iest, and most religious efforts, appear in the comparison. Who can turn from the Grecian poets and philosophers, with all their acknowledged excellences-yea, even from the almost divine Plato himself-to the Holy Scriptures, without feeling, for the time, a conviction amounting to the full assurance of absolute certainty, that the latter is indeed from Heaven-the voice of God, and not of man? The term άvopɛía, here used, would seem, if etymologically considered, to be improperly applied to the Deity. This objection, however, is entitled to but little weight. The word is applicable to spiritual energy of any kind, as well as to that which is properly human. It denotes, strictly, energy of soul, or strength of will; not merely in the sense of physical power, outwardly to execute its volitions, but rather as a pure, internal, spiritual force, by which one man or one being may differ from another. There may be a good will, yet weak; but when this moral strength is added to the other cardinal virtues, the manly character is said to be complete, and hence the name. It is what the Apostle means by the word άperý (the same with the Latin virtus, from a similar etymology), when he says, Add to your faith virtue. In the Laches, 192, D., Plato defines it as καρτερία τις τῆς ψυχῆς. Elsewhere, connecting it with all the virtues, he describes the truly brave man as one who fears nothing which ought not to be feared, while, at the same time, he fears everything which ought to be feared; thus viewing it as in unison with the highest wisdom, and as utterly opposed to that blind, counterfeit foolhardiness which has no relation to the rational soul, but belongs as much to the beast as to a human being. Hence he shows that "the truly brave, since he must know what is truly good, must necessarily partake of righteousness, temperance, and holiness; because to him alone it pertains, by reason of this virtue, to have a true fear in regard to God and man, so as to fear what ought to be feared, and to be ever bold when engaged in right and duty" (vide the Laches, 199, D.); thus making ȧvopɛía the support and life of all the other virtues, according to a favourite theory, that they are all, when genuine, essentially connected; that, where one exists, all exist in a greater or less degree; and that, where one is wanting, all are to be suspected of spuriousness. In this sense of energy of will* it is properly applied to the Deity, notwithstanding the apparent etymological inconsistency. It strikingly suggests that definition of the Divine nature which Aristotle ascribes to Plato, namely, "that whose very essence is energy"ἡ ἀρχὴ ᾖς οὐσία ἐνέργειά ἐστ τιν ; that which must act with an intensity of energy proportioned to an infinite nature, ever in harmony with itself, and ever in the most vehement and burning opposition to all that is unlike. See remarks on this passage of Aristotle, page 190. Δειλία is the opposite of ἀνδρεία. In some respects it is nearly synonymous with pa@vuía, easiness, fickleness, or weakness of will. Tpvpn, effeminacy, the result of sensuality. No terms, certainly, could be more remote from any right conception of a spiritual God. To such as those with whom Plato supposes himself contending, and to all who deny a special providence (although they may not see the logical consequences as the philosopher has analyzed them), may be applied the language of the Bible: Ye thought that I was altogether such a one as yourselves. And yet men of this description often assume to be under the teaching of a higher philosophy than those weak and simple ones, who imagine that their smallest sins and their lightest cares are the objects of God's special regard. Philosophical theism often seems to talk very piously, * We would ever use the term will, in such a connexion as this, in its highest import, as distinguished from animal wilfulness, or mere volition, and as ever conjoined with reason; or, as Cicero defines it, Voluntas est qua quid cum ratione desiderat. any and to claim the merit of being very religious, because it graciously admits the Divine existence and intelligence, while yet it denies everything which could make that existence an object of love, or fear, or of interest of any kind beyond what might be felt in the contemplation of a mathematical theorem. The ancient Epicureans sometimes affected this kind of sentimental religionism,* some specimens of which we find admirably set forth, in all their hollowness, in Cicero's treatise De Natura Deorum, lib. i., s. 41: Ac etiam de sanctitate, de pietate scripsit Epicurus. At quo modo in his loquitur? Ut Coruncianum aut Scævolam pontifices maximos te audire dicas: non eum, qui sustulerit omnem funditus religionem? Quid est enim, cur Deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, quum Dii non modo homines non colant, sed omnino nihil curent, nihil agant? Sec. 42: Horum enim sententiæ omnium non modo superstitionem tollunt, in qua inest timor inanis Deorum; sed etiam religionem, quæ Deorum cultu pio continetur. Sec. 43: Epicurus vero ex animis hominum extraxit radicibus religionem, quum Diis immortalibus et opem et gratiam sustulit. Quum enim optimam et præstantissimam naturam Dei dicat esse, negat idem esse in Deo gratiam. Tollit id quod maxime proprium est optimæ præstantissimæque naturæ. How well, also, might what follows apply to those sentimental followers of Spinoza, who, rapt in philosophical adoration of "the holiness of nature and of the awe of the infinite," do yet, in their high and transcendental spirituality, so vehemently condemn the sensual philosophy of Epicurus. At enim liber est Epicurei de sanctitate. Ludimur ab homine non tam faceto, quam ad scribendi licentiam libero, Quæ enim potest esse sanctitas, si Dii humana non curant? *This word cannot probably be found in any English dictionary, and yet nothing seemed so well adapted to the idea we wished to express, namely, that species of scientific piety which abounds so much in such modern books as Nichols's Architecture of the Heavens, and in the lectures of Dr. Dionysius Lardner. XLIV. The True Dignity of Man his Religious Nature. Analysis of the Words Σέβας, Εὐσέβεια, &c. PAGE 53, LINE 2. Οὐκοῦν δὴ τάγε ἀνθρώπινα πράγματα τῆς τε ἐμψύχου μετέχει φύσεως ἅμα, καὶ θεοσεβέστατον, κ. T. λ. This is said by way of magnifying the importance of man; although, even when regarded as one of the least parts of the universe, he would not, as has been shown, be beneath the care of a special providence. Two things are said to enhance his dignity. He partakes of an animated nature, and he is of all animals the most religious. Compare the Protagoras, 522, Α. : Ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὁ ἄνθρωπος θείας μετέχει μοίρας, πρῶτον μὲν διὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ξυγγένειαν, ζώων μόνον θεοὺς ἐνόμισε, καὶ ἐπιχείρει βωμούς τε ἱδρύεσα θαι καὶ ἀγάλματα θεῶν— And since man shares in the divine, he alone, of all animals, through his relationship to the Deity, believes in the existence of Gods, and undertakes to establish altars in their honour." Compare, also, Ovid, Metamorph., lib. i., 70: 66 Sanctius his animal mentisque capacius altæ Pronaque quum spectant animalia cætera terram, Os homini sublime dedit, cœlumque tueri Jussit, et erectos ad sidera tollere vultus. Ανθρώπινα πράγματα is equivalent here to οἱ ἄνθρωποι ; the form of the words being probably affected by the neuter ζῶον. For the same reason we have αὐτό instead of αὐτός which we should have expected. It is by the attraction of Swov, understood or implied in wwv. See remarks on this peculiarity of the Greek language, page 203. It is, how. ever, to be used here as if connected with av@pwπоç; and is the same as though we should say in English, the animal man itself is the most religious, &c. The words θεοσεβέστατον, θεοσέβεια, are etymologically formed on the same idea with the Hebrew phrase, л? nin, the fear of the Lord, which is the Old Testament term for religion or piety. Aelodauovía contains etymologically the same radical conception, but is almost always used in a lower and somewhat bad sense, as, for example, by Paul, Acts, xvii., 22. It partakes of the degeneracy of its component, daíμwv; and as that became only another name for Fortune, so this sinks down into superstition, or that fear and worship of Fortune, Destiny, and other imaginary personifications, which is closely allied to atheism. Aεioidaμovía is seldom, if ever, taken for the pure and reverential fear of God; while, on the other hand, dɛoσébeta, or its equivalent, evσébɛta, is made the parent of all the other virtues, and the first in the estimation of Heaven. Thus Plato speaks of it in the Epinomis, or whoever was the author of that dialogue: μεῖζον γὰρ μόριον ἀρετῆς μηδεὶς ἡμᾶς ποτε πείθῃ τῆς εὐσεβείας τῷ θνητῷ γένει. Εpinomis, 989, B. To the same effect Sophocles, in the Philoctetes, 1442: Εὐσεβεῖτε πρὸς θεούς· ὡς τἄλλ ̓ ἅπαντα δεύτερ ̓ ἡγεῖται Πατὴρ Ζεύς. οὐ γὰρ ἡὐσέβεια συνθνήσκει βροτοῖς· or, in other words, all virtues arising out of mere earthly relations are temporary, and must perish. Piety alone survives the grave. The primary root, σébaç, signifying wonder, astonishment, awe, is sometimes used for the very Numen or Divinity himself, examples of which are frequently to be found in Pindar and Eschylus. The verb is sometimes apparently employed for Tuav, to signify reverence towards human magistrates. This, however, is only a secondary sense, and the primary still holds its place in the ancient idea that magistrates represented the Divine authority, and that judges stood to us in the place of the Elohim. The |