and if the merchandise is entered for consumption shall pay the full
amount of the duties and charges ascertained to be due thereon."
United States v. Goldenberg, 95.
EJECTMENT.
See ADVERSE POSSESSION.
1. Hyer and Shield were engaged separately, each on behalf of himself
and his associates, in seeking from the city government of Richmond
a concession for a street railway with collateral lines. Hyer's organi-
zation was to be called the Richmond Conduit Company, and Shield's
the Richmond Traction Company. Hyer made a deposit of money in
a bank in Richmond to aid in his projects. Hyer and Shield then
contracted in writing as follows, each being fully authorized thereto
by his associates: "We hereby bind ourselves, in our own behalf and
for our associates, mutually to coöperate one with the other in secur-
ing a franchise for said railway and to divide equally between us
and our associates whatever may be realized from the enterprise, first
deducting from said amount whatever actual expenses may have been
incurred by either side, such expenses to be paid out of the first
money realized from said enterprise. The deposit already made with
the State Bank of Richmond, by Hyer or his associates, is to stand
and remain intact as it now is for the purpose of securing the fran-
chise aforesaid, subject to any conditions for the withdrawal thereof
made by Hyer with the depositor after the seventeenth day of August,
1895; and further, it is agreed that the application and franchise to
be presented to the common council of the city of Richmond shall be
that of the Richmond Traction Company, for the building of an over-
head trolley railway or cable system." A full statement of the action
of the two companies was made to the Richmond authorities. Hyer
fully performed his agreements. He was unable to go to Richmond
when the matter was settled, and Shield secured the concession for
himself and his associates, and refused to permit Hyer and his asso-
ciates to participate in it. By bill in equity, amended bill and sup-
plemental bill, Hyer sought to be declared owner of one half interest
in the Traction Company's franchise, property and stock, and for a
decree securing the possession and enjoyment thereof. Held, that,
without deciding whether the contract sued on was, under the facts
and circumstances disclosed, void as against public policy, the case
presented was not one which called for the interposition of a court
of equity; but that the plaintiff's remedy was by an action at law.
Hyer v. Richmond Traction Co., 471.
2. Courts of equity have jurisdiction to hear the complaints of those who
assert that their lands are about to be assessed and subjected to liens
by a board or commission acting in pursuance of the provisions of a
statute which has been enacted under the forms of law, but which,
it is claimed, is unconstitutional, and therefore does not avail to con-
fer the powers sought to be exercised. Wilson v. Lambert, 611.
1. The 45th Rule of Equity, providing that "no special replication to any
answer shall be filed," and that "if any matter alleged in the answer
shall make it necessary for the plaintiff to amend his bill, he may
have leave to amend the same with or without payment of costs, as
the court, or a judge thereof, may in his discretion direct,” means, at
most, that a general replication is always sufficient to put in issue
every material allegation of an answer or amended answer, unless the
rules of pleading imperatively require an amendment of the bill; and
such an amendment is not required in order to set out that which may
be used simply as evidence to establish any fact or facts put in issue
by the pleadings. Southern Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 1.
2. When the defendant's answer in a chancery suit sets up matters which
are impertinent, and he also files a cross bill making allegations of
the same nature, a demurrer to the cross bill on that ground should
be sustained. Harrison v. Perea, 311.
The ruling in Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351, that when a second
action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand,
the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to
those matters in issue or points controverted, upon the determination
of which the finding or verdict was rendered, affirmed and applied.
Dennison v. United States, 241.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 5, 6, 7, 8, 12.
1. In the case of a petition for habeas corpus for relief from a detention
under process alleged to be illegal, by reason of the invalidity of the
process or proceedings under which the petitioner is held in custody,
copies of such process or proceedings must be annexed to, or the
essential parts thereof set out in the petition, mere averments of con-
clusions of law being necessarily inadequate. Craemer v. Washington
State, 124.
2. A writ of habeas corpus cannot be made use of as a writ of error.
Crossley v. California, 640.
1. A right of citizenship in an Indian Nation, conferred by an act of its
legislature, can be withdrawn by a subsequent act; and this rule
applies to citizenship created by marriage with such a citizen. Roff
v. Burney, 218.
2. Whether any rights of property could be taken away by such subse-
quent act, is not considered or decided. Ib.
INDICTMENT.
See CRIMINAL LAW, 3, 4, 9, 10.
1. An infant is ordinarily bound by acts done in good faith by his solicitor
or counsel in the course of the suit, to the same extent as a person of
full age; and a decree made in a suit in which an infant is a party, by
consent of counsel, without fraud or collusion, is binding upon the
infant and cannot be set aside by rehearing, appeal or review.
Thompson v. Maxwell Land Grant & Railway Co., 451.
2. A compromise made in a pending suit which appears to the court to be
for the benefit of an infant, party to the suit, will be confirmed with-
out reference to a master; and, if sanctioned by the court, cannot be
afterwards set aside except for fraud. Ib.
It being found that the defendant converted the entire assets which are
the subject of this controversy, there was no error in charging him
with interest on the amount so converted, without regard to whether
he did or did not make profits. Harrison v. Perea, 311.
INTERNATIONAL LAW.
See JURISDICTION, C, 1, 2.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.
1. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway v. Interstate Commerce
Commission, 162 U. S. 184, and Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cin-
cinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Company, 167 U. S. 479,
adhered to, to the points that Congress has not conferred upon the
Interstate Commerce Commission the legislative power of prescribing
rates, either maximum, or minimum, or absolute; and that, as it did
not give the express power to the Commission, it did not intend to
secure the same result indirectly by empowering that tribunal, after
having determined what, in reference to the past, were reasonable and
just rates, to obtain from the courts a peremptory order that in the
future the railroad companies should follow the rates thus determined
to have been in the past reasonable and just. Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Alabama Midland Railway Co., 144.
2. Competition is one of the most obvious and effective circumstances that
make the conditions, under which a long and short haul is performed,
substantially dissimilar, and as such must have been in the contempla-
tion of Congress in the passage of the act to regulate commerce.
is no longer an open question in this court. Ib.
3. The conclusion which the court reached in Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 145 U. S. 263, and Wight v. United
States, 167 U. S. 512, that in applying the provisions of §§ 3, 4, of the
Interstate Commerce Act of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24 Stat. 379,
making it unlawful for common carriers to make or give any undue
or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person or
locality, or to charge or receive any greater compensation in the
aggregate for the transportation of passengers or of like kind of prop-
erty, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, for a
shorter than for a longer distance over the same line in the same
direction, competition which affects rates is one of the matters to be
considered, is not applicable to the second section of the act. Ib.
4. The purpose of the second section of that act is to enforce equality
between shippers over the same line, and to prohibit any rebate or
other device by which two shippers, shipping over the same line, the
same distance, under the same circumstances of carriage, are com-
pelled to pay different prices therefor, and it was held in Wight v.
United States, 167 U. S. 512, that the phrase "under substantially
similar circumstances and conditions," as used in the second section,
refers to the matter of carriage, and does not include competition
between rival routes. Ib.
5. This view is not open to the criticism that different meanings are
attributed to the same words when found in different sections of the
act; for, as the purposes of the several sections are different, the
phrase under consideration must be read, in the second section, as
restricted to the case of shippers over the same road, thus leaving no
room for the operation of competition, but in the other sections,
which cover the entire tract of interstate and foreign commerce, a
meaning must be given to the phrase wide enough to include all the
facts that have a legitimate bearing on the situation
is the fact of competition when it affects rates. Ib.
6. The mere fact of competition, no matter what its character or extent,
does not necessarily relieve the carrier from the restraints of the third
and fourth sections; but these sections are not so stringent and im-
perative as to exclude in all cases the matter of competition from con-
sideration in determining the questions of "undue or unreasonable
preference or advantage," or what are "substantially similar circum-
stances and conditions." The competition may in some cases be
such, as, having due regard to the interests of the public and of the
carrier, ought justly to have effect upon the rates, and in such cases
there is no absolute rule which prevents the Commission or the courts
from taking that matter into consideration. Ib.
7. The conclusions of the court on this branch of the case are: (1) that
competition between rival routes is one of the matters which may
lawfully be considered in making rates for interstate commerce; and
(2) that substantial dissimilarity of circumstances and conditions may
justify common carriers in charging greater compensation for the
transportation of like kinds of property for a shorter than for a longer
distance over the same line, in such commerce. Ib.
8. Whether, in particular instances, there has been an undue or unrea-
sonable prejudice or preference, or whether the circumstances and
conditions of the carriage have been substantially similar or other-
wise, are questions of fact depending on the matters proved in each
case. Ib.
9. The Circuit Court had jurisdiction to review the finding of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission on these questions of fact, giving effect
to those findings as prima facie evidence of the matters therein stated;
and this court is not convinced that the courts below erred in their
estimate of the evidence, and perceives no error in the principles of
law on which they proceeded in its application. Ib.
A. JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME Court.
1. Under Rev. Stat. § 709, if the ground on which the jurisdiction of this
court is invoked to review a judgment of a state court is, that the
validity of a state law was drawn in question as in conflict with the
Constitution of the United States, and the decision of the state court
is in favor of its validity, this must appear on the face of the record
before the decision below can be reëxamined here. Miller v. Cornwall
Railroad Co., 131.
2. A suggestion of such appearance, made on application for reargument,
after the judgment of the trial court is affirmed by the Supreme Court
of the State, comes too late. Ib.
3. This court has no jurisdiction on a writ of error to a state court to
declare a state law void on account of its collision with the state con-
stitution. Ib.
4. An objection in the trial of an action in a state court that an act of
the State was "unconstitutional and void," when construed in those
courts as raising the question whether the state legislature had power,
under the state constitution, to pass the act, and not as having refer-
VOL. CLXVIII-47
|