son and Hall were not admissible against the de-
fendants, without shewing that they were authorised
to act for them.

JERVIS, C. J.-Is it not like the attorney on the
record in an action?

Mr. Geo. Lewis, the insolvent's attorney, mentioned to the Court the inconvenience resulting to an insolvent from withholding his final order in due course. The officers of the County Courts seized the property of the insolvent in execution, which went in due course, as the protecting order was no Sir F. Thesiger and Hill, Q.C. contrà.-From the bar to an action for the recovery of a debt. This led beginning to the end of the proceedings in Parliato the practical absurdity of making a man pay parti-ment, Messrs. Dyson and Hall appeared as the cular debts in his schedule by instalments at the same agents for the promoters, they conducted all the protime that they were making payments by instalments ceedings, and the Act was made. Surely the proto the creditors generally inserted in their schedules. moters cannot now repudiate the authority of Messrs. The creditors who resorted to proceedings in the Dyson and Hall to act for and to bind them. County Courts for the recovery of their own debts in Crowder, Q.C.-Supposing an attorney has carried the schedule obtained a preference over those cre- on an action. If it afterwards becomes necessary to ditors who did not resort to legal proceedings. If prove his acts or his declarations against his apparent all the creditors took proceedings under those cir- client, it is not sufficient to shew that he is the atcumstances, it was clear that the protection of the torney upon the record. It may have been a voluninsolvent statutes would be a nullity, which he sub-tary act on his part, without any retainer or authomitted the Court had the power to prevent, and was rity from the party for whom he appears. Besides, bound to prevent, by carrying out the provisions of some of the defendants may have become promoters the Act, and granting in due course the final order. at the last meeting, after the statements now tenMr. Commissioner LAW expressed his disapproval dered were made. of the system into which they had fallen of not JERVIS, C. J.-The statements being made in the granting the final order, a system into which they course of proceedings which resulted in an Act of had fallen in consequence of the defective state of the Parliament subsequently adopted by all the defendAct in reference to the enforcement of these pro-ants, they are, in my opinion, admissible against posals if they were not acted upon after the final them without further proof of authority. I underorder was obtained. His present impression was, stand the statements to be of such matters only as that disobedience to the order of the Court the agents would make for the purposes of the Bill; for the payment of an instalment becoming due they must be clearly within the scope of their under a proposal after the granting of the final order authority. Evidence admitted. conditional upon these payments being made, was a contempt of Court, and might be dealt with accordingly. In this case he did not see the usual reason for withholding the final order, for the insolvent being an officer of the court, if the payments were not made, his own income would vanish at once. The final order might therefore be granted, and the proposal will be part of the final order.

The final order was granted.

Nisi Prius.

COURT OF COMMON BENCH. Reported by W. J. METCALFE, Esq. of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law.

SITTINGS IN LONDON AFTER MICHAELMAS

TERM.

Saturday, Dec. 14, 1850.

(Before Chief-Justice JERVIS.) FISHMONGERS' COMPANY v. DIMSDALE. Subp.du. tecum-Evidence-Privilege-Secondary evidence-Proceedings in Parliament-Agent Statements-Admissibility.

If an attorney appears in obedience to a subpoena
duces tecum, and objects that he holds the deed
which he is subpoenaed to produce for a client,
secondary evidence of the deed is admissible,
though it is not proved that such client objects,
or that he has had notice to produce.
A. and B. appeared in Parliament as the agents
for the promoters of a Bill; the proceedings re-
sulted in an Act being made:
Held, that statements made by A. and B. for the
purposes of the Bill, were admissible against the
promoters, without further proof of authority to
act for such promoters.

On the trial of this cause, a deed was called for on behalf of the plaintiff, and an attorney appeared to a subpoena duces tecum, but objected to produce it on the ground that he was holding it for a client, and that he had not the authority of his client for the production. Secondary evidence was then tendered. Crowder, Q.C. objected to its reception. It did not appear that the client had any objection to its production, or that he had received notice that it was wanted; the privilege was that of the client, not of the attorney, and the plaintiff should, therefore, have given the client notice, and should have shewn his dissent to its production.

Sir F. Thesiger, contrà. The refusal of the attorney to produce it is sufficient; he says that he holds it for the client, and he is not, therefore, entitled to produce it without the express authority of his client. A similar case occurred before Parke, B. and secondary evidence was admitted. JERVIS, C.J.-I think it must be sufficient to shew the refusal of the attorney. The attorney, when served with the subpoena, may not have mentioned his client to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff, supposing that the attorney holds for himself, may thus be turned round at the trial, because he had given no notice to a person of whom he probably never before heard. It would be very difficult to obviate the objection if valid. I think secondary

evidence is admissible.

Sir F. Thesiger, M. D. Hill, Q. C., Channell,
Serjt. and Bovill, for the plaintiffs.
Crowder, Q. C., E. James, Q. C., Allen, Serjt.
Skinner, Bramwell, Hindmarsh, and J. Brown, for
the defendants.

Friday, December 20, 1850.
DE GRUCHY v. BRUYERES.
Husband and wife-Separation-Liability.
If husband and wife are living apart, the husband
is liable for necessaries, unless he makes her an
adequate allowance, considering his own means
and circumstances.

Semble, a letter to the wife directing her to get in
and send a list of her debts, that some arrange-
ment might be made respecting them, does not,
if such allowance was adequate, render him
liable.

And semble, he is not liable, though, after such
letter he did not, during the remaining three
'months, remit any further dividends of the pro-
perty, which was settled to her separate use.
The action was in assumpsit on the common counts
for goods sold, and on an account stated. The defend-
ant pleaded the general issue.

The plaintiff was a tradesman living at St. Helier's,
in Jersey, and the defendant was superintendent of
the London and North-Western Railway. It ap-
peared that the defendant, who was formerly an
officer in the Engineers, married in 1822, 10,0007.
Consols being settled to the separate use of his wife;
that afterwards a further sum of 5,000l. stock was
left by will to the separate use of his wife,
with a remainder in a further sum of 1,0001.
subject to a life estate; that in 1842 the defendant
became embarrassed, and that it was then arranged
that his wife and children should leave him in Lon-
don and go to live in Jersey; they did so, and re-
mained there till May 1847, they then came to Lon-
don and stayed with the defendant till November
1847, the wife and three children then returned to
Jersey, where they remained till June 1848, when
they finally returned to England; the defendant was,
during all this time, holding the situation of super-
intendent, at a salary of 8007. a year, and the duties
of the place prevented him from living out of Eng-
land; he had remitted to his wife at different times
sums of money amounting in the whole to 6007. a
year, being equal to the proceeds of her own pro-
perty. Some letters were read from the defendant
to his wife, in which he addressed her affectionately
and urged her to rejoin him in London. One of
those letters was dated March 1848, and pressed her
to send him a list of the debts owing in Jersey and
elsewhere, that he might see what arrangement could
be made respecting them. After that letter no further
dividend was sent to the defendant's wife. This
action was brought for necessaries supplied to the
defendant's wife and children between January 1847
and May 1847, and between November 1847 and
June 1848; the letter of March 1848, was not com-
municated to the plaintiff.

JERVIS, C.J. in addressing the jury said,-This case presents some difficulties in law, though the facts are clearly ascertained. It is a question entirely of principal and agent. The general presumpEvidence admitted. tion is that the wife is the agent for the husband, but It appeared that the defendants were the pro- if you are of opinion that, at the time when the moters of a Bill in Parliament, which was carried credit was given circumstances existed which rebut through and resulted in an Act. Statements made the presumption of agency, you will find a verby Messrs. Dyson and Hall, the parliamentary dict for the defendant. You must consider agents, when appearing for the promoters, were now whether, at the very time of the contract, there tendered in evidence for the plaintiffs. was any presumed agency existing, for nothing that happened after that period could in any way vary

Crowder, Q.C. objected. The statements of Dy

NISI PRIUS.

the state of things. It is clear that at that time the
wife was living apart from her husband. She would
then, prima facie, be presumed to have autho-
rity to find him; but that presumption might be re-
butted by the fact of his having given her an ade-
quate allowance, taking into consideration his means
and circumstances. Now she was living at Jersey,
reported to be a cheap place, and had 6007. a year,
which was remitted to her. He had 8007. a year
salary, so incumbered that he could scarcely call
101. a year his own. I shall leave to you these two
questions:-First, were they living separately?
Secondly, if they were, did the defendant make her
an adequate allowance? If these questions are
answered in the affirmative, I shall then direct a
verdict for the defendant, with leave for the plaintiff
to move to enter a verdict for himself, on the passage
contained in the letter of March 1848, and on the
fact of no dividends being sent to the wife after the
date of that letter. It may turn out that that letter
will alter the defendant's liability as to the whole or
as to a part or not at all.
The jury found that they were living apart, and
the allowance was sufficient.
Verdict for the defendant.
Channell, Serjt. and H. Hill, for the plaintiff.
Byles, Serjt. and Crompton, for the defendant.

Circuit Reports.

OXFORD CIRCUIT.
Reported by J. E. DAVIS, Esq. Barrister-at-Law.
WORCESTER SPRING ASSIZES.
Monday, March 10.
(Before Mr. Justice TALFOURD.)
REG. v. GARDNER.

Costs of prosecution-Indictment under statute
8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 17.
An indictment under the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109,.
which enacts that every person who, by fraud or
unlawful device, or ill practice, in playing at
cards, &c. "shall win from any other person any
sum of money or valuable thing, shall be deemed
guilty of obtaining such money or valuable thing
from such other person by a false pretence, with
intent to cheat or defraud such person of the
same, and being convicted thereof, shall be
punished accordingly," is, within the meaning of
the statute 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 23, which empowers
the Court to order the costs of prosecutions in
indictments (inter alia) for "knowingly and de-
signedly obtaining any property by false pre-

tences.

The indictment contained eight counts. Of the first six, some alleged that the prisoner, with one James Briston, and another person unknown, conspired to cheat and defraud Robert Hopkins, and did actually cheat and defraud him of the sum of five pounds, setting out the overt acts in various ways, alleging them to be the inducing Hopkins to play at divers games of cards, and using packed cards. Others of the six counts alleged the conspiracy to be to defraud Charles Royston, and the actually cheating and defrauding him of twenty pounds, by similar means. The seventh and eighth counts were framed under the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109, s. 17, and respectively charged the prisoner with having won from Hopkins the sum of five pounds, and from Royston the sum of twenty pounds, by means of unlawful devices, to wit, by packing and arranging the cards.

The jury having returned a general verdict of guilty,

Huddleston, for the prosecution, made an ap plication to the learned judge that the costs of the prosecution should be taxed, and allowed by the officer of the court.

TALFOURD, J. observed that the Court had no power to grant the costs of a prosecution for conspiracy.

Huddleston begged to call his lordship's attention to the language of the 17th section of the statute 8 & 9 Vict. c. 109. That section enacts "that every person who shall by any fraud or unlawful device, or ill practice in playing at or with cards, dice-tables, or other game, or in bearing a part in the stakes, wagers, or adventures, or in betting on the sides or hands of them that do play, or in wagering on the event of any game, sport, pastime, or exercise, win from any other person to himself, or any other or others, any sum of money or valuable thing, shall be deemed guilty of obtaining such money or valuable thing from such other person by a false pretence with intent to cheat or defraud such person of the same, and being convicted thereof shall be punished accordingly." Now the statute 7 Geo. 4, c. 64, s. 23, which enumerated the particular description of misdemeanors in which power is conferred on the Court to allow the costs of prosecutions, expressly specified indictments for "knowingly and designedly obtaining any property by false pretences.' submitted that this indictment was in substance an

He

IRISH.

if he did what he did bonâ fide, and without malice, he was protected from liability to the plaintiff. Exceptions.-The declaration, which was in case, and contained five counts, stated, in the first count, that the plaintiff was a clerk in holy orders of the United Church of England and Ireland, and was employed and officiated as curate in the parish of Cloone, in the County of Leitrim, and that the defendant was a justice of the peace for the said county; that a charge was preferred before the defendant as such justice by one Anne Thompson against the plaintiff, charging the plaintiff with having assaulted her, with intent, &c. and that the said A. T. then and there made a deposition before the defendant in support of the charge, but that no indictment or other criminal proceedings had been instituted against the plaintiff in respect thereof, and that the same had still remained undecided; and that the defendant, maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff as such clerk, whilst the subject of said charge was undecided, falsely and maliciously, and not in the execution or discharge of the defendant's duty as justice of the peace, or of any official duty, and without any reasonable or probable cause, did publish, of and concerning the plaintiff as such clerk, &c. and of and concerning said charge, a certain false, scandalous, malicious, and defamatory libel, purporting to be the deposition of Anne Thompson, setting out, with inuendoes, the charge made by Anne Thompson, which commenced as follows:"County of Leitrim, to wit.-I, Anne Thompson, of Clooncumber, in said county, and in the parish of Cloone, do solemnly and sincerely declare," &c. and concluded in the following form:-" And I make the above declaration, conscientiously believing the same to be true. Taken and acknowledged before me at Lough Rynn, in said county, this 12th day of March, 1850. CLEMENTS, J. P."

IRISH.

part of the plaintiff, stated the defendant was
a parishioner of Cloone; that he knew of no
difference between him and the plaintiff; and
that the latter expressed an anxiety to have the
contents of the document submitted to the bishop.
The defendant's counsel called on the Lord Chief
Justice to nonsuit the plaintiff, or direct a verdict
for the defendant, on the ground that no notice of
action had been given to the defendant, though it
appeared that he was a justice of the peace, and had
done the act complained of in his capacity as such
justice, and also that for the same reason the venue
should have been laid in Leitrim. The learned
Chief Justice refused to nonsuit the plaintiff, but, the
defendant having closed his case without offering
any evidence, told the jury that in his opinion the
document was libellous and defamatory, and that
the publication of it by the defendant was not on a
justifiable occasion; and that, although the de-
fendant might have had, as a magistrate, jurisdiction
to take the declaration and to decide the case, or to
take informations, yet that the act of publication
was perfectly distinct from the taking of the decla-
ration, and that the defendant had no right to publish
it; and that, in so doing, he went plainly and
distinctly beyond his province, and acted illegally;
and that his conduct being illegal in that respect, he
was responsible in damages to the plaintiff, and left
to the jury to say, first, whether the declaration was
a libel; and, secondly, whether it was published by
the defendant.

The defendant's counsel excepted to his lordship,
on the grounds that he ought to have nonsuited the
plaintiff for the reasons above stated; that he ought
to have told the jury that the act of the defendant
was privileged, under the circumstances; and that,
though the publication was the act of the defendant,
yet that they ought to find against the plaintiff if
they believed that it was done by the defendant
bona fide in the execution of his duty as a magis-
trate. There having been a verdict for the plaintiff
for 2001. damages, the case now (January 21st) came
on for argument upon the above exceptions.

"ANNE THOMPSON." The count also averred special damage to the plaintiff. In the second count the document containing the alleged libel was described as a " declaration," and not as a deposition; the third count Hayes (with whom was M'Donagh, Q.C.) in supwas similar, but omitting the averment of port of the exceptions. The defendant was entitled the absence of reasonable or probable cause; to a month's notice of action, and to have had the the fourth count averred that the defendvenue laid in the county of Leitrim, and evidence ant pretended and alleged that a charge was ought to have been given by the plaintiff that the preferred before him as a justice of the peace, and act complained of had been done within six months that he published a certain libel, &c. purporting to before the commencement of the action. (12 & 13 be the declaration of Anne Thompson, &c. and of Vict. c. 16, ss. 8, 9, 10, & 12.) The defendant acted and concerning the said pretended charge. In the in the transaction as a magistrate in the discharge fifth count, which was similar to the preceding, it of his duty. It was part of the duty of the defendwas alleged that defendant was in the habit of acting ant, pursuant to the 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 62, which was as a justice of the peace. The defendant having passed to prevent the taking unnecessary oaths, to pleaded the general issue, the case was tried before take "declarations," and it would have been a the Lord Chief-Justice at the Nisi Prius sittings of breach of duty to have refused. The 18th section of this Court after last Michaelmas Term. The Rev. the 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 62, provides that "whereas it Arthur Hyde, the rural dean of the district in which may be necessary and proper in many cases not the plaintiff officiated, proved that he had received herein specified, to require confirmation of written the original document containing the alleged libel instruments, or allegations, or proof of debts, or of from either Anne Thompson or her husband James the execution of deeds or other matters," it shall Thompson; that it was in the defendant's hand-"and may be lawful for any justice of the peace, &c. writing; that he had apprised the plaintiff of its to take the declaration of any person voluntarily contents through the Rev. Mr. Hogg, his brother making the same before him in the form of the schecurate. The witness also stated that it was in his dule to this Act annexed." And it is enacted that capacity of rural dean that he had received the do- any person wilfully making a false declaration shall cument, which was handed to him in an envelope, be deemed guilty of a misdemeanour. It was also but whether sealed or not he could not recollect, the duty of the defendant to deliver the declaration and that if there was any address on it, it was in the to the person making. If he had retained it, the defendant's handwriting; that he gave it to Mr. purpose of the Act would have been defeated; for Hogg that he might shew it to the plaintiff's rector; instance, it is the practice for vendors of property to that, in consequence of a written application from make solemn declarations about incumbrances of the plaintiff, he had given him the copy now what use would these be if the magistrate had the produced; that the witness never gave a copy, power to detain them? The defendant in deliverexcept the one mentioned; that the charges ing the document to the party, however, used the utcontained in the declaration, were intended to have most caution to prevent its contents being known been made the subject of a complaint to the bishop to any one except the parties making the of the diocese in which the plaintiff officiated, but inquiry. [CRAMPTON, J.-But where was the dewere not, in consequence of the plaintiff having re- fendant's jurisdiction to take the declaration at all?] signed his curacy; that, in consequence of what The 18th section of the Act of 5 & 6 Wm. 4, emJames Thompson, and his wife, Anne Thompson, powered him, and where powers are intrusted to a had stated to him, he (witness) had suggested to public officer it is incumbent on him to act. The them to go before the nearest magistrate, without bishop might have objected to exhibit criminal artinaming one; that two days after that he received cles against the plaintiff until something more than a the document from them (the Thompsons); that mere verbal statement appeared. But a magistrate is previous to the taking the declaration he had a verbal within the protection of the statute if he bona fide becommunication on the subject with Lord Clements, lieves himself to be acting in the exercise of his duty. in which he suggested to him (Lord C.) to take it [MOORE, J.-May not the words "other matters,' himself-first, as the character of a clergyman was in the 18th section, mean matters of a similar kind involved; and, secondly, as he did not wish to tres- to those previously enumerated? The enacting pass on the bishop's time without having something clause is sufficiently extensive. [PERRIN, J.-Has stronger to go upon than a mere verbal statement; the justice a right to take a declaration in a case that the document was all in Lord Clements's hand- where he can institute a judicial proceeding; as, for writing, and none of it in that of his clerk; that the example, where he might have taken the informareason assigned by the plaintiff for wishing for a copy tions of this woman against the plaintiff for the criof it, was to shew it to the bishop. The witness minal offence?] Assuming the offence to have been also stated that he never knew of any misunder-both an ecclesiastical and a civil one, the ecclesiasstanding between the plaintiff and the defendant, tical remedy may have been selected; the case would and that he shewed the document to another have been different had it been a charge of felony. rural dean, and to the senior clergyman of the If the defendant acted bona fide on a mistaken view diocese, for their advice, and that he believed that the of the law, it proves it to be the very case in which rural dean was the proper channel through which a notice of action ought to have been given. (Bird v. complaint should be laid before the bishop. The Gunston, 2 Chitty, 459; Beechey v. Sides, 9 B. & Rev. Mr. Hogg, who was produced on the C. 806, per Lord Tenterden; Cooke v. Clarke, 10

VOL. XVII. No. 418,

IRISH.

Bing. 19; Ballinger v. Ferris, 1 M. & W. 628, per
Lord Abinger; Rudd v. Scott, 2 Scott's, N.R. 631;
Hughes v. Buckland, per Rolfe, B. 15 M. & W.
346; in Wedge v. Berkeley, 6 Ad. & Ell. 667.)
Lord Denman says-" If the plaintiff meant to say
that the defendant acted in the execution of his office
colourably, or to discharge an old grudge, or other-
wise, in bad faith, he should have required the
learned judge to have put the question of bona
fides to the jury;" and in the same case
Littledale, J. says, "Whether the defendant is en-
titled to a verdict on the merits, and whether he is
entitled to notice, are very different inquiries. If he
had notice, and the merits were against him, he
might tender amends." (Horn v. Thornborough,
3 Ex. 346.) The Lord Chief Justice in this case
told the jury in his charge, that the defendant might
have been right in receiving the declaration, though
answerable for the publication of it. [BLACKBURNE,
C. J.-What I told the jury was, that whatever
might have been the jurisdiction of the magistrate
in a criminal case, he certainly had no right to make
himself ancillary to the publication of such.] The
case of Theobald v. Crichmore, 1 B. & Ald. 227,
shews that the whole proceedings must be taken as
one transaction. [MOORE, J.-Suppose a complaint
made before a magistrate in respect of an indictable
offence, and an information is taken, would he be
warranted in making this the medium of scandal
against the party?] No; but the question for the
jury here was, whether the defendant acted bond
fide-and did he believe that he was acting in the
execution of his duty. [MOORE, J.-I merely put
a case where a magistrate is justified in taking in-
formations, but makes no improper use of them.]
[CRAMPTON, J.-Assuming the case to be one of
privileged communication, there are certain acts
which a man may do, such as making a speech in
the House of Commons, but if he publish it he
becomes responsible. Had the defendant sent this
declaration to the editor of a newspaper, he
could not possibly have justified the Act.] In
this case the publication was a part of the
original transaction, and therefore the ques-
tion should be left to the jury as to the character in
which it was done; the question of the publication
having been privileged was likewise a question for
the jury. (Lake v. King, 1 Saund. 131, a.) In Fair-
man v. Ives, 5 B. & Ald. 647, it was held that evi-
dence was admissible to shew that the party believed
the facts to be true. (Weatherston v. Hawkins,
1 T. R. 110; Dunman v. Bigge, 1 Camp. 269, in
note: Child v. Affleck, 9 B. & C. 403; Wyatt v.
Gore, Holt's N. P. 299.) [CRAMPTON, J.—This
question was considered in Black v. Holmes, 1 Fox
& Sm. 28, in this Court.]

Carleton and Martley, Q.C. in support of the
verdict.-The fact of a justice of the peace being a
wrong-doer does not entitle him to notice of action.
For instance, if an action is brought against a magis-
trate for the fraudulent removal of property to avoid
a distress, he is not entitled to notice. The question
in every case is whether he is acting in the execution
of his duty. In actions against a justice a dispute
may arise as to the law or the facts. The cases cited
for the defendant are of the latter class. They
admit the existence of authority in the magistrate,
while they dispute the facts on the assumed existence
of which the exercise of that authority is based.
(Weller v. Toke, 9 E. 364.) In this case there are
two parallel questions closely approximating, but
never meeting, one for the Court, the other for the
jury. The first is a question of law whether the
act complained of bears such a legal resemblance to
the line of the magistrate's duty as to afford a pre-
sumption that he bona fide believed he was acting
within the scope of his duty. The second is a ques-
tion of bona fides in fact; what Jeremy Bentham
calls a psychological fact, and is a question for the
jury. By the 20th section of the statute 12 & 13
Vict. c. 69, a magistrate is bound to return every
information to the clerk of the Petty Sessions.
[CRAMPTON, J.-If the defendant had transmitted
the declaration to the Petty Sessions he would have
taken a most effective way of giving it publicity.] It
was not an information taken in the manner pre-
scribed by the statute, and the magistrate not having
pursued the course prescribed by law, cannot now
rely on his being a magistrate to protect him. Ac-
cording to the interpretation of the words "other
matters" in the 18 sec. of the 5 & 6 Wm. 4, c. 62,
the defendant's counsel, or any person whatever,
may tender to a magistrate any statement, whether
it be a libel, a slander, or blasphemy, if he brings it
to him as a declaration; but the statute only pro-
vides for the substitution of declarations where pre-
viously oaths might have been taken (Maloney v.
Bartley, 3 Camp. 210), and also in cases of some
proceedings of foreign courts. The words "other
matters mean other matters ejusdem generis, such
as the execution of deeds, &c.; the defendant acted
at the suggestion of a third person, who put him in
motion, and who had no right to do so; to take it
most strongly for the defendant, that to listen to the
complaint, and to take it down in writing was within

IRISH.

IRISH.

IRISH.

Macmeehan said he entertained a great respect fr Mr. Roleston, but he dissented from the propriety of the course taken by him. Perrin, J. had epressed a decided opinion that counsel ought not to act without an attorney.

PIGOTT, C.B. said he could not compel counsel to act; he could do no more than appeal to the scie of feeling of the Bar.

Murphy (solicitor) having consented to act s attorney for the prisoner, Macmeehan consented t act as counsel.

Equity Courts.

the scope of his duty-that does not give him pro- there says,-"In general, an action lies for the prisoner who was unable to employ one; but be tection; acting in the apparent scope of his duty he malicious publication of statements, which are false thought the case different as regarded an attorney, took this information, not in the shape of an infor- in fact, and injurious to the character of another A case occurred at the Special Commission in Clamation, but as a declaration. Now the ex parte pub- (within the well-known limits as to verbal slander), mel, before himself and the Lord Chief Justice (Re lication of a charge, no matter how regularly taken, and the law considers such publication as malicious, v. Cody), in which an attorney had been paid is libellous. (Rex v. Lee, 5 Esp. 123; Duncan v. unless it is fairly made by a person in the discharge certain services, and refused to act further wither Thwaites, 3 B. and C. 556.) If a third person, as of some public or private duty, whether legal or receiving further remuneration; the Chief Justics the proprietor of a newspaper, having received a moral, or in the conduct of his affairs in matters and himself were of opinion that they had no pore copy could not justify the publication, how could a where his interest is concerned. In such cases the to compel him to do so, but they called upon M. magistrate? Why should he be justified in doing occasion prevents the inference of malice, which the Roleston to defend the prisoners, and he consented that which no other member of the community could law draws from unauthorised communications, and to do so without the assistance of an attorney; and. be justified in doing? Can, then, it be said that where affords a qualified defence, depending upon the after as able a defence as ever he (the Chief Bang a justice has proceeded irregularly his publication of absence of actual malice; if fairly warranted by any had heard in a court of justice, the prisoners wa the matter, of the character of which there can be no reasonable occasion or exigency, and honestly made, convicted. doubt, it having been found by the jury, can be jus- such communications are protected for the common tified? The result of the cases which have been convenience and welfare of society; and the law has cited on the question of notice is, that where not restricted the right to make them within any the magistrate has acted in the scope of his narrow limits." Those abstract propositions are jurisdiction, but has exceeded it in some circum-universally true. No one was produced to shew that stances of time and place, then it becomes a question the defendant ever spoke to any one on the subject, of bona fides (Hughes v. Buckland, 15 M. & W. 353, and he inclosed the declaration in an envelope to per Pollock, C.B.); but no case is shewn in which the person who requested him to take it. [BLACKnotice was required, where, as here, not one single BURNE, C.J.-If you were justified in sending the step was taken in the direction of duty. Upon the communication to the rural dean, you are not an question of privilege, Fairman v. Ives, 5 B. & Ald. swerable for what he afterwards did. CRAMP642, is distinguishable; the complaint there was TON, J. It is to be remarked that Lord made bona fide to a quarter who had the power of Clements communicated the facts only to redressing it, though not by a judicial proceeding. those who knew them before.] The case of [PERRIN, J.-Here the rural dean directs the parties Re The Dean of York, 2 A. & E. 35, and 1 Black. to go before the magistrate, and he communicates Com. by Steph, shew the authority of the bishop to with the magistrate, stating that he wishes the decla- act in such cases. The resident rural dean requested ration to be taken, in order that he might act on it, the defendant to act. In Padmore v. Lawrence, Reported by RICHARD GRIFFITHS WELFORD, Esq. of the if necessary, and then he inclosed it in an envelope 11 A. & E. 382, the Court adopts the ruling in Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law. to the rural dean; if he does that bona fide, is it not Toogood v. Spyring, holding that persons who institute privileged? Can it be said that the defendant is complaints on subjects in which they are interested divested of a personal interest in the good conduct are privileged. (Wright v. Woodgate, 2 Cr. M. & of the minister of his parish? [CRAMPTON, J.-Or R. 373; Ward v. Jolly, 6 C. & P. 499; Delaney v, suppose the magistrate had received the declaration, Groves, 4 Esp. 193; Woodward v. Lander, 6 C. & and wishing that the charge against the party should P. 548.) [MOORE, J.-In the case cited by Mr. be investigated, as, if the charge was true, the person Martley from 1 Q.B. Rep. (Blagg v. Sturt), Baron would be very unfit indeed to continue as minister Parke left the question of bona fides to the jury.] of the parish?] There was not the slightest evi- In the present case Lord Clements was no volunteer. dence of anything of the kind here; there was no The only fault of which he has been guilty is, that evidence of Lord Clements having acted qua he acted with the delicacy of a gentleman, and in a parishioner; he never sought to investigate the manner befitting his station. Cur. adv. vult. complaint; he never asked the bishop or rural dean to investigate it; the rural dean asked him to take Saturday, Jan. 25.-BLACKBURNE, C.J.-As the the declaration, and, after he took it, he never made time approaches for serving notice of a new trial, any investigation on the subject. R. v. Beare, 1 Ld. I take this opportunity of stating, that in the case Ray. 416; Wyatt v. Gore, Holt's N.P. 299, are dis-of Little v. Lord Clements, the Court are unanitinguishable. The true test of a privileged communication is, that it is a communication to be put to some use; but this communication was put to no use. Blagg v. Sturt, 10 Q.B. 899, and ib. in Ex. Ch. 906, and 1 Taylor on Evid. 39, 40, were also

cited.

JUDGMENT.

DOWN.

CROWN COURT.

Venire de novo.

LORD CHANCELLOR'S COURT.

March 12 and 15. ELLIS V. BOWMAN. Imbecility-Marriage contract-Issue to try power of a deceased lunatic to contract marriage. Though a person was found lunatic from cred antecedent to a marriage contracted by his, and a son, the issue of that marriage, had enjoyed estate devised to the lunatic and his childres, as legitimate child, the Court will not decide againd the validity of such marriage without an issue directed to try the fact.

This was an appeal from an order of the Master of the Rolls, directing an issue to try whether & Mr. Bailey Bird was, in the year 1818, at the time of his marriage, a person of sound mind. The order was made in July 1850, and the appeal was advised because the issue stands for trial at the present assizes for Norfolk. The father of Mr. Bird was an architect and surveyor at Norwich. He died in 1815, and bequeathed considerable property to trustees for the benefit of his widow and their only son, and in the event of the son dying without issue, then for the benefit of his sister, the plaintiff, Mrs. Ellis. The son had been of weak intellect from an early age in consequence of improper treatment during an illness, and the testator in his will gave directions with respect to the allowances he was to receive for his maintenance. In 1818, with the consent and approbation of his mother, he married one Anne Fuller, and he had a son, the issue of that marriage, in 1819, but before the birth of the child the plaintif obtained a commission of lunacy, and the jury found

Chief Baron PIGOTT took his seat in the Crown the said Bailey Bird to be of unsound mind for

RIGHT OF THE COURT TO ASSIGN COUNSEL TO
DEFEND A PRISONER.

REG. v. ANDREW FOGARTY.

mously of opinion that there ought to be a new trial; they think that I ought to have left it to the jury to say whether Lord Clements did bona fide believe that he was acting in his capacity, and within his jurisdiction as a magistrate, in the discharge of his duty; and, secondly, that I ought to have informed M'Donough, Q.C. in reply.-In Wedge v. Berke- the jury that if he did, what he did bona fide ley, 6 A. & E. 669, Coleridge, J.'says "The distinction and without malice was protected from liability. It is clear between that which amounts to a defence, is not necessary to enter more into detail, but if the and that which entitles to notice." Here the de-case goes again to a jury, that is the direction in fendant was admittedly a justice of the peace for the substance and in letter which I shall give. county, and had jurisdiction, and it is conceded that he might have taken an information on oath; he was applied to as a magistrate, he did not volunteer, he plainly assumed to act as a justice of the peace, and believed he had jurisdiction to act as he was called on to do. Admitting that in the entire of that act his taking the declaration, and returning it in an en-Court at half-past nine o'clock. velope, he was not entirely warranted, that is precisely the state of things entitling him to notice of an action; the acts he did were not alien to his jurisdiction, nor done diverso intentu. (Wedge v. In this case the prisoner was charged with the Berkeley, 6 A. & E. 669; Haseldine v. Grove, 12 murder of his wife, Margery Fogarty, by adminisL. J., N.S. 10, M.C.) If a magistrate were a per-tering to her a dose of arsenic, at Kilkeel, on the fect lawyer he would not require notice at all. It is 26th July, 1850. where a man acting bona fide transcends his authority, that he is entitled to notice, in order that he may have an opportunity of making amends. (Cox v. Reid, per Patteson, J., 13 Jur. 563.) If the plaintiff seek to rely on the ground that the magistrate acted so illegally as to disentitle him to notice, he ought to have caused this question to be put to the jury. The question of bond fides is for the jury. The case suggested of a magistrate rescuing his goods under a distress is not in point, for in such case he does not assume to act magisterially. Prestige v. Woodman, 9 B. & C. 12; and Weller v. Toke, 9 E. 363, are against the plaintiff. Briggs v. Evelyn, 2 H. Blackst. 114, shews that the presumption is in favour of the justice having acted magisterially; in the cases in which notice was held not to be requisite, the acts of the justice were destitute of authority, both in law and fact. (Culverson v. Milton, 2 M. & R. 200; Briggs v. Evelyn, 2 H. Blackst. 114, a; Ballinger v. Ferris, 1 M. & W. 629; Hughes v. Buckland, 15 M. & W. 351; Bird v. Gunston, 2 Chitty, 461; Theobald v. Crichmore, 1 B. & Ald. 227; Maloney v. Bartley, 3 Camp. 211.) Malice has been negatived by the only two witnesses who were produced. On the question of privilege, the rule as to privileged communications, as laid down by Parke, B. in Toogood v. Spyring, 1 Cr. M. & R. 193, is now universally adopted; if it has been in any way modified, it has been extended, not limited. Parke, B.

PIGOTT, C.B. after conferring with the Crown
Solicitor, addressed Mr. Macmeehan, and requested
that he would undertake the defence of the prisoner,
who was unable to employ attorney or counsel.
Macmeehan replied that he had no objection per-
sonally to act, but there was a feeling and opinion
existing on the subject among the Bar which com-
pelled him to beg that his lordship would excuse him
for declining.

After some conference among the members of the
Bar,

Sir Thomas Staples, Q.C. rose and addressed the
Court. He said that on the part of the Bar he
thought it right to state that there was a feeling
among them in which he quite concurred, that no
counsel could, with propriety, undertake the defence
of a prisoner without receiving instructions from an
attorney. He also had to say, not on the part of
Mr. Macmeehan, but on the part of the Bar, that in
every case in which counsel was assigned, the Crown
should pay him a fee; up to a very recent period it
was a rule to do so.

PIGOTT, C.B. said he could make no rule upon the subject of payment of counsels' fee in such cases; but he would certainly recommend that it should be paid by the Crown, and it was his own opinion that the fee ought to be paid. With respect to the assignment of counsel and attorney for a prisoner, it was his opinion that a judge might with propriety call on a barrister to give his honorary services to a

twenty years previous to the marriage. The finding of the jury was confirmed, and committees of the estate and person were duly appointed, but no proceedings were taken to annul the marriage because the Court refused to permit them to be undertaken at the expense of the lunatic's estate, and the plaintiff was not in a condition to undertake them at her own. In 1825 the wife of the lunatic died; in 1843 he died himself, and in 1845 his son died, after having made a will in which he disposed of all his property in favour of the family of William Bauldry, Under these circumstances the suit was instituted in 1847 against the trustees and against Bauldry, the plaintiff claiming under the will of her father, on the ground that Bailey Bird being an idiot and incapable of contracting marriage, and the issue of such mar riage being illegitimate, she was entitled to the whole of the property bequeathed by the will of the father, and the son of Bailey Bird had no right to make any disposition in favour of Bauldry. The Master of the Rolls thought it was one of those cases that the Court never disposed of without the intervention of a jury, and he made the order, against which the plaintiff appealed, on the ground that there was abundant evidence to justify a decree without such intermediate proceeding.

James Parker, Miller, and Selwyn, for the appeal, cited Evans v. Blood, 3 Bro. P.C. 632; Clark v. Clark, 3 Vernon, 414; Attorney-General v. Parnther, 3 Bro. C. C. 440; Hall v. Warren, 9 Ves. 605; McAdam v. Walker, 1 Dow. 177; Pickering v. Higginson, 27 Aug. 1807, Q.B.; Browning . Pearse, 2 Phillim. 59; Short v. Lee, 464.

Rolt, Goodeve, and Barrett, contrà, cited I Roll's Abridgment, 340, c. 8 and 10, and 357, nom. Bastard; Hargreave's Coke Littleton, 88; Statute of Merton; Sergeson v. Sealey, 2 Atk. 412; Milton. Conyers, 4 Ex. Rep. 18; the Portsmouth case;

LORD CHANCELLOR'S COURT.

Haggard's Eccl. Cases; Parker v. Parker; Lee's cases, vol. 2, 382; Leggat v. O'Brien, Milward's Irish Eccl. Cases, 397.

The LORD CHANCELLOR.-The bill is filed by Mrs. Ellis for the purpose of establishing the will of Bailey Bird the elder, under which (made in 1814) the plaintiff was entitled in remainder to the property thereby devised, the devise being first to Bailey Bird the younger, and to his children, he not having any child at the date of the will. He was married in 1819, and there was a son the undoubted issue of that marriage, who died in 1843, having made a will of this property in favour of William Bauldry. He and other parties interested were made defendants to the bill. The main question is, whether this last testator, the son of Bailey Bird the younger, was legitimate; for if he was not, his will was of no effect against the plaintiff's title; and that question again depends on the fact whether Bailey Bird, his father, was of sufficiently sound mind to -contract marriage at the time at which the marriage de facto took place. The plaintiff alleges that he had not at that time capacity to contract marriage; and she relies on the fact that under a commission of lunacy issued soon after the alleged marriage the jury found Bailey Bird to have been of unsound mind then and for twenty years preceding. It was, however, argued on behalf of Bauldry, the appellant, that Mrs. Ellis could not be now heard to impeach the validity of the marriage, she having assented to it at the time, or at all events having acquiesced. I have made myself perfectly acquainted with every point in the affidavits, but I will not now state the impressions made by them on my mind, as the matter is to undergo further inquiry by my affirming the order of the Master of the Rolls. It was argued that the Court ought, if possible, to give effect to the marriage after so long a time, particularly after the alleged acquiescence of the person who now impeaches the validity of it. I cannot admit that there was any acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff. She had no notice of the intended marriage until the 27th of June, 1819, and it took place on the 7th July afterwards. She obtained, as soon as possible, a commission, and the party was found to be of unsound mind, and the care of him was taken from the wife, the natural person to be appointed committee. The only reason that can be assigned for that is, that the marriage was not considered valid. It further appears that the plaintiff was in poor circumstances, and unable to prosecute a suit to set the marriage aside. She applied to the Court, asking that the expenses of a suit for that purpose should be supplied out of Bailey Bird's estate; but the Master to whom that matter was referred reported that it was his opinion that it was not expedient to charge such expenses on the lunatic's estate. That report of the Master is not inconsistent with an opinion on his part that the marriage was invalid. The plaintiff had no funds and was not then able to question the validity of the marriage. She could not do more than she did at the time; and certainly there is no good ground to infer her acquiescence in the marriage; after the general finding of unsoundness the onus of proving a lucid interval at the time of the marriage lies on the party who now asserted such lucid interval. Another inference of acquiescence was that the plaintiff had written a letter to the son of Bailey Bird (Bauldry's testator), calling him her "Dear Cousin," and asking him for pecuniary assistance. That was very natural. There is no reason at all, nor was there ever any reason, to doubt that he was the offspring of Bailey Bird by the alleged marriage. There is no imputation of any impropriety on the mother, and no doubt this person was their child. There is no act of acquiescence on the part of the plaintiff to preclude her now from questioning the legitimacy of this person, by whose will the property to which she is entitled, if he was illegitimate, is given away from her. She has still a right to question the sanity of the father, and the validity of his marriage. After some observations in reference to arguments urged on him by Bauldry's counsel to the effect that even if the marriage was not valid, still he ought to construe the will of Bailey Bird the elder so as to give effect to his intention therein expressed in favour of the issue of his son whether legitimate or not, said that the law was opposed to such a construction, and would not give the property to illegitimate offspring unless distinctly designated.

an

Dec. 7 and 9, 1850. HALL V. HALL. Partnership Continuiug trade-Receiver manager-Costs. The Court will not, by the appointment of a receiver or a receiver and manager, take the conduct of a continuing partnership trade into its own hands for the purpose of being carried on. A party who so conducts his opposition to a motion for a receiver (conducting it in person) that the questions involved in the application, and the authorities upon it have not been argued, through such party's neglect, to take the ordinary means

LORD CHANCELLOR'S COURT.

of having the case fully discussed, will not, on the
discharge on appeal of the order made against
him, be allowed his costs in the Court below.
In this case an order had been made by the Master
of the Rolls for an injunction restraining the defend-
anf from restricting his copartner, the plaintiff, in
the enjoyment of his partnership rights according to
the terms of the partnership articles. The plaintiff
and defendant are partners as brewers, maltsters,
and wine and spirit merchants at Romsey, Hants;
the defendant having brought the capital into the
business, afterwards sought to exclude the plaintiff
from participation in its management. The injunc-
tion granted by the Master of the Rolls having been
systematically disregarded by the defendant, the
plaintiff gave a notice of motion before the Master
of the Rolls for the appointment of a receiver and
manager of the copartnership business, and that the
defendant might stand committed for breach of the
injunction. That motion having stood over for some
time at the defendant's request, and on his promise
to act in strict regard to the partnership articles, but
none of such promises having been kept, notice
was given to the defendant that the motion
would be brought on the 8th of May, 1850.
Instead of instructing counsel, as he had done on
the previous motion for an injunction, the defendant
appeared in person, but without offering any affidavit
in answer to the affidavits on which the plaintiff's
motion was founded. The plaintiff's counsel then
waived that part of the notice of motion which asked
for the commitment of the defendant for breach of
the injunction, and an order was made for the ap-
pointment of a receiver and manager of the partner-
ship. The defendant moved by way of appeal to
discharge that order.

LORD CHANCELLOR'S COURT.

so disobeying, but that could not give any power according to the practice of the Court, to abandon that remedy, and to substitute another remedy of a totally different nature. I therefore cannot conceive that if a party is not prepared to ask for a commitment for a breach of an injunction, he can then ask to substitute the appointment of a receiver and manager. The rights to those different remedies are essentially distinct, depending upon totally different grounds and circumstances. The motion, I consider, was made before the Master of the Rolls for a receiver and manager, and upon that occasion, in all probability, the case was opened on the part of the plaintiff, presenting to the mind of the Master of the Rolls certain breaches of the articles of co-partnership of such a nature as might, or might not, furnish a ground for the plaintiff to pray a dissolution. I think it is extremely probable (though not likely to be so intended) from the result, that the Master of the Rolls' attention was directed to those acts of alleged misconduct on the part of the defendant, and that it was assumed the plaintiff was seeking for a dissolution of the partnership upon those grounds, and that the distinction between the injunction for breach of the articles of copartnership, and the appointment of a receiver and manager, with a view to dissolution, was not presented to the mind of the Master of the Rolls. The defendant was incompetent to do it, and the plaintiff's object, and the object of his counsel, was to call the attention of the Master of the Rolls to a totally different view of the case. I cannot conceive that if the attention of the Master of the Rolls had been called to the state of the record and to the application of the general principles which had prevailed in the appointment of receivers or managers, I cannot but conceive, from my knowledge Lloyd and H. Clarke supported the appeal of the extreme care and accuracy of that learned judge, motion, and contended that it was contrary to the that if he had intended to overrule any of the prepractice of the Court to grant a manager of a part-vious decisions, he would have stated distinctly his nership business except with a view to winding it up, intention so to do, and have stated ample grounds and as incidental to a dissolution, and that in order to justify the conclusion to which he came; but to ground an application for a receiver in partnership nothing appears to have fallen from him tending to matters there must be an absolute exclusion of the shew that his lordship at that time intended or conplaintiff from the partnership concern. They read templated introducing any decision in the slightest the affidavits on which the order had been made, and degree inconsistent with what had been the previous cited Oliver v. Hamilton, 2 Anstruther, 453; Waters course of authority of the Court. It now stands v. Taylor, 15 Ves. 13; Harrison v. Armitage, 4 that this is a bill, not brought for a dissolution of a Mad. 143; Goodman v. Whitcomb, 1 Jac. & Walk. partnership in which the plaintiff complains that the 589; Marshall v. Colman, 2 Jac. & Walk. 266; articles of the partnership have not been observed, Smith v. James, 4 Beav. 583; Richards v. Davies, he does not make that complaint the foundation of 2 Russ. & Myl. 347. his prayer that he may be relieved from the partnership, but, on the contrary, his sole object is to establish the partnership and to enforce its being carried on according to its terms. It is, therefore, not a case which at all falls within that class of decisions where it is in the election of a party who complains of a breach of the articles of the partnership who does elect to make that complaint the foundation of the prayer for dissolution, and the general principle appears to be resulting from all the authorities, as far as I can collect, that the breaches of the articles of partnership are not necessarily the foundation of a dissolution; The LORD CHANCELLOR.-Upon the best con- but when those breaches are of such a nature as to sideration I can give this case, I think the order that shew that a partnership cannot be carried on for the has been made cannot be supported. It does not benefit of the parties according to the original inappear to me to be consistent with the course of tention as apparent from the articles, inasmuch as authority that has prevailed in the Courts, and I am one side has put an end to the partnership according not surprised at that when my attention is directed to to the original agreement and articles in that case, the extreme difficulty which must result from the the other party may be relieved from the partnership, prosecution of such an order under circumstances although there is no express provision that the partlike the present. It is extremely unfortunate for the nership should determine upon the breach of either Court, where applications are made which depend of those complaints or of any others. It is, thereupon certain principles of law upon which the juris- fore, upon the ground that virtually the parties have diction of the Court is found, that persons who are determined the partnership, or at least that one has, totally incompetent of bringing before the Court as far as he is concerned, withdrawn himself from what has been the state of the authorities to shew the partnership according to the articles, and that how they apply to the circumstances of the case the other, by reason of such conduct, claims to be should attempt to conduct their own business, they relieved or prays a dissolution, and, therefore, in are wholly incapable of doing justice to their own every case it must be looked to to see when comcase, or of calling the attention of the Court to the plaints are made of breaches of the articles, with material circumstances. In this case it appears there what view the complaint is urged, whether it is was a motion made for an injunction and receiver, or urged with a view of making that complaint the rather, in the first instance, for an injunction, and foundation of dissolution, or the foundation of a afterwards a motion, to commit for a breach of that decree enforcing or carrying on the partnership acinjunction, and for the appointment of a receiver. cording to the original terms, and preventing by It does not very distinctly appear as to what passed. proper means those breaches recurring which I think, in reference to the granting of the injunc- have before happened by reason tion, beyond this, that the allegation on the part of duct of one of the parties. Now, in this the plaintiff was not satisfactorily answered, on the case, the party prays the establishment of part of the defendant, to the satisfaction of the Master the partnership according to its terms, namely, of the Rolls, that the defendant had not observed specific performance of the articles of agreement. but had violated some of the articles of co-partner- Well, in the course of that he finds it necessary to ship, and he was enjoined against the continuance of move for an interim injunction, and he shews reathat breach of the articles with which he was sonable grounds to influence the discretion of the charged, so far as it was supposed to be made out. Master of the Rolls that it is proper for his safety to As to the propriety of that injunction, neither as to secure, as far as can be secured under the authority circumstances under which it was granted, nor as of the Court, the partnership being carried on until to its particular terms, I do not think the Court the hearing according to the articles. We get an has at present anything to do. I do not think that injunction; by-and-bye, he is dissatisfied with the question is at all before the Court. I will therefore then state of things, notwithstanding that injunction, assume for the purpose of the present motion that and he then comes and prays for a receiver. Now, the injunction was properly granted, and that if it was his suit in such a form-had he presented his was disobeyed there was a known remedy which it complaint in such a manner-as to entitle him to was open to the parties to obtain against the party ask for that particular relief? Were the acts which

Bacon and Welford, supported the order, and cited and referred to Const v. Harris, Turner & Russ. 496; Goodman v. Whitcomb, supra; Wallworth v. Holt, 4 Myl. & Cr. 635; Wilson v. Greenwood, 1 Swans. 471; Richardson v. Hastings, 2 Bea. 323; Fairthorne v. Western, 4 Hare, 329; England v. Curling, 8 Beav. 129; Malcolm v. Montgomery, 2 Molloy, 531; Bowman v. Bell, 14 Sim. 392; Thomas v. Davies, 11 Bea. 29; Danl. Chan. Prac. 1612, n..

Lloyd, in reply.

JUDGMENT.

of the con