conditions of such an establishment. These conditions are, 1st, security from winds; 2d, security from ice; 3d, security from an enemy.

As to the first condition, if a position be taken at A, on the southern margin of the Shears, it will be sufficiently under the lee of the main to be protected from all the winds from the south-east by south to west, (round by the south,) and by the shoal off Low-Plumb-Point and the Shears proper, it will be so much protected from winds blowing from west to east, (round by the north,) that the profile of this part of the Breakwater may be made comparatively weak, and at a small expense; against winds from east to south-east by south, the Breakwater alone must afford protection, and must be made proportionably strong. A Breakwater so constructed here as to guard against winds, will also afford security against ice, and thereby fulfil the second condition. As to the third condition, however, it would be defective: the distance from the main is too great for it to be well defended by works upon the shore, and fortifications upon the spot itself would involve considerable expense.

The condition of complete security from an enemy obliges us therefore to abandon this position, and to seek for one, not otherwise objectionable, nearer the shore.

Referring now to the plan marked B, just within the pitch of Cape Henlopen, it will be seen that a harbour there will be entirely sheltered from all winds from east to west-north-west, (round by the south,) but being distant from the Shears, will not be sensibly benefited by the lee of that shoal, and consequently will require a strong Breakwater against all winds from the other thirteen points of the compass. In this position, as in the other, the embankment against the winds and waves may be so contrived as to give entire security from the ice, while its proximity to the shore will enable a fort,

fore, be presented; one designed to afford a complete, spacious and defensible harbour; the other intended to protect, at a minimum of expense, a limited number of vessels.

The situation for the first has already been described. On examining for a proper site for a small Breakwater, the Commission found the conditions of security from ice and winds not easily reconcileable with that of security from an enemy, there being no place near the shore in which a small Breakwater can be made, to guard against both ice and wind.

The course of the ebb tide is there nearly parallel with the shore; the Breakwater therefore, which should be so placed as to arrest and deflect the floating ice, would leave the vessels, intended to be covered, still exposed to the action of the north-easterly gales; consequently, an equal length, at least, would be required against the winds as against the ice. A harbour for three or four vessels could not be made, under these circumstances, without a very considerable development of Breakwater.

Going to the opposite side of the roadstead, however, we find that the Shears, being themselves a good Breakwater against the northerly, north-easterly and easterly winds, (with the help of certain means hereafter recommended,) an embankment against the ice alone, will give a harbour of considerable capacity, which will be safe, as to both ice and winds. It is true, that, in resorting to this position, we relinquish the condition of entire safety from an enemy, only to be attained near the shore; but it is also true, so far as our judgment is correct, that there is no alternative.

A few observations will be made, here, however, as tending to diminish the objection to this position. 1st. A battery of heavy guns and sea-mortars upon the shore would make the situation of an enemy's vessels, even in the harbour, somewhat hazardous, and would bear, with much effect, upon his vessels, when attempting to enter or to leave the roadstead. 2d. Should an enemy succeed in stationing his ships within the harbour, and not be molested while there, either by works on the shore, or by the floating defences, which would, in time of war, be stationed near the mouth of the bay, he would not be able to enforce a blockade, without passing, in every attempt, within range of the works. 3d. The object of an enemy being to blockade the bay, he would derive but little advantage from the harbour; because, during eight or ten months in the year, a man of war would find safe anchorage over every part of the sur