I think the substance of his testimony is that the same thing is true in Eudora.

As a layman, I speak with due deference to the views of the Corps of Engineers, and I have the highest regard for them. They have done a great job and in a fine way, and I am for them 100 percent.

I just believe that what has happened on the Mississippi River is a thing that happens on a small stream that flows through my place. When I straightened it, it piles water below. When we have the cutoffs, the water has gone up at Natchez and Vicksburg.

I agree with the engineers that merely divorcing them would not solve the problem. We are not here to oppose the Morganza unless Morganza destroys the Eudora or the equivalent of it. We are not trying to be selfish. I maintain that it would not be selfish of me to complain about, according to Louisiana and Arkansas, the protection to which they are entitled and at the same time not permitting me to assert the protection which my people are entitled to.

One way in which we got the act of 1936 passed was that our people were flood-minded. We had a big flood that year. It hooked It hooked up with another bill. We had a big flood in 1937.

We in Congress cannot pass a flood bill just to aid one State. We have had a flood, and the farther we get away from that flood, the less chance we have of getting legislation for it.

When we accord protection to Louisiana, the Government of the United States is not to encourage a great crevasse, such as occurred in 1927, by making no provision as recommended by the Chief of Engineers for that strategic section.

Mr. Chairman, I am just human. Facetious remarks have been made about diverting through the Yazoo Basin. There is nothing new about that. I speak as a layman. There was a diversion through the Yazoo Basin in 1927. The waters came back and recoiled and there was a break opposite Vicksburg. There was a diversion in 1912 or 1913. The waters came back at Vicksburg, and there was a break in Louisiana.

Therefore, merely diverting temporarily, if it could be done with the Yazoo Basin, would do nothing except intensify. the situation. opposite Vicksburg in Louisiana.

I am not going to quibble about the flood capacity of the Mississippi River, whether it was 1,500,000 cubic feet in 1927 or whether it is two million five or six hundred thousand feet now. This I know: Our Chief of Engineers, commencing with 1927, to the latest statement of the Chief of Engineers to this committee, says that there must be a diversion in the middle section and a diversion in the lower section.

We are not opposing one. We are advocating both, and I do not think it would be fair of me to advocate the Eudora and not at the same time accord to you the right to advocate the Morganza.

I have high regard for the engineers, Mr. Chairman, with respect to engineering problems, to be considered in the light of scientific statements. However, I have formal reports, and the engineers tell me they are governed by their written reports to Congress rather than by the heated answers to direct examination and cross-examination; and by reference to the report of the Chief of Engineers and the report of the Mississippi River Commission in 1935, on which the Overton Act is based, it was stated that the carrying capacity of the Mississippi River between the mouth of the Arkansas and the Red was

1,900,000 cubic feet per second; that the problem of providing for the greater flood was to provide for 3,000,000 cubic feet per second in that area; that in the southern section the problem was to provide for about 3,000,000 cubic feet per second in that area.

I am not quibbling about whether that capacity has been increased by the cut-off in the Greenville Bend, as we know them in the lower valley, or not. It may be that it will carry 2,000,000 or 2,200,000 or 2,500,000 or 2,600,000. I am not an engineer. That water came out of the Ohio. There was in excess of 2,000,000 cubic feet a second in Memphis. No engineer has told me just how much it would carry if that water came rushing out of the Arkansas and out of the White, as it did in 1927.

The engineers were on safe ground when they said that the carrying capacity was 1,900,000, to be exact, or, in round numbers, 2,000,000. With the rectification of the levee lines, we may say that 2,600,000 may be carried, or 2,500,000. They said that 3,000,000 was to be provided for.

If we can provide for 2,500,000 or 2,600,000 in the middle section, let us make a comparison with the lower section. Eudora as adopted was to provide for a million feet; the lower section was to provide for three million. We were to take a million and a half down the main river, the main Atchafalaya River, between the levees, was to provide for 500,000; that is, 2,000,000. The Morganza west floodway was 500,000. There you have got 2,500,000 on paper-just like our theoretical statements as to the discharge capacity-without any Morganza, for an additional 500,000 in the lower section. There is a million five hundred thousand down the main river, 500,000 through the Atchafalaya, and 500,000 through the West Atchafalaya. I am not advocating letting you go along with 2,500,000. I say you are entitled to the additional factor of Morganza, and if you can find another factor in addition to Morganza, I will be glad.

The wisest statement I ever heard any engineer make was that in a major flood in the lower Mississippi Valley there could not be too many factors of safety.

Mr. Chairman, I represent the area opposite the middle section. I just beg your indulgence while I remind you of what the Chief of Engineers said about the two floodways in answer to your question. I read from page 75 of the hearings before the Senate committee on the Overton bill in 1936. This question was propounded by Senator Overton to General Markham [reading]:

General, what have you to say with reference to undertaking to effect a division of the plan that you have recommended to, say, develop the Atchafalaya as a floodway-its west bank-and the Morganza, supplemented with the floodway already constructed at Bonnet Carre, and then to finish the work in the northern sectior, dispensing with, for the time being, or holding in abeyance, the construction of the Eudora floodway?

Major General MARKHAM. I think it would be to the highest degree unfortunate, as far as I can see. It would have no sound foundation of any kind or character. It would mean that the middle section, as we have called it, from the Arkansas to the Red, on both sides of the river, would be left in jeopardy of crevasse and overflow; and thus we would be accomplishing nothing having to do with that section.

I think that if the plan is going to be carried out it should be carried out in its entirety with the presumption of recognition that there are no alternatives that we know anything about.

Mr. Chairman, in response to another question, and I give you the exact words, General Markham stated that of these two projects,

when the Overton bill was under consideration the Eudora was the heart of the problem in these two sections.

Prior to 1927 the outlet through Arkansas and Louisiana had just been closed, about 6 years. Until 1922, in the vicinity of Cypress Creek, Ark., there was an opening. It was about 16 miles wide in 1916. Up to 1919 it had been closed to 1,200 feet. The Government of the United States, through its Mississippi River Commission, permitted it to be closed in 1922, and the next great flood that came was in 1927, and it was the greatest in our history. The Government made a mistake in closing that natural outlet, the last one, and the Government of the United States undertook to recognize and rectify that mistake in the Overton Act, when it provided as best it could for the two diversions in the middle and lower sections of the river.

We are advocating the construction of both of these projects. We are advocating a modification of both of them to make them engineeringly sound and to authorize the use of those floodways when they are required in the middle section to enable the levees to carry the water without crevasse and when they are required for the same purpose in the lower section.

There is the

Now, Mr. Chairman, I may just refer to the map. main Mississippi River, between Vicksburg and Greenville, carrying all the water that is divided at the head of the Atchafalaya and Old Rivers. The Mississippi River has been leveed. The Government of the United States has raised those levees.

That river has been supplemented by the Atchafalaya, and all of us know that in the past 75 years the increased capacity of that river has been enlarged-I hesitate to say how many times, but I have talked to men who tell me that they walked across the Atchafalaya on rafts many years ago.

Therefore, the main Mississippi River, with the same levees, all to the 1928 grade, by nature, has two rivers to carry this water from Old River to the Gulf of Mexico.

That is not all. We have supported and provided for an outlet that was formerly opposed by some of the people in Mississippi at Bonnet Carre. The Legislature of Mississippi adopted a resolution in opposition. The Senators and Representatives said, in 1927, to our fellow-citizens in Mississippi, "If we must have a diversion through Louisiana, then we cannot oppose a diversion at the Bonnet Carre," and that opposition was withdrawn in a spirit of cooperation, a spirit of give and take.

We have supported an additional outlet at Morgan City. Nature is thus supplemented by two artificial outlets.

Now, for our very salvation-as you look at the map, the Yazoo Basin is the largest of all the single basins, the very heart to the Eudora area in asking for protection there, we ask for nothing more or less than the people in the Morganza area, and all the good things that have been said about Morganza may be increased many times, and, in my judgment, you would not have the benefit accurately described that would result, if you make comparisons with our area, because I take it that our friends from Louisiana have estimated the results from Morganza, and they have mentioned the benefits to Mississippi-probably overestimated them.

The Eudora is as important to our property and to our lives. I make no comparison except to say that the areas speak for themselves.

One thing more, Mr. Chairman. It strikes me that Mississippi has for the first time a legislative interest given to it, whether it be large or small, by the compromise made in 1936. If the citizens of Louisiana are unanimously for Morganza, we get credit in Eudora for 25 percent, whatever that may be, whether it is 7 or 10 percent of the whole. Moreover, Mr. Chairman, there are 800,000 acres in the Eudora area and approximately 60,000 acres in Morganza. My experience is that it takes a good deal more land for the projects than some of the estimates. They ask for a free hand in Morganza. I do not know whether it will take more than estimated.

Senator Bilbo and you and I do not ask for anything more when we ask for the power of condemnation. That is the power the Government has in the Tennessee Valley. They tell me they have taken almost whole counties. That is the power that the Federal Government exercised in the Missouri. That is the power that the Federal Government exercised in Boulder Dam. That is the power that the Government is exercising in the St. Francis and in the Yazoo, where, with Senator Bilbo's assistance, we got a W. P. A. project and appropriation to buy the land, for the Sardis Reservoir.

If it takes 500,000 for a forest in Louisiana, if it takes 600,000 for a forest area in Mississippi, it is going to take a sufficient area for Morganza and for Eudora.

We profited by the flood of 1937. The sills must come out of both floodways.

If the Government is going to the enormous expense of constructing the Morganza and the Eudora, we have got to tell our colleagues it is going to benefit all. We have got to modify it so that the Chief of Engineers may use those floodways when it is necessary to supplement those rivers.

In 1935 I said, Senator, that I wanted just as few acres of land as possible to be taken for floodways. I did not introduce a bill in the House. The chairman introduced a bill. I waited for almost a year. It was a stalemate. Finally, on August 9, 1935, I introduced a bill as a substitute, and I said, "Give the engineers power to narrow that floodway and construct it so they will acquire the fees and use as little land as possible in both floodways."

In this connection, I call attention to the report of the Chief of Engineers in comprehensive document, April 6, 1937, where he recommends that the fees be acquired in all floodways, naming the Eudora and Morganza in his recommendation and report.

I call attention to this significant language of the President of the United States, who knew the situation that would be comparable to that situation in Arkansas, if nothing more or less than the flowage right between the fuseplug levee and the back-flow levee would be applied. There are those of us who know the armed resistance that was encountered at the New Madrid, and the President of the United States, in addition to the recommendation of the Chief of Engineers, on April 26, 1937, in transmitting that report of the Chief of Engineers, recommended the purchase of the land in these floodways, and said:

Mention is made of securing fee simple title to floodways on the Mississippi River. It occurs to me that in view of the history of previous legislation and its results, this is advisable in order that no questions may arise if it is found necessary to flood these lands.

The President of the United States supplements the recommendation of the Chief of Engineers. The President went further and he recommended that substantial provision be made to reimburse the local and taxing units by rental of land. I recommend that.

The resettlement projects in Mississippi have taken large areas of land. Congress provided for those projects. It provided for those projects of the Federal Government paying taxes. If the recommendation of the President of the United States were adopted and the lands in those floodways were leased or rented to citizens, I do not see why the proceeds of those lands should not be used in financing the local institutions. I am agreeable to that.

In the report of April 6, 1937, we have something like 65 reservoirs recommended, and the country is clamoring for them. They had the power to condemn in the St. Francis; they have not used it. They had the right to condemn for levee rights along the Arkansas that they did not exercise. They had the power to condemn at Sardis. They did not exercise it.

Why are we asking for it? We are frank; we are citizens of a common country. We know that merely divorcing these two projects. will not do the job. I personally believe that the recommendations of the Chief of Engineers and the President of the United States should be adopted. The Chief of Engineers made that recommendation for the Eudora. He recommended $103,000,000 in the Overton bill, in the document to which I have referred. He recommends an additional appropriation of $14,000,000 to acquire the difference between the flowage rights and the fees in these floodways. My recommendation is that we follow his recommendation.

I trust it will never be necessary for the Federal Government to condemn a single place in the Eudora or Morganza. My recommendation is that if we say it is a national problem, it ought to be paid for by the National Government. There cannot be any provision for a floodway that takes a great area, whether it be in Mississippi or Louisiana or any other State, that does not give the Federal Government power to condemn.

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, I advocate that any modification of the Flood Control Act of 1928 should follow the act of 1936-should provide for the two sections where definite provisions have not been made, and that equal and similar provisions should be made for both sections.

I may say in this connection that, as a layman, the construction of Morganza will not solve the problem. The construction of the back guide levee will not solve the problem. The construction of the Eudora alone will not solve the problem. If we are going to say anything to the people, we should be able to tell them that we have modified the project so that when the next flood comes there will be protection as planned in the entire alluvial valley, and that the legislation will make adequate provision for an effective Overton Act, for the Morganza and for the Eudora, which will give the people the protection that they are entitled to.

As I say, merely passing the bill with respect to one item means denying it as to the other, and the Government of the United States wants to do, I am sure, as the people of the country desire—justice to all the sections.