THE BILL FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE INDIGENT INSANE. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, JUNE 15, 1854. WASHINGTON: PRINTED AT THE CONGRESSIONAL GLOBE OFFICE, 1854. THE INDIGENT INSANE. The Senate having under reconsideration the bill making a grant of Public Land to the several States of the Union for the benefit of Indigent Insane Persons, which had been returned by the President of the United States with his objections Mr. CLAYTON said: Mr. PRESIDENT: I confess that I feel somewhat oppressed while approaching the discussion of a question of this magnitude under all the circumstances of this case. This subject has undergone a protracted debate, and it is a difficult thing for any man to command the attention of a wearied Senate. If I were not impelled by a strong sense of duty, I certainly should forbear to address you at all upon the subject; but with the impressions on my mind, it would be inconsistent with my public duty for me to withhold the free expression of my thoughts in relation to the President's message from my associates in this body. Indulge me, then, sir, while I perform this duty, as well as, under all embarrassments, I may, and suffer me to introduce a few preliminary observations, before I enter into the examination of the main questions it presents. It was said by the honorable Senator from Georgia, [Mr. TоOMBS,] at the outset of this debate, in reply to some remarks which you, sir, (Mr. Foor occupying the chair,) had made, that the President of the United States, in acting upon a bill sent to him for his approval, or disapproval, by Congress, had as free and unrestrained power to decide upon the whole merits of the matter, as any Senator on this floor, or any member of the other branch of the National Legislature. That I may not misquote the language of the honorable Senator, I will use his words as they are contained in the report of his remarks. His observation I advert to the sentiments thus expressed by the honorable Senator from Georgia, not merely because he uttered them, but because I know that the error contained in them is a very common one; and that the impression exists among gentlemen in both branches of Congress, that the President has as much right to exercise legislative power when he is acting upon a bill which has passed Congress, as any member of either branch of the National Legislature has when he is voting on that bill. This presents a question that I have never yet heard fully discussed; and the Senate will pardon me if I give now, somewhat at length, my own views in reference to that matter. The first section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States provides: "ALL legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives." As a necessary consequence, then, no legislative power whatever can be vested in the Preșident or anybody else. The veto clause in the Constitution, the clause which directs the President to approve a bill, or to disapprove it, does not confer upon him ALL the veto power, but only a qualified and conditional veto, and it is a clause in pari materia with this, and to be construed in connection with it. The question is then, taking the two together, in what cases may the Presi dent, consistently with the true spirit and intent of the Constitution, exercise the veto power? If he converts it to purposes of legislation, he clearly violates the Constitution; but if he uses it, as I hold he is bound to use it, for the purpose of keeping the legislative body within the exercise of its legitimate functions, for the purpose of preventing the legislative body from transcending the limits which the Constitution has fixed for it, and especially from thus encroaching on the coördinate branches of the Government and the States; if he confines the power to these cases and to such inconsiderate and hasty measures as have, from some clerical or accidental mistake on their own face, palpably defeated or not expressed the "legis lative will," then he is acting in the true spirit of the Constitution. For these purposes he has not only the power to disapprove and reject, but it is his duty to exercise it, Whenever Congress exercises power beyond the limits of the Constitution, or as we commonly say, unconstitutionally, that is not the "legislative power" delegated by the first section of the first article of the Constitution. That is an exercise of ultra legislative power; and, in my judgment, it is to cases of that character, and cases where the true legislative will has been by a palpable blunder accidentally defeated, that the President was intended to be confined by the framers of the Constitution. As to cases of inconsiderate and hasty legislation, the|| purpose of correcting an error might at any time be still more appropriately obtained by requesting the President to return the bill for correction to the House where it originated. Here the veto is not conferred by the Constitution, as it was formerly exercised in England, for it never was here an absolute veto. It was never like the veto of the Roman Tribune, who could put a perpetual interdict upon the operation of any act of the Roman Senate. We have, here, not vested in the President, but in another branch of the Government, the Tribunitian power. The absolute veto upon the acts of the Senate is in the House of Representatives. It is with much more propriety delegated to that body by the American Constitution, than the same power of the people to prevent oppression upon them was conferred upon the Roman Tribune. Under the actual operation of our Government, the Senate is as much a popular body, according to my experience, as the other House, and is quite as anxious to guard the rights of the people; but in theory, the immediate Representatives of the people, as they are called, were put as a check upon the Senate, with all the powers of the Roman Tribune. The question recurs, then, what is the power of the President within its true constitutional limits? Has he the power of a third branch of the legislative body, to defeat the legitimate and constitutional action of both the other two? Let us see whether it is possible that the framers of the Constitution intended it so to be. The Secretary can inform me how many committees there are in this body, and I will thank him to mention the number. I do not know how many there are in the House of Representatives; but there are many more there, and any one can soon learn the number. In both these bodies men operate upon the principle of a division of labor. The general subjects of legislation are classified, and those of each class are referred to the appropriate committee. Each committee is confined within its own jurisdiction, and is bound to report upon the subjects confided to it. Sir, let us see to what consequences the doctrine must lead us, that the President has a right to the same extent to exercise the power of approving or disapproving, when a bill is submitted to him, which a member of the National Legislature has when voting on the bill. The Constitution directs positively that the President shall, within a limited time, consider a bill sent to him, and at the expiration of that period return it, if he disapproves it, to the House where it originated, with his objections. He is thus bound to render reasons for the opinion he gives when he disapproves a bill. Not so a Senator of the United States, or a member of the House of Representatives, when voting on any measure before Congress. My honorable friend from Georgia, when giving a vote here upon any question, acting in obedience to the dictates of his own conscience, is answerable to no tribunal on earth for the vote he gives, except his constituents. He is not bound to render reasons, or to make objections if he sees fit to vote against a bill; and by an express provision of the Constitution, he is not answerable anywhere else for any speech or vote he may choose to give here. But the President, by the express language of the Constitution, is made answerable for his opinion, in case he rejects an act of Congress. When he has rendered his reasons for such a disapproval, the Senate or the House of Representatives, in which the bill originated, is then bound to consider it after having entered all his objections on the Journal. His decision and his reasons must then be questioned, and must become the subjects of critical examina-mittees to carry their investigations to any extent tion, for it is so enjoined by the Constitution. The cases of a member of Congress and the President of the United States are therefore in no respect alike. In the one case the right is unrestrained, and it is a duty to exercise it without restraint, and every member of each House of Congress is bound to protect every other member in the enjoyment of it. That unquestioned and unquestionable right is absolutely necessary for the success of our system of free government. It was said by you, sir, (Mr. Foor in the chair,) in the course of the debate, that this veto power was a remnant of despotic authority. It is so. Since the day when the Plantagenets, the Tudors, and the Stuarts disappeared, we have heard of no such thing as a veto in England. No British monarch has dared to put his veto on an act of Parliament during the last hundred and seventy years, and if one should do it, it is believed it would be at the peril of his head. The PRESIDING OFFICER, (Mr. Foor, after consulting the Secretary.) The Chair can inform the Senator from Delaware that there are twenty-seven standing committees of this body. Mr. CLAYTON. Twenty-seven standing committees besides the select committees ! Each of these has its own appropriate duties. Through those committees we legislate. We have the power, with the House of Representatives, to appropriate the public money to enable those comdemanded by the interests of the nation in any case before us; but the President cannot appropriate one dollar to enable him to investigate anything. The Constitution never contemplated, then, as it did not give him the means, that he should examine subjects as we are enabled to examine them, or that he should be responsible for failing to examine them. It was never contemplated that he should exercise power either in the same way, or to the same extent, with Congress. In other words, I mean to say, the Constitution never contemplated that he should exercise the right of putting his veto on any act of Congress on mere grounds of policy or expediency. Whenever he does that, he transcends the constitutional limits marked out in the instrument called the Constitution of the United States, by trespassing on the rights of the legislative body, and the people they represent. He is not a legislative representative of the people. But when he confines himself to vetoes upon unconstitutional acts of Congress, he acts strictly within the limits of his jurisdiction, and has a clear and well-defined right to the exercise of the power. There is not a man here now, and there never was a man on this floor since the Government was first established, who was able to investigate one twentieth of the subjects that present themselves before the Congress of the United States each session. We perform these duties by dividing the labor, as I have stated, through the instrumentality of our committees. When those committees assemble, what is their practical operation? The chairman divides the labor among the members of the committee. All of us, who have served on committees during any considerable period of time, know that no chairman could possibly transact all the business of his own committee. He therefore divides it, and the members to whom he assigns particular duties perform them, and present to him and to the other members of the committees the result of their labors. If that result be approved by the committee, a report is made to the Senate; and the Senate, as a general principle,|| acting upon faith, confiding in the judgment and ability of the committee, without investigation, unless under peculiar circumstances, to which I shall presently advert, vote as the committee have decided. Sir, if I had not the reports of committees to guide me, I should not know, one half the time, how to vote on the questions which present themselves here. I admit that, sometimes, we do not take a committee's report. Sometimes, a member of a committee finds fault with a report, and then arises a debate; and whenever there is a difference of opinion in the body, we are all called upon and feel bound to investigate the subject which has created such division; but, ordinarily, we do not attempt it; and no man ever existed who could perform the whole duty of examining pari passu, with the proceedings of Congress, every subject that is presented to it. Now, sir, one objection which I make to the veto message-and it is for that purpose that I introduce these remarks-is, that the President rests his opposition to the bill under consideration, not only on constitutional grounds, but on grounds of non-expediency and policy. True it is, ("and pity 'tis, 'tis true,") it has been done before by some of his predecessors; but I deny that such a power was ever rightfully exercised by any of them. Perhaps I shall be best understood if I take the distinction between power and right. The President may rightfully or wrongfully put his veto on any act of Congress. So a Senator has the power to vote against his oath and his conscience; but he has not the right to do it; and the President surely is, and ought to be, confined by the Constitution as much as a member of Congress. any constitutional provision, entitled to receive, and, in fact, he does not receive, any of the reports of committees of Congress, or any part of the evidence on which they are founded. He cannot even summon a witness, or cause a deposition to be taken. He can employ no clerks, no agents, not even a messenger, for such a purpose. He has no power to send for persons or papers, in order to make the examination which is often indispensable, and he has not a dollar to expend for such an object. His six Cabinet Ministers have more duties than they can now perform, without turning legislators, and could be of no use to him as such. To turn them from the duties Congress has enjoined upon them would be a gross abuse of power. And if the whole of them were to devote themselves, day and night, to the review of all our legislation, they could not, properly, examine one fourth of it. Their offices were not created by the Constitution, but by the law; and, as mere creatures of the legislative will, should they attempt to thwart the wishes of those who established their offices and prescribed their ministerial duties, they might find themselves confronted either by a repeal of the laws which gave them their being, or by a legislative impeachment. The President must, therefore, supervise the legislation of Congress without assistance from any quarter, if he attempts it. But more, sir; if the framers of the Constitution and the laws had intended that the President should examine the infinite multitude of topics arising out of the questions of expediency, justice, and policy of all legislative measures, de novo, would they not have directed that the memorials or petitions which are addressed exclusively to the Legisla ture, and accompany all bills, when sent from one House to the other, should go with the bills to him, too, and be examined by him with them? He never sees the representations of parties who apply to Congress. Their petitions and memorials are not brought before him; and if there are counter petitions and remonstrances, he never sees them; so that he is in the dark on both sides. He is in the dark as to all the facts educed by legislative investigation for and against every measure which is passed here on principles of expediency. He hears no debates. If he were intended to constitute a third legislative body, petitions and remon. strances should be addressed to him as fully as they ever were to an English monarch, to enable him to do justice. If he is really a part of the legislative body, the other two Houses ought never to have had the power to adjourn without consulting him, nor should he have been less protected than they are by being liable, as he is, to be questioned for his speeches and decisions in other places. Practically, we all know that no President ever did undertake to review all the legislation of ConSir, suppose the President of the United States gress. No, sir; not one tenth part of it. No true were actually to attempt to investigate every ques-friend of any President will contend that it was or tion of expediency, justice, and policy, as well as every question of constitutionality, presented by the bills which are sent to him for his signature. Assume, for the sake of the argument, that it is not only his right, but his duty, to do that. Then what a situation is he placed in! He is bound, according to that argument, to discharge a duty for which he has not any means conferred on him by the Constitution or the law. He is not, by can be his duty to perform such an impossibility. If it be his duty, he would be impeachable for not performing it. If he had such a power, and exercised it, he, and not Congress, would have all legislative power, for they could not even pay their own per diem without his consent, and he could control them, or drive them home without a dollar of their wages, if they displeased him. If such be his powers and his duties, every Pres |