Ambassador MCMANAWAY. I welcome that. I am not speaking for the administration, but I would welcome that personally. We do not have that. Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, we wanted you to be as responsive as you could be and I will close with this. Do you know what the explosive material was that was used in that explosion? Ambassador MCMANAWAY. The British authorities have yet to say definitively that it was Semtex, but that is the closest that we have come to. Senator LAUTENBERG. Semtex is only made in one place. Where is it made? Ambassador MCMANAWAY. Czechoslovakia. Senator LAUTENBERG. Are we in touch with that government? Senator LAUTENBERG. OK. We would invite you, unless there is anything else, to sit with us, please, through the remainder of the hearing, away from the table so that we can call on you when we hear from the families. Thank you very much for your testimony. SUBMITTED QUESTIONS [The following questions were not asked at the hearing, but were submitted to the Department for response subsequent to the hearing:] QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR LAUTENBERG RELATIONSHIP TO FAA Q. What role does the State Department play in FAA issuing a security bulletin? A. The State Department has the following roles in the FAA Aviation Security Bulletin process: -State, through its overseas reporting, may be the source of the information that FAA re-issues as an FAA aviation security bulletin. This was the situation, for example, with the so-called "Helsinki threat" which was telephoned to the U.S. Embassy in Helsinki. -The FAA clears the text of aviation security bulletins with the State Department prior to its release. -The Department of State repeats these cables to posts affected by the bulletin so that specified officials at our diplomatic posts can assist the U.S. carriers in obtaining the cooperation of the host government in increasing security measures as appropriate. Such bulletins are not threat advisories to USC personnel and are subject to a very limited distribution at the Embassy. In the wake of Pan Am 103, we have restated these procedures to our embassies and consulates in the clearest possible language to ensure that all of them understand the purpose and limited dissemination of FAA Aviation Security Bulletins. Q. What role does the State Department play in informing a foreign carrier or foreign airport about a potential threat? A. The Department of State repeats FAA Aviation Security Bulletins to posts. These cables are repeated to posts affected by the bulletin so that specified officials at our diplomatic posts can assist the U.S. carriers in obtaining the cooperation of the host government in increasing security measures as appropriate. Embassies are authorized to share the contents of the Bulletin with host nation officials responsible for civil aviation, security and intelligence. The nation receiving the bulletin makes final decisions on onward dissemination within civil aviation channels in accordance with the text of the FAA aviation security bulletin. The Embassy would not advise foreign carriers of the contents of the Bulletin. If foreign carriers are advised of Aviation Security Bulletins this is done by the government of the airline's nation of registry, not by the USC. Q. Does the State Department have any authority over, or influence on how a foreign carrier or airport responds to the potential threat notification? Please explain. A. In answering this question, it is important to separate the issues of “authority” from "influence.' In terms of "authority", there is no direct managerial relationship between the Department of State and any of its Embassies and either a foreign carrier or a foreign airport. Assuming that an airline or airport serves as a carrier or final point of departure for the U.S., there is existing U.S. legislation regarding airport security which is germane to how an airport reacts to a security threat. In a worst case scenario, this legislation (Title 5 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1985, Public Law 99-83) provides a basis for suspending air service from that airport to the U.S. and issuing a travel advisory to alert the U.S. public to security deficiencies at the airport. In terms of "influence", it must be recognized that the host government is responsible for security within that country. What the U.S. can do—at either an Embassy or an airport-supplements the basic security provided by the host government. A concrete example of the State Department's work with other nations concerning civil aviation security occurred in that aftermath of Pan Am 103 when the FAA decided to impose new security standards on U.S. carriers operating in Europe, the Middle East and selected airports in Asia. Each Embassy worked closely with its host government to ensure that these changes could be implemented immediately. All governments agreed to these changes, even when the imposition of the new security standards created practical difficulties in airport management and operations. Our ability to "influence" other governments in these matters helps ensure that the aviation security bulletin is treated seriously, and that steps are taken to provide additional security measures for U.S. carriers, when necessary to counter a given threat. Q. Approximately fifty percent of U.S. citizens traveling overseas use foreign carriers. What does the State Department do to ensure their safety? A. The State Department assists and offers services to Americans who travel abroad on foreign flag carriers in the same manner that it serves all other citizens. In terms of aviation security the State Department and FAA cooperate in assessing foreign airports as well as foreign carriers serving the United States. Both agencies also have training programs to increase the capabilities of foreign aviation security officials. Q. Who takes the lead in protecting U.S. citizens who travel overseas, the FAA or the State Department? A. The FAA plays a crucial role in assessing the security standards at foreign airports and for foreign carriers serving the U.S. This is an extension of FAA's existing authorities which apply to U.S. carriers. The State Department, on the other hand, assesses overseas situations and offers advice to Americans traveling abroad on a range of issues including overall security and health issues, local legal practices, providing travelers with lists of lawyers, doctors and hospitals and many other services which address problems encountered by Americans while they travel abroad. The State Department is also deeply involved in legal processes when an American dies abroad. -We visit citizens who are arrested or serving prison sentences. -If an incarcerated citizen's life is endangered by inadequate diet or medical care provided by a local prison, dietary food supplements and/or medical care may be arranged under the Emergency Medical and Dietary Assistant Program. -The Department provides repatriation loans to destitute citizens who have no other means to return to the United States. -If necessary, the Department assists in the return of ill or injured Americans to the United States. This may involve loans for appropriate medical escort via special commercial air ambulance or, occasionally, by U.S. Air Force medevac. When an American dies abroad we undertake several services: To be satisfied next to kin are notified or to do the notification ourselves to the family. To transfer money, if needed, for the preparation and return of remains to the United States. To prepare a Foreign Service Report of Death which is accepted for U.S. Legal purposes as a death certificate. To serve as provisional conservators of an estate of an American dying abroad if authorized next to kin is not at hand. To provide all appropriate information to families about these above steps. -In case of disasters, such as earthquakes, hurricanes and airplane tragedies the Department organizes task forces to respond to public inquires and seek to as certain the welfare of Americans believed to be involved. Any or most of the above described services may come into play in such disasters depending on specific circumstances. Through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance program, the Department works to improve the ability and willingness of other countries to counter possible terrorist threats. Q. What are security bulletins and who receives them? A. Security bulletins are developed by the FAA and serve as that agency's means to advise aviation security officials of information which helps ensure the safety of U.S. air carriers throughout the world. The Department of State repeats these cables to posts affected by the bulletin so that specified officials at our diplomatic posts can assist the U.S. carriers in obtaining the cooperation of the host government in increasing security measures as appropriate. Such bulletins are subject to a very limited distribution. Consequently, FAA aviation security bulletins are received by FAA officials, security officials at the U.S. carriers and selected personnel, including the Regional Security Officer and civil aviation personnel, at U.S. Embassies in the region affected by the information. Q. What role does the State Department play in the FAA's decision on whether to issue a security bulletin? A. The decision on whether to issue such a bulletin rests with the FAA, following consultation with other agencies which may have provided material which is incorporated into the security bulletin. The State Department participates in this proc ess. Q. Does State play any role in informing U.S. carriers of a security bulletin? A. The FAA is responsible for advising U.S. air carriers about an aviation security bulletin. The Department of State has no role in this process. Q. What does the State Department do to inform U.S. citizens that a security bulletin has been issued? A. In the event of a specific and credible threat to civil aviation which could not be countered, a strong recommendation would be made to the carrier that it cancel the flight(s) in question. If necessary to ensure the security of the traveling public, the Department of State would issue a travel advisory warning the public about this situation. Such a travel advisory would be widely disseminated in cooperation with the international media and the travel industry itself. The Department of State will also issue a travel advisory when the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Secretary of State, determines that aviation security at a foreign airport presents a security hazard to the American traveling public. Q. Is there one set of rules governing the notification of U.S. government overseas employees, and another for its citizens? A. The Department of State wishes to state categorically to this Committee, the Congress and the American people that there is not, and cannot be, a double standard between the travel security information available to official personnel overseas and to the American public. Q. Are Embassies or diplomatic posts informed of possible security bulletins, even when FAA has decided not to issue a security bulletin? A. Aviation security information, whether it results in an aviation security bulletin or not, is occasionally developed based on Embassy reporting. Therefore, a small number of embassies, involved directly with a given security threat, may see the information before it is reissued, if at all, as an FAA security bulletin. This is true whether the threat applies to a U.S. carrier or not. The number of officials who would see such information in an Embassy is very limited. They would have access to the information consistent with their official duties involving civil aviation or security. Q. If so, doesn't this suggest a duplicity of treatment? A. No. Embassy personnel who have access to the information prior to its release as an FAA aviation security bulletin have such access because they were involved in collecting the initial threat information or a closely related function, such as civil aviation or security. Q. Which is more serious, a travel advisory issued by State or a security bulletin issued by FAA? A. Travel advisories and security bulletins are significantly different. A travel advisory is the Department of State's means to advise the public of a situation-be it civil unrest, terrorism, medical or otherwise-which should be considered in making travel-related decisions. Aviation security bulletins are not public documents. They advise the U.S. air carriers of information which the FAA believes is needed by the carriers to help ensure aviation safety. A public travel advisory would be issued regarding civil aviation only if the threat was credible, specific and could not be countered. The travel advisory would be issued, for example, if an air carrier declined to cancel a flight in response to such a threat. If a travel advisory is issued in such a circumstance it would serve as the U.S. government's notice to the public to avoid the flight(s) affected by the threat. INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION (ICAO) Q. What was the State Department's participation in the recent ICAO meetings in Montreal regarding aviation security? A. The State Department was extensively involved in all aspects of the February 15-16 ministerial level meeting of the ICAO Council. First, the State Department, through the U.S. Mission to ICAO in Montreal, brought the issue of Pan Am 103 to the formal attention of ICAO at its Council meetings which began on 16 January. Building upon this issue, and in coordination with the British, the proposal for a special ICAO Ministerial was put forward. Through its Embassies the Department made demarches in many capitals to coordinate with others regarding their participating at this meeting. In parallel with these approaches, the Department was involved in the interagency effort to refine U.S. objectives for the meeting. Participating bureaus and offices in this process included the Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, and the Bureau of International Organizations. Work continues in these bureaus and at the U.S. Mission to ICAO to ensure that the work plan adopted at the ICAO Ministerial is fulfilled by developing enhanced aviation security standards to help prevent a repetition of the Pan Am 103 tragedy. Q. What was accomplished at those meetings? A. The February, 1989 meeting of the ICAO Council adopted a detailed work plan which was tasked to two of the standing committees of ICAO. The Unlawful Interference Committee was tasked with developing new security measures applicable to: -Detection of sabotage devices, especially explosives. -Comprehensive screening of checked baggage. —Screening of passengers and hand baggage. -Security problem created by the increasing carriage of radios, computers, and other electrical equipment. -Achievement of full and reliable reconciliation of passengers and their baggage. -Security problems posed by the handling of cargo, mail and courier services. -Problems of controlling access at airports. -Provision of advice to States on request on aviation security organization and techniques. -Coordination by ICAO of an aviation security training program. -Provision to member States, on request, of international security surveys under ICAO auspices. The Air Navigation Commission was assigned responsibility for developing procedures to examine the possibility of taking security considerations into account in the design of aircraft. This work plan is currently being fulfilled by the relevant committees. Initial action by the ICAO Council on these proposals should be taken at the Council meeting scheduled for May/June of this year. Q. What have we learned from the Pan Am flight 103 that will result in changes to international aviation security standards? A. The sabotage of Pan Am 103 is a tragic reminder that the international community is still vulnerable to terrorist and other criminal attacks. Citizens from approximately twenty nations died in the crash. The attack against Pan Am 103 reinforced the commitment of many nations to work closely and effectively together to promote aviation security. The detailed work plan adopted at the February meeting of the ICAO Council reflects priority areas in which additional effort is necessary. These include, among others, enhanced capability to detect sabotage devices; comprehensive baggage screening; full and reliable reconciliation of passengers and their baggage; expanded security training; and, improved aircraft design to withstand attacks. Work in each of these areas will go forward in ICAO as well as in individual countries. Over time, this work will enhance further aviation security and promote adoption of the most comprehensive and effective aviation security standards possible. Q. What is the State Department doing differently today that it wasn't doing before Pan Am flight 103? A. In the aftermath of the bombing of Pan Am 103 the Department of State has re-issued guidance on the proper handling of aviation security bulletins by our embassies abroad. These instructions make clear that FAA bulletins have a limited circulation at post, are provided for official purposes, are not to be posted in a public area and do not serve as threat advisories to the Embassy community. These instructions were re-issued to preclude another mistake such as the posting the "Helsinki threat" by the Embassy in Moscow. State is also reviewing its procedures for notifying and supporting next of kin in the wake of disasters so that we may identify "lessons learned" and apply those lessons to any such incidents in the future. We have also reviewed the national-level counterterrorism research and development program to identify projects or funds that can be redirected to meet higher priorities such as improving the detection of thin sheet explosives. In addition, we have launched a number of initiatives which may result in an international protocol regarding the “tagging" of plastic explosives. We have taken the lead in urging the international community to develop an effective protocol which requires that plastic explosives be “tagged" to make it easier to detect these materials. The U.S. has hosted a meeting of allied nations on this issue and also participated in a recent meeting under ICAO auspices which reviewed the entire issue. Q. What new things will the State Department be doing in the future in response to Pan Am flight 103? A. The State Department is committed to a comprehensive program to apply the "lessons learned” from the Pan Am 103 bombing to preventing such incidents in the future. Among the steps that we will take are the following: -Funding additional research into detection techniques for plastic explosives through the interagency counterterrorism research and development program. We will also continue our research efforts into other components of the counterterrorism R&D program; -Reviewing our processes for assisting the families of victims of such incidents to ensure that the "lessons learned" from Pan Am 103 in terms of services to families and the treatment that we extend to victims of international terrorist incidents. —Expanding significantly, starting in FY 1989, the training opportunities in civil aviation security that we provide through the Anti-terrorism Assistance program; -Working with our allies and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) to develop strengthened civil aviation security to help prevent another incident such as the bombing of Pan Am 103; -Working with other governments to implement the new security measures for U.S. carriers announced by Secretary Skinner on April 3; and -Such other steps and findings as may emerge from the on-going investigation of Pan Am 103. Q. In your estimation, are ICAO and individual foreign governments as concerned about the security problem as the United States? A. The attitude of any nation concerning terrorism often reflects that nation's particular experiences with terrorism. In the aftermath of Pan Am 103, however, there is an increasing recognition by many nations that all countries and airlines are at risk from such acts. We believe that many governments are as concerned about terrorism and civil aviation security as is the U.S. A concrete example of this was the recent ICAO Ministerial meeting. The thirty-three members of the ICAO Council, adopted by consensus a detailed work plan on aviation security at the February ministerial level Council meeting. This action sets the direction for work in aviation security that ultimately will engage most of ICAO's 160 members. COMPARATIVE RISK FOR U.S. CARRIERS Q. Are U.S. airlines operating overseas at a greater risk than the carriers of other countries? A. No. While some U.S. carriers may be a more likely target for terrorists than the airlines of most other nations, U.S. carriers also impose security measures higher than those imposed by almost any other carrier. These security measures are designed by FAA and the airlines to offset the higher threat level perhaps experienced by some U.S. air carriers. |