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permitted to behold him. He maketh his angels winds, his ministers a fiery flame, as the inspired Apostle renders it, Heb., i., 17; and not, as it would be explained by the rationalizing interpreter, he maketh the winds his messengers, and the flaming fire his servants. The angels of the Lord are ever encamped round about the righteous, although we have but one example in the Bible of the glorious vision being revealed to mortal eyes. See 2 Kings, vi., 17.

The great objection to this view, as it would present itself to some minds, would spring from the prejudice to which Plato alludes in the Epinomis, 982, D., E., and on which we have remarked, pages 226, 227. Men are so much inclined to associate undeviating regularity and constancy in physical motions with a nature implying the absence of a special will and reason; as though an animated personal agency must necessarily be sometimes freaky and capricious in its operations as evidences of the exercise of a personal volition. One answer to such an objection is furnished at once by maintaining that all such intermediate spiritual powers are under the constant control of the Supreme Will and Reason, producing the regularity of natural sequence, not as though it needed such sequences at all as indispensable helps to itself, but for our sakes, that by means of them, as signs, we might be able to exercise faith in the general constancy of the Divine operations, and regulate our own conduct in accordance with it. When, however, this feeling becomes practical atheism, prevailing to any great extent among mankind, we have reason to believe that God will come forth, as Plato says in the Politicus, from his retired place of observation, break up the long repose of nal

* There are also in the Bible intimations that evil supernatural agents, under the dominion of the Prince of the Powers of the Air, are sometimes permitted to exercise a physical influence in the affairs of our globe, and thus to afflict men with disease both of mind and body. See Luke, xiii., 16; Job, i., 12; ii., 6, 7.

tion be favourable to such a position, yet what right would we have to extend this to the immense scale of the universe, unless impelled to it by the unconscious working of this innate law of our moral nature? If this world were filled with happiness to overflowing, how could so narrow an induction dare to step beyond its limits? What is our position, with infinite space all around us, and two illimitable eternities, before and behind us, that we should draw any inferences from a mere induction of facts as to the moral attributes of the Deity, unless in the soul itself there is some sure foundation for faith in their existence? If, however, on the other hand, we are actually compelled to reverse the picture, and to assert that misery, in our world at least, forms the rule, and happiness the exception-if the Bible tells us that man is born to sorrow-i -if Plato declares that our good things are much fewer in number than our evil things-and if the true voice of humanity has responded in all ages to these assertions both of profane and Holy Writ

-on what ground can we yet cling to the belief in the Di. vine benevolence, except by relying on the deep conviction of that moral sense, which tells us, and, even though worlds on worlds should exhibit facts to the contrary, would still tell us, that God is good.

If no induction can prove it, neither can any induction strip us of the belief as long as the soul remains true to herself. There is within us something higher than the speculative or the inductive reason, which exclaims, as the spontaneous sentiment of the soul, which she can neither demonstrate nor reject, If there be a God, he must be good, and must delight in goodness. The Judge of all the Earth must do right. In proof of this, Plato does not hesitate to appeal here to the consciences even of his supposed opponents, and therefore he says, Tévte övtes—all five of us, namely, the three parties to the dialogue, and the two imaginary disputants who speculatively deny a providence; as

much as to say, Here we all agree-here there is no need of argument; we all admit that, if there is a God, he must be good, however much we may differ as to that in which his goodness consists.

XLIII.

Sublime Mode in which the Bible represents the Divine Providence and Omniscience as contrasted with all mere Philos ophizing on these Attributes. Analysis of the Greek Word 'Avôpɛía, as denoting one of the Cardinal Virtues of Soul. PAGE 52, LINE 2. Δειλίας γὰρ ἔκγονος, κ. τ. λ. By con necting this with what is said, page 46, line 10, åpeτns μèv ἀνδρείαν εἶναι, δειλίαν δὲ, κακίας, we get the whole argument, which may be thus stated: We admit the Gods to be good; avôpɛía is a part of virtue; dɛɩλía is its opposite; apyía is the offspring of deiλía: therefore it cannot be through ȧpyía and palvuía that the Gods neglect the affairs of men. He had before proved that it could not be from want of power. This is conclusive. As a matter of reasoning, it is admirably stated, and is in itself unanswerable. And yet in a manner how different from all this parade of argument do the Scriptures treat this subject of the Divine providence and omniscience. How sublimely do they assume all these positions, without reasoning at all about them. The Lord looks down from heaven. His eyes behold, and his eyelids try the ways of the children of men. He knoweth our sitting down and our rising up. He understandeth our thought afar off. He never slumbereth nor sleepeth that keepeth Israel. As the mountains are round about Jerusalem, so the Lord is round about his people from henceforth and for evermore. The eyes. of the Lord are in every place, beholding the evil and the good. This is the style worthy of a Divine revelation; and how poor aoes our cold philosophizing, even in its best, and loft

iest, and most religious efforts, appear in the comparison. Who can turn from the Grecian poets and philosophers, with all their acknowledged excellences-yea, even from the almost divine Plato himself-to the Holy Scriptures, without feeling, for the time, a conviction amounting to the full assurance of absolute certainty, that the latter is indeed from Heaven-the voice of God, and not of man?

The term avopɛía, here used, would seem, if etymologically considered, to be improperly applied to the Deity. This objection, however, is entitled to but little weight. The word is applicable to spiritual energy of any kind, as well as to that which is properly human. It denotes, strictly, energy of soul, or strength of will; not merely in the sense of physical power, outwardly to execute its volitions, but rather as a pure, internal, spiritual force, by which one man or one being may differ from another. There may be a good will, yet weak; but when this moral strength is added to the other cardinal virtues, the manly character is said to be complete, and hence the name. It is what the Apostle means by the word ȧperý (the same with the Latin virtus, from a similar etymology), when he says, Add to your faith virtue. In the Laches, 192, D., Plato defines it as καρτερία τις τῆς ψυχῆς. Elsewhere, connecting it with all the virtues, he describes the truly brave man as one who fears nothing which ought not to be feared, while, at the same time, he fears everything which ought to be feared; thus viewing it as in unison with the highest wisdom, and as utterly opposed to that blind, counterfeit foolhardiness which has no relation to the rational soul, but belongs as much to the beast as to a human being. Hence he shows that "the truly brave, since he must know what is truly good, must necessarily partake of righteousness, temperance, and holiness; because to him alone it pertains, by reason of this virtue, to have a true fear in regard to God and man, so as to fear what ought to be feared, and to be ever bold when

engaged in right and duty" (vide the Laches, 199, D.); thus making ȧvopɛía the support and life of all the other virtues, according to a favourite theory, that they are all, when genuine, essentially connected; that, where one exists, all exist in a greater or less degree; and that, where one is wanting, all are to be suspected of spuriousness.

In this sense of energy of will* it is properly applied to the Deity, notwithstanding the apparent etymological inconsistency. It strikingly suggests that definition of the Divine nature which Aristotle ascribes to Plato, namely, "that whose very essence is energy”—ἡ ἀρχὴ ἦς οὐσία ἐνέργειά ἐστ TIV; that which must act with an intensity of energy proportioned to an infinite nature, ever in harmony with itself, and ever in the most vehement and burning opposition to all that is unlike. See remarks on this passage of Aristotle, page 190.

Δειλία is the opposite of ἀνδρεία. In some respects it is nearly synonymous with pa@vuía, easiness, fickleness, or weakness of will. Tpvpn, effeminacy, the result of sensuality. No terms, certainly, could be more remote from any right conception of a spiritual God. To such as those with whom Plato supposes himself contending, and to all who deny a special providence (although they may not see the logical consequences as the philosopher has analyzed them), may be applied the language of the Bible: Ye thought that I was altogether such a one as yourselves. And yet men of this description often assume to be under the teaching of a higher philosophy than those weak and simple ones, who imagine that their smallest sins and their lightest cares are the objects of God's special regard.

Philosophical theism often seems to talk very piously,

* We would ever use the term will, in such a connexion as this, in its highest import, as distinguished from animal wilfulness, or mere volition, and as ever conjoined with reason; or, as Cicero defines it, Voluntas est qua quid cum ratione desiderat.

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