cate himself from the former: or like the Cuttle-fifh, throws out Clouds of Darkness and Obscurity, that it may be more difficult to find and take him. For he afferts, that without this Declination of the Seeds, no Reason can be given for the Freedom of Will, which we perceive in all Animals. But the fame Cicero, in the firft Book of the Nature of the Gods, answers him thus: Hoc perfæpe facitis, Epicurei, ut cum aliquid non verifimile dicatis, & reprehenfionem effugere velitis; efferatis aliquid quod omnino ne fieri poffit: at fatius fuerit illud ipfum, de quo ambigebatur, concedere, quam tam impudenter refiftere; velut Epicurus, cum videret, fi Atomi ferrentur in locum inferiorem fuopte pondere, nihil fore in noftra poteftate, quod effet earum motus certus & neceffarius: invenit quo modo neceffitatem effugeret, quod viz, Democritum fugerat: Ait Atomum, cum pondere & gravitate directò deorfum feratur, declinare paulum.' Hoc dicere turpius eft, quam illud, quod vult, non poffe defendere. The Cuftom of you Epicureans is this; when you affert any Thing that is improbable to be true, and are defirous to avoid Reprehenfion, you advance fomething that is wholly impoffible to be done: but you would act more ingenuously, if you granted the Matter in Doubt, rather than infifted fo obftinately on your own Opinions,like Epicurus, who, when he faw that if the Atoms were mov'd downwards, by their own Weight, nothing would be in our Power, because their Motion would be certain and neceffary, found a Way, which Democritus never thought of, to avoid this Neceffity, and faid, that an Atom, tho' by its own Weight, and Heaviness, it be carry'd directly downwards, yet declines a little: To fay this, is more weak and difhonourable, than not being able to make good what he afferted. And in his Book, De Fato, Cicero likewise says: Epicurus uno tempore res duas fufcipit inenodabiles; unam, ut fine caufa fiat aliquid, ex quo exiftet, ut de nihilo quippiam fiat; quod nec ipfi, nec cuiquam Phyfico placet; alteram, ut cum duo Individua per Inanitatem ferantur, alterum è régione moveatur, alterum declinet. Epicurus takes upon him at once to make good two Things, for either of which no Reason can be given: one, that any Thing can be done without a Caufe; from whence it will follow, that any Thing may be made of Nothing; which neither himself, nor any natural Philofopher will allow the other, that when two indivifible Bodies are mov'd thro' the Void, one of them fhould defcend in a strait Line, the other by Declination,

Bb

clination. And in the fanie Book he goes yet farther, and fays, Quæ ergo nova caufa in natura eft, quæ declinat Atomum? aut num fortiuntur inter fe, quæ decliner, quæ non? aut cur minimo declinet intervallo, majore non? aut cur decliner uno Minimo, non declinet duobus aut tribus ? Optare hoc quidem eft, non difputare; nam neque extrinfecus impulfam Atomum loco moveri & declinare dicit, neque in illo Inani, per quod feratur Atomus, quidquam fuiffe caufæ, cur ea non è regione ferretur, nec in ipfa Atomo mutationis aliquid factum eft, quamobrem naturalem fui ponderis motum non teneret. Ita cum attuliffet Epicurus nullam caufam, quæ iftam Declinationem efficeret, tamen aliquid fibi dicere videtur, quum id dicat, quod omnium mentes afpernentur & refpuant. What new Caufe is there then in Nature, that can make an Atom decline? Or have they caft Lots among themselves, which fhall decline, and which not? Or why does an Atom decline the leaft Interval of Space, and not a greater? Or why does it decline one Leaft, and not two or three. This is to chufe what he will fay, not to difpute: For he neither fays, that an Atom declines in its Motion; by reafon of any outward Impulse, nor that in the Void, thro' which the Atom is mov'd, there is any Caule, why it does not descend in a direct Line; nor laftly, that any Change is made in the Atom it self, that may oblige it not to keep. and observe the natural Motion of its own Weight. Thus tho Epicurus alledges no Caufe of that Declination, yet he feems to himself to fay fomething, even when he says that which the Understanding and Reafon of all Men defpife and reject. And thus Cicero has laid wafte the Gardens of Epicurus, and overthrown all that Philofophy, that attack'd even Providence it self.

But Lucretius is more fuccessful in that long Difputation, from v. 319. to v. 547. concerning the Variery of the Figures of his Atoms: And likewife in that of the Seeds of different Figures, that enter into the Contexture of every Compound Body: which begins at v. 547. and ends v. 683. He also adorns his Arguments with Fables properly introduc'd and apply'd, and fupports his Affertions with several ftrong and convincing Reasons.

Nor will any Adverfary of the Epicurean Philofophy ever be able to evade thofe Arguments, by which, from v, 684.

to v. 988. he demonftrates, that his Atoms are void of Colour, Smell, Heat, in a Word, of every Quality, and of all Manner of Senfe. I confefs he does not rightly explain the Origin of Senfe, but he proves, that the Senfe of Animals is not due to fenfible Seeds, which was his chief Design in this Book, with a Sharpness of Wit and Strength of Judgment, even worthy of Lucretius himself.

At length, from v. 989. to v. 1959. he builds innumerable Worlds: and this too might have been granted, if he had affign'd any proper Architect for fo great a Work: Sed quis credit ex Atomorum Concurfione fortuita hujus Mundi pulcherrimum ornatum effe perfectum? An cum machinatione quadam aliquid moveri videmus, ut Sphæ ram, ut Horas, ut alia permulta, non dubitamus quin fint opera illa rationis? Cum autem impetum Cœli cum admirabili celeritate moveri, vertique videamus, conftantiffime conficientem viciffitudines anniverfarias cum fumma falute & confervatione rerum omnium, dubitamus quin ea non folum ratione fiant, fed etiam excellenti quadam divinaque ratione? Quod fi Mundos efficere poteft Concurfus Atomorum, cur Porticum, cur Templum, cur Domum non poteft, quæ funt minus operofa, & multo quidem faciliora. Cicero, de Nat. Deor. lib. 2. Who can believe, that this most beautiful Frame of the World was produc'd and perfected by a fortuitous Concourfe of Atoms? When we fee any Thing move, as it were by Art and Skill, as the Spheres, the Seafons, and many other Things, do we doubt whether they are the Works of Reason? When we fee with what wonderful Celerity the Sun is mov'd and whirl'd around, and how he caufes the annual Changes and Viciffitudes, to the utmost Benefit and Preservation of all Things, do we doubt that all these Things are not the Work of Reason, nay, of an excellent and divine Reason too? And if a Concourfe of Atoms can make Worlds, why can it not make a Portico, a Temple, or a House, which require less Skill and Labour, and are much more eafy to make? Thus Cicero, that moft grateful Champion of Providence,

Laftly, from v. 1060. to the End of this Book, the Reader may behold innumerable Worlds born daily, and dying every Day, and bless his own good Fortune, that he remains fafe and unhurt in the midst of so many and fo greas

41444

Bb 2

Ruing

Ruins and Devaftations. Mean while he cannot but fmilé to fee fome Infant fucking Worlds, and others grown feeble and dodder'd with Age, now dying with Hunger, now choak'd up with Fat. For Nothing is more certain, than that Lucretius always lofes himself, when he falls foul upon Providence.

The END of the Second Bo OK.

Of the Third Book of

LUCRET I U S.

HIS is that Book of Lucretius, which, above all the rest, ought to be read with most Judgment and Difcretion: For fince it is in this, that the Poet endeavours to prove the Soul to be of a corporeal Nature, it may fall out that fome will too credulously yield themfelves up to his Arguments; while others, perSwaded that fuch a Doctrine, right or wrong, ought to be condemn'd without Mercy, will voluntarily deprive themselves of reading fo excellent a Book. Left this fhould happen, it will not be amifs to put them in Mind, that many of the Antients were of Opinion, that Spirits are to be reckond in the Number of Corporeal Things. Among To his admirable egythefe was not only Porphyrius, in Matha Says but Plotinus and Jamblichus: and of