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and to claim the merit of being very religious, because it graciously admits the Divine existence and intelligence, while yet it denies everything which could make that existence an object of love, or fear, or of any interest of any kind beyond what might be felt in the contemplation of a mathematical theorem. The ancient Epicureans sometimes affected this kind of sentimental religionism,* some specimens of which we find admirably set forth, in all their hollowness, in Cicero's treatise De Natura Deorum, lib. i., s. 41: Ac etiam de sanctitate, de pietate scripsit Epicurus. quo modo in his loquitur? Ut Coruncianum aut Scævolam pontifices maximos te audire dicas: non eum, qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem? Quid est enim, cur Deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, quum Dii non modo homines non colant, sed omnino nihil curent, nihil agant? Sec. 42: Horum enim sententiæ omnium non modo super. stitionem tollunt, in qua inest timor inanis Deorum; sed etiam religionem, quæ Deorum cultu pio continetur. Sec. 43: Epicurus vero ex animis hominum extraxit radicibus religionem, quum Diis immortalibus et opem et gratiam sustulit. Quum enim optimam et præstantissimam naturam Dei dicat esse, negat idem esse in Deo gratiam. Tollit id quod maxime proprium est optimæ præstantissimæque naturæ.

How well, also, might what follows apply to those sentimental followers of Spinoza, who, rapt in philosophical adoration of "the holiness of nature and of the awe of the infinite," do yet, in their high and transcendental spirituality, so vehemently condemn the sensual philosophy of Epicurus. At enim liber est Epicurei de sanctitate. Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto, quam ad scribendi licentiam libero, Quæ enim potest esse sanctitas, si Dii humana non curant?

* This word cannot probably be found in any English dictionary, and yet nothing seemed so well adapted to the idea we wished to express, namely, that species of scientific piety which abounds so much in such modern books as Nichols's Architecture of the Heavens, and in the lectures of Dr. Dionysius Lardner.

XLIV.

The True Dignity of Man his Religious Nature. Analysis of the Words Σέβας, Εὐσέβεια, &c.

PAGE 53, LINE 2. Οὐκοῦν δὴ τάγε ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα τῆς τε ἐμψύχου μετέχει φύσεως ἅμα, καὶ θεοσεβέστατον, κ. T. λ. This is said by way of magnifying the importance of man; although, even when regarded as one of the least parts of the universe, he would not, as has been shown, be beneath the care of a special providence. Two things are said to enhance his dignity. He partakes of an animated nature, and he is of all animals the most religious. Compare the Protagoras, 522, Α. : Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέχει μοίρας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ξυγγένειαν, ζώων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισε, καὶ ἐπιχείρει βωμούς τε ἱδρύεσθαι καὶ ἀγάλματα θεῶν—“ And since man shares in the divine, he alone, of all animals, through his relationship to the Deity, believes in the existence of Gods, and undertakes to establish altars in their honour." Compare, also, Ovid, Metamorph., lib. i., 70:

Sanctius his animal mentisque capacius altæ
Deerat adhuc-

Pronaque quum spectant animalia cætera terram,
Os homini sublime dedit, cœlumque tueri

Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus.

Ανθρώπινα πράγματα is equivalent here to οἱ ἄνθρωποι ; the form of the words being probably affected by the neuter ζῶον. For the same reason we have αὐτό instead of αὐτός which we should have expected. It is by the attraction of Swov, understood or implied in wwv. See remarks on this peculiarity of the Greek language, page 203. It is, how. ever, to be used here as if connected with av@pwπоç; and is the same as though we should say in English, the animal man itself is the most religious, &c.

The words θεοσεβέστατον, θεοσέβεια, are etymologically formed on the same idea with the Hebrew phrase, л nin, the fear of the Lord, which is the Old Testament term for religion or piety. Aelodauovía contains etymolo. gically the same radical conception, but is almost always used in a lower and somewhat bad sense, as, for example, by Paul, Acts, xvii., 22. It partakes of the degeneracy of its component, daíuwv; and as that became only another name for Fortune, so this sinks down into superstition, or that fear and worship of Fortune, Destiny, and other imaginary personifications, which is closely allied to atheism. Aɛioidapovía is seldom, if ever, taken for the pure and reverential fear of God; while, on the other hand, θεοσέ bela, or its equivalent, evσébɛia, is made the parent of all the other virtues, and the first in the estimation of Heaven. Thus Plato speaks of it in the Epinomis, or whoever was the author of that dialogue: μείζον γὰρ μόριον ἀρετῆς μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς ποτε πείθῃ τῆς εὐσεβείας τῷ θνητῷ γένει. Εpinomis, 989, B. To the same effect Sophocles, in the Philoctetes, 1442:

Εὐσεβεῖτε πρὸς θεούς·

ὡς τἄλλ ̓ ἅπαντα δεύτερ ̓ ἡγεῖται Πατὴρ
Ζεύς. οὐ γὰρ ἡὐσέβεια συνθνήσκει βροτοῖς·
κἂν ζῶσι, κἂν θάνωσιν, οὐκ ἀπόλλυται;

or, in other words, all virtues arising out of mere earthly relations are temporary, and must perish. Piety alone survives the grave. The primary root, σébaç, signifying wonder, astonishment, awe, is sometimes used for the very Numen or Divinity himself, examples of which are frequently to be found in Pindar and Æschylus. The verb is sometimes apparently employed for Tuav, to signify reverence towards human magistrates. This, however, is only a secondary sense, and the primary still holds its place in the ancient idea that magistrates represented the Divine authority, and that judges stood to us in the place of the Elohim. The

ultimate radical may be the Hebrew ya, juravit, and this perhaps remotely connected in meaning with ya, the sacred number seven.

XLV.

Men compared to Sheep of the Divine Pasture. Language of Plato on this Subject in Harmony with the Scriptures.

PAGE 53, LINE 6. Θεῶν γε μὴν κτήματά φαμεν εἶναι, κ. T. 2. This comparison is quite a favourite with Plato. Thus Socrates says in the Phædon, 62, B.: 'Aλλà Tódɛ γέ μοι δοκεῖ εὖ λέγεσθαι τὸ θεοὺς εἶναι ἡμῶν τοὺς ἐπιμε λουμένους, καὶ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἓν τῶν κτημάτων τοῖς vεois elvai "This seems to me to be well said, that the Gods are our keepers, and that we are among their flocks or possessions;" from which he deduces an admirable argument against the lawfulness of suicide. It is worthy of note, too, that this is evidently referred to as a saying which had come down from the olden time; and in this light it furnishes a pleasing evidence of the piety and sound religious philosophy of the primitive or patriarchal ages. The same comparison may be found in Plato's romance of Atlantis, where he speaks of the care which the Gods took of the inhabitants of that blessed isle, and in which he represents them as forming a perfect theocracy : καὶ κατοικίσαντες οἷον νομεῖς κτήματα καὶ ποίμνια καὶ θρέμματα ἑαυτῶν nμãs eτρεpov. Critias, 109, C. Compare the present treatise, page 69, line 2 : ξύμμαχοι δὲ ἡμῖν θεοί τε ἅμα καὶ δαίμονες· ἡμεῖς δ' αὖ κτήματα θεῶν καὶ δαιμόνων— The Gods and Genii are our helpers, for we are the flocks or possessions of the Gods and guardian divinities."

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Whatever may have been the origin of the sentiment and of the expression, it is, with the exception of the use of the plural dev, not only purely Scriptural in its conception,

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but also in the very language. For proof of this, compare Psalm c., 3: For we are his people and the sheep of his pasture. He hath made us, and his are we; as the Hebrew, ib, in accordance with the Keri, should be translated. He will feed his flock like a shepherd. Isaiah, xl., 11. From this ancient idea of the resemblance which the Divine as well as kingly authority bore to the pastoral relation, came the noun Tоun, in that frequent Homeric meaning of ruler or shepherd of the people—

Αγαμέμνονα ποιμένα λαών

as also the verb πоaívw, in that sense of ruling which we find in the Septuagint version of Psalm ii., 9; Matthew, ii., 6; Rev., ii., 27; vii., 17; xii., 5; xix., 15.

XLVI.

Peculiarity of certain Negative Forms of Greek Verbs.

be

PAGE 55, LINES 1, 2. Επιμελουμένῳ . . . ἀμελοῦντι. Why does the positive, in this word, take the middle or deponent, and the negative or privative the active voice? It may difficult to explain the philosophy of this and of many other matters in the Greek, yet we would simply advert to the fact, that this is the case with a very large number of verbs ; and even to such an extent as to entitle it to be justly regarded as one of the peculiarities, or well-settled idioms of the language. Indeed, we seldom, if ever, find a word strictly negative or privative of the middle form. The active form of the privative, it is true, sometimes slightly varies from what would be the analogical active of the middle or deponent positive in use; yet still, not to such a degree as to affect the principle to which we have adverted. The former is generally in a pure, while the middle or deponent may be in oua; and sometimes the latter is compounded with a preposition, while the former has only the simple

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