shooting as distinguished from the mere protection of ducks or othe game which cannot be harvested. Upon no other theory can the expense of maintaining the Federal Wildlife Service be saddled on th hunter instead of distributed over the entire national tax structure. Ducks which cannot be harvested have no economic value. They are not a "resource" until they are available for shooting purposes If they cannot be shot, or shot at, they are nothing more than an expen sive nuisance. They are in fact so much of a nuisance that Represen tative Lemke has introduced a bill, H. R. 4093, to raise the price of duck stamps to $2 so the Wildlife Service can pay farmers for crop damage done by ducks which the hunter is not allowed to shoot. Likewise, the Senate duck stamp amendment would tax the hunte an extra dollar to expand a system which is fundamentally incapabi of producing a sufficient number of shootable ducks for the 2,000,000 or more hunters who buy duck stamps every year. The present sys tem has failed because it does not adequately promote the breeding o ducks. The vast bulk of the ducks which fly over American shooting grounds are bred in Canada and Alaska. This means that, as it now operates the Federal Wildlife Service cannot touch the origin of the biggest par of the duck crop. Their efforts to increase the breeding of ducks ar necessarily confined to a very small percentage of the total duci population. t The 200 refuges now possessed by the Service are mainly "resting areas as distinguished from "breeding" areas. Their purpose is conserve the seed stock of ducks and to return enough breeders to Canada to produce a shootable crop of new ducks every year. These refuges now cover 3,250,000 acres, acquired at a cost of $29. 500,000, and maintained with duck stamp money. Beyond the neces sary function of preserving an adequate seed stock for return t Canadian breeding grounds, these refuges produce only a relatively small number of shootable ducks. No one has shown the duck hunte how the acquisition of more refuges, or an increase in "management" can produce any worthwhile increase in the annual crop. Under these circumstances, it seems obvious that the only way to produce more ducks for shooting purposes is to restore and develop additional nesting grounds in Canada where most of our ducks are bred. That such development is practical and successful is proved by the history of Ducks Unlimited. Ducks Unlimited is an organization of American sportsmen, finance by voluntary contributions from American hunters. Since 1938 with full cooperation of the Canadian Government, and with less than $2,000,000, this voluntary organization has restored and developed. over 1,000,000 acres of breeding grounds in Canadian provinces, and has lifted the Canadian crop of shootable ducks which migrate ove our shooting grounds to more than 110,000,000 in 1948. Their engineers have surveyed and mapped out projects which could in a short time produce all the ducks we need for shooting purposes, at a cost far below the cost of our present system of refuges. Senator BREWSTER. I suppose you have seen Mr. Oscar Chapman's statement to us, the Acting Secretary? Mr. HUNTER. Yes, sir. Senator BREWSTER. He said: In contrast, the population of migratory birds, which were substantially creased from 1929 to and including 1944, showed a startling decline to the last ason. That would seem to be in conflict with your statement, apparently, bout 1948, unless he is reflecting that. Mr. HUNTER. On the figures announced, the figure in 1947 was 10,000,000 ducks. They would not give out a figure for 1948 ecause of an agreement with the Wildlife Service, whose figures often onflict with Ducks Unlimited. But there is every evidence, from many counts in many States, that the crop shows a definite increase n 1948. So I feel sure I am right in saying we had more than 110,00,000 ducks coming off the Canadian breeding grounds in 1948. Senator BREWSTER. So you disagree with his statement, which howed a startling decline down to the last season? Mr. HUNTER. There was a decline in 1945, which started an upward trend in the following year. Senator BREWSTER. So you think from 1946 on it has increased? Mr. HUNTER. Yes, sir. The Canadian crop has increased. And whenever the Canadian crop increases, our return ducks naturally increase. The Canadian crop is the key to the whole situation. The CHAIRMAN. Are there any statistics from Canada which would bear out your contention? Mr. HUNTER. Yes, sir. I could get those from Ducks Unlimited. The CHAIRMAN. Would you do that, and send them to us, so that we can get that into the record? We are very anxious to have the whole picture. (Mr. Hunter subsequently furnished the following letter and in formation for the record:) United States Senator EDWIN C. JOHNSON, DENVER, May 16, 1949. DEAR SENATOR JOHNSON: Enclosed herewith is a chart showing comparative figures of duck populations through 1946. For 1947 the Ducks Unlimited figure Was 110,000,000; there is no "official" Ducks Unlimited figure for 1948, but my information is that the figure is somewhere between 115,000,000 and 125,000,000. There is a great discrepancy between the Ducks Unlimited figures and the Federal wildlife estimates. This is hard to explain, and even harder to understand. The Ducks Unlimited figures represent birds counted just as they "flock up" and prepare to move south, before our shooting season starts. The Federal wildlife figures, as near as I can tell, represent what they call a "trend" figure, taken after the hunting season closes, which purports to give an estimate of birds returned to the nesting grounds. Even so, I can't reconcile the figures because, for example, the Federal wildlife figures for 1948 are 54,000,000 ducks alive after the season closed. Their survey shows that the average hunter killed nine and a fraction ducks during the 1948 season. Assuming 2,000,000 duck stamps (hunters) that would mean a kill of 18,000,000 ducks; 18,000,000 plus 54,000,000 is 62,000,000, which apparently is all the ducks which can be accounted for out of the 110,000,000 Canadian ducks plus the unknown quantity representing the United States bred crop. What became of the other 48,000,000 ducks? This juggling with figures has been going on for years and no one has yet come up with a satisfactory explanation for it. The point in sending you the chart, of course, is to show that shooting depends on the production of ducks in Canada more than on any other one factor. Yours sincerely, ED M. HUNTER. Year by year estimate of duck population since 1934 [Inventory records of Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of Interior, commence with January 1995 Water fowl refuges as of June 30, 1948, 196 (aggregate area, 3,122,231 acres). NOTES ON DUCK POPULATION CHART 1. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service's winter duck population estimate is made after the close of the hunting season. It is an estimate of the cont nental supply except where "starred," which indicates that ducks wintering south of the United States-Mexico border were not included. 2. Ducks Unlimited's summer duck population estimate covers the territory from the Manitoba-Ontario boundary, the west coast of Hudson Bay north to the Arctic and west to the Yukon-Alaska border, and the Alberta-British Columbia border. In other words all western Canada is included except British Columbia. In this area approximately 70 percent of the continental duck population breeds. Ducks Unlimited's estimate is made before the hunting season opens and includes the increment of the year. 3. From 1937 to 1942, inclusive, the Fish and Wildlife Service's estimate was consistently higher than Ducks Unlimited, which is as it should be. Interpreted, this means that the kill, crippling losses, and normal die-off, were within the increment and more breeding stock was returning to western Canada each succes sive year. This was observed and duly recorded by Ducks Unlimited Keymen observers. A feature of this period is the sudden upsurge of the population in 1941 and 1942. 4. In 1943 Ducks Unlimited's and the Fish and Wildlife Service's estimates drew together and, if we are dealing with cyclic phenomenon, as the chart strongly indicates, this fact could be recognized as a danger signal and used as a guide to determine the allowable hunting pressure. 5. In 1944 Ducks Unlimited showed an increase of 15,000,000 over 1943. In 1944 the sale of duck stamps was 1,169,352. Fish and Wildlife Service's estimate dropped to 105,500,000, thus falling below Ducks Unlimited's for the first time. On the face of it, this means that an increase of 15,000,000 could not compensate for the kill, crippling loss, and normal die-off. 6. In 1945 Ducks Unlimited showed no increment over the previous year. That year duck-stamp sales suddenly zoomed 300,000-over 1944. Apart from any increase in hunting pressure, the fact that Ducks Unlimited showed no increment means that we had a "crash" decline on our hands. The kill, crippling loss-believed to be much larger than anyone is prepared to admitand normal die-off is a total loss to the population. Had any faith at all been placed in Ducks Unlimited's estimates and used in conjunction with the Fish and Wildlife Service's estimates, as is done in this chart, the turning point could have been recognized and proper action taken. The partial failure of the 1945 hatch was not due to drought as is popularly believed, but to abnormal frosts in May and June during the height of the nesting season. Brood survival fell below average and an unknown number of adult females failed to produce young at all. 7. The 1946 breeding season was favorable and Ducks Unlimited's estimate was 106,000,000, indicating a good recovery by a severely reduced breeding stock. In 1946 Ducks Unlimited Keymen for the first time reported a reduction in the breeding stock returning. 8. A disturbing feature of the facts revealed by the chart is that nothing in Ducks Unlimited's (or anyone else's) present program could have prevented, or alleviated in the slightest degree, the collapse which has been recorded. Even the shooting pressure (much as it occupies the spotlight) is a minor factor in declines of this nature. BERT CARTWRIGHT. Year by year estimate of duck population since 1934 [Inventory records of Fish and Wildlife Service, Department of Interior, commence with January 185 Water fowl refuges as of June 30, 1948, 196 (aggregate area, 3,122,231 acres). NOTES ON DUCK POPULATION CHART 125, 350,000 105, 500,000 80,000,000 54, 000, 000 54, 000, 000 53, 460,000 1. The United States Fish and Wildlife Service's winter duck population estimate is made after the close of the hunting season. It is an estimate of the continental supply except where "starred," which indicates that ducks wintering south of the United States-Mexico border were not included. 2. Ducks Unlimited's summer duck population estimate covers the territory from the Manitoba-Ontario boundary, the west coast of Hudson Bay north to the Arctic and west to the Yukon-Alaska border, and the Alberta-British Columbia border. In other words all western Canada is included except British Columbia. In this area approximately 70 percent of the continental duck population breeds. Ducks Unlimited's estimate is made before the hunting season opens and includes the increment of the year. 3. From 1937 to 1942, inclusive, the Fish and Wildlife Service's estimate was consistently higher than Ducks Unlimited, which is as it should be. Interpreted, this means that the kill, crippling losses, and normal die-off, were within the increment and more breeding stock was returning to western Canada each succes sive year. This was observed and duly recorded by Ducks Unlimited Keymen observers. A feature of this period is the sudden upsurge of the population in 1941 and 1942. 4. In 1943 Ducks Unlimited's and the Fish and Wildlife Service's estimates drew together and, if we are dealing with cyclic phenomenon, as the chart strongly indicates, this fact could be recognized as a danger signal and used as a guide to determine the allowable hunting pressure. 5. In 1944 Ducks Unlimited showed an increase of 15,000,000 over 1943. In 1944 the sale of duck stamps was 1,169,352. Fish and Wildlife Service's estimate dropped to 105,500,000, thus falling below Ducks Unlimited's for the first time. On the face of it, this means that an increase of 15,000,000 could not compensate for the kill, crippling loss, and normal die-off. 6. In 1945 Ducks Unlimited showed no increment over the previous year. That year duck-stamp sales suddenly zoomed 300,000-over 1944. Apart from any increase in hunting pressure, the fact that Ducks Unlimited showed no increment means that we had a "crash" decline on our hands. The kill, crippling loss-believed to be much larger than anyone is prepared to admit― and normal die-off is a total loss to the population. Had any faith at all been placed in Ducks Unlimited's estimates and used in conjunction with the Fish and Wildlife Service's estimates, as is done in this chart, the turning point could have been recognized and proper action taken. The partial failure of the 1945 hatch was not due to drought as is popularly believed, but to abnormal frosts in May and June during the height of the nesting season. Brood survival fell below average and an unknown number of adult females failed to produce young at all. 7. The 1946 breeding season was favorable and Ducks Unlimited's estimate was 106,000,000, indicating a good recovery by a severely reduced breeding stock. In 1946 Ducks Unlimited Keymen for the first time reported a reduction in the breeding stock returning. 8. A disturbing feature of the facts revealed by the chart is that nothing in Ducks Unlimited's (or anyone else's) present program could have prevented, or alleviated in the slightest degree, the collapse which has been recorded. Even the shooting pressure (much as it occupies the spotlight) is a minor factor in declines of this nature. BERT CARTWRIGHT. |