radical. Sometimes the positive is strictly deponent, while in other cases it has an active voice in use; but even then the privative form in w is the privative, not of the active, but of the middle; as, for example, rεi0w, to persuade; Tεíloμaι, to obey or trust; àπeléw, to be disobedient. In illustration of this peculiarity, we may mention, as some of the most usual cases, although by no means the whole, πείθομαι, to obey, ἀπειθέω (not ἀπείθομαι), to be disobedient; douaι, to be glad, andéw, to feel disgust, or displeasure; vμéquaι ¿vovμiéqual, to be angry, or under mental excitement, ȧ0vμέw, to be without spirit, or discouraged; κndoμal, to be concerned about anything, åkŋdéw, to be careless or unconcerned; Kooμéw, to put in order, to regulate, kooμéopaι, to keep one's self in order, or to act in a comely manner, ȧкoσμɛw, the negative, not of the active, but of the middle or passive, namely, to be without order, or to act in a licentious or disorderly manner; ëλπw, to raise hopes, Eλπoμaι, to hope, déλπw, or dɛλπтéw, to despair; μέλομαι, οι μελέομαι, ἐπιμελέομαι, to take care of, or be concerned for, ἀμελέω, to neglect, μηχανάομαι, οι μηχανέομαι, to plan, to invent, àμnxavéw, to be without plans, to be at a loss; Bovλouar, to be willing, abovλéw, to be unwilling, or refuse-although this word has oftener, perhaps, the sense of inconsiderateness, or want of reflection, as though it were the privative of βουλεύω-τρομέομαι, to tremble, άτρομέω, or ἀτρεμέω, to be undisturbed ; φείδομαι, to spare, ἀφειδέω, to be lavish, or prodigal. Compare, also, xapíšoμai, ȧxaριστέω ψεύδομαι, ἀψευδέω, ἀψευστέω-δύναμαι, ἀδυνατέωσέβομαι, ἀσεβέω, &c. It may be observed, that in most of these cases the form with a privative is not the direct negative either of the active or the middle; that is, is not simply the denial of a reflex action, but expresses rather a negative state of mind. As, for example, ȧπɛɛiv, besides being wholly different from μὴ πείθειν, is not even equivalent to μὴ πείθεσθαι, το which it seems to have the nearest alliance, but expresses rather that positive condition of the soul from which all acts of disobedience do proceed. So, also, in the passage from the text, ἀμελεῖν is not the same as μὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, but rather expresses that sluggish, indifferent, careless disposition, which is so utterly opposed to all right views of the Divine nature. Μὴ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι may or may not involve criminality, as may be seen from the manner in which it is used page 50, lines 8, 10. It may result from want of power, or a variety of other justifying reasons. ̓Αμελεῖν always implies fault, and is always to be taken in an unfavourable sense. So, also, μὴ πείθεσθαι, οι μὴ πιστεύειν, may be consistent with freedom from all blame, according to the presence or absence of other circumstances; but åñει0εiv must always be associated with condemnation, as implying an unbelieving and guilty condition of the soul. This is the force of the word as used by our Saviour, John, iii., 36 : ὁ δὲ ἀπειθῶν οὐχ ὄψεται ζωήν—The unbelieving shall never see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him. For these reasons, perhaps, these verbs fell into an intransitive sense, leaving the denial of the action of the positive form to be expressed by the negative particles. And perhaps, also, because they differ somewhat from the mere negation of the reflex action of the middle, they retain, for distinction's sake, the active form; although, at first view, such privative words would seem, of all others, the most foreign to the ordinary use of that voice. XLVII. Great Things cannot Exist without Small. Application of the Maxim to the Doctrine of a Special Providence, Education, and to Politics. PAGE 55, LINE 5. Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ κυβερνήταις, οὐδὲ στρατηγοῖς οὐδ ̓ αὖ πολιτικοῖς χωρὶς τῶν σμικρῶν μεγάλα. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄνευ σμικρῶν τοὺς μεγάλους φασὶν οἱ λιθολόγοι λίθους εÙ KεTσOαι" Neither to pilots, nor to commanders, nor to political men, can great things exist without small things; for, as the stone-masons say, neither do large stones lie well together in a structure without the small." This maxim is capable of the widest range. It is not only applicable to stone-masons, and politicians, and to the sublime argument of Plato here in favour of a special providence, but is also of the highest importance in respect to education, and well worthy the attention of all teachers of youth. For want of a patient and laborious care in respect to what may seem the more minute elements of science, a structure is often erected without cohesion or symmetry, and destined. through the looseness of its parts, to fall to pieces almost as soon as completed. As Plato applies the maxim here to politicians, so, also, Aristotle, in his Politica, lib. ii., 2, institutes a similar comparison in respect to government, and shows that it is essential to the very constitution of a sound and healthy state that its individual elements should be small things mingled with great, in such a way as to give coherence and sympathy to the whole. In pursuance of this same idea, he condemns those theorists who, even in his day, advocated the impracticable doctrine of perfect equality, and charges them with being the greatest enemies to that very idea of unity which they would be thought so zealously to maintain. The levelling dogma, he admits, is plausible, and apparently most philanthropic-εὐπρόσωπος καὶ φιλάνθρωπος äv eivai dóžeiεv-but, in the end, instead of being productive of the greatest happiness of the greatest number, it is fraught with the seeds of all evil both to individuals and to the state. As unity implies plurality and variety, so, he declares, there can be no true unity in sameness. There can be no binding sympathy except in a community of higher and lower, lesser and greater interests. As well might one attempt to construct a wall with round, smooth pebbles, all of the same size and fashion, or produce harmony from strings all of the same length and tension; which, as he justly remarks, might furnish an insipid homophony, but never a true symphony: ὥσπερ κἂν εἴ τις τὴν συμφωνίαν ποιήσειεν ὁμοφωνίαν, ἢ τὸν ῥυθμὸν βάσιν μίαν. Politica, ii., 2. There is a singular passage in the Ajax of Sophocles, in which we think there is had in view this same comparison of great and little stones, although the word is not expressly mentioned in the Greek. He also applies it, in the same manner, to those wild and disorganizing doctrines of government, which would destroy all confidence and all mutual support, by exciting an unholy jealousy between the rich and the poor. The passage is interesting, if for no other purpose, to show how precisely the same, in temper and in argument, have been the demagogues of all ages: Πρὸς γὰρ τὸν ἔχονθ' ὁ φθόνος ἔρπει. Αλλ' οὐ δυνατὸν τοὺς ἀνοήτους τούτων γνώμας προδιδάσκειν.—Αjax, 151. Which we would thus attempt to render, by way of improvement on Potter's version, in which, we think, he has overlooked the implied simile, and thus failed to bring out its principal beauty: Thus envy secretly assails the rich. And yet small stones, unmingled with the great, The high and low in mutual sympathy Sustain each other; yet this truth is one Which fools can never learn. No one, we think, can fail to admire the still higher and yet most just application which Plato makes of this striking comparison to the government of the Divine Architect, and to the doctrine of a special providence. XLVIII. Gentleness of Plato's Mode of Argument, and its Peculiar Adaptation to the Minds of the Young. PAGE 57, LINE 2. Τῷ γε βιάζεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις, κ. τ. λ. The propriety of this word will best appear in a paraphrase of the spirit of the whole passage. It suggests some such train of thought as this: "We have now addressed his reason, and by a summary yet conclusive syllogism, forcibly, as it were, compelled him to admit the incorrectness of his positions. Still, although his reason is silenced, his feelings or imagination may yet refuse to surrender, and may revolt at the idea that the Deity is concerned in all the apparently trivial and minute operations of the universe. There seems, therefore, in addition, to be need of some soothing charms (έπd☎ν), some gentle persuasions, to overcome those prejudices or distastes which will not yield to reason." Ἐπάδειν (ἐπῳδή), with its derivatives, is a favourite word with Plato. What a sublime beauty does it possess in the Phædon, where Socrates, after having gone through the strongest and most recondite arguments that reason could array for a future life, makes, as his ground of confidence, the cheering hope which the belief produces in the soul, and those sweet persuasions of a moral kind, which surpass in power all the deductions of the intellect; "for noble is the prize (he says), and great the hope"-καλὸν γὰρ τὸ ἄθλον καὶ ἡ ἐλπὶς μεγάλη. And then, after having gone through the mythical representations of the unseen world, he tells us that the soul must ever chant these to itself as some soothing incantation (τοιαῦτα χρὴ |