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'Ω γῆς ὄχημα, κἀπὶ γῆς ἔχων ἕδραν
Οστις πότ' εἶ σὺ δυστόπαστος εἰδέναι,
Ζεύς, εἴτ' ἀνάγκη φύσεος, εἴτε νοῦς βροτῶν,
Προσηυξάμην σε· πάντα γὰρ δι' ἀψόφου
Βαίνων κελεύθου, κατὰ Δίκην τὰ θνήτ ̓ ἄγεις.

O Thou who guid'st the rolling of the earth,
And o'er it hast thy throne, whoe'er thou art,
Most difficult to know-the far-famed Jove,
Or nature's law, or reason, such as man's-
I thee adore, that, in a noiseless path,
Thy steady hand with justice all things rules.

Euripides, Troades, 890.

We do not know which to admire most, the philosophy or the poetical beauty of these remarkable lines. The expression, kami yns exwv Edpav, relieves them, in our view, from all liability to the charge of pantheism. These words, in the connexion in which they appear, are only applicable to what Plato styles ψυχή υπερκοσμία; a soul which, although pervading, is also, at the same time, above, and distinct from, the world or universe which it moves; for yñ here is evidently to be taken in this large sense. The last line, also, can only be referred to a moral power, not only far above pantheism, but also that view which delights in contemplating a God of mere intelligence. It indicates a special moral providence, looking to ends and varied by events, yet at the same time general, administered by unbroken and harmonious laws, pervading all nature, silent in their operation, traversing a noiseless path (d' áópov Baívwv kɛɛvlov); the universal moving power of earth (mundi vehiculum); influencing and controlling all things, and yet in its secret springs unsearchable (dvoróπαOTоç εidévai); ruling in the earthquake, the fire, and the tempest, yet, in itself, not the earthquake, nor the storm, but the still small voice of mind, specially and for special ends controlling matter.

So Plutarch, writing of the Divine Logos, or Reason, in

the government of the world, uses almost the very words of Euripides, if he did not rather intend a quotation: owns γὰρ Ο ΘΕΙΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ ἀπροσδεής ἐστι καὶ δι' ἀψόφου βαίνων κελεύθου τὰ θνητὰ ἄγει κατὰ δίκην. Plutarch, De Iside et Osiri. We may compare with this a passage from Seneca, Nat. Q., lib. ii., 14: Deum illum maximum potentissimumque, qui ipse vehit omnia (mundi vehiculum), qui ubique et omnibus præsto est. Compare, also, a passage of one of the lost tragedies of Euripides, as it is quoted by Eusebius, Præp. Evang., xiii., page 681:

Σὲ τὸν αὐτοφυῆ, τὸν ἐν αἰθερίῳ
Ρύμβῳ πάντων φύσιν ἐμπλέξανθ'.

Thou self-sprung Being that dost all infold,

And in thine arms heaven's whirling fabric hold.

The idea expressed by such phrases as those on which we have been just commenting, may have been more ancient than Plato or Euripides, and may have given rise to the mythological representation of the chariot and horses of the sun. It is more likely, however, that the poetical representation may have suggested the language here employed. We have also in the Phædrus (246, A.) this same comparison, by which man, in his compound being, is likened to a chariot and horses, with their charioteer, representing respectively his animal and his rational nature.

XXXVII.

Second Grand Division of the Argument.

Doctrine of a

Special Providence. Mistake of Cudworth.

PAGE 42, LINE 10. Τὸν δὲ ἡγούμενον μὲν θεοὺς εἶναι, μὴ φροντίζειν δὲ, κ. τ. λ. We come now to the second grand division of the subject, and one, the treatment of which will probably be more satisfactory to the reader, pre

senting, as it does, less of subtle physico-metaphysical discussion, and more that is in strictest harmony with the Holy Scriptures. The author is now to prove the doctrine of a special providence against those who speculatively admitted the existence of a Deity, and yet could not believe that he concerned himself with the ordinary affairs of human life ; especially, what seemed to them of so little consequence— human sins. Cudworth asserts that "Plato, in his tenth book of Laws, professedly opposing the atheists, and undertaking to prove the existence of a Deity, does, notwithstanding, ascend no higher than to the Psyche, or Universal Mundane Soul, as the self-moving principle, and the immediate or proper cause of all the motion which is in the world. And this (he says) is all the God he there undertakes to prove." This very learned man must have strangely overlooked the latter part of this book, upon which we are now entering, or he could not have made so incorrect an assertion. It is true, that all which his previous argument has required as yet has been the existence of such a Psyche; but he now advances not only above self-motion, or psychical power, to the second hypostasis of intelligence, or Nous (as it may be regarded when viewed according to the statements and divisions of the Timæus), but also to that still higher degree which is above mind or intelligence, and which he elsewhere styles Tò 'Aya@óv; including, in the idea, all moral attributes-justice and severity, as well as benevolence and compassion.

It is of this higher degree, or hypostasis, as we think it may be styled, that Plato, or some later Platonist, thus speaks, in that remarkable passage, contained in what is styled the second epistle to Dionysius, 312, E.: Пɛpì Tòv πάντων βασιλέα πάντ' εστὶ, καὶ ἐκείνου ἕνεκα πάντα· καὶ ἐκεῖνο αἴτιον ἁπάντων τῶν καλῶν· δεύτερον δὲ περὶ τὰ δεύτερα, καὶ τρίτον περὶ τὰ τρίτα" All things relate to the King of all, and on his account are all things, and he is

the cause of all things beautiful; but the second honours pertain to the second, and the third to the third." In other words, He is the final, or moral, as well as the designing, and the efficient or psychical cause of all things (ěveka ov Távта); for the manifestation of whose moral glory all things are created, moved, and constantly governed.

Every reader must admit that the admirable arguments which follow in the remainder of the book are generally in strict accordance with the Holy Scriptures, and that Plato even reasons on this part of his subject in a more religious manner than many nominally Christian writers; much of whose theology and science might fairly be ranked with the very atheism with which he is here contending.

XXXVIII.

The Greek Words for Blessedness, Happiness, Fortune, &c.

PAGE 42, LINE 14. ἀληθείᾳ μὲν οὐκ εὐδαίμονες, δόξαις δὲ εὐδαιμονιζόμεναι, κ. τ. λ. The words εὐδαίμων, εὐδαι μovía, do not refer simply to a state of present pleasure or enjoyment; for, in that sense, the poets and others were right in asserting, and the philosopher could not deny, that wicked men are often happy. Evdaíuwv, in its primitive, etymological import, has a much higher sense than this; a sense derived to it at that time, when Aaíμwv remained unimpaired in its significance as one of the Divine names, and had not yet been corrupted into that atheistic sense of Fortune which it subsequently acquired in the natural degeneracy of man and of language. From ev and Aaíuwv, it would etymologically signify one who had the favour of Heaven; and its purest meaning would be best expressed by our good old Saxon word blessed. It refers not simply to a man's present state of feeling or enjoyment, but to the whole of his being and his relation to the whole; so that

one in the midst of the most acute pain, like the martyrs in the flames, might be ɛvdaíμwv; while another, in the present enjoyment of all the pleasures of sense, might be ǎ0λoç: as Socrates, in the Gorgias, describes the life of the sensualist as δεινὸς καὶ αἰσχρὸς καὶ ἄθλιος, and asks if any one would dare to call such εὐδαίμονας, or blessed, ἐὰν ἀφθόνως ἔχωσιν ὧν δέονται—“ even if they have in the greatest abundance all that their souls may desire." Gorgias, 494, E. This is also the meaning of Solon in that most celebrated account which Herodotus gives of his interview with Croesus; although he sometimes uses õàbɩoç instead of evdaíuwv, out of accommodation to the language of the sensual Phrygian.

Plato himself clearly gives this as the radical idea of the word, and seems evidently to allude to its etymology when he says, οὐ γὰρ ̓́ΑΝΕΥ ΓΕ ΘΕΩΝ μήποτέ τις εὐδαίμων ἐστίν—“ Without the Gods no man can be called εὐδαίμων, blessed, or happy." So, also, in the Timaus, 90, D.: Aɛi δὲ θεραπεύοντα τὸ θεῖον, ἔχοντά τε 'ΕΥ μάλα κεκοσμημέ νον τὸν ΔΑΙΜΟΝΑ ξύνοικον ἐν αὑτῷ διαφερόντως ΕΥΔΑΙΜΟΝΑ είναι “ He must be blessed beyond all others who cultivates the divine, and who has ever in harmony within him the indwelling God." The juxtaposition of terms here leaves no doubt that there was intended an allusion to the radical sense and etymology of the word. same allusion in the Orestes of Euripides:

Όταν δ' ὁ ΔΑΙΜΩΝ ΕΥ διδῷ τί δεῖ φίλων ;
ἀρκεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸς Ὁ ΘΕΟΣ, ὠφελεῖν θέλων.

There is the

When God his blessing grants, what need of friends?
A friend above supplies the soul's desire.

Euripides, Orestes, 660.

These lines are quoted by Aristotle in the discussion of the question, πότερον εὐδαίμων δεήσεται φίλων ἢ μή; Ethic. Nicomach., ix., 9. Even this cold and passionless writer tells us that happiness (εὐδαιμονία) is a divine thing (θεῖον

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