Αθ. Ναί, ζῆν.

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ;

ΑΘ. Τί δέ; ὁπόταν ψυχὴν ἔν τισιν ὁρῶμεν, μῶν ἄλλο ἢ ταὐτὸν τούτῳ ζῇν ὁμολογητέον ;

ΚΛ. Οὐκ ἄλλο.

ΑΘ. Ἔχε δὴς πρὸς Διός· ἆρ ̓ οὐκ ἂν ἐθέλοις περὶ ἕκασ τον τρία νοεῖν ;

ΚΛ. Πῶς λέγεις ;

Αθ. Ἓν μὲν, τὴν οὐσίαν· ἓν δὲ, τῆς οὐσίας τὸν λόγον· ἓν δὲ, ὄνομα. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐρωτήσεις εἶναι περὶ τὸ ὂν ἅπαν δύο.

ΚΛ. Πῶς δύο ;

Αθ. Τοτὲ μὲν ἡμῶν ἕκαστον τοὔνομα προτεινόμενον αὐτὸ, τὸν λόγον ἀπαιτεῖν· τοτὲ δὲ τὸν λόγον προτεινόμε νον, ἐρωτᾷν αὖ τοὔνομα. ἆρά γε τὸ τοιόνδε αὖ βουλόμεθα νῦν λέγειν ;

ΚΛ. Τὸ ποῖον ;

to live) when a thing itself moves itself?” ζάω, to live, and ζέω, to boil, to bubble, to bubble up, are unquestionably of the same radical idea. Effervescence or fermentation from the action of heat, taking place in matter otherwise apparently motionless, would be the phenomenon which of all others would most readily suggest to the primitive mind the idea of self-motion, and would thus be taken as a symbol of life.

5. Ἔχε δὴ πρὸς Διός. "Hold there by Jove." An important position is gained. Let us secure it, and then advance to another view of the subject. Compare Gorgias, 490, A. The usual rendering of this phrase, age dum, does not seem to us to give its peculiar significance.

6. ἓν μὲν, τὴν οὐσίαν, κ. τ. λ. "One thing the essence, one the λόγος or reason of the essence, and one the name.” See Note XXVII., App.

7. καὶ δὴ καὶ. This phrase generally denotes an application of a preceding proposition. "And accordingly, respecting every such essence, there must be always two questions."

8. τοτὲ μὲν .... . τοτὲ δὲ. “ At one time, the name being presented, we demand the λόγος, reason or definition ; at another time, the λόγος or reason being given, we ask the name.”

ΑΘ. Ἔστι που δίχα διαιρούμενον' ἐν ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἐν ἀριθμῷ. τούτῳ δὴ τῷ κατ' ἀριθμὸν, ὄνομα μὲν, ἄρτιον· λόγος δὲ, ἀριθμὸς διαιρούμενος εἰς ἴσα δύο μέρη.

ΚΛ. Ναί.

10

ΑΘ. Τὸ τοιοῦτον φράζω. μῶν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὸν ἑκατέρως προσαγορεύομεν, ἄν τε τὸν λόγον ἐρωτώμενοι, τοὔνομα ἀποδιδῶμεν, ἄν τε τοὔνομα, τὸν λόγον· ἄρτιον ὀνόματι, καὶ λόγῳ, δίχα διαιρούμενον ἀριθμὸν προσαγορεύοντες, ταὐτὸν ὄν ;

66

ΚΛ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Ὧι δὴ ψυχὴ τοὔνομα, τίς τούτου λόγος; ἔχομεν

9. δίχα διαιρούμενον. This may be taken impersonally. “It is divided into two," or generally, "there is or there may be this division into two, both in other things and also in respect to number." τούτῳ δή. “ Το this thing, that is, this division”—τῷ κατ ̓ ἀριθμὸν, namely, that which has respect to number, the NAME (ovoμa) is ἄρτιον ; but the λόγος (notion, reason, or definition) is a number di visible into two equal parts." And this is the 2óyoç or notion given in the eighth book of Euclid's Elements of Geometry, in these very words.

10. μῶν οὖν οὐ ταὐτὸν ἑκατέρως προσαγορεύομεν. The whole passage may be thus freely rendered: "Do we not in both respects substantially predicate the same, if, being asked in respect to the notion, we give the name (of the thing of which it is the notion), and being asked in respect to the name, we give the notion (to which the name belongs)predicating of the name as subject, ἄρτιον, and of the notion as subject, a number divided, &c., being substantially the same.” After all, there seems no little confusion in the sentence. The two questions may be thus stated: 1st. What is the name of that whose notion is a number divided, &c.? To this the answer is ἄρτιον. 2d. What is the notion of that whose name is aprɩov or even? To this the answer is ἀριθμὸς εἰς ἴσα δύο μέρη διαιρούμενος a number divided or divisible, &c. We have placed a comma after ὀνόματι, although differing in this respect from the editions of Bekker and Ast. The following seems to us to be the order of the latter part: προσαγαρεύοντες ὀνόματι, ἄρτιον, και (προσαγορεύοντες) λόγῳ, δίχα διαιρούμενον ἀριθμόν, ταὐτὸν ὄν (ἐν ἀμφοτεροις προσαγορευόμενον). See Note XXVIII., App.

11. See Note XXVIII., App.

ἄλλον πλὴν τὸν νῦν δὴ ῥηθέντα, τὴν δυναμένην αὐτὴν αὐτὴν κινεῖν κίνησιν ;

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ΚΛ. Τὸ ἑαυτὸ κινεῖν φῂς λόγον ἔχειν τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν ήνπερ τοὔνομα ὃ δὴ πάντες ψυχὴν προσαγορεύομεν ;

ΑΘ. Φημί γε. εἰ δ ̓ ἔστι τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχον, ἆρα ἔτι που θοῦμεν μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι ψυχὴν ταὐτὸν ὂν καὶ τὴν πρώτην γένεσιν καὶ κίνησιν τῶν τε ὄντων καὶ γεγονότων καὶ ἐσομένων, καὶ πάντων αὖ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις ; ἐπειδή γε ἀνεφάνη μεταβολῆς τε καὶ κινήσεως ἁπάσης αιτία ἅπασιν ;

ΚΛ. Οὔκ· ἀλλὰ ἱκανώτατα δέδεικται ψυχὴ τῶν πάν των πρεσβυτάτη, γενομένη τε ἀρχὴ κινήσεως.

Αθ. Αρ' οὖν οὐχ ἡ δι' ἕτερον ἐν ἄλλῳ γιγνομένη κίν νησις, αὐτὸ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ μηδέποτε παρέχουσα κινεῖσθαι μηδὲν, δευτέρα τε καὶ ὁπόσων ἀριθμῶν βούλοιτο ἄν τις ἀριθ. μεῖν αὐτὴν πολλοστήν, τοσούτων, σώματος οὖσα ὄντως ἀψύχου μεταβολή ;

ΚΛ. Ορθῶς.

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ΑΘ. Ορθῶς ἄρα καὶ κυρίως ἀληθέστατά τε καὶ τελεώτα τα εἰρηκότες ἂν εἶμεν ψυχὴν μὲν προτέραν γεγονέναι σώο

12. See Note XXVIII., App.

13. ἆρα ἔτι ποθοῦμεν μὴ ἱκανῶς δεδεῖχθαι. Ποθοῦμεν prægnantem sensum habet, est enim: num quid adhuc desideramus (existimantes) non satis demonstratum esse, &c.-Ast. We see no necessity for this explanation of Ast, but would prefer directly connecting ποθοῦμεν with δεδεῖχθαι, without resorting to any ellipsis or prægnant construction. "Do we yet feel the want of its being sufficiently shown,” &c. Μὴ here occurs in the usual manner, and with the usual force which it has after verbs containing in themselves the sense of a negative either expressed or implied, such as those of forbidding, preventing, want, &c. ; and in such cases it is not to be rendered by itself, but regarded as strengthening the quasi denial of the governing word. Ποθοῦμεν may be ranked in this class, and, alalthough a verb of want or desire, invariably takes an accusative. 14. See Note XXIX., App.

15. πολλοστὴν. For remarks on this word, see Note XXIX., App. 1. εἶμεν. The common reading is ήμεν, but as the optative is clear

ματος ἡμῖν· σῶμα δὲ, δεύτερόν τε καὶ ὕστερον ψυχῆς ἀρχούσης, ἀρχόμενον κατὰ φύσιν.

ΚΛ. 'Αληθέστατα μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Μεμνήμεθά γε μὴν ὁμολογήσαντες ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσ θεν, ὡς εἰ ψυχὴ φανείη πρεσβυτέρα σώματος οὖσα, καὶ τὰ ψυχῆς τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἔσοιτο πρεσβύτερα.

ΚΛ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.

ΑΘ. Τρόποι δὴ καὶ ἤθη καὶ βουλήσεις καὶ λογισμοὶ καὶ δόξαι ἀληθεῖς, ἐπιμέλειαί τε καὶ μνῆμαι, πρότερα μήκους σωμάτων καὶ πλάτους καὶ βάθους καὶ ῥώμης εἴη γεγονότα ἄν, εἴπερ καὶ ψυχὴ σώματος.

ΚΛ. 'Ανάγκη.

ΑΘ. 'Αρ ̓ οὖν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖν ἀναγκαῖον, τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ τῶν καλῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ αἰσχρῶν, δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων, καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐναν τίων ; εἴπερ τῶν πάντων γε αὐτὴν θήσομεν αἰτίαν;

ΚΛ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ ;

ΑΘ. Ψυχὴν δὴ διοικοῦσαν καὶ ἐνοικοῦσαν ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς πάντη κινουμένοις μῶν οὐ καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἀνάγκη διοικεῖν φάναι ;

ΚΛ. Τί μήν ;

ly required, we have with Ast substituted eluev, which is used for εἴημεν, the η in this form being often dropped in the dual and plural. Κυρίως is a stronger word than ὀρθῶς. It means "by authority-as an established truth-or as something which we may now assert with confidence."

2. See Note XXX., App.

3. τῶν τε ἀγαθῶν αἰτίαν εἶναι ψυχὴν καὶ τῶν καλῶν. "Soul is the cause of the good, and fair, and right.” It is not, however, simply the efficient cause regarded objectively, but the very subjective ground of their existence, without which they could have no being, whether there was a universe of matter or not. Where soul is not, there can be no harmony, no beauty, no right, no good. And so, also, it not only makes its own paradise, but its own earth, and its own hell. Without it there is no discord, no deformity, no evil. 4. διοικοῦσαν · ἐνοικοῦσαν, σε pervading — inhabiting — indwell

ing."

ΑΘ. Μίαν, ἢ πλείους; Πλείους· ἐγὼ ὑπὲρ σφῶν ἀποκρινοῦμαι. Δυοῖν μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος, καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξεργάζεσθαι. ΚΛ. Σφόδρα ὀρθῶς εἴρηκας.

Αθ. Εἶεν. ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴν πάντα τὰ κατ ̓ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν, ταῖς αὐτῆς κινήσεσιν, αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστι, βούλεσθαι, σκοπεῖσθαι, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, βουλεύεσθαι, δοξάζειν ὀρθῶς, ἐψευσμένως· χαίρουσαν, λυπουμένην· θαῤῥοῦσαν, φοβουμένην· μισοῦσαν, στέργουσαν· καὶ πάσαις· ὅσαι τούτων ξυγγενεῖς ἢ πρωτουργοί κινήσεις, τὰς

5. πλείους. The general sense of the passage is best preserved by rendering this word, not many, but more than one.

6. δυοῖν. See Note XXXI., App., on the Platonic doctrine of the evil principle.

7. ἄγει μὲν δὴ ψυχὴ πάντα. Ψυχή is here used collectively as the antithesis of matter, for all souls, including the spirits of men and angels (or δαίμονες), as well as the Divine soul, which he regards as the principium or fountain of the whole genus. The doctrine, that even the human soul was older than body, was taught by Plato, yet not in the sense in which it is commonly understood. It has, however, no necessary connexion with his present argument against the atheists.

8. χαίρουσαν. The sudden change here from the infinitive to the participle seems made on purpose for variety. Χαίρουσαν, however, if any should choose so to regard it, may be taken with pvxv as the accusative before these infinitives. The order would be thus : αἷς ὀνόματά ἐστι (τὸ) ψυχὴν χαίρουσαν λυπουμένην, κ. τ. λ. βούλεσθαι σκοπεῖσθαι, κ. τ. λ.

9. πάσαις, connect with κινήσεσιν αἷς above. Πρωτουργοὶ κινήσεις, “ first working motions,” viz., those of soulsuch as βούλεσθαι σκοπεῖσθαι, &c. Δευτερουργοὺς αὖ, “ second working motions,” corresponding to order second of motion described some ways back“ second causes,” or “ motions of matter produced by impulse” (ἐξ ἄλλου εἰς ἄλλο μεταβολή). The author has in view the classification made page 27, line 16, and also 30, line 15. This we believe to be the true sense of the passage, but a glance at the position of the participles and infinitives above suggests another division, which, although it may not have been intended, is yet most important and It will be seen that these participles all express feelings of the

true.