lative argument, this doctrine of subsequent accommodation, as opposed to a previous designed use, may have a formidable appearance, but it vanishes on a close observation of nature, because the soul, in such observation, instead of really relying on a posteriori facts, cannot divest itself of that a priori view which believes in design, and looks for design, and carries along the preconception of design as involved in those ideas of God and truth with which it enters upon the investigation. Plato, as we have seen, overcomes the difficulty by beginning with motion instead of evidences of design; thence, from this more remote point of view, proving the higher antiquity of soul, then of the acts or exercises of soul, one of which is Bouλnois, purpose, or design. Another subtle objection from this same school was, that knowledge, being the knowledge of things, must, therefore, have been posterior to things; hence that mind was young. er than matter. In this they, of course, rejected the doctrine of any other knowledge than that of things, or that the mind or intellect contained, in any sense, its own ideas or intelligibles (vonrá); making it to be all from without by way of impression from the external world.* If this be * Should it be said that the objection may be stated in the same way in respect to ideal or eternal truth, and that there must have been vonrá before vous, or truth before knowledge, the only reply is, that God is at the same time, and from eternity, both vous and vontóv, intelligens and intelligibile, or intellectum. It is the absolute necessity of some such view which suggested to the most profound minds of antiquity the idea of a plurality in the Divine nature, a distinction of two hypostases, at least, with a third, pux, to which they were related, and in which they were united. Instead of being contrary to reason, it was the highest result to which she arrived (if the truth was not rather obtained from some primitive revelation), as her only refuge against the cheerless and incomprehensible conception of an eternal, solitary monadity, or the equally difficult conception of a necessary, eternal, outward universe, towards which the Divine love and the Divine intelligence might be directed. atheism, as it most assuredly is, when held in relation to the Divine Mind, what shall we think of the corresponding doctrine when applied to the human soul? If we start from the conclusions to which such inquiries lead us, it should be borne in mind, that the only possible defence against them must be found in that ideal philosophy which supposes a knowledge belonging to mind, as mind, whether it be Divine or human, entirely independent of things, or of any out. ward world. The above atheistic objection is also expressed by Lucretius, with far more of poetry than piety: Exemplum porro gignundis rebus, et ipsa Notities hominum Divis unde insita primum, Si non ipsa dedit specimen natura creandi? Lucretius, lib. v., 182. XXXI. Platonic Doctrine of the Evil Principle. Of 'Aváyêη, or Necessity. PAGE 32, LINE 2. Δυοῖν μέν γέ που ἔλαττον μηδὲν τιθῶμεν, τῆς τε εὐεργέτιδος καὶ τῆς τἀναντία δυναμένης ἐξερ. yášɛσ0αι—“ Nothing less than two, at least, the one that does us good, and the one that is able to do the contrary.” We have here presented, in the most unequivocal terms, that grand defect in Plato's theology, which occasionally mars, by its presence, almost every part of his otherwise noble system. It is most clear, from this and other passages in his dialogues, that he held the doctrine of two uncreated principles or souls, one good (or the benefactor, as he styles him), the other evil. Neither Plato, however, nor Zoroaster, can be charged with the absurdity of believing in two Supremes. They avoided this by running into the incon sistency of supposing that the evil principle, although uncreated, was under the dominion of the good, constantly controlled, and ultimately to be completely conquered by it. This doctrine, likewise, made harsh discord with almost every other part of his philosophy, especially his views of the origin of the universe, as set forth in the Timæus, where no mention is made of a distinct evil soul; and yet, when we examine the matter closely, it is difficult to see how he could have come to any other conclusion. Plato had no other guide than reason, aided, perhaps, by a dim and corrupted tradition of primitive truth; and reason can account in no other way for the existence of evil, without charging it upon God as its immediate author. It is evident, from the manner in which he ever speaks on this subject, that he had a deep conviction of the essential goodness of the Deity, and that he felt himself sorely pressed by the difficulty of reconciling with this goodness the evil which he saw everywhere existing in the world. On this point, compare what he says in the second book of the Republic, 379, Β., C. : οὐκοῦν ἀγαθὸς ὅ γε θεὸς τῷ ὄντι τε, καὶ λεκTÉOV OUTW—“ Wherefore is not God really good, and must we not thus ever affirm ?” Ο δέ γε μηδὲν κακὸν ποιεῖ, οὐδ ̓ ἄν τινος εἴη κακοῦ ̓ΑΙΤΙΟΝ. οὐκ ἄρα πάντων γε αἴτιον τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν εὖ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ κακῶν ἀναίτιον. οὐδ' ἄρα ὁ θεὸς ΠΑΝΤΩΝ ἂν εἴη ̓́ΑΙΤΙΟΣ, ὡς οἱ πολλοὶ λέγουσιν· ἀλλ ̓ ὀλίγων μὲν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις αἴτιος, πολλῶν δὲ ἀναίτιος· πολὺ γὰρ ἐλάττω τἀγαθὰ τῶν κакwν hμiv" But he doeth nothing evil (evidently taking kakòν here in the sense of physical evil), nor could he be the cause of anything evil. The Good cannot, then, be the author of all things, but only of those that are good, while he is never the author of the bad. God cannot, therefore, be the author of all things, as the many say, but only of few things is he the cause to men, &c., for our good things are much fewer in number than our evil things." He does 66 not, in this place of the Republic, directly speak of the evil principle, but leaves it to be plainly inferred: Tov dè kaκῶν ἄλλα ἄττα δεῖ ζητεῖν τὰ αἴτια, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν θεόν "Of the evils, then, must we seek some other cause, and not the Deity." After this, he proceeds to censure Homer for his myth of the two casks which lie in the court of Jove, one filled with good and the other with evil, from which he dispenses to mortals severally as he will.* When we read the impressive application of this great truth which Achilles makes to the case of Priam, we cannot help recognising the poet as far more orthodox than the philosopher, and as coming much nearer to the true teaching of revelation. He was so, however, because, instead of yielding his mind to the perplexing and insurmountable difficulties which attend every merely speculative view of the matter, he simply gives utterance to one of those universal and unvarying sentiments of the human soul, which could have come from no other source than a tradition of the primeval fall and the woes consequent upon it. Revelation removes this difficulty respecting the origin of evil, not by solving the mystery, and bringing it down to the level of our understandings, but by imposing silence upon reason, in her attempt to investigate a subject altogether beyond her powers. The Bible does not shrink from the solemn declaration, I form the light and I create the darkness; I make peace and I create evil; I the Lord do ALL these things;† and yet, at the same time, it sternly Δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει, ᾧ μέν κ' ἀμμίξας δοίη Ζεύς, κ. τ. λ.—Iliad, xxiv., 527. + Isarah, xlv., 7. There can be no doubt, from the mention here of the light and the darkness, and from the connexion of this remarkable declaration with the prophecy respecting Cyrus, that there must have been intended a special reference to the Zoroastrian or Persian doctrine. forbids the impious thought, that the Divine Essence can hold any communication with sin. Thou art of purer eyes than to behold iniquity. Evil shall not dwell with thee. The caviller may say that this is cutting, instead of untying the Gordian knot; and that, according to this, revelation teaches the apparent contradiction, that God creates evil, and yet is not the author of sin, without which there could be no evil. It is even so. There is a contradiction to our understandings, but it is a contradiction to which we must submit, or receive all the contradictions, mysteries, absurd ities, and total darkness of atheism. It has been well observed, that this great difficulty lies, in some form, at the very threshold of every system which has the least title to be styled religious, in order to teach us that some things must be received as matters of faith. This, instead of behighest dictate. It ing at war with reason, is, in fact, its presents an incipient faith as the only condition on which everything else is to be understood, and declares that we are shut up to it by something higher and stronger than reason itself, even the necessities of our moral being. Let those who, in such a case as this, will not take the Bible as their only guide, devise, if they can, a better system than the one which Plato and Zoroaster felt themselves compelled to adopt, although they must have been well aware of the difficulties, and war of ideas, or first principles, in which it involved them. They could not believe in two Supremes on account of the logical contradiction, and yet, if they held that the evil soul was inferior to, and capable of being controlled by, the Good (as they unquestionably did), the same old objection comes back with all its force. The position to which our philosopher manifests so strong a repugnance is only so changed as to make God the permissive, instead of the positive author of evil. Small consolation in this; especially when taken in connexion with that melancholy declaration just quoted by us from the |