XXV. 1831. 58. myself in the midst of you, and in the hall which CHAP. witnessed my oaths. Penetrated by a sense of the duties which they have imposed upon me, I will always look for support in the national will, of which you are the King's speech. constitutional organs; and I expect from you that July 23. cordial co-operation which can alone give my government the strength without which it will be unable to respond to the expectations of the nation. I have said, gentlemen, that henceforth the charter shall be a truth: what I have said has already been accomplished. The charter is nothing but a constitutional monarchy, with its conditions loyally maintained, its consequences frankly accepted. In calling me to the throne, France wished that royalty should become national: it did not intend it should be impotent. A government without force can never be suitable for a great nation. I have just traversed great part of France; the marks of affection I have received have deeply touched my heart; they are ever present to my thoughts. You will assist me in accomplishing the objects I have so much at heart. Order shall be protected, liberty guaranteed, the efforts of the factious confounded and repressed. Thence will arrive that confidence in the future which can alone secure the prosperity of the State. I know the extent of suffering which the commercial crisis in which the nation has been involved has produced: I am grieved at it, and admire the courage with which it has been borne. I hope it is drawing to its close, and that ere long the maintenance of order will restore the security necessary for the ex- July 24, penditure of capital, and restore to our commerce and v. 155, 156. industry its wonted activity."1 1 Moniteur, 1831; Cap. 59. the Govern the choice Notwithstanding the ardent wish thus expressed by the Sovereign for a strong Government, and the support Defeat of of the majority of the Chamber, he soon found that he ment on was not likely to obtain it. The crises on which support of Presi to the Government from the legislature and the nation dent and is most required, are generally those when it is most sident. VOL. IV. 2 N Vice-Pre XXV. 1831. CHAP. resolutely withheld; for every one is then striving for himself, and self counsels coincidence with the majority. At the very first division for the choice of a President, the weakness of Government and the democratic temper of the Chamber became apparent. The candidate of the Government for the presidency was M. Girod de l'Ain, and M. Lafitte of the Opposition. The first had 171 votes, the second 168; so that M. Casimir Périer prevailed only by a majority of 3 votes. But the result was still more disheartening on the contests for the Vice-Presidencies; for M. Dupont de l'Eure and M. Béranger, the liberal candidates, had a majority of 10 over the government ones. The defeat of Ministers was now apparent, as Casimir Périer had always declared that he would only rule by means of a parliamentary majority, which, he thought, should be at least of 40 votes. He and M. Sébastiani, Baron Louis, and M. Montalivet accordingly the same day tendered their resignations to the King. To all appearance, a Hist. xiv. change of Ministry was inevitable, when it was prevented, and they were induced to resume their seats, by the intelligence which reached Paris by telegraph on the very next day, that the Dutch troops had invaded Belgium.1 1 Moniteur, Aug. 4, 1831; Ann. 227, 229; Louis Blanc, ii. 418. 60. Holland and Flanders. To understand how this came about, it must be preAffairs of mised that the relative positions of Belgium and Holland had essentially changed during the nine months which had elapsed since the house of Nassau was precipitated from the throne at Brussels. Patriotic spirit, vigour of administration, wisdom of council, had done as much on the one side as tumult, selfishness, and disunion had effected on the other. There was no need for the intervention of a congress: a fair stage and no favour was all that the King of the Netherlands required to regain his lost dominions. Such had been the vigour of administration in Holland since the catastrophe occurred, that she had now sixty-eight thousand men on foot, of which four thousand eight hundred were cavalry, with XXV. 1831. a hundred and fifty guns ready for the field, besides four CHAP. sail of the line, and a large fleet of smaller vessels ready for sea. On the other hand, the preparations of the Belgians had been on paper and in words only. Such had been the stagnation of commerce, and the misery of the industrious classes in consequence of the revolution, that the collection of taxes in most places had become impossible. The provisional government at Brussels was without either money, men, or consideration. The assembly there decreed the formation of an armed force of a hundred thousand men, but there were not twentyfive thousand really present with the standards, and they were in the most miserable state, without magazines, equipments, or discipline. In addition to this, a strong party in the chief towns, particularly Antwerp, Ghent, Bruges, and Brussels, composed of the richest and most Ann. Hist. eminent citizens, were desirous of resuming the connec- 400; Cap tion with Holland, and the King was in daily expecta- Louis tion of a counter-revolution to that effect, or an election 418. of one of his sons as king of the Belgians.1 1 xiv. 399, v. 160, 162; Blanc, ii. London should have In these circumstances, what the principle of non- 61. intervention required, and the five powers whose repre- What the sentatives were assembled at London should have done, congress if they had really been actuated by that principle, or done. influenced by a sense of justice, was very evident. They should simply have formed a cordon of troops round Holland and Flanders, and allowed them to fight it out. Considerations of the highest political importance, with a view to the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, had suggested the formation of that united kingdom, and these considerations had only become the more pressing from the Revolution of 1830 in France, and the extreme violence with which the great majority there was now urging the Government to embrace the cause of the malcontents in all the adjacent countries, and adopt a system of general propagandism. Still these considerations did not authorise the armed inter XXV. 1831. CHAP. vention of the great powers; because, although they had all guaranteed the kingdom of the Netherlands to Frederick-William, that gave them a title to support him only against foreign aggression, not domestic revolt. But now the course of events had rendered the just course at the same time the wisest. Principle and expedience for once pointed in the same direction. The faith of treaties and the dictates of public morality alike prescribed non-intervention; and it at the same time restored the barrier of Europe against France, and preserved that which the victories of Marlborough had won, and those of Wellington had secured. 62. Views of Talleyrand Palmerston. Obvious as these considerations were, and decisively as they would at any other time have spoken to any and Lord government of Great Britain, there were others which told with still more effect at the moment on the minds of the able statesmen who at that period directed the foreign affairs of France and England. Both these countries were then in a state of revolution, and foreign affairs were regarded in both, less with reference to the future interests of either country, than to their present bearing on the position of the party which had risen in each to the direction of government. M. Talleyrand was the representative of the Citizen-King, who had in a moment of public fervour, and by the aid of the popular party in Paris, dethroned his lawful sovereign, and now with difficulty restrained the loudly-expressed demand of the party to whom he owed his elevation, that France should lend its aid to the democratic party in all the adjoining states, and in particular support the revolutionary government recently established in Belgium. Lord Palmerston was the foreign secretary of a ministry in England which had recently overturned the longestablished dominion of the Tories, and only now maintained its ground against them by having awakened and by keeping alive a burst of democratic fervour, second only to that which had recently overturned the throne of CHAP. Charles X. on the other side of the Channel. XXV. 1831. 63. which led support Belgians. However obviously the ultimate and lasting interests of both countries might require the maintenance of the Reasons barrier of the Low Countries to prevent their collision, them to and however loudly the principles of non-intervention required an entire abstinence on either side from any interference in the quarrels of Holland and Belgium, yet it was evident that such a course would at the moment be perilous to the government at the head of both. The cabinet of Louis Philippe would never recover in France the discredit of having allowed the patriots of Belgium to be put down by the advanced guard of the Holy Alliance, and lost the opportunity of wresting from the Allies the inestimable barrier of the Flemish fortresses; the Whigs in England would have been seriously weakened in the estimation of their popular supporters at the critical moment of the Reform struggle, if they had looked tamely on while FrederickWilliam put down the insurrection in Belgium, and prevented the tricolor flag from waving at the mouth. of the Scheldt. In a violent political crisis, considerations of party generally prevail over those of country; and thence the entire deviation which ensued in the policy of England from that which had been invariably pursued by its government for two hundred years. Saxe 64. elected King of June 1. The leaders of the revolution in Belgium were well aware of the dangerous ground on which they stood. Leopold of They knew that they were in a manner the advanced- Cobourg work of revolution against Europe, and that Holland d was the advanced work of Europe against them; and it Belgium. was on the support of France and England that they looked for their only effectual support against the open or covert hostility of Russia and Prussia. No sooner, accordingly, did they receive Louis Philippe's refusal of the crown for the Duke de Nemours, than all shades |