CHAP. progress of General Kreutz with four regiments of cavalry, XXVI. who had crossed the river, and threatened to cut off the

1831.

Feb. 17.

Feb. 19.

Feb. 26.

communication between Warsaw and Cracow. Dwernicki, accordingly, received orders immediately to recross the Vistula, which he did on the 17th at Goru. Two days after, he met the advanced guard of Kreutz, which he defeated, and took four pieces of cannon; but having pursued their advantage too far, the Poles fell under the cross fire of some Russian guns, and were driven back with heavy loss. After this, Dwernicki took post opposite Karczew, and hindered the Russians from crossing the Vistula; and soon after turned against his old antagonist, Kreutz, whom he forced to recross the river, with the loss of two entire squadrons, which were made prisoners in the town of Pulawy. Such was the exaltation of the Polish cavalry, and depression of the Russians at these repeated March 3. defeats, that Dwernicki, on the 3d March, again crossed the Vistula on the ice, and attacked the Russians in position on the road leading to Kurow, totally defeated them, drove them headlong through that town, taking four guns and three hundred men prisoners. Dwernicki, upon this, got the surname of the "Furnisher of Cannon" in the Polish army; and such was the terror which his hussars inspired in the enemy, that whole squadrons took to flight at the sight of a few Polish uniforms. Kreutz retreated with the utmost expedition, recrossed the Wieprz, and never rested till he got across the Bug; while Dwernicki, to whom the route of Zamosc was thus opened, reached that fortress, which he entered in triumph, and gave some rest to his heroic followers. His ranks were there rapidly recruited by volunteers, who flocked from all quarters to join his victorious standard; but they did i. 300, 309; little more than compensate the losses by the cholera, the fatal bequest of the retreating Russians, which in a few weeks carried off five hundred men. 1

March 9.

1 Rom. Solt.

Ann. Hist. xiv. 491.

Although the Poles might well congratulate themselves upon these glorious actions, and derive confidence from

XXVI.

1831.

56.

appointed

the Diet.

the stand they had made in the commencement of the CHAP. war against the gigantic forces of their opponents, yet alarm not the less prevailed in the capital, and the public voice loudly demanded a change in the direction Skrzynecki of the armies. Though their courage had attracted the generaladmiration of all Europe, and rendered abortive the issimo by first efforts of the enemy, yet they could not disguise from themselves that their situation was beset with dangers, and that a single false step on the part of their general might land them in destruction. Their forces had been driven back into Warsaw; the fire of Praga had alone repelled the enemy from the capital, and rumour, with its hundred tongues, had already spread abroad through Europe the report that it was taken, and all was lost. Radziwil's military talents had not proved equal to the emergency: during the battles of Grochow and Praga he had given scarce any orders, and the troops had obeyed the commands of Chlopicki and Skrzynecki, whose coolness and military talents, in spite of themselves, forced them to the lead. The former, desperately wounded, lay stretched on the bed of suffer- 1 Rom. Solt. ing. The command of the armies was accordingly taken. 305, 309, from Radziwil, and unanimously bestowed by the Diet Ann. Hist. on Skrzynecki, whose exploits and military talents ere 493. long fully justified the choice.1

ii. 1, 7;

xiv. 492,

phy and

Born in Gallicia of parents in affluent circumstances, 57. SKRZYNECKI received a liberal education, and he was His biograintroduced into the world under the auspices of the character. Czartoryski family. In 1809, when the war broke out between the French and Austrians, and Gallicia was invaded by the Russian forces, he entered a regiment levied by Prince Constantine Czartoryski, and acquired, during the short campaign which followed, the reputation of a good infantry officer. Afterwards, when the kingdom of Poland was re-established, he was promoted to the footguards of the Grand-duke Constantine, but having, like many others, fallen under the displeasure of that capricious

VOL. IV.

2 T

1831.

CHAP. tyrant, he was transferred to a regiment of the line; and XXVI. being a sort of martyr, he immediately became popular with the army. After this he was for a time tinged with the mystical ideas on religion which, spreading from the Congregation in France, were, during the Restoration, so widely diffused over the higher classes in Europe. But this did not cause him to abandon his patriotic feelings; and during the trials in 1826 of the persons connected with the secret societies in Poland, he contributed not a little, by his energy and intelligence, to the acquittal of several of the accused. When the revolution broke out at Warsaw on the 29th November, he was in command of a regiment there, and was one of the first who joined the popular side. Though far from sanguine as to the issue of the contest, and by no means led away by the illusions which generally prevailed among the liberal enthusiasts on that subject, he actively contributed his part to the liberation of the country; and his military capacity and courage in danger at the battles of Grochow and Praga were such as clearly pointed him out for the situation of commander-in-chief, when the wound of Chlopicki disqualified him for further service in the field. He was at this time forty-five years of age; his figure was tall, and countenance handsome, and his address and talent in conversation had already obtained for him much envied success in society. His ambition, 1 Rom. Solt. like that of most eminent men, was great; but it was Biog. Univ. set on lofty things, and concealed from all but his most intimate friends under the charm of a polished and captivating manner.1

ii. 15, 17;

lxxxii. 234, 236, sup.

58.

attempts at

It

The first care of Skrzynecki, on being elevated to the Ineffectual supreme command, was to endeavour to open a negotiation a negotia with Marshal Diebitch for the restoration of peace. was soon found, however, that this attempt was hopeless, prepara- as every similar one is with Russia when not preceded Skrzynecki. by defeat. The Russian commander had no power to treat, except on the terms of an unconditional surrender,

tion, and vigorous

tions of

XXVI.

1831.

and to those conditions the Poles could not for a moment be brought to listen. Both parties, therefore, made preparations for a renewal of the struggle; and the roads having become impassable in the two last weeks of March by the sudden thaw, both had a short leisure to complete these preparations. Diebitch spread his army out in extended cantonments, reaching over a breadth of eighty English miles, for the sake of provisions and lodgings for his numerous followers; and Skrzynecki made the utmost efforts to raise the spirits and increase the number and efficiency of his troops. The recruits were clothed, armed, and disciplined with the utmost diligence; the new intrenchments round Warsaw were pushed forward with the utmost rapidity-the whole inhabitants, male and female, labouring night and day in the trenches; and the greatest efforts were made to provide the necessary supplies of ammunition for the troops. By these means, the chasms in the ranks occasioned by the battles of Grochow and Praga were rapidly filled up by ardent recruits; and the general-in-chief raised the 1 Ann. Hist. enthusiasm to the highest by a noble proclamation, in xiv. 493; which he called upon them to conquer or die in defence ii. 21. of their country. *

Skrzynecki's plan of operations, which bore the signetmark of genius, was to take advantage of his central position, protected by the fortifications of Warsaw, and

* "Soldats! nous avons devant nous un ennemi fier de son bonheur, de ses forces, et du rang qu'il tient en Europe. Mais, s'il est formidable par sa puissance, les outrages dont il nous a accablés ont comblé la mesure, et le rend coupable aux yeux de Dieu et des hommes. Pleins de confiance désor mais dans la sainteté de notre cause, et dans la Divine Providence, nous pouvons sans crainte nous mesurer avec lui. Jurons en notre âme et conscience que nous resterons fidèles à cette devise, Vaincre ou mourir pour la patrie!' et nous servirons d'exemple dans l'histoire du monde aux défenseurs des droits sacrés et inviolables des nations. Si la victoire ne doit pas couronner nos efforts, du moins nous ne vivrons pas pour nous soumettre à son joug odieux. C'est à cette gloire que je vous convie, et je vous assure la couronne du martyr, si ce ne sont des couronnes de lauriers, au bout de cette carrière héroïque et semée de dangers. Nous les gagnerons certainement, si vous me secondez par votre valeur et votre soumission. SKRZYNECKI."-ROM. SOLT. vol. ii. p. 24.

Rom. Solt.

XXVI.

1831.

59.

Skrzynecki's plan of

CHAP. fall with his concentrated forces upon Diebitch's men while still dispersed in their cantonments, and inflict upon them, by a sudden irruption when unprepared, as great a loss as possible. The weight of the attack was to be directed towards Ostrolenka, in order to force back operations. the Russian right wing, and reopen the communications with Lithuania, into which it was proposed to throw a division, which was to advance towards Wilna, and lend its aid to the malcontents in that province, with whom a correspondence had already been entered into. At the same time, taking advantage of the consternation produced by the sudden attack in the centre, Dwernicki with his little band of heroes was to move rapidly into Volhynia, and rouse the insurrection in that province and Podolia, where a large body of insurgents, for the most part cavalry, awaited only their approach to join the national cause. Everything here depended upon the success of the first attack on the Russian centre by Skrzynecki in person; but the straggling positions of the Muscovites, and the vigour and secresy of the Polish general, joined to the advantages of his central position, gave the prospect of decisive success in that quarter.1

1 Rom. Solt.

ii. 37, 41;

Ann. Hist.

xiv. 493.

60.

his disposal.

The forces with which the Polish general had to underForces at take these various operations, though not considerable, were yet nearly adequate to their accomplishment. The troops at his disposal amounted to 55,000 men, of whom 16,000 were cavalry, with 125 guns. The first division, 9540 strong, with 18 guns; the third, under Malachowski, 11,096 bayonets, with 20 pieces of cannon; and the fourth, of 7665 combatants, were under the immediate command of Skrzynecki, with Uminski's cavalry, 5700 sabres. The second division, of 8288 men, with 18 guns, under General Gielgud, was to force its way athwart the Russian right into Lithuania, while the cavalry of Lubienski and Skarzynski, mustering 7000 sabres, were, under Dwernicki, to diverge into Volhynia. If the insurrection in these provinces could acquire consistency before the Mus