closure is had, the land is sold, and the Indian is left homeless and hopeless, a pauper for the community to support. Out of 1,735 Indians to whom patents were issued about the year 1871 on the Chippewa Reservation of Isabella County, Michigan, fully fivesixths have sold, or in some manner have been cheated out of, their lands. A few of them have sold at something near a fair consideration. Many have been defrauded of their lands by some of the measures above named or other equally nefarious practices, while others, in large num bers, sold their lands before the selections were approved or patents issued, receiving only a nominal price (about twenty-five cents per acre) for lands worth from $5 to $25 per acre. One of these selections was purchased for $15, and the party who purchased the same has been offered $4,000 for it but refused to sell. All the circumstances connected with these sales point directly to collusion between the agent and the parties purchasing in the execution of these unmitigated frauds. So well have the Indians of Isabella County, Michigan, become convinced of their entire inability to protect their lands, that at a recent council with them, held by a special agent of this office, at which a number of allotments were made, they unanimously requested that the patents for the lands allotted be issued to them without the power of alienation. These Indians are citizens and voters, and a few of them hold office in the towns where they reside. The investigations heretofore made show that the most intelligent of them have been victims of some of the practices above enumerated. Under numbers of the treaties with the different tribes, patents have issued restricting the right of sale, except upon the approval of the Secretary of the Interior and the President. In cases of this character, where the guards against fraud would appear to be sufficient to insure the most perfect good faith and to prevent a sale by a party not entirely competent to transact his own business, the records of this office show that frauds have been committed. Instances of this character will be found in the history of the Shawnee, Miami, Sac and Fox, Pottawatomie and other Indians of Kansas, to whom patents in fee or otherwise were issued, and who have been despoiled of their lands, and to whom the government has since been compelled to afford an asylum in the Indian Territory. It has been strongly urged that citizenship should be extended to all of the so-called civilized Indians. Such citizenship, if conferred indiscriminately, would, in my judgment, while the Indians are in their present transition state, be of incalculable damage to them. We should move slowly in the process of making Indians citizens, until they are prepared to assume intelligently the duties and obligations of citizens. The experience of the past has shown us that to make them citizens hastily is to make them paupers. Indians of full age are infants in law; and in fact they need a long tutelage before launching them into the world to manage their own affairs. Entire civilization, with education, a knowledge of the English language, and experience in business forms and matters, especially such as relate to the conveyance of lands, should precede citizenship if it is the intention of the government to save the Indians from pauperism and extermination. The progress made in Indian civilization, the history of each tribe, the reports of this office, and of each and every officer who has intelligently investigated this question, all go to show the necessity for a permanent home for the Indians with an indefeasible title to the same. If this desired reformation in the management of their affairs can be effected, I am assured that the progress of the Indians will be rapid and permanent, and that all cause for the maintenance of an armed force to restrain the Indians and secure peace in the Indian country will be at an end. They will then fall readily within the jurisdiction of the laws, and their future status as a peaceable and law-abiding people will be fixed. After a careful consideration of this important question I have come to the conclusion that as fast as the Indians are consolidated upon reservations, as recommended in another part of this report, or in cases where they are now located on good agricultural lands, where it is deemed best that they should remain, the Secretary of the Interior should be authorized by a law applicable to all the tribes to allot the lands in such reservations among the Indians belonging thereon, in tracts not exceeding 160 acres to each head of a family, or 80 acres to each single person over 21 years of age, and to issue patents therefor without the right to sell, mortgage, lease, or otherwise alienate the same for the term of twenty-five years from the date of the patent, after which time the same may be alienated under such rules and regulations as the Secretary of the Interior, for the time being, may see fit to impose; said lands so patented to be exempt from taxation and from levy or sale under process of any court for a like term of years; all property acquired by the Indians, aside from the lands received from the government as above suggested, and the annuity or other tribal funds derived under any treaty with the government, to be subject in all respects to the laws of the State or Territory in which the party may reside. This may be accomplished by retaining the reservation intact for all purposes connected with the title to these lands. Such an act would, I am satisfied, afford to the Indians the degree of protection necessary to their civilization and lead them gradually to a full comprehension of the rights, privileges, duties, and responsibilities of American citizenship, which I shall hope to see accorded to them whenever in the future they may become fully competent. A bill embracing the material points above indicated will be prepared for submission at the coming session of Congress. INDIAN AUXILIARIES. The scattering of seventy-four Indian agencies over a wide extent of territory has apparently necessitated the establishment of a greater number of detached military posts. The dividing of the Army into so many small detachments tends to deprive it of the strength needed for the suppression of a sudden outbreak. For the past year it has been almost impossible to obtain even an escort of cavalry or infantry, inasmuch as the number of men at each military post has been sufficient only to furnish it a respectable garrison. The history of the past three years has proven conclusively that this attenuation of the Army renders it impossible to administer even a homeopathic dose of coercion until after a lapse of considerable time. This weakness emboldens the savages, so that a mere handful, like the 87 warriors, with their 200 women and children, under Dull Knife, can cut through a military department and spread terror and slaughter for a month with impunity. The consolidation of Indian tribes upon fewer reservations, as recommended elsewhere, would enable the Army to concentrate and become more effective. There is, however, another remedy for the evil indicated, which, in my judgment, can be and should be quickly adopted to save the loss of life and property consequent on Indian outbreaks, and the great expense now entailed on the government by Indian wars. An auxiliary force of Indian cavalry should be organized, enlisted from the young men of the most warlike tribes, and placed under the command of Army officers of experience. Such a force should be held ready for effective service at a moment's warning. The mere fact of its existence would serve to check the tendency to outbreaks, and by enlisting the young and warlike from the various tribes, the element of strife that is now chafing for the excitement of the war-path would find legitimate occupation that would tend to repress the natural disposition for indiscriminate war and bloodshed. Another consideration which calls for the organization of such a force is the fact that our Indians are among the best, perhaps are the very best, horsemen in the world; and it is no disparagement to white soldiers, whose bravery is deservedly held in high esteem, to admit that Indians are their superiors in following the trail of a foe. They will not stand up in the open field and fight like our white soldiers, but mounted and set upon a trail they will follow it with a persistent speed that no white man can equal. Such an auxiliary force, not exceeding 3,000 men, could be so placed as to be brought rapidly into action, in case of any threatened outbreak. It should be held in large bodies, to be effective, and not divided up infinitesimally, as would be the case with ordinary army scouts; and it would put an effectual stop to raids running a course of from 700 to 1,800 miles. Of its feasibility there need be no question, for there can be no truer friend or braver man than the American Indian of the better type, and his loyalty to the government, when once enlisted in its service, is beyond any reasonable doubt. If the English Government can trust the sepoys of India, we can place full confidence in our Indian allies. I would urge the speedy organization and equipment of this auxiliary force, to which the objections raised by many to the increase of the Army would not apply, because it could be used only to suppress, prevent, or shorten the duration of any Indian disturbance. Added to the Army, it would entail very little expense, and detract nothing from the productive resources of the country. Moreover, the utilizing of a portion of our population which we are now obliged to feed, and often to fight, would be an act of public economy. Under proper officers, this corps might even become a valuable training school, in which, when not in active service, the education of those enlisted could be greatly advanced. In the light of past experience, this would seem to be the only weapon with which to terminate this perpetual warfare without largely increasing the Army, and thereby drawing from the effective industry of the country. It should be distinctly understood that the Indian auxiliaries would be entirely under control of the War Department, and that such an organization should not subtract one man from the number of enlisted men in the Army as at present provided by law. In view of the necessity of protecting white men from hostile Indians, the Army is insufficient in numbers. An addition of three thousand Indian auxiliaries would give it only the support it greatly needs, and enable it to cope successfully with the enemies of our peace. THE OUTBREAK OF THE BANNOCKS. The delay in carrying out the provisions of the treaty of July 3, 1868, for lack of any sufficient appropriation of money, and the small quantity of supplies furnished to the Bannocks by the government, have forced these Indians to continue their nomadic life to the present time. It is not possible for them to settle upon the reservation which has been set apart for them until such time as sufficient funds are appro priated by Congress to subsist them while doing the first year's farm work. If they stop hunting and commence farming they must be fed until their crops are gathered. No appropriation has ever been made for them sufficient for this purpose. Each successive year they have been less successful in finding game when on the hunt, and during the war with the Nez Percés they were forced to remain upon their reservation and accept the scant allowance of food which the government had furnished for them. Excited by what they heard of the war, irritated by what they esteemed to be bad faith in the issuance to them of scant rations, annoyed by the encroachments of the whites upon their reservation, and cherishing a chronic dislike for the Shoshones, with whom they were associated at Fort Hall Agency (the friendly and peaceable character of the latter rather aggravating their hostility to them), they became more and more restless until, during the summer of 1877, a Bannock Indian under the influence of whiskey and war-paint started out from the agency, armed with Winchester rifle and revolver, and shot and seriously wounded two unoffending teamsters who were passing the agency. On the 23d of November the perpetrator of this deed was arrested and handed over to the civil authorities through the instrumentality of the agent, without resistance or opposition. On the same day, as an outcome of the excitement and bitter feeling resulting from this arrest, another Bannock, a friend of the prisoner, shot and killed the agency butcher, Alexander Rhodan. Troops were immediately called for. On the 20th of December, Colonel Smith, of the Fourteenth Infantry, arrived at the agency, and on the 9th of January, 1878, the murderer of Rhodan was arrested by the military at a point some sixty miles distant from the agency; subsequently he was tried and hanged. The excitement and threatening demonstrations on the part of the Bannocks consequent upon this arrest were such that Colonel Smith, reenforced by cavalry, on the 16th of January surrounded two Bannock villages at the agency and captured 53 warriors with 32 guns and about 300 ponies. The prisoners, except the father and two brothers of the murderer, were released, after admonition by Colonel Smith, and were suffered to return to their people, and in April the captured ponies, being of but little value, were returned to them. The arms, although worthless, were retained. Their best arms had been secreted and their valuable ponies moved to places of safety before the military surrounded their camp. The failure of this attempt to disarm and dismount the Bannocks served to arouse and exasperate the Indians, and was followed, as the agent predicted that it would be, by retaliation as soon as the grass was in condition to feed the Indian ponies. Meantime the cavalry, on the 18th of January, returned to Fort D. A. Russel, and on the 5th of May the infantry also left, with the exception of one officer and twenty-two men, entirely too small a force to restrain or intimidate the malcontents. The situation of affairs at the Fort Hall Agency, between the time of the arrest of the Indian who shot the two teamsters and the commence ment of the Bannock war, may learned by the following telegrams: Lieut. Gen. SHERIDAN, Chicago, Ill.: HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, Indian agent at Ross Fork, near Fort Hall, Idaho, has reported to Secretary of Interior that, since shooting of Alexander Rhodan, Bannocks have been very bold and threatening, and that there is danger of outbreak at any time. Beef contractor unable to hire men to deliver beef at agency. Commanding officer at Hall has furnished seven (7) men, all he can spare. Secretary of War has referred matter, with request that one hundred (100) troops be sent immediately, and General of the Army desires you to send that force at earliest practicable moment. Please acknowledge receipt. THOMAS M. VINCENT, Assistant Adjutant-General. ROSS FORK, IDAHO, November 28, 1877. COMMISSIONER INDIAN AFFAIRS, Washington: Bannock camp moved to Cedars, seven miles from agency. Satisfied they are purchasing ammunition at settlement north of us, and otherwise preparing for war. further depredations committed. Cold weather in our favor. General THOMAS M. VINCENT, DANILSON, Agent. CHICAGO, November 29, 1877. Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.: No Your telegram of this date received. Information from commanding officer at Fort Hall, forwarded to Washington yesterday's mail, led me to believe the Bannock agent is stampeded. Re-enforcements from Camp Douglas left by rail for Fort Hall yesterday morning. Should arrive to-day. It seems to me the agent should consult with the commanding officer about disturbances, which he neglected to do. General P. H. SHERIDAN, Commanding Division, Chicago: P. H. SHERIDAN, OMAHA, NEBR., November 28, 1877. The following dispatch from Captain Bainbridge, dated 27th instant, received this morning: "Your telegram received. I was at the agency two days ago, and returned to my post with the impression that there would be no outbreak. Did not consider the matter of sufficient importance to put government to the expense of a telegram, and made a written report of affairs at agency to department headquarters. "From report of agent last night and this morning, think it possible an outbreak may occur. Mail-carrier, a soldier, reports this evening nothing unusual at agency. Indians trading at store as usual, and everything quiet. Inasmuch as this garrison is here for protection of agency, think it strange agent did not apply to me for troops. Did not know he had made the application. Think re-enforcement unnecessarily large. "BAINBRIDGE." Subsequent to the dispatch to you of yesterday, a dispatch was received from Captain Bainbridge stating that there was danger of an outbreak. The above dispatch, which is a later one, is in reply to that sent him from these headquarters, and gives, Í think, the true state of affairs. Commanding officer at Camp Douglas reports that 104 men under Major Bryant left Douglas this morning for Hall. [First indorsement.] GEO. CROOK, HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSOURI, Chicago, November 28, 1877. Respectfully forwarded to the Adjutant-General of the Army. P. H. SHERIDAN, Lieutenant-General, Commanding. WAR DEPARTMENT, Washington City, December 6, 1877. SIR: I have the honor to transmit, for your information, a copy of a telegram from General Crook, communicating a report of Captain Bainbridge relative to an anticipated outbreak of the Bannock Indians at Fort Hall Agency. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, To the honorable SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR. GEORGE W. MCCRARY, Secretary of War. |