sole power is to enforce the statute as written by the Legislature. The court has no right to add anything to or take anything from a statute, where the meaning of the statute is clear. It is only in cases where the statute is ambiguous that any rule for the determination or construction of statutes can be resorted to. The word "such" is not a synonym of the word "other." It is difficult to conceive of where the words can be used interchangeably.

[5] We know of no rule of law which will justify the court in convicting a person of any crime, unless the offense comes under the letter of the statute. The law is that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. Such has been the law from time immemorial.

and the courts can neither add to nor take from them."

[7] It has been said that it is not the words of the law, but the internal sense of it, that makes the law, and our law, like all others, consists of two parts, namely, body and soul. The letter of the law is the body of the law, and the sense and the reason of the law is the soul of the law; and it often happens, when you know the letter, you know not the sense, for sometimes the sense is more confined and contracted than the letter, and sometimes it is larger and more extensive. Therefore in the construction of criminal statutes, as has been said in Bishop on Statutory Crimes, § 230: "The doctrine is that, in favor of accused persons, criminal statutes may be either, according to the form [6] In Harrington v. State, 54 Miss. 490, it of the provision, contracted or expanded by is held by this court that an indictment un-interpretation in their meanings, so as to exder section 2489, Code 1871, for the alteration empt from punishment those who are not of the record, must charge that the alteration was "wittingly" done, and, if charged that it was "willingly," is fatally defective; that, while it is not always necessary to follow the literal language of the act in framing indictments for statutory offenses, it is essential that either the same words, or words equivalent in meaning and synonymous, should be used. To the same effect are Roberts v. State, 55 Miss. 421; Richburger v. State, 90 Miss. 806, 44 South, 772; State v. Presley, 91 Miss. 377, 44 South. 827. In Monaghan v. State, 66 Miss. 513, 6 South. 241, 4 L. R. A. 800, this court held that "it will not yield for considerations of expediency, and supply by judicial construction what is palpably omitted from the statute." And this court, in State v. Richardson, 86 Miss. 439, 38 South. 497, held that a penal statute must be strictly construed. In Yerger v. State, 91 Miss. 802, 45 South. 849, it was held that, where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the court cannot hold that the Legislature meant something different from the true meaning of the terms used; and in Adams v. Saunders, 93 Miss. 520, 46 South. 960, this court said that the statute then under consideration was penal and must be strictly construed, and applies only where the conduct of the offender comes clearly within the terms of the law; and State v. Henry, 87 Miss. 125, 40 South. 152, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 340, et seq., holds that a state statute, the language of which is plain, must be enforced as written, regardless of the evil to which it might lead, that "a state Legislature is an absolute despot, its acts on all subjects being free from any restriction whatever not found in a state or federal Constitution, and that it is the duty of the courts to enforce the law as written by the Legislature, and not what it (the court) may think should be the law." This court in Stewart v. State, 95 Miss. 627, 49 South. 615, speaking through Mr. Justice Smith, construing this identical statute, says:

within their spirit and purpose, while at the same time, as the last section shows, and as explained in the last chapter, they can never be expanded against the accused, so as to bring within their penalties any person who is not within their letter. Otherwise expressed, whenever the thing done is not within the mischief evidently intended by the statute, though it is within its words, the doer is not punishable, while, on the other hand, one may defend himself by showing, if he can, that either the main part of the enactment or some exceptive clause thereof is so unguardedly worded as to open an escape for him through the letter, his act being still a complete violation of its spirit." Or, as stated by Hawkins (2 Hawk. P. C. c. 18, § 16): "No parallel case which comes within the same mischief shall be construed to be within the purview of the statute, unless it can be brought within the meaning of the, words." "In slightly different language,' though a case of this sort is fully within the mischief to be remedied, and is even of the same class and within the same reason as other cases enumerated in the statute, construction will not be permitted to bring it within the statute, unless it is also within the statutory words." Bishop on Statutory Crimes, § 220, referring to numerous authorities.

The casual reader is apt to seize and emphasize that portion of the statute which says "shall receive any deposit," and the statute does not specify from whom the deposit may be received, and hence it may be argued that the condemnation is directed against the receiving of any deposit from any one. It may be, and doubtless was, the intention of the Legislature to prohibit the reception of any deposit from any one; but it is absolutely certain, from the reading of the statute, that the condemnation was directed, not simply to the receiving of deposits, but against the persons engaged in a

bankers, brokers, etc., engaged in the business of receiving on deposit the money of such persons.

in bringing forward section 2418, Code of 1880, into the Code of 1892, and from that Code into the Code of 1906 as section 1169, which section is the one upon which this prosecution is founded, is that the word "such" was substituted for the word "other" between the words "or" and "persons” in the

[8] To hold this indictment good, it would be necessary to discard and ignore every known rule of grammar-the science which treats of the principles of languages, the study of the forms of speech, and their re-fourth line thereof. Because of this substilations to one another. There is no way or tution of the word "such" for "other," which method known to educated man by which I think was manifestly a mere clerical error, they can interpret human speech, except by appellant contends, first, that the only person construing the words in their relation to one who can commit this crime is an officer or another. Talleyrand, the greatest diplomat agent of a bank, etc., engaged in receiving of Europe, at least in his day, said: "Words deposits from officers or agents of banks, etc., are vehicles by means of which we conceal engaged in a like business, and, second, that our thoughts." This may be true in the dip-in order for the crime to be committed the lomatic service, but it is not to be permitted person making the deposit must be an officer either in the legislative or judicial depart- or agent of a bank, etc., engaged in receiving ment of the government. If the Legislature deposits from officers or agents of banks, etc. intended to cover the contention of the state in this case, it acted upon Talleyrand's idea that words, instead of expressing, conceal one's thoughts. The human fraud may use words for the purpose of concealing his thoughts, but the honest man uses only such words as express his intentions. We cannot fritter or pare away what was perfectly and intelligently expressed by the lawmaker, in order to effectuate what we may suppose was the legislative will.

It is insisted by the state that the use of the word "such" for "other" was a clerical error. But we do not know of any rule or principle which justifies us in so holding. It must be presumed that the Legislature intended to say just exactly what it did say. As said above, the courts have no right to enact a law; but the creation of a crime is exclusively with the Legislature. It may be that the Legislature in enacting this statute did a very unwise thing-that it should make punishable the receiving, by the president, cashier, etc., of any bank on deposit the money of any person, knowing the insolvency of the bank and without informing the depositor of its condition. In our judgment the statute should be amended so as to read, instead of "such" persons, "other" persons, thus making it unlawful for any one engaged in the banking business or brokers' business to receive on deposit the money of other persons while the bank is insolvent, etc.

In conclusion, to put the case in a nutshell: The crime defined by the statute is that certain persons conducting a certain business of receiving on deposit money of "such" persons, etc.; whereas, the indictment charges certain persons conducting a certain business of receiving on deposit money of "other" persons-clearly and manifestly a different of

fense.

Affirmed.

SMITH, J. (dissenting). I am unable to concur in the conclusion reached by my

The first of these contentions my Brethren have upheld; but I am not sure, from the language of their opinion, whether they mean to uphold the second or not. This language is as follows: "It may be, and doubtless was, the intention of the Legislature to prohibit the reception of a deposit from any one; but it is absolutely certain, from a reading of the statute, that the condemnation was directed, not simply to the receiving of deposits, but against the persons engaged in a certain business," etc. When any statute is brought under review by the courts, the only duty they have to discharge is to ascertain the legislative intent, as contained therein, and to give effect thereto. When the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, it is unnecessary to invoke any rule of construction, for in that event the statute itself is its own best interpreter. The first thing to be ascertained, therefore, is whether the language of the statute is ambiguous. That portion of the statute which describes the character of persons who can commit the crime defined, disconnected from the remainder of the statute, is plain and unambiguous; for the word "such," so considered, plainly restricts the commission of the crime to agents and officers of banks, etc., engaged in receiving deposits from agents and officers of banks, etc., engaged in the like business. So, also, when so considered, is that portion of the statute which describes the character of persons for whose benefit the statute was passed; for by it all depositors, irrespective of the business in which they are engaged, are protected. The ambiguity arises when the statute is considered as a whole. When this is done, it becomes doubtful whether the Legislature intended to protect all members of the general public in making deposits in any bank, etc., or all depositors in making deposits in banks, etc., provided such banks, etc., are engaged in receiving deposits from the officers and agents of other banks, etc., or only the offi

The case was tried by the court without a jury on an agreed statement of facts, which is as follows:

"It is agreed that the entire record, as it now appears as case No. 15,052, in the Supreme Court of Mississippi, will be used in so far as it is applicable on the trial of this case, by either party to this litigation.

The chancellor overruled the motion of the filed under section 4312 of the Code of 1906. appellants to dissolve the temporary injunction, and made same perpetual, enjoining the board of supervisors "from further proceeding to collect the said commutation tax by criminal proceedings or through the agency of the other defendants, until it has so shaped its contracts with the road contractors as to put the same in legal force, and until the persons subject to, or claimed to be subject to, road duty in said county, have been placed legally in default as road hands." C. A. French and R. B. Anderson, for appellant. J. McC. Martin, for appellees.

(Supreme Court of Mississippi. Dec. 4, 1911.) TAXATION (§ 485*) - MERCHANDISE - VALUATION EVIDENCE.

In a proceeding to reduce an assessment of plaintiff's stock of merchandise at $50,000 on February 1, 1910, which was destroyed by fire on February 12th following, evidence that plaintiff collected $76,000 insurance thereon was admissible.

[Ed. Note. For other cases, see Taxation, Dec. Dig. § 485.*]

"(2) The following additional facts will be admitted and made a part of the record in this trial, viz.: "That on February 12, 1910, Kuhn Bros., plaintiffs here, were insured against loss or damage by fire on their stock of goods by contract with various insurance companies. That said stock of goods, which was assessed at $50,000, and the assessment of which is here in question, was the subject of the insurance, and that on the 14th day of May, 1910, the sum of $76,000 was paid to said Kuhn Bros. on said contracts of insurance. That all of said contracts of insurance were identical, except as to the respective amounts. That the body of each of said policies was the same insurance contract in common use in this state at the time, and is the same in common use at the present time, and is generally known and described as the New York standard form of insurance policy. That the form attached to each policy, except as to amount, was as follows:

“For Building, Stock and Fixtures, or
Stock only.

$2,500.00. On their stock of merchandise, con-
sisting of dry goods, clothing, no-
tions, and such other merchandise
not more hazardous as is usually
kept for sale by assured.
On store and office furniture and fix-
tures, including iron safe.

None.

None.

All while contained in the threestory and basement brick building with metal roof, occupied as a dry goods and clothing store, situate No. 113, on the west side of North Washington street in Vicksburg, Mississippi.

On the above-described building.

"Iron Safe Clause.

""(1) The assured shall take a complete Appeal from Circuit Court, Warren Coun- itemized inventory of stock on hand at least ty; H. C. Mounger, Judge.

"To be officially reported." Action by Kuhn Bros. against the Board of Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Vicksburg. From a judgment refusing to reduce the assessment of plaintiffs' stock of merchandise, they appeal. Affirmed.

once in each calendar year, and unless such inventory has been taken of the property covered by this policy within twelve calendar months prior to the date thereof, one shall be taken in detail within thirty days after date hereof, or this policy shall be null and void from such date, and upon demand of the assured the unearned premium from such

"(2) The assured shall keep a set of books, which shall clearly and plainly present a complete record of business transacted in ref

This is an appeal from a judgment rendered by the circuit court of Warren county, ap-date shall be returned. proving the action of the board of mayor and aldermen of the city of Vicksburg in refusing to reduce the assessment on the stock of merchandise of appellants, which was as-erence to the property herein mentioned, insessed on February 1, 1910, for $50,000, and was destroyed by fire on February 12, 1910. The petition for reduction in assessment was

cluding all purchases, sales, and shipments, both for cash and credit, from the date of the inventory provided for in the preceding

section, and during the life of this policy, or equipment is in full compliance with the this policy shall be null and void.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Criminal be liable only pro rata with such other in- Law, Cent. Dig. § 1676; Dec. Dig. § 723.*] surance for any direct loss by lightning, whether such other insurance be against direct loss by lightning or not.