too well the direct tendency of such a spirit to darken the understanding, and to lead to error instead of truth. We would not, however, confound this with a modern affectation which has sought to support itself by the authority of our philosopher. Plato, it should be ever borne in mind, had no Bible, and he did well, therefore, and exercised his highest reason in seeking for a Divine revelation in those universal sentiments of all people and nations, which were as ancient in time as they were extended in space, and which could most truly be said to be, semper, ubique, et ab omnibus. This object of his reverence was something far different from the vox populi of the demagogue, who is often most successful when he can array the artificial and transient feeling of one generation, or one nation, against what he would style the antiquated prejudices of mankind. It was rather that vox humanitatis, which, by its universality at all times and in all regions, gave evidence of having been once the voice of God, remains of a primitive inspiration, however darkened it may have been by human depravity-opinions which had not been the product of the speculative reason, but which, under the conserving influence of a higher principle, had maintained their ground in spite of the opposition of human depravity, and the consequently superinduced darkness of the human understanding. It was this vox humanitatis to which Hesiod seems to allude: φήμη δ' οὔ τις πάμπαν ἀπόλλυται, ἥν τινα πολλοὶ Works and Days, 709. Compare, also, Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, i., 43: Solus enim videt, primum esse Deos, quod in omnium animis. eorum notionem impressisset ipsa natura. Quæ est enim gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doc. trina anticipationem quamdam Deorum? quæ póλmpus appellatur, &c. Quum enim non instituto aliquo aut more aut lege sit opinio constituta, maneatque ad unum omnium firma consensio, intelligi necesse est esse Deos, quoniam insitas eorum vel potius innatas cogitationes habemus. De quo autem omnium natura consentit, id verum esse necesse est. And again, lib. ii., 12: Itaque inter omnes omnium gentium sententia constat. Omnibus enim innatum est et in animo quasi insculptum esse Deos. Still more to the same effect, Tusc. Disp., i., 30, where we find the best definition of the Law of Nature that has ever been given. Ut porro firmissimum hoc afferri videtur, cur Deos esse credamus, quod nulla gens tam fera, nemo omnium tam sit immanis, cujus mentem non imbuerit Deorum opinio. Multi de Diis prava sentiunt (id enim vitioso more effici solet), omnes tamen esse vim et naturam Divinam arbitrantur. Nec vero id collocutio hominum aut consensus efficit: non institutis opinio est confirmata, non legibus. Omnis autem in re consensio omnium gentium LEX NATURÆ putanda est. IX. Antiquity of Atheism. PAGE 11, LINE 12. Γίγνονται δὲ ἀεὶ πλείους ἢ ἐλάττους ταύτην τὴν νόσον ἔχοντες. "There have always been more or less who have had this disease of atheism." It has been maintained that there were no philosophical atheists, professedly so, before Democritus and Leucippus. Plato, however, asserts that some such have existed from a very early period, and in this he is borne out by Aristotle, who tells us that most of the earliest philosophers, especially those of the Ionic school, assigned only material causes of the universe : τῶν πρώτων φιλοσοφησάντων οἱ πλεῖστοι τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἴδει μόνον ᾠήθησαν ἀρχὰς εἶναι πάντων. Aristotle, Metaph., i., 3. A distinction, however, should be made between those who were professed atheists, such as Democritus and Diagoras, and those who were inclined to an atheistical mode of philosophizing, while they yet professed to be theists, although of an impure and inconsistent species. In this latter class the world has always abounded. On the other hand, it is most conclusively shown by Cudworth, that, although this materializing school was ancient, the first philosophy was spiritual, and that the subsequent atheism arose from a perversion of the atomical theory, which, when truly held, and according to the views of those who originated it before Democritus, was not only favourable to, but one of the firmest supports of a pure theism. Plato, in this passage, styles atheism a disease, as though it were something unnatural, a corruption, diaplopà (see page 4, line 18), a departure from those innate sentiments or πроAnyes, of the race of which he and Cicero speak so emphatically. So, also, the apostle treats it as a degeneracy from a primitive better state, Rom., i., 28. He speaks of this tendency as a darkness of the spirit, καὶ ἐσκοτίσθη ἡ ἀσύνετος καρδία αὐτῶν, Rom., i., 21 : as a reprobate mind or reason, ȧdóкipov vovv, 28, to which men "had been given up, because they did not like to retain God in their knowledge." We cannot read these Scriptures without calling to mind a similar sentiment expressed in a fragment of the old poet Empedocles: Δειλὸς δ' ᾧ σκοτόεσσα θεῶν πέρι δόξα μέμηλεν. Ah wretch! whose soul dark thoughts of God invade. If the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is that darkness! X. Principle of Authority. PAGE 12, LINE 6. ἂν ἐμοὶ πείθῃ, περιμενεῖς ἀνασκοπῶν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει, πυνθανόμενος παρά τε τῶν ἄλ λων, καὶ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα καὶ παρὰ τοῦ νομοθέτου. “ Ι "If you will take my advice, you will patiently wait, repeatedly examining whether it is thus or otherwise, learning from others, and therefore, and in a most especial manner, from the Lawgiver." Notwithstanding the earnest recommenda tion to most diligent study and inquiry, and in perfect con. sistency with it, Plato holds that the acceptance of established opinions must go before and guide the exercise of private judgment; not to supersede or dispense with the ne cessity of the latter in its proper time and place, but because the state of mind which submits to lawful authority affords the surest guarantee of subsequent mental independ ence, instead of that counterfeit which is often nothing more than a slavish fear of a creed, and which loses all true independence, in its premature efforts to avoid what the best and wisest of mankind have long regarded as established. The next sentence contains a thought of the highest practical importance: ἐν δὲ δὴ τούτῳ τῷ χρόνῳ μή τολμή σης περὶ θεοὺς μηδὲν ἀσεβῆσαι, “ but during this period see to it that you venture upon nothing impious or unholy." That is, religious obligation must be revered, and pious emotions cherished, before the young soul can reason about them, and there is no period, however short, that we have a right to remain atheists until we are able to prove by induction the existence of a God. He who thus honours reason, by following its first dictate, submission to authority which God himself has established, will doubtless leave those who have been taught to pursue a different course, far behind him in all the severer and more abstruse depart ments of philosophy and theology. Throughout this whole treatise, it should be borne in mind that vouoléτηs means rather the ancient founder of a state or of a religion, than. a temporary or subordinate magistrate; so that "to learn of the Lawgiver," is to consult with deference and respect, as one great means of forming right opinions, the civil and religious constitution of the state in which we may be born. XI. Degrees of Atheism.-Peculiarity of Plato's Style. PAGE 12, LINE 13. Пavтáяaoi μèv ovv, &c. The author now proceeds to the discussion of speculative and practical atheism in its three degrees, which may be thus stated: 1st. An absolute denial of the existence of a Deity. 2d. The opinion that, if a Deity exists, he does not concern himself about us, or in other words, the denial of a Providence. 3d. A sentiment clearly allied to the second; that if a Deity exists, and if he even exercises a physical care or providence over the world regarded as a physical production, still he is in a great measure, if not wholly, indifferent to moral conduct, and that, therefore, his displeasure, should it be ever excited, is easily appeased, not by repentance, nor by an atonement that God himself has provided, but by self-imposed votive offerings and superstitious services We expect a direct argument on the first head, conducted in the usual manner by an appeal to evidences of design in the phenomena around us. This mode of proceeding is adopted in the discourses recorded in the Memorabilia, and there is, also, an admirable specimen of it in Cicero's treatise De Natura Deorum. Such a line of argument, however, although quite a favourite with modern theolo |