view be the true one, Plato approaches a higher doctrine than has ever been supposed to be taught in his pages. LI. Doctrine that the Parts are made only for the Whole, as set forth by Plato, and as viewed by Modern Rationalists and Semi-infidels. The Converse Doctrine, that the Whole is also for the Parts, examined with reference to the Mutual Harmony of both. PAGE 58, LINE 4. οὐκ ἕνεκα σοῦ γιγνομένη, σὺ δὲ ἕνεκα Ekɛívov. The doctrine that the parts are made for the whole is unquestionably true, especially when viewed in reference to physical ends alone. It is, however, only a portion of the truth, and when, as in Pope's Essay on Man, and in the writings of many scientific religionists, it is unqualified by any other views of the system of the universe, it may be very far from any true religious tendency. In. deed, in some minds, it might easily coalesce with atheism; and although its advocates may sometimes seem to talk devoutly, it has much more of the appearance of philosophy than of piety about it. It is a speculative tenet, not much dwelt upon in the Scriptures, and, instead of being directly expressed there, is rather implied in a higher truth, to which, as we have intimated, Plato might have been darkly aiming in the language referred to in the close of the preceding dissertation, namely, the doctrine that the whole itself, with all its parts severally and collectively, is made, not for itself, but for a manifestation of the Divine glory and blessedness; a doctrine, the object of most bitter dislike to the frigid rationalist, but which contains an inexpressible moral sublimity to the mind that will have no philosophy which is not in accordance with the teachings of the Sacred Volume. Irrespective, however, of this higher truth, the proposition here set forth has a converse which is also equally true, namely, that the whole is made for the parts. This is not the opposite of the other, for in that case they could not both be true, but, as we have styled it, its converse. It might be maintained even on physical grounds. "An organized product," says Kant, "is that in which all the parts are mutually ends and means," that is, not merely in respect to those below them in the scale, but each severally and reciprocally in respect to all the rest. In a much higher sense is this true of that organized product so appropriately styled by the scholastic name The Universe. Even on physical grounds, then, may we say, that the whole is as much necessary to make each part what it is, and without which it could not have been what it is, as the parts are for the completion and harmony of the whole. It is chiefly, however, in a moral point of view that this converse doctrine assumes a most glorious and thrilling interest. There are some seemingly most inconsiderable portions of the creation for which we are assured that all things are working together for good: τοῖς ἀγαπῶσι τὸν Θεὸν ΠΑΝΤΑ συνεργεῖ εἰς ἀγαθόν. Romans, viii., 28. So, also, 1 Corinthians, iii., 21, 22: ПANTA vμ☎v ŠσTIV —ALL things are yours; whether THE WORLD,* or life, or death, or the present, or the future, ALL are yours—ñáντα ὑμῶν ἐστιν. There are again, on the other hand, other parts, of no higher rank, for which all things are working together for evil. "If nothing else," says one of the ablest writers of modern times, "if nothing else, our sins shall give us consequence." Although the other doctrine may be speculatively correct, yet these latter are the views which have the greatest prominence given to them in revelation. The Author of the Bible does not intend that man shall hide himself in an affectation of insignificance, or cover up his * Here κóσμos must certainly be taken in its largest sense. individualism in what the sentimental humility of his philosophy might style his subserviency to the interests of the universal life. The proposition, against the abuse of which we are contending, might seem, at first view, to be grounded on more enlarged and comprehensive notions of existence. It has so much to say of the great whole, and of a kind of Strauss-ian immortality, which belongs to the race rather than to the individual parts. It is, however, mainly true in a physical aspect; and when it occupies the mind alone, or the moral importance of the individual is not held up as a corrective, it becomes a cold and speculative fatalism-a physical fatalism, in the worst sense of the term, which would bind both matter and spirit, not by the decrees* of a moral governor, founded on moral reasons, but in the adamantine chain of law viewed as something apart from God-a fatalism which would regard even the Deity himself, should it graciously admit his existence, as included in the machinery of the universe. Such a doctrine possesses but little, if any, superiority over the creed of the atheist. Akin to this is that profession of abstract benevolence which loses sight of individuality in the contemplation of masses or of the great whole, and affects to regard individual happiness only as contributing to the general happiness of the universe. This, although it may be agreeable to the speculative intellect, or to those whose theology is but a philosophy, is nevertheless most chilling to all the moral and religious affections. Its concrete selfishness is only hardened and rendered darker, while, at the same time, it is more and more concealed from the conscience, by the false warmth and glow of an abstract benevolence. Its love to God is only a pantheistic rapture, instead of a feeling of gratitude to a personal Redeemer.. Its affection to man is not that love to one's neighbour which the Bible en *This unquestionably was the primitive sense of the word fatum. tioned in the passage lately quoted (page 247) from the ninth book of the Laws. A life of ascetic virtue was the remedy which he would in general propose; although, in the pride of philosophy, he was but little aware how utterly defective is any thing which bears the name of human virtue, when laid by the side of that Holy Law which "pierces even to the dividing asunder of the soul and the spirit, and is a discerner of all the thoughts and intents of the heart." To a Christian mind this silence in regard to an atonement is the second great fault in Plato's theology. The other is his doctrine of an original independent evil principle. This being closely connected with the dogma of the innate evil of matter, through which the soul was tainted, led him naturally to teach an ascetic mode of purification to the exclusion of any external, forensic, and vicarious atonement. He preached much and most eloquently against the lusts of the flesh as the cause and essence of all depravity; but his philosophy contains but slight recognition of those sins of the spirit in which the much-denounced body has no share, and which may be supposed to belong to a purely spiritual being as well as to one who is enclosed in the grossest robes of matter. Hence it is easy to see how these two errors, although apparently so remote, have a common origin and a common seat in depraved and blinded human nature; and how all, whether out of the Church or in the Church, who have endeavoured to rectify it in a manner different from that pointed out in the Bible, have ever stumbled on this same point, namely, the teaching of an ascetic mode of purification, through the penances and mortification of the flesh, not as auxiliary and disciplinary, but as remedial and saving. In respect to the doctrine of an atonement, the Greek poets are more often in accordance with the Bible, and those traditions which had come down from a remote antiquity, than our philosopher. Even in the very practices whose superstitious observances he condemns, and justly condemns, there may be manifested that deep sense of the need of expiation which has been felt in all ages-which has formed a part of all false religions, and of all corruptions of the true—and which only finds repose in a believing and intelligent view of the doctrine of the cross. His argument, however, is sound, as directed against some of the practices which prevailed in the Greek religion, and which operated equally with atheism in encouraging the most abominable licentiousness; for their great design was not so much to take away sin, or the consciousness of sin, as to avert its consequences.* It is the glory of the Gospel that God is παραιτητός that he can be propitiated; while the awful sacrifice by which it is accomplished levels in the dust all the pride of human virtue, and all the lofty aspirations of human philosophy. It relieves the penitent and believing spirit from that gloomy sentiment of the Grecian poet, which has ever weighed so heavily on the dark heathen mind— Διὸς γὰρ δυσπαραίτητοι φρένες while yet it gives no countenance to that false, presumptuous belief in the Divine placability, against which Plato is here contending, and on which some in our own day would lay so much stress. With such, whether ancient or modern, it is not the Divine mercy which they would exalt— for that has no meaning separate from the Divine justice— but, rather, that idol attribute of their own imaginations, which is so well expressed, in this very argument, by the Greek word paovuía; that sluggish indolence, indifference, or good-nature, to use a common expression, which constitutes the prime attribute of the Deity of the ancient Epicurean and the modern sentimentalist. * See remarks on this distinction, note 1, page 4. + Eschylus, Prom. Vinct., 34. |