1539. Id. Pits. Slack coal burning. The owner, lessee, or agent of any mine, who, by working such mine, has caused, or may hereafter cause, the surface on the public domain, commons, highway, or other lands to cave in and form a pit in which persons or animals are likely to fall, shall cause such cave or sink to be filled up, or to be securely fenced with a good, lawful fence; and if he has heaped or piled, or shall hereafter heap or pile, slack coal on the surface, and such slack coal shall take fire and endanger the life or safety of any person or animal, he shall cause the fire to be extinguished or the burning coal to be inclosed with a sufficient fence. [C. L. § 2241. 1540. Penalty. Any person failing to comply with the provisions of this chapter shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be liable for all damages. [C. L. § 2242. TITLE 43. the MINORS. 1541. Period of minority. The period of minority extends in males to age of twenty-one years; and in females to that of eighteen years; but all minors obtain their majority by marriage. [C. L. § 2560. 1542. Minors' contracts. Disaffirmance. A minor is bound not only by contracts for necessaries but also by his other contracts, unless he disaffirms them before or within a reasonable time after he attains his majority and restores to the other party all money or property received by him by virtue of said contract and remaining within his control at any time after attaining his majority. [C. L. § 2561. The rule that an infant is bound by his contracts unless he disaffirms them within a reasonable time after his majority, applies only to such contracts as are beneficial to the infant. Groesbeck v. Bell, 1 U. 338. In determining what is a "reasonable time" within which an infant must disaffirm a contract, the jury can take into consideration the nature of the contract and the situation of the parties. No particular manner of disaffirmance is necessary. Id. Persons cannot disaffirm a parol partition of their father's land made during their minority, if, after attaining majority, they retain, control, and sell parts allotted to them. Whittemore v. Cope, 11 U. 344; 40 P. 256. 1543. Id. No contract can be thus disaffirmed in cases where on account of the minor's own misrepresentations as to his majority, or from his having engaged in business as adult, the other party had good reason to believe the minor capable of contracting. [C. L. § 2562. Minor may keep bank account, 381. 1544. Payment for personal services. When a contract for the personal services of a minor has been made with him alone, and those services are afterward performed, payment made therefor to such minor in accordance with the terms of the contract, is a full satisfaction for those services, and the parent or guardian cannot recover therefor a second time. [C. L. § 2563. TITLE 44. NAMES. 1545. Change of name of person, city, town, etc. Petition. Any person, city, town, precinct, or school district, desiring to change his or its name, file a petition therefor in the district court of the county where located, setting forth: 1. The cause for which the change of name is sought. 2. The name proposed. 3. If the petitioner is a person, that he has been a bona fide citizen of the county for the year immediately prior to the filing of the petition; or, if the petitioner is a city, town, precinct, or school district, that two-thirds of the legal voters thereof desire such change of name, and that there is no other city, town, precinct, or school district, in this state, of the name sought. [C. L. §§ 222*, 3861-2*. 1546. Hearing. Proof of publication. Order. At any subsequent term; the district court may order the change of name as requested, upon proof in open court of the allegations of the petition, and that there exists proper cause for granting the same, and that thirty days' previous notice of the hearing thereof has been given in a newspaper published or having a general circulation in the county. [C. L. §§ 223*; 3862-4. 1547. Effect of change. Such proceedings shall in no manner affect a legal action or proceeding then pending, nor any right, title, or interest what soever. TITLE 45. NATURAL GAS. 1548. Confining gas in unused well. Any person or corporation in possession as owner, lessee, agent, or manager, of any well in which natural gas has been found, shall, unless said gas is being utilized, within three months from the completion of said well, or at any time upon ceasing to use such well, confine the gas in said well until such time as it shall be utilized; provided, that this section shall not apply to any well operated as an oil well. ['92, p. 41. 1549. Plugging abandoned well. Upon abandoning or ceasing to operate any well sunk in exploring for gas, the person or corporation that sunk the same shall fill up the well with sand or rock sediment to a depth of at least twenty feet above the gas-bearing rock, and drive a round, seasoned wooden plug, at least three feet in length, equal in diameter to the diameter of the well below the casing, to a point at least five feet below the bottom of the casing; and immediately after drawing the casing, shall drive a round, seasoned wooden plug, to a point just below where the lower end of the casing rested, which plug shall be at least three feet in length, tapering in form, and of the same diameter at the distance of eighteen inches from the smaller end as the diameter of the hole below the point at which it is to be driven. After the plug has been properly driven there shall be filled on the top of the same, sand or rock sediment to a depth of at least five feet; provided, that in case such geological formation shall be encountered in the bore as to make some other method more effective for preventing flooding by water from superposed strata, the inspector may direct what other plan shall be pursued without unreasonable cost to the owner or lessee of the well. ['92, pp. 41-2. 1550. Penalties for neglect. Any person or corporation who shall violate any of the provisions of sections fifteen hundred and forty-eight and fifteen hundred and forty-nine, shall be liable to a penalty of two hundred dollars for each and every violation thereof, and to the further penalty of two hundred dollars for each thirty days during which such violation shall continue; and all such penal Repeated Su chap. 83, 1899 ties shall be recovered, with costs of suit, in a civil action or actions, in the name of the state for the use of the county in which the well shall have been opened. ['92, p. 42. 1551. Rights of adjacent owner. Whenever any person or corporation shall abandon any gas well, and shall fail to comply with section fifteen hundred and forty-nine, any person or corporation lawfully in possession of lands adjacent to or in the neighborhood of said well may enter upon the land upon which said well is situated and take possession of said well, and plug the same in the manner provided by section fifteen hundred and forty-nine, and may maintain a civil action in any court of the state, against all or any of the owners or persons abandoning said well, to recover the costs thereof. This shall be in addition to the penalties provided by section fifteen hundred and fifty. ['92, p. 42. 1552. Right of way for pipe lines. Any person, corporation, or association desirous of obtaining the right of way for a pipe line or lines, or for the location of any gas tank or reservoir, shall be entitled to exercise the right of eminent domain. ['92, p. 42. is a written promise or request for the payment of a certain sum of money to order or bearer, in conformity to the provisions of this title. [C. L. § 2841. Cal. Civ. C. ? 3087. Notes, bills, checks, etc., may be made or drawn by telegraph, ? 2699. Provision in a note that "if the interest be not paid as stipulated, the legal holder may declare the principal due and proceed by law to recover both principal and interest," does not destroy negotiability. Smith v. Williamson, 8 U. 219; 30 P. 753. The stipulation in a note which includes the covenants of a mortgage by which the makers agree to pay taxes on the property, assessment, insurance, and damages for waste, renders the note non-negotiable. Salisbury v. Stewart, U.; 49 P. 777. The fact that the makers of a promissory note undertake to pay an attorney's fee if a suit should be brought to enforce the collection of a note, does not render the note non-negotiable. Id. A note falling due in the hands of the payee ceases to be negotiable. Afterwards indorsers take it subject to the same defense that could have been made in the hands of the payee. The stipulation to pay attorney's fees in case of suit, binds the maker to pay them as a part of the costs of the remedy, but he cannot be required to pay more than the fees actually charged. Id. Decisions on consideration, ? 1567; on suretyship, etc., 1568; on notes generally, 1658. 1554. Payable in money only. Conditions. A negotiable instrument must be made payable in money only, and without any condition not certain of fulfillment. [C. L. § 2842. Cal. Civ. C. 3088. 1555. Payee to be ascertainable. The person to whose order a negotiable instrument is made payable must be ascertainable at the time the instrument is made. [C. L. § 2843. Cal. Civ. C. 3089. 1556. When payee has option. A negotiable instrument may give to the payee an option between the payment of the sum specified therein and the L performance of another act; but as to the latter, the instrument is not within the provisions of this title. [C. L. § 2844. Cal. Civ. C. 3090. 1557. Date. Time and place of payment. A negotiable instrument may be with or without date, and with or without designation of time or place of payment. [C. L. § 2845. Cal. Civ. C. 3091. 1558. Collateral security. A negotiable instrument may contain a pledge of collateral security, with authority to dispose thereof. [C. L. § 2846. Cal. Civ. C. 3092. 1559. Must not contain other contract. A negotiable instrument must not contain any other contract than such as is specified in this chapter. [C. L. § 2847. Cal. Civ. C. 3093. 1560. Any date may be inserted. Any date may be inserted by the maker of a negotiable instrument, whether past, present, or future, and the instrument is not invalidated by his death or incapacity at the time of the nominal date. [C. L. § 2848. Cal. Civ. C. 3094. 1561. Six classes. There are six classes of negotiable instruments, namely: first, bills of exchange; second, promissory notes; third, bank notes; fourth, checks; fifth, bonds; sixth, certificates of deposit. [C. L. § 2849. Cal. Civ. C. 3095. notes, 22 1658-1662. Checks and bank notes, ?? Bills of exchange, 1612-1657. Promissory 1663-1665. Repeated be chapt 83. 1899 CHAPTER 2. INTERPRETATION. 1562. Time of payment not specified. A negotiable instrument which does not specify the time of payment is payable immediately. [C. L. § 2850. Cal. Civ. C. 3099. Similar provision, ? 1586. 1563. Place of payment not specified. A negotiable instrument which does not specify a place of payment is payable at the residence or place of business of the maker, or wherever he may be found. [C. L. § 2851. Cal. Civ. C. 3100. 1564. "Order" or "bearer." An instrument, otherwise negotiable in form, payable to a person named, but with the words added, "or to his order," or. "to bearer," or words equivalent thereto, is in the former case payable to the written order of such person, and in the latter case payable to the bearer. [C. L. $2852. Cal. Civ. C. 3101. 1565. Where payable to maker or fictitious person. A negotiable instrument, made payable to the order of the maker, or of a fictitious person, if issued by the maker for a valid consideration, without indorsement, has the same effect against him and all other persons having notice of the fact, as if payable to the bearer. [C. L. § 2853. Cal. Civ. C. 3102. 1566. When payee obviously fictitious. A negotiable instrument, made payable to the order of a person obviously fictitious, is payable to the bearer. [C. L. § 2854. Cal. Civ. C. 3103. bu chapt 83. 1899 Repialid 1567. What presumed from signature. The signature of every drawer, acceptor, and indorser of a negotiable instrument is presumed to have been made for a valuable consideration, before the maturity of the instrument, and in the ordinary course of business. [C. L. § 2855. Cal. Civ. C. 23104. 1581. Want of consideration does not excuse, The holder of negotiable paper before maturity is presumed to be a holder for value and is not obliged to show that he paid value for it, until under proper pleadings evidence is offered to overcome this presumption. Voorhees v. Fisher, 9 U. 303; 34 P. 64. If a party executes a promissory note while he is so intoxicated that he does not know what he is doing, and after becoming sober ratifies the transaction by keeping the consideration which he would receive for the note, he cannot afterwards avoid the note. Smith v. Williamson, 8 U. 219: 30 P. 753. A promissory note in the hands of a bona fide holder cannot be avoided on the ground that the maker of the note at the time he executed it was so intoxicated that he did not know what he was doing. Id. Conversations between two makers of a note whereby one of them was induced to sign it, are not competent evidence to affect the payee, when he was not present, and had no knowledge thereof. Flint v. Nelson, 10 U. 261; 37 P. 479; affirmed 166 U. S. 276. Where several makers place a note in the possession of one of their number, and he delivers it to the payee, he acts as the authorized agent of all the makers, and the payee takes it, if for value, charged with no other equity than appeared to his knowledge. Id. R., in a separate answer to an action upon a promissory note, stated that his co-defendant, who held the note for sale, had promised him to erase his name before selling the note, and that plaintiff, to whom same was transferred, accepted it with knowledge of such agreement, but by mistake or inadvertence, the indorsement was not erased; held, that these facts constituted a good defense to an action against R. Gregg v. Groesbeck, 11 U. 310; 40 P. 202. Makers of a note cannot show a contemporaneous parol agreement, that they signed on the representation of plaintiff's cashier that they would not be called upon to pay it; nor is proof that one maker signed without consideration sufficient to destroy the presumption of consideration arising from the note itself; nor is a bank that takes a note for value before maturity, signed by its cashier and others, chargeable with knowledge of an agreement between the cashier and his co-makers that the note was not to be delivered until it was signed by the president of the bank. First Nat'l Bank v. Foote, 12 U. 157; 42 P. 205. CHAPTER 3. INDORSEMENTS. 1568. Indorser, who is. One who writes his name upon a negotiable instrument, otherwise than as a maker or acceptor, and delivers it, with his name thereon, to another person, is called an indorser, and his act is called indorsement. [C. L. § 2856. 39. Cal. Civ. C. ? 3108. Indorsement, Suretyship, and Guaranty. An indorser holding other notes and mortgages as securities from the maker of the note may transfer such securities to the payee, who may proceed to recover upon the securities before suing upon the note indorsed. Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Smith, 2 U. If a material fact connected with the contract of suretyship and directly affecting the sureties' liability, and which might influence them in entering into the contract, is purposely concealed from them in the interest of the creditor, such concealment, though no inquiry is made by the sureties, amounts to fraud upon them, and would discharge them from liability; held further, that sureties upon a note based upon a contract made by a person who was acting as agent for both parties to the contract, such fact being unknown to the sureties, would not be liable. Jungk v. Holbrook, - U. —; 49 P. 305. See same case, 9 U. 49; 33 P. 236. 12 U. 209; 42 P. 292. When the payee of a note gives the principal an extension of time, for a valuable consideration, without the consent of the surety, the latter is thereby discharged from further liability. Baskin v. Godbe, 1 U. 28. Where payee after knowledge that one of two makers is in fact a surety for the other, agrees with the principal to extend the time of payment, or do any act to continue the liability of the surety without the latter's consent, the surety is discharged. Gillett v. Taylor; — Ú. -; 46 P. 1099. A person who signs a note as maker but is in fact a surety, will be considered as a principal with respect to all who have no notice of the suretyship; but where such fact was known to plaintiff before equities attached, such maker may prove the same by parol evidence. Id. Where the relation of principal and surety exists between two joint makers of a promissory note, the surety to whom the note has been assigned by blank indorsement cannot, as an indorsee, sue his principal. His remedy is for money paid to the use of his principal. Miller v. Zeigler, 3 U. 17; 5 P. 518. A held the note of B, which had been transferred to him by S, who represented the note as “good.” After the note was past due and unpaid, S indorsed the same as a guarantee that the note was good. Afterwards, without any notice to S of the nonpayment of the note by B, suit was commenced by A against S and the makers thereof. Held, that S was a guarantor, and liable on the note only after a regular prosecution against the maker thereof and the use of due and reasonable diligence on the part of the plaintiff to collect the same from the maker by due course of law. Anderson v. Stevens, 2 U. 538. Notwithstanding the contract of guaranty is the obligation of a surety, it is to be construed as a mercantile instrument in furtherance of its spirit and liberally to promote the use and convenience of commercial intercourse. Davis v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 104 U. S. 159. Affirming 2 U. 411. One or more persons may sign a note as guarantors, and deliver it to the payee with the agreement that they shall not be bound unless other persons named shall also sign, and if such |