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February 19, 1897, granting authority to this court to fix the fees in the Circuit Courts of Appeals under which the rule referred to in the certificate was adopted and under which it is contended by the clerk of the Circuit Court of Appeals he is entitled to a fee for indexing, etc., and under which rule, if the clerk performs any of the services designated, he is entitled to the entire fee (Bean v. Patterson, 110 U. S. 401). It is equally true that repeals by implication are not favored and that it is only in cases of clear inconsistency that a later act will be held to repeal a former one on the same subject. We think that in the present case clear inconsistency exists and that the rule invoked in the certificate of the Circuit Court of Appeals cannot stand consistently with the act of Congress of February 13, 1911, on the same subject. See King v. Cornell, 106 U. S. 395.

It may also be true that the supervision by clerks of the Circuit Courts of Appeals will tend to uniformity of printing, better indexing and consequent greater facility in hearing cases upon appeal and writ of error. But Congress, with full authority, has regulated the matter, and it is the duty of the courts to enforce the legislation with a view to effecting the purposes for which it was enacted.

We are therefore of the opinion that the later act, that of February 13, 1911, repeals the table of fees as to the fees of the clerk of the Circuit Court of Appeals in the case mentioned under the facts certified. It follows that the first question certified by the Circuit Court of Appeals must be answered in the affirmative, and the second question also in the affirmative so far as the fee in question to the clerk of the Circuit Court of Appeals is involved.

It is so ordered.

Argument for Petitioner.

231 U.S.

CAMERON v. UNITED STATES.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT.

No. 165. Argued October 21, 1913.-Decided January 5, 1914.

The estate of the bankrupt is in process of administration after the petition has been filed and a receiver appointed and an examination may be ordered at any time thereafter under § 21a of the Bankruptcy Act.

Section 7 of the Bankruptcy Act does not prevent a prosecution for perjury in the giving of testimony by the bankrupt; the immunity applies to past transactions concerning which the bankrupt is examined. Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139.

In the absence of clearly expressed legislative intent, retrospective operation will not be given to statutes; nor in absence of such intent will a statute be construed as impairing rights relied upon in past conduct when other legislation was in force. Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards, ante, p. 190.

Section 860, Rev. Stat., although repealed before testimony was used, if in force when the testimony was given, protected the giver thereof from having it used against him in a criminal proceeding. The use of testimony given by the bankrupt in a hearing before a commissioner to contradict his testimony given before the referee, in a trial on an indictment for perjury in giving the latter testimony, violates the immunity guaranteed under § 860 Rev. Stat., and the use thereof is reversible error.

192 Fed. Rep. 548, reversed.

THE facts, which involve the immunity of one examined in a bankruptcy proceeding prior to the repeal of § 860, Rev. Stat., from having his testimony used against him, and the construction of §§ 7 and 21a of the Bankruptcy Act, are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Howard S. Gans for petitioner:

Under 860, Rev. Stat., defendant was guaranteed against the reception in evidence against him of any part of the testimony given by him in either of the bankruptcy

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proceedings, save that which in the indictment based upon that proceeding was assigned as perjurious.

Testimony given in the bankruptcy proceeding other than that assigned as perjurious was read in evidence to the defendant's prejudice.

Testimony given before the commissioner was used to prove the falsity of testimony given before the referee.

The prosecution was permitted to read testimony given before the referee which contradicted testimony given before the commissioner on a matter not assigned as perjurious in either indictment.

Testimony not assigned as perjurious was read as a basis for contradiction by the witness Smith, and thus the jury was permitted to consider further evidence that the defendant had sworn falsely in matters not assigned as perjury in either indictment.

The prosecution was permitted to read testimony not assigned as perjurious on the theory that it tended to establish his criminal intent.

The right to immunity from the use of this testimony was not affected by the subsequent repeal of § 860, Rev. Stat. Lapham v. Marshall, 51 Hun, 36, 41; Sorenson v. United States, 143 Fed. Rep. 820; Bram v. United States, 168 U. S. 532, 550; Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 144 Fed. Rep. 356, 360; United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482-486; Chew Heong v. United States, 112 U. S. 536–554; Heydenfeldt v. Daney Mining Co., 93 U. S. 634, 638.

A construction which would involve for the Government the disgrace of a breach of good faith, will by every possible means be resisted. United States v. Taylor, 104 U. S. 216, 221; Town of Red Rock v. Henry, 106 U. S. 596, 604; United States v. Central Pac. R. R. Co., 118 U. S. 235, 240; United States v. Hosmer, 9 Wall. 432.

A statute will not be given a retrospective operation, unless by its plain terms that result is rendered imperative. White v. United States, 191 U. S. 542, 552; United States

Argument for the United States.

231 U. S.

v. Heath, 3 Cranch, 399, 408; Twenty per cent. Cases, 20 Wall. 179, 187; Reynolds v. McArthur, 2 Pet. 434.

It will never be given such an effect so as to destroy vested rights. United States v. Chew Heong, 112 U. S. 536, 559; Twenty per cent. Cases, 20 Wall. 179, 187; Davis v. Bohle, 92 Fed. Rep. 325, 328.

All general terms in statutes should be limited in their application so as not to lead to injustice or oppression or any unconstitutional operation if that be possible. It will be presumed that exceptions were intended which would avoid results of that nature. Carlisle v. United States, 16 Wall. 147, 153; Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457, 460; United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482; Kennedy v. Gibson, 8 Wall. 498, 506; Taylor v. United States, 207 U. S. 120, 125; Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U. S. 197, 212.

The right of immunity when acquired is a vested right. Society &c. v. New Haven, 8 Wheat. 461, 494; Twenty per cent. Cases, 21 Wall. 179, 187; Moore v. State, 43 N. J. Law, 203, 227, 256; Commonwealth v. Duffy, 96 Pa. St. 506, 514; State v. Sneed, 25 Texas Rep. (Supp.) 66; State v. Keith, 63 N. Car. 140, 144.

Defendant was examined as one of the officers of the bankrupt company, and pro hac vice was the bankrupt, and entitled to the immunities guaranteed by the section. In re Alpine Cotton Co., 131 Fed. Rep. 824; In re Royce Dry Goods Co., 133 Fed. Rep. 100, 106.

The evidence was insufficient to justify the submission of any of the assignments of perjury, and it was error to deny the defendant's motion to take the case from the jury and for the direction of an acquittal.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Denison, with whom Mr. Francis H. McAdoo was on the brief, for the United States:

Section 860, Rev. Stat., was repealed before the trial

231 U. S.

Argument for the United States.

and does not apply; but neither it nor § 7a-9 of the Bankruptcy Act gave any privilege against the use of the fact of self-contradiction as part of the proof of perjury.

Section 860 was repealed without a saving clause before petitioner's testimony was used against him, and therefore afforded no protection. Balt. &c. R. R. Co. v. Grant, 98 U. S. 398; Ewell v. Daggs, 108 U. S. 143, 150; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U. S. 574; Kans. P. R. Co. v. Twombly, 100 U. S. 78, 81; McNulty v. Batty, 10 How. 72; Re Hall, 167 U. S. 38; South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U. S. 433; Wilkinson v. Nebraska, 123 U. S. 286; Cf. Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457.

There is no such immunity.

The immunity granted by § 7a-9, of the Bankruptcy Act does not prevent the Government from using the bankrupt's testimony to prove other points of the charge than the mere text of the false statement itself. Daniels v. United States, 196 Fed. Rep. 459; Edelstein v. United States, 149 Fed. Rep. 636; Glickstein v. United States, 222 U. S. 139; United States v. Brod, 176 Fed. Rep. 165; Cf. People v. Cahill, 126 App. Div. (N. Y.) 391; United States v. Smith, 47 Fed. Rep. 501.

Nor does it prohibit the admission of testimony before the commissioner to sustain the charge before the referee, and vice versa, since both examinations were part of the same proceeding. Powers v. United States, 223 U. S. 303. The evidence supported the verdict.

The examination by the commissioner as special examiner was duly authorized, and the false testimony there was perjury.

The decision of the Court of Appeals below is supported by the undisputed rulings under the acts of 1841 and 1867 and by the uniform practice under the present act until the contrary decision rendered in 1909, by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Skubinsky v. Bodek, 172 Fed. Rep. 332, but see Judge Buffington's dissent, and see

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