"The great and first works would be the works of art, while the things of nature, and even nature herself, would be posterior to, and ruled by art and mind.” There is likewise another view which is essential to the full interpretation of the passage, namely, that not only was it impossible that these phenomena of matter should exist objectively, without the previous existence of soul as an efficient cause of that substance of which they are phenomena, but also that they could not exist subjectively without a soul of which they constitute the sensations. In this sense, also, is it true that spirit must be older than hard, and soft, and visible, &c. Compare the passage in the Phædon, in which he refutes the doctrine that the soul is only a harmony, by showing that its pre-existence is essential to harmony itself, and that, where the former is not present, the latter is nothing more than dead strings, and chords, and tensions, and relaxations, and vibrations of the air, but has as harmony no real or true being. It is clear that the same reasoning may be carried down through all the elementary properties of matter. XVIII. Remarkable Comparison of the Dangerous Flood. PAGE 21, LINE 3. Σκοπεῖτε οὖν, καθάπερ εἰ ποταμὸν ἡμᾶς ἔδει τρεῖς ὄντας διαβαίνειν ῥέοντα σφόδρα, κ. τ. λ. The common reading is εἰ καθάπερ. We have ventured to make the change from the exigency of the place, and on the authority of Stephanus. "Consider, then, as if we three had to cross a violently flowing river," &c. The Athenian here most graphically compares himself and his two companions, just entering upon this most profound and difficult argument respecting motion, to men who are about to plunge into a deep and rapid torrent, and who, therefore, need the utmost caution in the examination of every step, lest, if at any point they should lose a firm foothold, they might be overwhelmed in floods of darkness, and carried down the stream of doubt, without any chance of recovery. The comparison is admirably sustained, and even when it seems to be dropped, does nevertheless continue to affect the discourse, and tinge the style with a metaphorical hue for many sentences ; as in the expressions, λόγος σφοδρότερος καὶ ἄβατος—παραφερόμενος, page 22, and ἐχόμενοι ὥς τι vos ȧopaλovç πεíομатоç, page 23. Cicero was very fond of imitating Plato, and we cannot help thinking that he had this passage in his eye, and meant to institute a similar comparison in respect to himself, when placed in like circumstances in reference to another great truth. Itaque dubitans, hæsitans, circumspectans, multa adversa reverens, tamquam in rate in mari immenso, nostra vehitur oratio. Cicero, Tusc. Disp., i., 30. So, also, in the Phædon, after exhausting the direct arguments for the immortality of the soul, Socrates "trusts himself to the best of human reasons (that is, to the old and unbroken tradition respecting the doctrine) as the safest vessel to which the soul could be committed, and on which alone, although in continual danger of shipwreck, it could be expected to outride the storms of doubt; unless, perhaps, it might hereafter find a surer vehicle in some Divine revelation, or λóyos veios, which Heaven might yet condescend to make known to men." We do not know which to admire most, the sound philosophy, the unaffected humility, or the striking imagery, with which the whole passage abounds. Δεῖν γὰρ περὶ αὐτὰ ἕν γέ τι τούτων διαπράξασθαι, ἢ μαθεῖν ὅπη ἔχει, ἢ εὑρεῖν, ἢ, εἰ ταῦτα ἀδύνατον τὸν γοῦν βέλτιστον τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων λαβόντα ἐπὶ τούτου ὀχούμενον, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ σχεδίας, κινδυνεύοντα διαπλεύσαι τὸν βίον· εἰ μή τις δύναιτο ἀσφαλέστερον καὶ ἀκινδυνότερον, ἐπὶ βεβαιοτέρου οχήματος ἢ ΛΟΓΟΥ ΘΕΙΟΥ τινος, διαπορευθῆναι. Phædon, 85, Ε. We take ἀνθρώπινος λóyos, in this passage, not in the sense of reason or argument, but rather as it is used in the Gorgias, 523, A., at the introduction of the mythical representation of the judgment after death: ἄκουε μάλα καλοῦ λόγου, ὃν σὺ μὲν ἡγήση μυ θον, ἐγὼ δὲ λόγον. In the word σχεδίας above, Plato seems to have had an eye to Homer's account of the shipwreck of Ulysses, in his voyage on such a vessel from the island of Calypso, and thus to intimate that this ẞéλtɩotos τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων λόγων could be regarded as at best only a temporary support, until the coming of that more sure (Bebaιóтepos) word of Revelation. Can we doubt that the soul of our philosopher would have rejoiced in the announcement that there was even then in the world a "sure word of prophecy, like a light shining in a dark place,” and that he would have surrendered all his speculative reasoning for the security and comfort of such an assurance ? XIX. Invocation of the Divine Aid in the Argument. Striking Examples of this from other Dialogues, PAGE 22, LINE 11. "Αγε δή, Θεὸν εἴποτε παρακλητέον ἡμῖν, νῦν ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω γενόμενον. " If ever we ought to call upon God, let it be done now." Many professed Christian writers, both metaphysicians and theologians, might here take a lesson from the heathen philosopher. What more sublimely appropriate than this petition for Divine aid in an argument against those who denied the Divine existence? The dark, violent, and almost impassable torrent upon which they are about to embark is yet kept in mind, and in view of this the soul is led to seek for some aid out of itself. There is, we think, an allusion to some of those prayers which Homer puts into the mouths of his heroes, as they are about to engage in some arduous and perilous contest; it may be to the prayer of Ajax for light in that desperate battle (lib. xvii., 645) in which Jove covers the whole field of conflict with thick darkness; or, perhaps, in still greater consistency with the metaphorical imagery here employed, to the prayer of Achilles, in the twenty-first book of the Iliad (273), when in danger of being overwhelmed by the rising floods of the angry and turbulent Scamander: Ζεῦ πάτερ, ὡς οὔτις με θεῶν ἐλεεινὸν ὑπέστη, Whether this be so or not, it is in this case a prayer which the purest Christianity need not blush to acknowledge and admire. There are several interesting examples of similar invocations in others of the Platonic dialogues, either put into the mouth of Socrates or of some speaker by whom he is evidently represented. We have but little doubt, too, that in these remarkable peculiarities of character, Plato accurately represents the model he so closely observed, and with whom his own intellectual existence may almost be regarded as identified. We may note, among others, the invocation in the fourth book of the Laws, at the commencement of his system of positive legislation for the state; a work which certainly, of all others, should never be attempted without a deep feeling of the necessity of Divine assistance. Θεὸν δὴ πρὸς τὴν τῆς πόλεως κατασκενὴν ἐπικαλώμεθα· ὁ δὲ ἀκούσειέ τε, καὶ ὑπακούσας ἵλεως εὐμενής τε ἡμῖν ἔλθοι, συνδιακοσμήσων τήν τε πόλιν καὶ τοὺς νόμους, 712, Β. "Let us invoke the aid of God in the construction of our state. May he hear us, and when he has listened to our requests, may he kindly and propitiously come to our assistance, that he may jointly with us arrange in order the state and the laws." How much higher a light than this is boasted of by those modern law-makers who have endeavoured, as far as they could, to banish the voice of prayer from our legislative halls! Compare, also, the Philebus, 25, Β : Θεὸς μὲν οὖν (ἡμῖν φράσει) ἂν πέρ γε ἐμαῖς εὐχαῖς ἐπήκοος γίγνηται. Here, too, the subject, in the discussion of which the Divine aid is invoked, is of the very highest importance, being no less than a most profound analysis of the radical difference between physical or sensual, and spiritual pleasure; a theme, in his estimation, so holy, that, when again alluding to it in the sixth book of the Republic, he utters the same word (evenue) which was employed in driving all profanation, whether of speech or action, from the sacrificial altar, Rep., vi., 509, B. Perhaps, however, the most striking example of an invocation of this kind may be found in connexion with that sublime prooemium of the Timæus, to which we have already alluded. That too, it should be borne in mind, is a treatise on law, or, in other words, the legislation of the physical and intellectual universe, embracing equally the laws of mind and matter: ̓Αλλὰ τοῦτό γε δὴ πάντες ὅσοι καὶ κατὰ βραχὺ σωφροσύνης μετέχουσιν, ἐπὶ πάσῃ ὁρμῇ καὶ σμικροῦ καὶ μεγάλου πράγματος θεὸν ἀεί που καλοῦσιν· ἡμᾶς δὲ τοὺς περὶ παντὸς λόγους ποιεῖσθαί πη μέλλοντας, εἰ γέγονεν, ἢ καὶ ἀγενές ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη θεούς ἐπικαλουμένους εὔχεσθαι πάντας κατὰ νοῦν ἐκείνοις μὲν μάλιστα, ἐπομένως δὲ ἡμῖν εἰπεῖν, 27, Ο. "Even those who have but little of sobriety, in the undertaking of any affair, whether of small or great consequence, always call upon God. Much more, then, when about to engage in a discussion respecting the universe, whether it is generated or eternal, ought we to invoke God by prayer, that what we say may be, first of all, according to his mind, and then consistent with ourselves." PAGE 23, LINE 1. Σπουδῇ πάση παρακεκλήσθων. The prayer on the present occasion has all the conciseness and simplicity that characterize all the recorded petitions of |