Argument for Appellant. and not a part of any one of them; not negatively merely, but affirmatively and fully, to the end that real conformity by the carrier to the requirements of the act should be obtained, and as the act declares, obtained speedily, by procedure formal and ceremonious, in which all parties in interest were to be heard; and it provided for a decision of the particular question and the particular grievance thus brought to the attention of the Commission and examined by it; and in case of refusal to obey, the act provided for a suit to be brought in a judicial court of "equity," which court is required "to hear and determine the matter speedily as a court of equity," with all that the phrase implies. The Commission is to inquire into "anything done or omitted to be done" by any common carrier subject to the provisions of the act in contravention to the provisions thereof; and it authorized the Commission to require the carrier to "satisfy the complaint," or answer; and then, after hearing, to require the carrier "to cease and desist from such violation, or to make reparation, or both." How can this be done short of a decision upon the whole matter? To again illustrate, let it be supposed that the sole complaint was that the carrier was exacting double what was just and reasonable for a particular service, and that this, on due notice to both sides, was found to be true. This would be a palpable violation of the act. But the Commission is authorized to require the carrier to cease and desist from doing that very wrong. Does the carrier do so unless and until he reduces his exaction to the true point of justice and reason? To hold otherwise would be, it is submitted, trifling both with grammar and common justice. If the statute had conferred the very same power, and in the very same words, upon a court of equity instead of the Commission, could the power of the court to redress the whole grievance be doubted? But the admitted power of the Commission to command the desistance from a charge of one hundred cents per hundred pounds is no less "judicial" than a requirement not to charge more than the sum found to be reasonable and just. And the two things are precisely the same in principle and legal effect, and are inseparable. Argument for Appellant. On the subject of "reparation" provided for in section 3, I ooserve again that this section is to be enforced by the Commission. How is this possibly to be done, otherwise than by commanding action by the carriers suited to the nature of the case, so as to obliterate the whole undue preference, etc., and how possibly otherwise can reparation be made to a locality? Reparation means "restoration" of the right. No such exercise of the power by the Commission is either "fixing rates or prejudging a matter, as referred to by Mr. Justice Shiras in the Social Circle case. VI. The words "lawful order" mean an order the Commission has jurisdiction to make. An order may be lawful and at the same time erroneous, so that if the Commission made an order in a matter over which they had jurisdiction, which was merely an error of judgment as to precisely the degree of reparation, for instance, the carrier ought to make, the order would still be lawful. In such a case the court is to "hear and determine the matter," that is, the whole subject, "as a court of equity, in such manner as to do justice in the premises "; that is, complete justice in the whole premises. "Premises" is not merely the particular order that the Commission has made, but it is the whole subject that had been duly brought before the Commission and on due notice and hearing had been acted upon. It is that duty which rested with the Circuit Court and is now imposed upon this court. All the preceding action described is not "fixing rates" in the sense that state commissioners of railways are authorized by their legislatures to establish general rates for all classes and for all railways, as is contended for by the defendants. We make no such claim. The action of the Commission, and the action of this court, on what is really an appeal from and a review of its judgment, is the trial and determination of a particular case, and determining for that particular case what the conduct of the carrier shall be in respect of the particular dispute involved in it. It is the exertion of no general power to prejudge or to fix rates, nor is it the exertion of any power to fix rates in general. If this distinction be observed, Argument for Appellant. there is no difficulty whatever. This is precisely in accord with what Mr. Justice Shiras said. After stating what had happened before the Commission and stating that in the Circuit Court evidence was introduced which had not been laid before the Commission, showing that the rate to Birmingham had been forced down by the coming in of a new competitive road, and that the Circuit Court had thereupon found that the evidence was sufficient to overcome the findings of the Commission, and that the rate complained of was not unreasonable; and after stating that the Circuit Court of Appeals had adopted the views of the Circuit Court in respect of the reasonableness of the rate from Cincinnati to Atlanta, and "as both courts found the existing rate to have been reasonable, we do not feel disposed to review their finding on the matter of fact," he then condemned the conduct of the carriers in lying by. He then says, "Whether Congress intended to confer upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the power to itself fix rates was mooted in the courts below and is discussed in the briefs of counsel." He says, "We do not find any provision in the act which expressly or by necessary implication confers such power," etc. He then says, "The reasonableness of the rate in a given case depends on facts, and the function of the Commission is to consider these facts and give them the proper weight. If the Commission, instead of withholding judgment in such a matter until an issue shall be made and the facts found, itself fix a rate, that rate is prejudged by the Commission to be reasonable." In this proposition we entirely concur; but in this case the identical question was raised by the petitions, an issue was made, evidence was taken on both sides, and the facts found, so that the sum fixed as reasonable by the Commission was not prejudged. And he adds that "Subject to the two leading prohibitions that their charges shall not be unjust and unreasonable, and that they shall not unjustly discriminate so as to give undue preference or advantage, or subject to undue prejudice or disadvantage persons or traffic similarly circumstanced, the act to regulate commerce leaves common carriers as they were at common law." Here again Opinion of the Court. it will be seen that reasonableness and unreasonableness, justice and injustice, preference, advantage, prejudice, disadvantage are the very subjects that he says are within the competence of the Commission to determine. If the Supreme. Court had been of opinion that the action of the Commission in its decision in regard to the Atlanta rate was beyond its jurisdictional power, they would have so said, and affirmed the judgment on that ground; but in distinct terms they affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court and the Court of Appeals upon the express ground that the Commission was in error in its finding of fact. VII. The judiciary of the United States have recently been able, without the special aid of any act of Congress, to preserve the interstate carriers from being despoiled by unlawful interference with their operations. It is to be hoped for the good name of Congress and for the public welfare and contentment that the same judiciary will find that Congress has adequately provided for protecting the people from being despoiled by the carriers, and that it is within the clear competence of the Commission and the courts to make these provisions effectual. Mr. Edward Baxter for appellees. Mr. A. A. Wiley filed a brief for appellees and for the Savannah, Florida and Western Railway Company. MR. JUSTICE SHIRAS, after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court. Several of the assignments of error complain of the action of the Circuit Court of Appeals in not rendering a decree for the enforcement of those portions of the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission which prescribed rates, to be thereafter charged by the defendant companies, for services performed in the transportation of goods. Discussion of those assignments is rendered unnecessary by the recent decisions of this court, wherein it has been held, VOL. CLXVI-11 Opinion of the Court. after elaborate argument, that Congress has not conferred upon the Interstate Commerce Commission the legislative power of prescribing rates, either maximum, or minimum, or absolute; and that, as it did not give the express power to the Commission, it did not intend to secure the same result indirectly by empowering that tribunal, after having determined what, in reference to the past, were reasonable and just rates, to obtain from the courts a peremptory order that in the future the railroad companies should follow the rates thus determined to have been in the past reasonable and just. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway v. Interstate Commerce Commission, 162 U. S. 184; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway, 167 U. S. 479. Errors are likewise assigned to the action of the court in having failed and refused to affirm and enforce the report and opinion of the Commission, wherein it was found and decided, among other things, that the defendants, common carriers which participate in the transportation of class goods to Troy from Louisville, St. Louis and Cincinnati, and from New York, Baltimore and other Northeastern points, and the defendants, common carriers which participate in the transportation of phosphate rock from South Carolina and Florida to Troy, and the defendants, common carriers which participate in the transportation of cotton from Troy to the ports of New Orleans, Brunswick, Savannah, Charleston, West Point or Norfolk, as local shipments or for export, have made greater charges, under substantially similar circumstances and conditions, for the shorter distance to or from Troy than for longer distances over the same lines in the same direction, and have unjustly discriminated in rates against Troy, and subjected said place and dealers and shippers therein to undue and unreasonable prejudice and disadvantage in favor of Montgomery, Eufaula, Columbus and other places and localities and dealers and shippers therein, in violation of the provisions of the act to regulate commerce. Whether competition between lines of transportation to Montgomery, Eufaula and Columbus justifies the giving to |