his ticket, with interest thereon, together with compensation for the
whole of the time lost in the trip, and, in some instances, the reason.
able cost of reaching the objective point by means of some other con
veyance. This rule obtains whether the action is brought for breach
of contract or in tort, unless it appears that the passenger has suffered,
in addition to the expense, loss of time, and inconvenience, some per-
sonal injury, of which the willful failure to transport him according to
the schedule time is a proximate cause. Hansley v. Jamesville etc R. R.
Co., 474.
14. LIMITATION OF LIABILITY.-A common carrier has no power to relieve
itself of liability to passengers simply by delegating its privilege to
carry to others, unless by express statutory authority it has power to
lease its line and privileges. White v. Norfolk etc. R. R. Co., 489.
15. DELEGATION OF POWERS-LIABILITY TO EXCURSIONISTS.-The fact that
a carrier of passengers hires its train or steamboat, manned by its own
crew under its pay, to the managers of an excursion for the pur
poses of an excursion, does not relieve it from liability for injuries
to an excursionist caused by the negligence or wrongful act of its
servants, unless it has delegated to such managers the exclusive right
to discharge its servants and hire others, although the contract of car-
riage is between the managers and the excursionists and the liability of
the carrier is not affected by the fact that the train or boat is chartered
to run between points not upon the carrier's regular lines. White v.
Norfolk etc. R. R. Co., 489.
16. LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF SERVANTS.-A common carrier undertakes
absolutely to protect his passengers against the misconduct of his own
servants engaged in executing the contract, and, whether the act of
the servant is one of omission or commission, whether negligent or
fraudulent, if it is to be done in the course of his employment the car.
rier is liable. Norfolk etc. R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 884.
17. LIABILITY FOR ACTS OF AGENT-EXEMPLARY DAMAGES-A common
carrier may be liable in exemplary damages for the act of its agent,
if the act is participated in, or authorized or ratified, by the carrier.
The measure of the carrier's liability must depend upon the particular
circumstances of each case, and is a matter to be left to the discre-
tion of the jury, whose finding is not to be disturbed, unless so unjust
as to evince passion, prejudice, partiality, or corruption. Norfolk etc.
R. R. Co. v. Anderson, 884.
18. CARRIERS OF PASSENGERS MUST NOT ONLY CARRY THEIR PASSENGERS
SAFELY, but must also protect them from ill-treatment from their
servants, other passengers, or intruders, and they are liable to a pas-
senger for injury or ill-treatment, inflicted upon him by their servants,
whether in the line of their employment or not. White v. Norfolk etc.
See BILLS OF LADING; RAILROADS, 18-22,
See AGENCY, 2; Banks, 1-12, 14, 17.
CHARITIES.
See REFORM SCHOOLS.
1 A DESCRIPTION in a chattel mortgage designating property as being a
specified amount of wheat, hay, and oats, and a specified number of
horses and cattle, and agricultural instruments all being on section 19,
in a township described by its number and range, is sufficient, though
neither the county nor the state is named, if the mortgage is filed in
the county in which the property is situate, and there is but one sec-
tion of land in that county corresponding to the description given, but,
as to any part of such property not then on the realty named, the
description is insufficient and the mortgage ineffective. Union Nat.
Bank v. Oium, 533.
2 VALIDITY OF-PROPERTY REMOVED TO ANOTHER STATE. — A chattel
mortgage valid under the laws of the state where it is executed, both
as between the immediate parties thereto and as against third parties,
is valid in another state to which the property has been removed,
although not executed according to the laws of the latter state. Craig
v. Williams, 934.
3. PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH-ANTECEDENT INDEBTEDNESS.-One who pur.
chases property or takes a security for an antecedent debt is not enti
tled to the protection of a statute purporting to protect purchasers and
encumbrancers in good faith for value. Union Nat. Bank v. Oium, 533.
4. A CHATTEL MORTGAGE TAKEN TO SECURE AN ANTECEDENT DEBT is enti-
tled to the saine protection against subsequent attaching creditors as
any other mortgage. Union Nat. Bank v. Oium, 533.
5. A CHATTEL MORTGAGE, THOUGH UNRECORDED, takes precedence over a
subsequent attachment based upon a debt existing prior to the execution
of the mortgage under a statute declaring that a mortgage of personal
property is void as against creditors of the mortgagor and subsequent
purchasers in good faith and for value, unless the original or an authen-
ticated copy thereof be filed in the office of the registrar of deeds. A
creditor, within the meaning of this statute, is one who becomes such
after the mortgage was executed. Union Nat. Bank v. Oium, 533.
6. ONE HAVING NOTICE of the existence of a chattel mortgage cannot treat
it as void because it has not been filed for record. Union Nat. Bank v.
Oium, 533.
7. A CREDITOR WHO HAS NOT CHANGED HIS POSITION after the making
and before the filing of a chattel mortgage executed by his debtor in
favor of another creditor, but has merely remained inactive, does not
become entitled, upon subsequently levying an attachment, to prece-
dence over a mortgagee because the latter has not filed his mortgage
for record. Union Nat. Bank v. Oium, 533.
8. AFTER THE TAKING POSSESSION of personal property by the mortgagee
he need not renew such mortgage by filing a copy thereof with the
registrar of deeds under a statute declaring that, in order to preserve
priority of lien, every chattel mortgage must, every three years, be re-
newed by filing a copy thereof with such registrar. Union etc. Bank v.
Oium, 533.
9. RENEWAL BY REFILING. A STATUTE REQUIRING CHATTEL MORTGAGES
TO BE REFILED at a specified time after they are recorded, with a state-
ment of the amount remaining due, must be construed with a view to
the object of the law requiring such mortgages to be filed for record.
Therefore, if the mortgagee takes possession of the property, and thereby
gives notice of his relation to it, the failure to renew by the filing
thereof is immaterial. Union etc. Bank v. Oium, 533.
See DEBTOR And Creditor, 2; VENDOR And Purchaser.
ONE RADICAL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CHECK AND A BILL OF EXCHANGE
is that the former need not be accepted, while the latter must be, in
order to fix the liability on the drawee. Simmons Hardware Co. v.
Bank, 700.
See APPEAL, 8; BANKS, 18-22; Estoppel, 2; Nonsurz.
CHIMNEYS.
See REAL PROPERTY.
QUIETING TITLE, COUNTERCLAIM IN SUITS FOR.-If, in an action to quiet
title, the defendant alleges title in himself by virtue of certain convey.
ances, and demands that his title be quieted as against the plaintiff, his
plea constitutes a counterclaim because it is connected with the subject
of the action, and a reply should be interposed by the plaintiff, where
the statute requires a reply to be made to a counterclaim. Power v.
Bowdle, 511.
COLLATERAL ATTACK.
See JUDGMENTS, 1, 9–11.
COMMERCE.
See INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
COMMON CARRIERS.
See CARRIERS.
CONCEALMENT.
See MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 46
CONDITIONS JUDGMENT.
See DEEDS, 3
CONDONEMENT.
See MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, IL
CONFESSION.
See JUDGMENTS, 11-13.
1. FOREIGN CONTRACT OF SALE, WHERE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN MADE-
COMITY.—If an agent receives in one state a proposition for a contract
of sale and transmits the same to his principal, a resident of another
state, who there accepts it, and ships the article by freight to the pur-
chaser, the sale is a contract of the latter state, and if, under the laws of
the latter state, the title to the property, by the terms of the contract,
would remain in the vendor as against attachinent or insolvent proceed.
ings, the courts of the former state will, as a matter of comity, give
that effect to the contract although by its own law it would be other.
wise. Barrett v. Kelley, 862.
IF A POLICY OF INSURANCE IS APPLIED FOR IN THIS STATE by a resident
thereof, and the corporation issuing the policy is a resident of another
state, and an assignment is subsequently made by a citizen of the first-
named state, any controversy afterward arising between the assignee
and the heirs or personal representatives of the assignor will be con-
trolled by the laws of the state in which the policy was applied for, and
which the assignee and the representatives of the assignor are residents,
rather than by the laws of the state whose corporation issued the policy.
Robinson v. Hurst, 266.
See CHATTEL MORTGAGES, 2.
CONFIRMATION.
See JUDICIAL SALES, 1.
CONNECTING CARRIERS.
See CARRIERS, 9.
See CONTRACTS, 1; JUDICIAL SALES, 2, 3.
CONSOLIDATION.
See ACTIONS, 1.
1. SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS.-If a state constitution declares what in-
debtedness cities of a certain class may not contract, such prohibitions
cannot be suspended or rendered nugatory by the failure of the legisla-
ture to make the classification of cities provided for by such constitu.
tion, and a forbidden indebtedness, though contracted in advance of
such classification, is void. Beard v. Hopkinsville, 222.
2. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT to the constitution of the United States
does not interfere with the proper exercise of the police power of the
several states. Commonwealth v. Vrooman, 603.
3. INSURANCE.—A STATUTE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL TO ISSUE ANY POLICY OF
INSURANCE against loss by fire, without authority to do so expressly con.
ferred by a charter of incorporation given according to law, is not invalid
as conflicting either with the fourteenth amendment to the constitution
of the United States, or with the section of the bill of rights affirming
that all men are born free and independent, and have certain inher
ent and inalienable rights, among which are those of acquiring, possess
ing, and protecting property and reputation. Commonwealth v. Vroo-
See BANKS, 23; MUNICIPAL Corporations, 3; Statutes, 1–5, 9, 10.
1. INJUNCTION, CONTEMPT IN DISREGARDING.-If persons receive a telegram,
purporting to be signed by one who is known to them to be a judge,
stating that he had signed an order restraining a sale, nevertheless
proceed with such sale, and upon proceedings against them are adjudged
to have committed a contempt of court, the judgment convicting them
and fixing their punishment will not be set aside on writ of error, al-
though the injunction or restraining order was not personally served
upon them, and they had no knowledge thereof other than that re-
ceived by the telegram. State v. Knight, 809.
2. JUDGMENT FOR.-A WRIT OF ERROR LIES to review a judgment or
order finding a person guilty of contempt of court, and prescribing
the punishment to be suffered therefor. State v. Knight, 809.
& A JUDGMENT CONVICTING AND PUNISHING ONE FOR A CONTEMPT Or
COURT MAY BE REVIEWED AND SET ASIDE ONLY for want of juris-
diction of the court over the subject matter, or the defendant, or for
want of power to render the particular judgment or order complained
of. The finding of the court upon a question of fact will not be re-
viewed. State v. Knight, 809.
4. PROCEEDINGS TO PUNISH, WHEN CRIMINAL IN THEIR CHARACTER. —
If a contempt consists of doing a forbidden act, injurious to the op-
posite party, the process for its punishment is criminal, and a judg-
ment of conviction can be reviewed by a writ of error if the statute
of the state authorizes the issue of that writ to remove for examination
and review the record of criminal actions. State v. Knight, 809.
1. CONSIDERATION.-A MORAL OBLIGATION is sufficient to support a promise
to pay. Robinson v. Hurst, 266.
2. WHEN DEPENDENT UPON THE LIFE OF A CONTRACTING PARTY.-A
contract to perform personal services requiring skill and ability of a
high order is subject to the implied condition that the party shall be
alive and well enough in health to perform it. Marvel v. Phillips, 370.
3. DEATH, DISCHARGE OF BY.-A contract entered into with an inventor
agreeing to pay all expenses of his application for a patent, to man-
age the business and advance all requisite funds, to use all reasonable
efforts to increase and supply the demand for the patented invention,
and to do all things which a wise and energetic owner of a patent
right with ample financial ability ought to do, is discharged by the
death of the party contracting to do these things, because his chief
undertakings are personal in their character, requiring personal skill,
attention, and ability of a high order. Marvel v. Phillips, 370.
4. DEATH OR A DISABILITY which renders performance impossible destroys
the contract. This rule remains applicable, though the contract pur-
ports to be binding on the contracting party and his legal representa-
tives. It would require explicit words to show that the parties entering
into a contract like this intended that executors should perform the
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