the depositions are toward (thing, or Food, or Temperbes, or Compensa de Seeming, & Aggression, etc; under the third Lead Sentiments whose dispositites are toward K±7lege, or Wealth, or Power, e Social Order Spintality, etc. There *... be implied also in each case digesties agits the opposites of there places. Thus the mind is carried back to the faniamental divisions of pleasures and pains toward the first, and away from the second of which more the dispositions lying in all sentimenta. The ultimate onstituents of sentiments are thus pointed out, and traces of them kept, and the unification of feeling, volition and cognition in sentiment made more evident.

{13. Sentiments whose dispositions relate to the actions of others embrace a large part of the sentiments arising from the wocial state. I say a large part, but not all, because the individual's dispositions to his individual ends are more or less directly affected by his social surroundings. This grand division includes three chief subdivisions: Sentiments relating to moral conduct, (relating to what ought to be the conduct of individuals toward each other), Sentiments relating to the government of the Family, and Political Sentiments, or those relating to positive authority on the part of men over each other, including the constitution of the state, the making and enforcement of laws, and the general administration of government. Of course, all the sentiments of this grand division may be either egoistic or altruistic; and it is further to be noticed that the characterisation of sentiments as sympathetic or antipathetic applies very pertinently here; for the

sentiments we entertain with respect to any specific moral or political conduct are characteristically sympathetic or the reverse. We approve or condemn, favour or oppose, facilitate or obstruct, wish well to, or wish ill, strive for, or seek to defeat, prevent or destroy.

§ 14. It must be borne in mind that not all ethical sentiments are found in the second of the grand divisions just made. For ethical sentiments relate not only to the conduct of others, but also to the conduct of self. Turning back to the subject of ethical emotions in a former part of this work, we shall find a division of that class of feelings which is very apposite here-a division including first those ethical emotions excited by other people's acts and states of consciousness, and secondly those excited with reference to one's own. As applied in the present connection we shall see those ethical sentiments wherein the ethical emotions are of the first of these two classes belonging to the second of the two grand divisions, and the rest to the first.

§ 15. Aesthetic sentiments may occur in either of the two grand divisions. Fulfilment of the aesthetic conditions may be found in emotions whose end is one's own conduct as well as in emotions creating volitions respecting the conduct of others; and whenever the aesthetic conditions are fulfilled, there are sentiments fairly entitled to be styled aesthetic.

§ 16. Below is a tabular statement of the divisions of sentiments of which I have been giving the exposition, which statement will subserve the purposes of a summing-up of this chapter. These highly complex and representative products of mental operations are born in us, are continually being formed and integrated within our minds, and are transmitted to our posterity. All reasoning is directed toward and is process in their formation, and in them reasoning terminates. When once formed they control and survey human conduct irresistibly; they determine the intellectual associations, they fix the emotions, determine the pleasures and pains, and consequently the ends and dispositions. They are not products of intellectual operations alone, nor of feeling nor of volition alone, but of all combined-in a word, they are properly the products of states of consciousness.

VOL. II.

PP

I. Sentiments whose Dispositions relate primarily to one's own actions.

A. Sentiments whose Dispositions are toward Primary
Pleasures as Ends.

B. Sentiments whose Dispositions are toward Second-
ary Pleasures as Ends.

1. Toward Clothing, Weapons, Fires, Bread, etc.
Defence, Temperance, Riding, Walking, etc.
Toward Freedom of Movement, Occupation,
Security, etc.

2.

3.

C. Sentiments whose Dispositions are toward Tertiary
Pleasures as Ends.

II. Sentiments whose Dispositions relate primarily to the actions of others.

A. Sentiments relating to the Moral Conduct of indi-
viduals toward each other.

B. Sentiments relating to the government of the Family.
C. Political Sentiments.

Sentiments of either of these grand divisions may be egoistic, altruistic, or indifferent as respects egoism and altruism. Sentiments of either may be sympathetic or antipathetic, or neutral. Sentiments of either may be aesthetic.

571

CHAPTER LXXI.

CHARACTER.

§ 1. THE consideration of the products of States of Consciousness is not complete without some further reference to Character, though a full treatment of that subject belongs to Ethology-a special science. A man's character is the sum of his sentiments, and his prevailing character the sum of his prevailing sentiments. This implies that a person's character is determined by his lines of association, and especially his inseparable associations, by his paramount pleasures and his prevailing dispositions, and his supreme and superior ends. But the synthesis of all these in sentiments enables us to study the proximate constituents of character coherently as they lie in the mind without the necessity of at first going back to the formative elements.

§ 2. Regarding character, then, as proximately dependent on sentiments, its analysis is much simpler, and by that analysis, too, the mind is carried back to the original elements to any extent desired. For after resting at sentiments, we are guided on to pleasures and pains, ends and dispositions, and associations, and thence to feelings, volitions, and cognitions, and the processes by which they grow and are formed, and thence back to the primal facts of consciousness, or farther, to the basic facts of life, organisation, motion, and force. The grand progressus of evolution is followed back to its earliest beginnings, and the connections of its various stages are plainly noted.

§3. The term character implies society. It means the marking, distinguishing features of the mental life of men as they are as compared with other men. If there were only one man, the term character would be irrelevant; he would have no character. And since man is in society his character includes, of course, reference to his own actions and also reference to the actions of those about him. Thus, in estimating character, we must take account of the sentiments whose dispositions relate to the actions of self and the sentiments whose dispositions relate to the actions of others, and those sentiments, as has been reiterated, may be egoistic or altruistic, sympathetic or antipathetic; and, following the subdivisions of sentiments, we must also consider the sentiments whose dispo

sitions are toward primary, secondary, and tertiary pleasures, as well as the sentiments regarding moral conduct of individuals, regarding the family and the state.

§ 4. In order then to get a complete qualitative account of the constituents of character in all its varieties, we have only to exhibit a complete chart or map of sentiments, with their varieties of dispositions, pleasures, and associations. Having spread out before us all the varieties of associations, of pleasures and pains, and of dispositions, and having given all the actual combinations of these in sentiments, we have a complete chart of human character as it is; and having given all possible combinations, we have before us all the possibilities of human character. No further analysis and no further synthesis is necessary.

§ 5. But in this combination and recombination of associations, pleasures and dispositions into sentiments, we must consider not only the qualitative but also the quantitative variations. And this presents one of the chief difficulties in the way of a science of character. Our measurements of quantity must be of the roughest kind; for who can gauge the subtleties of thought, feeling, and volition? We can only indicate in a very general way the comparative quantities of feeling, association, and disposition which enter into a given sentiment, and which exist relatively in similar sentiments in different people. But, so far as we can estimate and measure these quantities, so far our science approaches exactness, and to perfect such measurements, and to devise methods of measure and of comparative valuation in point of quantity, is a very worthy employment for the student of character.

§ 6. In this light we shall see how to deal with the empirical designations of character with which we so often meet. If a character is spoken of as affectionate we shall know that it is a character in which sentiments prevail containing dispositions having their root in the pleasures of society and sexuality, and in proportion as we find out toward what the affection is directed we shall be able to note whether primary, secondary, or tertiary developments of those pleasures are chiefly constituent of the sentiments in point. If a character is described as cruel we shall refer to it sentiments in which dispositions toward the predatory pleasures prevail. If it is esteemed just, we shall regard it as embracing prevailing sentiments containing ends of moral conduct. If it is called truth-loving, we shall see in the composing sentiments pleasures of knowledge as ends or pleasures of social