Philosophical Works, Volume 1Little, Brown, 1854 - Philosophy |
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absurd appearance argument arises assert belief body causation cause and effect ceptions cerning Charon color common comprehend conceive concerning conclusion conjoined connection betwixt consequence consider constant conjunction continued existence contrary custom Davenport DAVID HUME degree derived determined difference betwixt discover distinct distinguishable ence endeavor England entirely equal evident examine experience explain external faculty fancy feel finite extension force and vivacity friends gible give human Hume idea of extension identity imagination impossible impres impressions and ideas indivisible inference infinite divisibility infinite number influence instances John Home judgment kind King of Prussia letter Lord Marshal manner memory mind motion nature never objects observe operation opinion ourselves particular passions perceive perceptions perfectly person philosophers present impression pretend principle probability produce propen qualities question reason reflection regard resemblance rience right line Rousseau sensation senses sensible sion solidity substance suppose supposition thing thought tion
Popular passages
Page 308 - For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure.
Page 318 - As to causation, we may observe that the true idea of the human mind is to consider it as a system of different perceptions or different existences which are linked together by the relation of cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other.
Page 89 - Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions, and since all ideas are derived from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, that it is impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions.
Page 14 - That all our simple ideas in their first appearance are derived from simple impressions, •which are correspondent to them, and which they exactly represent.
Page 11 - Those perceptions, which enter with most force and violence, we may name impressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas, I mean the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning...
Page 322 - When I look abroad, I foresee on every side, dispute, contradiction, anger, calumny and detraction. When I turn my eye inward. I find nothing but doubt and ignorance. All the world conspires to oppose and contradict me; tho...
Page 216 - An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac'd in like relations of precedency and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter'.
Page 126 - But its true and proper name, as we observed before, is belief; which is a term that every one sufficiently understands in common life. And in philosophy, we can go no farther than assert, that belief is something felt by the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of the judgment from the fictions of the imagination.
Page 260 - ... all our perceptions are dependent on our organs and the disposition of our nerves and animal spirits. This opinion is confirmed by the seeming increase and diminution of objects according to their distance; by the apparent alterations in their figure; by the changes in their colour and other qualities, from our sickness and distempers, and by an infinite number of other experiments of the same kind; from all which we learn that our sensible perceptions are not possessed of any distinct or independent...
Page xxii - ... behalf of their wonted fury. My friends never had occasion to vindicate any one circumstance of my character and conduct: not but that the zealots, we may well suppose, would have been glad to invent and propagate any story to my disadvantage, but they could never find any which they thought would wear the face of probability. I cannot say there is no vanity in making this funeral oration of myself, but I hope it is not a misplaced one; and this is a matter of fact which is easily cleared and...