is termed on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, in or near the Sus district. That Spain once occupied such a spot there is little doubt, and it is said that somewhere on that dreary desert coast there are still to be seen the ruins of the houses of Santa Cruz de Mar Pequeña. Wherever the port may have been, its whereabouts are now extremely vague, and Señor Ojeda wishes to settle with the Moorish Government the exact position of the place, with an idea of its reoccupation by Spain, or more probably of its exchange for the other concession that he is desirous of obtaining. The Moorish Government is not likely to assist him in either case, and Santa Cruz having been thoroughly lost, it is certain that the Sultan will do his best to prevent its being found again, and even if its position is discovered, the usual procrastination will come into play, and Spain be prevented from taking possession unless she is prepared to do so by force. The second concession is to Spain a more important one, the inclusion in the territory of Ceuta of a bay and anchorage, and the opening of Ceuta itself as a port for trade. A distinct advantage to Spain would be the extent of territory, including Bensus Bay; but what she can hope to gain by the founding of a Moorish customhouse in Ceuta and the opening up of trade there, it is difficult even to surmise. Surrounded on all sides by most difficult mountains, which are crossed only by tracks that lead almost nowhere, it seems incredible that

Spain believes that she could compete with the Moorish ports. The only large town in the vicinity of Ceuta is Tetuan, but Tetuan is supplied by its own port, only five miles distant, while the cities of Central Morocco are infinitely nearer the ports of Tangier, Laraiche, and Rabat. The tribes inhabiting the country which surrounds Ceuta are living in abject poverty, while apart from these disabilities every bale of goods introduced would have to be twice taxed, by the Spanish and Moorish custom - houses, whereas elsewhere there is only the Moorish duty to pay. The very fact of the presence of a Spanish custom-house would deter experienced traders from importing goods via Ceuta, for the reputation of such establishments is none of the best.

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The influence of Spain in Morocco succumbed at the time of the American war, and if Señor Ojeda obtains even small portion of what he asks, he ought to consider himself a fortunate man. Morocco has no fear of Spain, as she has of France and England, while she hates every one and everything Spanish on account of the constant troubles occasioned by their possessions along the Mediterranean coast. The French, no doubt in revenge for Spain's attitude in regard to Tuat, are by no means supporting Señor Ojeda's demands, and the probabilities are that he will return to Tangier without having gained any but the least important points of the questions he has gone to Court to settle. With regard to the attitude of

the other Powers represented in Morocco little need be said. England and Germany are for keeping the status quo, as is no doubt France, and any attempt to upset it would be looked upon very seriously by those two Powers. There is no reason to believe that France wants to bring about a crisis in Morocco, and Spain has not the power to do so even if she did wish it. No exterior influence, in spite of the unnecessary alarm caused by France's move in the Sahara, is at present disturbing the country to any serious extent. With regard to internal struggles, we have been scared by the English and French press with rumours of "holy wars." It is a curious fact that whenever a newspaper turns its attention to the desert it discovers the rudiments of a "holy war" as assuredly as it does sand.

But even in North Africa and the Sahara the days of "holy wars are waning, and the Arab and Berber of the desert have discovered that it is more profitable to sit at home and guard their families, their property, and their flocks and herds, than to go and attempt to exterminate the Christian, especially when the Christian is armed with Maxim guns and magazine-rifles. Nor do these desert people play fair, for those who don't obey the summons loot the belongings of those who have gone away to fight during their absence. Thus it was in 1859-1860, when the Spaniards were invading Northern Morocco, the desert tribes who had proclaimed a "jehad"

and were marching toward the scene of action were so pillaged by their fellow-countrymen and co-religionists through whose country they were passing, that they were obliged to return, robbed of all their horses and arms, to their homes. Here again disappointment awaited them, for those who had remained behind in the desert, imagining that their fellowtribesmen could never return, had annexed the greater part of the absentees' property, including, in many cases, their women folk.

That "holy war,"

at all events, was not altogether a success, and it is still too fresh in the memory of their elders to instil much desire on the part of the fighting men to undertake another. As a matter of fact, the rumours and reports are without foundation. The desert tribes of Morocco will be careful not to interfere with the French as long as they remain where they are at present, and even if an advance should be made-and there is no reason to believe that such will be the case-it is not improbable that, after one attempt at resistance, these tribes will follow the example of the Igli people, and invite the invaders to occupy their country.

There is little else to be said with regard to the present condition of Morocco, which, on the whole, is as satisfactory-or as unsatisfactory-as ever, and likely to remain so for a considerable time to come. All speculation as to its future is useless, for the eventual fate of the country will either be decided at the time of a Euro

pean war, or in a conference of the European Powers. In the former case it will probably be the fortunate country not engaged in warfare who will take advantage of the warring of nations to settle the Morocco Question as she may please. In the latter case there is no knowing what may be decided, for should Morocco come before a European conference it is certain that it would be only one of a number of leading questions, and would be treated as such that is to say, that any Power might resign what rights she might think herself entitled to in deciding the fate of Morocco in exchange for privileges else where, which would eventually be likely to prove more beneficial. Morocco, geographically and ethnologically, is an extension of the French colony of Algeria, and as such France certainly has predominating rights. Provided neutrality of the Straits of Gibraltar was strictly guaranteed, and a com

mercial treaty which allowed of a certain freedom of trade to all nations entered upon, there is no possible reason why France should not possess the country. England has no intention of taking it, and no object in doing so, provided always the free passage of our navy and merchantmen is not interfered with in the Straits. That any part of it should fall into the hands of Spain, whose Government is not far removed above that of Morocco, must be prevented at any cost. Spain certainly could not do much in the way of conquest for herself, but it is just possible that an undue and unnecessary jealousy between France and England might facilitate her taking up a position on the Straits.

But whatever happens, we can rest certain of one thing, that when the Morocco Crisis really does arrive, it will settle itself. Till then it is only the Morocco Scare.

PEOPLE in England have watched the operations of the war in South Africa with the most profound and, as a rule, not unintelligent interest. They have, upon the whole, exhibited singular moderation and sobriety in the expression of the feelings which have been aroused, and, when things have gone amiss, have refused to be led into harsh immediate sentence upon the soldiers whom they have employed in the field and the administrators who were in office at home. They have recognised that a camcampaign must have its ups and downs, and that circumstances may sometimes be too strong for the most perfect organisation, the best conceived plan of action. But although they have been content in the meantime to stand the hazard of their military condition as it is, they have none the less resolved that the whole fighting force of the country must be revised in many details. They have seen that, in all warlike essentials, the English empire lacks nothing; but that, whether from parsimony or from other causes, these essentials have not hitherto been utilised to the utmost extent, and that a certain loss of power has been the consequence.

In the organising of our "new model" army that is to be, a great deal of public attention will be paid to its officering. Now, there is a certain school of would-be military critics in England, voicing

their opinions pretty loudly in the press, who say very hard things about the gentlemen who now hold commissionsasserting that they have failed to rise to the level of recent situations; that they are, as a rule, incapable and ignorant of their duties; that they are more devoted to their amusements than to their profession; and it is further thrown in their teeth that many supposed shortcomings arise from their being wealthy and aristocratic. Our future military organisers, therefore, will very likely be noisily pressed to make sweeping alterations in the methods of providing officers for our army, and to introduce sumptuary regulations of a most stringent description in their regimental life. Well, it may at once be conceded that our system of officering the army is not perfect. is not perfect. Nothing in this world is so. But, in making alterations, it behoves us to "gang warily," lest, in pruning away what is evil, we may deprive ourselves much that is superlatively good.

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It is well to ask ourselves, therefore, whether there is not a very sufficient answer to each of these counts in a general indictment, whether, as practical considerations, any of them really have any weight, and whether, on the contrary, England ought not to congratulate herself on having a class of servants who, in general merit, have no superiors in any of the

world's military forces. Has the body of our officers failed us in any detail? Mistakes may have been made, mischances may have occurred, and it may even be allowed that, on some occasions, there have been grievous oversights. Is it to be supposed, however, that, in an enormous army before an enemy, things are never to go wrong, that every individual who is employed is never to show any human weakness, any human shortcomings? It may be permitted to draw an analogy from the accidents of another profession which is certainly distinguished by its extreme care in its work. The 'British Medical Journal' of the 28th April tells how, in one very serious class of operations, it has often happened that instruments, sponges, and other foreign bodies have been by oversight left by the operator in the human frame after the wound that he has made has been closed up,-with what grim results the necropsies have proved. If it is acknowledged that surgeons, working coolly at an operating - table, with presumably every scientific advantage and assistance at hand, are liable to such ghastly mischance, is it to be wondered at that the minds of soldiers may now and then fail to grasp some detail which ought apparently to be so important that it cannot be passed unnoticed? And the circumstances of military oversights are often not sufficiently considered. The responsible man is probably by no means in a normal condition. It is than likely that he is

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extremely fatigued, worn and harassed by want of sleep and by long-continued anxiety, short of food and drink, besides being exposed to the somewhat distracting influence of whistling bullet and shrieking shell. Truly the wonder is, not that mistakes are made in action, but that so few mistakes are made; and the critic should remember that his own judgment and powers of mind might not be very cool and acute under similar circumstances.

But, to come to the definite allegations so often brought forward, let us begin by seeing if there is a want of capacity among our officers. Certainly, if there is a marked want of initial capacity, it does not say much for the mental power of the educated classes in England. All officers have had to pass into the army by a competitive examination open to the whole country, and in late years we have seen as many as four hundred individuals competing for a hundred vacancies. The examination may not, as some people think, have been on the most sensible lines; but at any rate the passing of it involved considerable exertion, and could not be accomplished by the fool of the family. Then, during an officer's whole service, he is constantly passing through special courses of instruction, besides performing the ordinary routine duties of his profession. He is called upon to have at least a good working acquaintance with signalling, pioneering, and the use of explosives, surveying, fortification, and, in the mounted services, veterinary practice.