cessary-ȧεì KaTÀ TAνтà EXOVтa. In these passages, neicessary—ἀεὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα. ther Paul nor Plato mean by the unseen things a mere negation of sense, namely, that which is simply concealed from view as a present fact, or not seen because belonging to a future untried state of existence; but rather those things that are in their very nature invisible, that is, which belong not to the sensible world-either the present or any one to come—the νοητά as distinguished from the αἰσθητά, or the objects of faith and reason as distinguished from the objects of sense. See, also, Rom., i., 20.

We find the doctrine of the hyle in the apocryphal book entitled The Wisdom of Solomon, ch. xi., 18: Kaì kтíoασα τὸν κόσμον ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης— having built the earth out of the unformed, or, rather, formless hyle." Compare, also, the Septuagint version of Genesis, i., 2: ǹ đè yñ ñv ảópaτος καὶ ἀκατασκεύαστος. The word ἀόρατος here could only have been used in reference to the Greek doctrine, which represented the hyle not only as invisible, but as incapable of being seen; in fact, as not belonging at all to the sensible world, even if it could not be ranked among the vonτá. It may be doubted whether we ever ought, in translating the more strict philosophers, to render vλŋ by our term matter, unless we can conceive of it as an essence abstracted from qualities, figure, and extension. That God may have created such an essence we have no right to deny, merely because our minds can form no conception of it; and if it may exist as the originally created ground of all subsequently generated or created material things when manifested in time and space and clothed with qualities by that Eternal Spirit, which, we are told in Genesis, hovered over the chaotic deep, then may the doctrine of Plato and of the more spiritual writers of the ancient world be in accordance with the philosophy of Paul, Hebrews, xi., 3.

Our only safety here is in clinging to the Bible, and to the fair interpretation of Genesis, i., 1. Human reason left

to itself, finds tremendous difficulties in both views; and when she rejects the aid of revelation, must shrink from taking a decided position on either. The belief that matter in any form, as an independent principle, is eternal, or that anything is such apart from God, carries us to atheism, although it may be maintained by an honest yet inconsistent theist. On the other hand, the doctrine that God once existed alone, or that there was a time when God was all, seems to draw after it the strange consequences that he never could have ceased to be all, or have become less than all, and that therefore creation is but an extension of his being; or, in other words, we are in danger of a pantheism seemingly more philosophical, yet less favourable to piety than the inconsistent theism which we have condemned. Reason reels and staggers here like a drunken man, and if she will walk alone, finds a dark abyss on each side of her narrow path, into which she is perpetually in danger of stumbling. There may possibly be a way between these two conclusions, but her eyes are too dim to discover it. The Scriptures most solemnly declare that God did call into being things that were not, and yet denies the conse. quence which reason, if she will trust herself alone, can hardly avoid deducing from it. We must, therefore, on this subject, as on the doctrine of evil, keep close to revelation, ready at a moment's warning, and without a murmur, to give up our most darling philosophy, if it comes at all in collision with any truth which a sound and unforced interpretation would elicit. Neither should we be afraid for our Protestantism, even if we are reluctant to adopt any interpretation which differs from that long received by the Church; by which we ever mean that line of the good, and pious, and learned in the Scriptures, in all ages, which no spiritually-minded reader of ecclesiastical history can ever. fail to trace. In such a case as this, too, we should feel that the most pious interpretation is most likely to be true,

even if it should not seem to be the most philosophical. If we cannot comprehend a positive enunciation of the great truth, we must be content with a negative one, better adapted, perhaps, to the present state of our faculties, and believe by faith that the worlds were not made of things which do

appear.

There is a passage in the Sophista in which Plato speaks plainly of a creation by the direct act of God, and that, too, from things which before were not. It is very much in the style of the Scriptures, and no better refutation of some of the charges against him could be given than this clear declaration from this undoubted dialogue: Zwa dǹ távтa θνητὰ καὶ φυτά, ὅσα τ' ἐπὶ γῆς ἐκ σπερμάτων καὶ ῥιζῶν φύεται, καὶ ὅσα ἄψυχα ἐν γῇ ξυνίσταται-μῶν ἄλλου τι νὸς ἢ θεοῦ δημιουργοῦντος φήσομεν ὕστερον ΓΙΓΝΕΣΘΑΙ πρότερον οὐκ ὌΝΤΑ—“In regard to all mortal animals and plants, whatever things grow from roots and seeds, whatever inanimate organizations exist in the earth-can we say that from any other cause than the creating God they come into being which before were not?" Sophista, 265, B.

PAGE 58, LINE 3. ὅπως ᾗ ἡ τῷ τοῦ παντὸς βίῳ ὑπάρχουoa ɛvdaíμwv ovoía-" All generation, or every generation, is taking place in such a manner that the essence which pertains to the universal life (or life of the whole) may be blessed." This is the best rendering we can give of this obscure passage. Ast translates it, ut universæ vitæ felix obtingat status. It is not clear what Plato means by the expression, ἡ οὐσία ὑπάρχουσα τῷ παντὸς βίῳ ; whether the life of the universe taken collectively as the sum of all which exists-in which case it would seem that ẞíos Tov Tavτòç would have been sufficient-or whether he intends by ovoía something higher than this, namely, that essence from which the life of the universe proceeds, or, in other words, the Universal Numen or Deity himself. If the last

view be the true one, Plato approaches a higher doctrine than has ever been supposed to be taught in his pages.

LI.

Doctrine that the Parts are made only for the Whole, as set forth by Plato, and as viewed by Modern Rationalists and Semi-infidels. The Converse Doctrine, that the Whole is also for the Parts, examined with reference to the Mutual Harmony of both.

PAGE 58, LINE 4. οὐκ ἕνεκα σοῦ γιγνομένη, σὺ δὲ ἕνεκα Ekɛívov. The doctrine that the parts are made for the whole is unquestionably true, especially when viewed in reference to physical ends alone. It is, however, only a portion of the truth, and when, as in Pope's Essay on Man, and in the writings of many scientific religionists, it is unqualified by any other views of the system of the universe, it may be very far from any true religious tendency. In. deed, in some minds, it might easily coalesce with atheism; and although its advocates may sometimes seem to talk devoutly, it has much more of the appearance of philosophy than of piety about it. It is a speculative tenet, not much dwelt upon in the Scriptures, and, instead of being directly expressed there, is rather implied in a higher truth, to which, as we have intimated, Plato might have been darkly aiming in the language referred to in the close of the preceding dissertation, namely, the doctrine that the whole itself, with all its parts severally and collectively, is made, not for itself, but for a manifestation of the Divine glory and blessedness; a doctrine, the object of most bitter dislike to the frigid rationalist, but which contains an inexpressible moral sublimity to the mind that will have no philosophy which is not in accordance with the teachings of the Sacred Volume.

Irrespective, however, of this higher truth, the proposition here set forth has a converse which is also equally true, namely, that the whole is made for the parts. This is not the opposite of the other, for in that case they could not both be true, but, as we have styled it, its converse. It might be maintained even on physical grounds. "An organized product," says Kant, "is that in which all the parts are mutually ends and means," that is, not merely in respect to those below them in the scale, but each severally and reciprocally in respect to all the rest. In a much higher sense is this true of that organized product so appropriately styled by the scholastic name The Universe. Even on physical grounds, then, may we say, that the whole is as much necessary to make each part what it is, and without which it could not have been what it is, as the parts are for the completion and harmony of the whole.

It is chiefly, however, in a moral point of view that this converse doctrine assumes a most glorious and thrilling interest. There are some seemingly most inconsiderable portions of the creation for which we are assured that all things are working together for good: τοῖς ἀγαπῶσι τὸν Θεὸν ΠΑΝΤΑ συνεργεῖ εἰς ἀγαθόν. Romans, viii., 28. So, also, 1 Corinthians, iii., 21, 22: IIANTA vμ☎v εσTIV —ALL things are yours; whether THE WORLD,* or life, or death, or the present, or the future, ALL are yours—ñávта νμ☎ν εOTIV. There are again, on the other hand, other parts, of no higher rank, for which all things are working together for evil. "If nothing else," says one of the ablest writers of modern times, "if nothing else, our sins shall give us consequence." Although the other doctrine may be speculatively correct, yet these latter are the views which have the greatest prominence given to them in revelation. The Author of the Bible does not intend that man shall hide himself in an affectation of insignificance, or cover up his

* Here κóoμos must certainly be taken in its largest sense.