never heard of. The defendant was a constable, he was indicted and convicted. On motion for a new trial, Determined, that where a constable prefers a false accusation agaist a free person of colour before a magistrate, to trepan the person and make money by his distress, he may be indicted and punished, though the injured person is not present to prosecute, and that he shall not shelter himself under the plea of his acting by warrant from a magistrate.

RODGERS ads. NORTON. 1 Harper's Rep. 5.

483. Free persons of colour are entitled to the benefit of the prison-bound's act.

GLEN VS. LOPEZ. 1 Harper's Rep. 105,

484. A free person of colour is entitled to the benefit of the insolvent debtor's act, but cannot be discharged without taking the oath it prescribes.

The Real Estate of Mrs. HARDCASTLE ads. The Escheator for PINEVILLE ACADEMY. Original Manuscript.

485. Elizabeth Hardcastle, a free woman of colour, died possessed of several tracts of land which the escheater for the Pineville Academy claimed as escheated; she having left no person that could claim the same by descent or purchase. The claim of the escheater was resisted by persons who represented themselves as next of kin. On appeal, Determined, that by the common law of the state, the free descendants of a negro are entitled to hold lands, and that where the evidence of relationship between the individuals claiming, and the deceased is satisfactory they may take by descent.

486. A free negro is an incompetent witness in any case where the rights of white persons are concerned.

FREEDOM, CLAIMING.

The Guardian of SALLY, a Negro vs. BEATY. 1 Bay, 258. 487. A negro slave the property of the defendant, with the permission of her master, had by her industry acquired a considerable sum of money over and above the sum stipulated for her wages, and having an affection for a negro girl, had purchased her with this money and given her freedom; the defendant claimed the girl as his property. Determined, that if the master of a negro slave permits her to work out upon condition of paying certain stipulated wages, all she saves beyond such wages shall be at her own disposal, and if she thinks proper to purchase the freedom of a negro with the surplus, such negro so purchased shall be entitled to her freedom.

CARPENTER US. COLEMAN. 2 Bay, 436.

488. In an action to try the freedom of negroes, an order for security for their forth coming on the trial, may be made at any

time during the pendency of the suit, and also for good usage in the mean time.

COLEMAN ads. Guardian of BEN. 2 Bay, 485.

489. An exemplification of a judgment in a court in Virginia, is sufficient to establish the freedom of a negro in this state.

PEPOON, Guardian vs. CLARKE. 1 Cons. Rep. 137. 490 A woman of colour had been brought from Maryland to Charleston by one Gibson. During his lifetime he had acknowledged that the mother of the woman was free, after his death, his wife, who intermarried with the defendant, detained her as a slave. Determined, that the acknowledgment of Gibson in his lifetime was sufficient evidence to establish her freedom, and entitle her to damages against his estate.

RICE ads. SPEAR, and others, 1 Harper's Rep. 20.

491. A negro had been set free in Virginia by the Will of his master. The executors in pursuauce thereof, assented to his going at large, and he was considered a freeman. There were sufficient assets to pay his master's debts. The negro was afterwards seized under a fi. fa. against his master's estate and sold. Determined, that the sale was void, and that the negro was entitled to his freedom.

HARBOURING.

THE STATE US. MARSHALL, and others. 2 M'Cord Rep. 63. 492. The jurisdiction of magistrates is taken away in all cases arising from torts and trespasses, but it does not follow that the penalty against a free negro for harbouring a slave, under the act of 1740, cannot be recovered before a magistrate.

KILLING SLAVES.

THE STATE US. WELSH. 1 Bay 169.

493. Determined that no person under the negro act can be permitted to exculpate himself by his own oath for killing a negro, but the master, overseer or some person having the immediate charge of such negro.

Rowe ads. THE STATE. 2 Bay, 565.

494. The Governor had pardoned or remitted the whole of the fine which had been inflicted by the court against one Kelly, for killing a negro. Determined, that he cannot pardon or remit that part of the fine which by law is to go to the informer.

ARTHUR US. WELL. 2 Cons. Rep. 314.

495. In this case, it appeared, that a negro of the plaintiff had runaway; he was seen by the defendant who ordered him to stop, he disregarded the command and continued to run from him. Defendant then fired at him, and killed him. On motion to set aside the verdict against defendant, Determined, that the

law does not authorize the killing of a runaway negro, unless the person attempting to take him is endangered by resistance, as by assaulting or striking.

THE STATE US. E. SMITH and R. SMITH. 1 Nott & M Cord 13.

496. The defendants had been convicted of killing a negro in sudden heat and passion. Determined that under the act of 1740, for killing a negro in sudden heat and passion, every one convicted of the offence, is individually liable for the whole penalty.

WITSELL US. EARNEST and PARKER. 1 Nott and M'Cord, 182.

497. The defendants went out to hunt runaway negroes. On approaching a house, a negro who was in or near jumped up and ran towards a swamp. The defendants fired at and killed him. The country had been in a state of alarm in consequence of depredations of runaway negroes. Determined that a person not clothed with the authority of the law to apprehend a negro slave as a felon, cannot lawfully kill such slave. while flying from him, and that the owner may recover compensation for such injury.

THE STATE vs. RAINES. 3 M'Cord, 533.

498. The defendant was indicted for killing a slave in sudden heat and passion; on which a verdict of "guilty of manslaughter" was found by the jury. On motion to arrest the judgment, Determined that no judgment could be rendered on such a verdict, on an indictment for killing a slave in sudden heat and passion. That the crime by Act of Assembly of killing a slave in sudden heat and passion, is a different offence from the common law crime of manslaughter, and that the act of 1821, making it murder to kill a slave, does not take away from the prisoner, if he be master or overseer in whose possession the slave was killed, the right of exculpating himself by his own oath, and the fact of a third person coming up at the moment of the death of the slave after the wounds are given, will not alter the case.

LIABILITY OF MASTER.

SNEE VS. PRICE. 2 Bay, 345.

499. While clearing a field, the negroes of defendant made a fire, which by high winds was communicated to plaintiff's building, and destroyed it with a quantity of corn. Determined that

the master of a slave is not answerable in damages for the unauthorized acts of his negroes, or where they are done without his knowledge or approbation; but in all cases in the way of trade, or any public employment, or where confidence is held out to the public, he is liable in damages to the party injured.

WINGIS VS. SMITH. 3 M'Cord, 400.

500. The empty carriage and horses of defendant were seen standing near a house in Hampstead, the driver, the slave of defendant, not on his seat; the horses moved from thence, slowly at

first, but soon at a furious rate, and on their way encountered a bread cart belonging to the plaintiff, which was broken to pieces by the encounter, and the driver of it much hurt; the horses of the defendant were said to be well broke. Determined that the master of a slave is not liable for damages resulting from the negligence or trespass of his slave; but that slaves who are tradsmen, ferrymen, carriers, and others acting in such like capacities, form exceptions to this rule. In such cases, the master by inviting others to repose a confidence in them, becomes security for the faithful performance of their duty, and must be answerable for their negleet.

POSSESSION BY SLAVE.

HARRINGTON US. WILKINS. 2 M'Cord, 289,

501. The plaintiff's slave had planted a small patch of the land in dispute for his own use, but not by his master's authority. Determined that the possession of a slave on lands, is not the possession of his owner, unless such possession was authorized by his owner.

PROPERTY CANNOT BE HELD BY SLAVES..

PEAKE US. CANTEY and JOHNSON. 3 M Cord, 107.

502. Three horses had been seized by Cantey, as belonging to slaves, and delivered to Johnson, a justice of the peace, who sold them under the 34th Sec. of the Act 1740. On the motion to reverse the decision of the presiding judge Determined that the negro act of 1740, authorizing magistrates to seize and sell horses belonging to slaves, is constitutional, for slaves can hold no property, nor sue or be sued, and that the exercise of such authority by a magistrate in determining whether the horse belonged to the slave or not, is a judicial act.

CLARKE and others ads. BLAKE. 3 M'Cord, 179.

503. The defendants as a patrol had entered the plantation of the plaintiff, and carried off four horses, which they alledged to belong to his negroes, they were taken to the next magistrate who gave notice to the plaictiff's agent, to come before him and take the oath prescribed by the act of 1740, or that they would be soid. The agent refused to do so and the horses were sold. The plaintiff brought an action of tresspass vi et armis, and a verdict was given in his favour: On motion to set aside the same, Determined, that the act of 1740 authorizes any person to seize and carry to the nearest magistrate, any horses kept, raised or bred by slaves; who is authorized to sell them; but that the horses must have been appropriated for the peculiar use and benefit of slaves. Though the horses be condemned and sold by the magistrate as the property of a slave; yet the true owner, if he be a free man, may have his action for damages against those who seize his horses. The decision of the magistrate is no bar to the action, and the fact, that the plaintiff's agent had notice of the

seizure cannot alter the case, as no person can take the necessary oath before the magistrate, but the owner of the horses.

RIOT.

THE STATE vs. THACKAM and MAYSON. 1 Bay, 352. See also 2 M'Cord, 462.

504. The defendants who were indicted for a riot, in entering a plantation and taking away in a tumultuous manner certain property, took with them a negro, who was armed as well as the defendants. Determined, that a negro is in contemplation of law, such a person as is capable of committing a riot, in conjunction with white men. It is not necessary that men should be possessed of civil rights to make them amenable to justice for offences.

STEALING SLAVES.

THE STATE vs. MILES. 2 Nott and M'Cord, 1.

⚫ 505. The defendant was indicted for inveigling, stealing and carrying away a negro from his owner and employer. The owner of the negro had entered into an agreement with his brother, who lived in Williamsburg, to let the negro work with him and to divide the proceeds of his labour; the negro was in that situation when he was taken or absconded. He was afterwards found in Charleston, where he had been sold by the prisoner. The offence was laid to have been committed in Charleston District, and the indictment was tried there. The defendant was convicted, and on motion for a new trial, Determined, that under the act, on an indictment for inveigling, stealing or carrying away a negro slave from his owner or employer, it is not necessary to prove the act of inveigling to consummate the felony of stealing or carrying away, and that a legal possession of the owner is sufficient without his having actual possession as during the time the slave has runaway, or on Sunday, when his services are not required, &c. and that the jury in such a case can not find the prisoner guilty of petit larceny. The act having made it a specific felony without benefit of clergy.

THE STATE vs. JAMES A. WHYTE and others. 2 Nott and

M'Cord, 175.

506. Billy, a negro man slave, had induced another negro slave to go off with him, saying that his young master would carry her to a free country; he also assisted the slave in getting off. Upon a motion for a prohibition against the defendants, who constituted the court which tried Billy, it was Determined, that the stealing of a slave may be committed by another slave, although no force be employed.

66

The act of 1754 making it a felony without benefit of clergy, to inveigle, steal or carry away any negro or slave, &c," applies to negroes as well as white persons, and the policy of the country as well as the express law, makes it necessary that the