to exercise banking powers, other than the issuing of bills to circulate
as money, to corporations. State v. Scougal, 756.
7. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BANKING, RESTRICTING RIGHT OF.-A state stat-
ute prohibiting the exercise of banking powers by natural persons, and
authorizing their exercise by corporations, is in conflict with the provi
sion of the constitution declaring that all men have inherent rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and property, and
of acquiring and protecting property, and the pursuit of happiness.
State v. Scougal, 756.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-IMPAIRMENT OF VESTED RIGHTS.—A statute giv.
ing prior liens upon the property of common carriers, mining and man-
ufacturing companies, for supplies furnished them, is not unconstitu
tional, as impairing the charter rights of such corporations to issue
bonds and secure them by mortgage or otherwise. Such corporations
take their charters subject to the general law of the state, and subject
to such changes as may be thereafter made in such law. Virginia De-
velopment Co. v. Crozer Iron Co., 893.
9. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUte—Railroad COMPANIES-COMMUNICATED
FIRE.-Section 1511 of the General Statutes of South Carolina of 1882,
authorizing a recovery against a railroad company of damages caused
by the destruction of property by fire, is constitutional. Mobile Ins Co.
v. Columbia etc. Ins. Co., 725.
10. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SPECIAL LEGISLATION.-A statute confined in its
operation to the giving of prior liens to the furnishers of supplies to
railway, canal, or other transportation companies, or mining or manu-
facturing companies, is not unconstitutional, as being special or class
legislation, as all persons subject to it are treated alike under the same
conditions. Virginia Development Co. v. Crozer Iron Co., 893.
11. STATUTES Creating Liens-Supplies, WHAT ARE.—Pig iron furnished
■ manufacturing company engaged in manufacturing iron, steel, and
other metals, is a "supply" within the meaning of a statute giving a
prior lien to "persons furnishing fuel and all other supplies necessary
to the operation of any manufacturing company." Virginia Development
Co. v. Crozer Iron Co., 893.
12 CONSTRUCTION OF CREATING LIEN.-A statute giving to liens for sup-
plies furnished corporations priority over mortgages and trust deeds
executed by a corporation, after a certain date, affects all mortgages ex-
ecuted after such date and after such statute has gone into effect. Vir-
ginia Development Co. v. Crozer Iron Co., 893.
8. CHATTEL MORTGAGES, 5-9; INTERSTATE COMMERCE; JUDGMENTS, 19,
LIBEL, 3; LIENS; TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.
STREET RAILWAYS.
See MUNICIPAL Corporations, 6.
See LANDLORD and Tenant, 1, 2; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONE, 4, 6-0; Bam-
Bee CORPORATIONS, 7-19; TAXES, 2, &
1. SUBROGATION OF INSURER.-An insurer, after paying a loss incurred by
the assured, is subrogated to all the rights of the assured against the
person or corporation whose tortious act has caused the loss. Mobile
Ins. Co. v. Columbia etc. R. R. Co., 725.
2 PROPER MODE OF ENFORCING RIGHT OF INSURER TO.-After several
insurance companies have paid to the assured the several amounts re-
quired by their respective policies, and thereby become subrogated to
the rights of the assured against the person or corporation whose in-
divisible tortious act has caused the loss, the proper mode of enforcing
such right of subrogation is by an action in the name of the assured
for the benefit of such insurance companies. Mobile Ins. Co. v. Colum-
bia etc. R. R. Co., 725.
SUBROGATION OF SEVERAL INSURERS-INSURERS MAY JOIN IN ACTION
AGAINST RAILROAD COMPANY FOR DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY BY FIRE.
Insurers becoming, by payment, subrogated as equitable assignees to
the rights of the assured, may join in an action to recover from a
railroad company the damages resulting from a fire caused by sparks
from defendant's locomotive, and for which the company is made liable
by statute. The right to maintain such action is not confined to the
owner. Mobile Ins. Co. v. Columbia etc. R. R. Co., 725.
4 SUBROGATION OF SEVERAL INSURERS-JUDGMENT IN SEPARATE ACTION
NO BAR TO JOINT ACTION, WHEN.-After several insurance companies
have paid to the assured the several amounts required by their re-
spective policies, and thereby become subrogated to the rights of the
assured against the person or corporation whose indivisible tortious
act has caused the loss, one of them cannot maintain a separate action
against the tort feasor for its proportion of the loss. If such action
is instituted, judgment obtained, and payment made, the proceeding
should be regarded as practically a voluntary payment, and is not a
bar to a joint action by the other companies and the assured to re-
cover the damages resulting to them from defendant's tort. Mobile Ins.
Co. v. Columbia etc. R. R. Co., 725.
See JUDICIAL SALES, 4; SURETYSHIP, 1, 2
1. SUBROGATION-RIGHT TO, HOW LOST.-A surety who pays a fudgment
against his principal and has it entered "satisfied," without having it
assigned to a trustee for his benefit, thereby loses his remedy of subro-
gation to the rights of the creditor, as against his principal, and
cosurety. Peebles v. Gay, 429.
2 SUBROGATION.-A surety who pays the debt of his principal is entitled
to be subrogated to the rights of the creditor, as against his principal
and a cosurety, and he is also entitled to have a judgment against
the principal which he has paid assigned to a trustee for his benefit,
in order to compel his cosurety to contribute his pro rata liability.
Peebles v. Gay, 429.
3. RIGHT TO SECURE CONTRIBUTION FROM COSURETY. - A surety who
has paid one-half of a judgment against himself, his principal and
his cosurety, and has had satisfaction entered as to the part paid, may
procure the assignment of the other one-half of such judgment to a
AM. ST. REP., VOL. XLIV.-66
trustee for his benefit, in order to compel his cosurety to contribute his pro rata liability. Peebles v. Gay, 429.
See MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 10, 11, 18.
TAX-COLLECTORS.
See TAXES, 10.
TAX LIENS.
See TAXES, 8, 9.
TAX SALES.
See TAXES, 4-7.
↳ "COLD-STORAGE BUSINESS," WHAT IS-TAX.-Under a statute imposing "upon all packing-houses doing a cold-storage business in this state, whether carried on by the owners thereof or by their agents," a tax of "five hundred dollars in each county where said business is carried on," a packing-house which uses cold storage for preserving its own commodities alone, and does not receive and store for the public, or any part thereof, is not "doing a cold-storage business," and is not, therefore, subject to the imposed tax. Stewart v. Atlanta Beef Co., 119. TAXATION OF SHARES OF CORPORATE STOCK is not a tax on the capital stock of the corporation, as they represent different property interests, are distinct subjects of taxation, and the taxation of both is not double taxation. Commonwealth v. Charlottesville etc. Loan Co., 950.
& TAXATION OF SHARES OF STOCK AND OF Capital of CorpORATIONS.—A statute taxing the "capital including money, credits, or other thing invested," and "the value of all capital of incorporated joint stock companies not otherwise taxed," authorizes the taxation, both of the capital stock not otherwise taxed and the shares of stock in such companies, held by resident and nonresident shareholders. Commonwealth v. Charlottesville etc. Loan Co., 950.
4. TAX SALES.-A DESCRIPTION in a tax proceeding that is inherently defective cannot be aided by extrinsic evidence. Power v. Bowdle, 511. 5. TAX SALE SUPPORTED BY A DESCRIPTION IN AN ASSESSMENT-KOLL ESSENTIALLY DEFECTIVE cannot be held valid on the ground that it was the duty of the owner to furnish a correct description, and that he has, therefore, estopped himself from questioning the sufficiency of the de scription used. Power v. Bowdle, 511.
& ASSESSMENTS.-A DESCRIPTION AS FOLLOWS: "Part of section 25, in township 141, of range 59, containing eighty acres, owned by James B. Power," is not sufficient to support a tax sale and deed. Power v. Bowdle, 511.
7. ASSESSMENT-ROLLS, DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY, EVIDENCE TO EXPLAIN. If a subdivision of land is described in an assessment-roll as E' NW, title based on a sale thereunder cannot be supported by averment and proof that these abbreviations and combinations of letters and figures were in general use in the state, and were generally understood by the people thereof, and that such figure, when placed as above, was under
stood to signify one-half, and such figure to mean one fourth, Power
▼. Bowdle, 511.
8. TAX LIENS ARE SUPERIOR TO THE RIGHTS OF EITHER Mortgagor or
MORTGAGEE as against a person without notice, and it is the duty of
the mortgagee or his assignee on failure of the mortgagor to discharge
such liens to discharge them himself as they fall due. Exum v. Baker,
449.
9. Suit to Determine ConflicгING CLAIMS OF TITLE.-A LIEN claimed by
the defendant may be adjudicated in an action to determine conflicting
claims of title if he sets out the facts of his case and asks judgment
thereon, and a part of the claim pleaded by him is that he has a lien on
the land by virtue of sales thereof made for delinquent taxes. Power
v. Bowdle, 511.
10. TAX-COLLECTOR, LIABILITY OF, FOR COERCING PAYMENT OF ILLEGAL TAX,
If a tax-collector causes an execution for taxes to be issued against one
not engaged in the business on which the tax in question has been im-
posed, and, through a levy by the sheriff, coerces the payment of such
tax, together with the cost of collection, such collector is personally
liable to the party so coerced for the whole amount paid to the sheriff,
whether it ever reached the collector's hands or not. Stewart v. Atlanta
Beef Co., 119.
See ASSISTANCE, 3; INTERSTATE COMMERCE, 2, 3; Judgments, 3.
1. PRINTED REGULATIONS LIMITING LIABILITY - BINDING EFFECT OF. —
Both the sender of a telegraphic message and the person to whom it is
addressed are bound by reasonable regulations printed upon a blank
furnished by the telegraph company upon which the message is written
and signed by the sender. Stamey v. Western Union Tel. Co., 95.
2 RIGHT TO STIPULATE AGAINST NEGLIGENCE OF MESSENGERS.-A telegraph
company may stipulate against liability for the negligence of its mes-
sengers in failing to deliver for transmission messages intrusted to them
by the patrons of the company. Stamey v. Western Union Tel. Co., 95.
8. REASONABLE REGULATION LIMITING LIABILITY-NEGLIGENCE OF MES-
SENGER.-A regulation printed upon the blanks provided by a tele-
graph company, which provides that "no responsibility regarding
messages attaches to this company until the same are presented and
accepted at one of its transmitting offices; and, if a message is sent to
such office by one of the company's messengers, he acts for that pur
pose as the agent of the sender," is reasonable, and the company is not
liable to the person addressed in such a message if the messenger to
whom it is intrusted fails to deliver it to the transmitting office, and
the company fails to transmit and deliver it. Stamey v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 95.
4. TELEGRAPH COMPANIES ARE LIABLE FOR ACTUAL DAMAGES received
through their negligent mistakes or errors in sending or transcribing
messages irrespective of the question of punctuality in their delivery.
Western Union Tel. Co. v. Rountree, 93.
5. INACCURACY IN TRANSCRIBING MESSAGE NO BASIS FOR RECOVERY OF
PENALTY. A statute providing that telegraph companies shall trans-
mit and deliver messages with "due diligence," and prescribing a pen.
alty for failure to comply with the terms of the statute, relates to the
time within which messages must be transmitted and delivered, and
not to accuracy and correctness in sending and transcribing them, and
the company is not liable by virtue of the terms of the statute, for the
penalty prescribed, merely because it makes a verbal, though material,
mistake and error in transcribing a message received and transmitted.
Western Uuion Tel. Co. v. Rountree, 93.
6. LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO TRANSMIT MESSAGE-DAMAGES.-A telegraph
company failing to send a message properly delivered to it is liable for
the damages sustained by the sender by reason of such failure. Hence,
if one having a definite offer of employment at so much per month, and
in a particular business, accepts by telegraph, but the offer expires by
lapse of time, and the opportunity is lost by a failure of the company
to send the message, it is liable for the actual damages sustained by
the sender. The plaintiff would be entitled to recover at least one
month's wages, if he remained unemployed for that length of time
and could not obtain employment elsewhere, as such offer would, prima
facie, cover the term of at least one month. Baldwin v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 194.
7. OMITTED CAUSE OF ACTION CANNOT BE INTRODUCED BY AMENDMENT
THOUGH IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN JOINED WITH THE ONE SUED ON.-The
statutory penalty for failure to transmit messages promptly is a separate
and distinct cause of action from the damages recoverable under the gen-
eral law for like default. While the statute allows both causes to be
joined in the same action, there is no authority, where one is omitted,
for introducing it by way of amendment to the declaration pending the
action. No amendment adding a new and distinct cause of action is
allowable unless expressly provided for by law. Baldwin v. Western
Union Tel. Co., 194.
8. LIABILITY FOR FAILURE TO DELIVER MESSAGE-ERRONEOUS ADDRESS.
If the sender of a telegraphic message gives the company the wrong
street address of the sendee, and the company receives and carries
the message promptly to the place designated by the sender, but is
unable to deliver it because the sendee is not there, it is not bound, in
order to escape the statutory penalty for failure to deliver with due
diligence, to take the message to another address which it does not
know, and has no reason to believe is the right one, although the name
given at such address is the same surname as that given in the mes-
sage. In order to hold the company liable it must appear that is
knew the proper address of the sendee, or could have readily ascer
tained it in the exercise of ordinary diligence. Western Union Tel
Co. v. Patrick, 90.
9. PREPAID MESSAGE AS EVIDENCE CALLING FOR PROMPT DELIVERY.—In
an action against a telegraph company to recover for failure to deliver
a message with due diligence, the fact that the message as delivered
was marked "paid" is evidence tending to show that it was a pre-
paid message, and should have been delivered with due diligence as
required by the statute upon which the action is founded. Conyers v.
Postal Tel. Cable Co., 100.
10. MESSAGE DELIVERED AS EVIDENCE OF MESSAGE SENT.-In an action
against a telegraph company to recover for failure to deliver a message
with due diligence, the message as delivered is admissible to prove the
contents of the message as sent, without producing or accounting for
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