Mr. R. F. Spragins argued the cause, W. H. Biggs, filed a brief for defendants and, with Messrs. Joseph W. Cox and

in error:

operation of discriminating against the | L. ed. 490-495; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, citizens of other states are equally as supra. invalid and unconstitutional as those which expressly so discriminate. Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 34 L. ed. 455, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 185, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862; Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U. S. 78, 34 L. ed. 862, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 485, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 213; Robbins v. Taxing Dist. 120 U. S. 489, 30 L. ed. 694, 1 Inters. Com. Rep. 45, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 592; State v. Bayer, 34 Utah, 257, 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 297, 97 Pac. 129; State v. Wright, 53 Or. 344, 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 349, 100 Pac. 296; Smith v. Farr, 46 Colo. 364, 104 Pac. 401.

The rule against discriminations, and guaranteeing all persons the equal pro- | tection of the laws, extends to aliens as well as citizens; and even the police power must not be exercised arbitrarily; it must be so exercised as not to deny to any person the equal protection of

the law.

Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 709, 28 L. ed. 1145, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730.

Classification, to relieve a law from the charge of a denial of equal protection, cannot be made arbitrarily, but must be based upon some difference which bears a just and proper relation to the attempted classification.

Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 155, 157, 41 L. ed. 668, 669, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255.

of the United States to adopt as correct It is the rule of the Supreme Court the construction given a statute by the highest court of the state, and not a concounsel. Nor will the Federal Supreme trary construction contended for by Court give to a statute a significance which the state court has decided it does

not have.

41 L. ed. 1095, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 665; Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 504, Wade v. Travis County, 174 U. S. 499, 43 L. ed. 1060, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715; FlaniL. ed. 597, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 314; Price v. gan v. Sierra County, 196 U. S. 553, 49 Illinois, 238 U. S. 446, 453, 59 L. ed. 1400, 1405, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 892; Orr v. Allen, 248 U. S. 35, ante, 109, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 23; American Steel & Wire Co. V. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 48 L. ed. 538, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365; W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452, 45 L. ed. 619 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423.

Providing that the amount of the privilege tax shall be regulated with reference to the location of the chief office of the person, firm, or corporation engaged in constructing works of a public nature does not conflict with any provision of the Federal Constitution.

Armour & Co. v. Virginia, 246 U. S. 3-5, 62 L. ed. 549, 550, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 267; Reymann Brewing Co. v. Brister, 179 U. S. 445, 45 L. ed. 269, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 201.

Residence and citizenship are not synonymous. The 14th Amendment refers to such privileges and immunities as pertain to citizenship of the United States, as distinguished from state eitizenship.

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U. S. 36130, 21 L. ed. 394-426; La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465, ante, 362, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 160.

The Constitution does not forbid every discrimination by a state against residents of another state, or the according to its own residents more favorable conditions in the pursuit of business, not affecting commerce.

This court determines for itself the construction and effect of any statute of Blake v. McClung, 172 U.. S. 256, 43 a state brought under review, without L. ed. 439, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165; Wilreference to the previous adjudication | liams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270, 45 L ed. of the highest court of the state on the 186, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 128; State v. subject. Stevens, N. H. L.R.A.1917C, 528, Butz v. Muscatine, 8 Wall. 575-587, 1999 Atl. 723; Wright v. May, 127 Minn.

150, L.R.A.1915B, 151, 149 N. W. 9;| Milwaukee, 228 U. S. 572, 582, 57 L. ed. Com. v. Hana, 195 Mass. 262, 11 L.R.A. 971, 976, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 610; Lindsley (N.S.) 799, 122 Am. St. Rep. 251, 81 N. v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co. 220 U. S. E. 149, 11 Ann. Cas. 514; La Tourette 76, 78, 55 L. ed. 376, 377, 31 Sup. Ct. v. McMaster, supra; Watson v. Mary- Rep. 337, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 160; Bradland, 218 U. S. 173, 54 L. ed. 987, 30 ley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477, 483, 57 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644; Patsone v. Pennsyl- L. ed. 603, 605, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 318; vania, 232 U. S. 138, 58 L. ed. 539, 34 Toyota v. Hawaii, 226 U. S. 190, 57 L. Sup. Ct. Rep. 281. ed. 183, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47; Gundling v. Chicago, 177 U. S. 183, 44 L. ed. 725, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 633; Brown-Forman Co. v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 563, 572–576, 54 L. ed. 883, 886-888, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 545-547, 53 L. ed. 315, 318, 319, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206; Chicago Dock & Canal Co. v. Fraley, 228 U. S. 684, 687, 57 L. ed. 1023, 1024, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715.

The privileges and immunities of the citizens of the several states are not abridged, contrary to the United States Constitution, art. 4, § 2, by the New York law that only citizens of the United States may be employed in the construction of public works, and that, in such employment citizens of the state of New York must be given preference.

Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175, 60 L. ed. 206, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 78, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 287.

The inhibition that no state shall deprive any person within its jurisdiction of the equal protection of the laws was designed to prevent any person or class of persons from being singled out as a special subject for discrimination and hostile legislation.

McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed. 869, 878, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3.

The 14th Amendment does not require that taxation be absolutely equal and uniform, nor that there be absolute | symmetry, nor does it forbid reasonable and appropriate classification, to be determined by the state legislature with reference to the peculiar conditions existing in the state.

The statute in question requires persons, firms, and corporations engaged in building railroads, streets, bridges, and other works of a public nature to take out a license and pay a privilege tax, the amount of the tax being regulated with respect to the location of the chief office of the one seeking to exercise the privilege. Both the state and the public have an interest or concern in such business or enterprises. It is one of public concern, and therefore subject to the state's police power to regulate, as are slaughterhouses, butchers, bankers, physicians, lightning-rod agents, auctioneers, warehouses, elevators, fire and life insurance, and numerous other occupations, the power in the states to regulate which has been recognized by this

court.

Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391, 226 U. S. 157, 161, 57 L. ed. 164, 169, 33 38 L. ed. 757, 4 Inters. Com. Rep. 670, Sup. Ct. Rep. 66; Hayes v. Missouri, 120 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 857; La Tourette v. McU. S. 68, 30 L. ed. 578, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. Master, 248 U. S. 465, ante, 362, 39 Sup. 350; Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27, Ct. Rep. 160; Toyota v. Hawaii, 226 U. S. 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357; David- 190, 57 L. ed. 183, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 47; son v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, 24 L. Bradley v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477, 483, ed. 616; Magoun v. Íllinois Trust & Sav. 57 L. ed. 603, 605, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 318; Bank, 170 U. S. 295, 296, 42 L. ed. 1043, W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. 1044, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; Bells Gap R. S. 452, 465, 45 L. ed. 619, 625, 21 Sup. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 Ct. Rep. 423; Southwestern Oil Co. v. L. ed. 892, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; South-Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 122, 54 L. ed. 688, western Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 692, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 496. 122, 54 L. ed. 688, 692, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 496; Watson v. Maryland, 218 U. S. 173, 54 L. ed. 987, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 644; Williams v. Arkansas, 217 U.. S. 79, 54 L. ed. 673, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493, 18 Ann. Cas. 865; W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minne: sota, 180 U. S. 452, 465, 45 L. ed. 619, 625, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423; Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v. Lynch, 226 U. S. 192, 57 L. ed. 184, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 44; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 58 L. ed. 539, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281; Adams v.

The United States Supreme Court has heretofore held that the state has the power to say who shall engage in the construction of its public works.

Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. 175, 60 L. ed. 206, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 78, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 287.

It therefore follows that the state of Tennessee not only had the power to say that persons, firms, and corporations having their chief office outside the state must pay a higher tax for engaging in

the construction of works of a public nature in such state, than is required of those having their chief office within the state, but that the state could have gone further, as was done in the case of La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U. S. 465, ante, 362, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 160, and could have confined the license to residents of Tennessee alone.

Every presumption should be indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a state statute. Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U. S. 392, 40 L. ed. 194, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43.

Mr. Justice McReynolds delivered the opinion of the court:

The point for determination is the liability of J. W. Wright, Jr., a citizen and resident of Alabama, with his chief office therein, who engaged in the business of constructing a railroad in Tennessee, for the tax prescribed by § 4 of "An Act to Provide Revenue for the State of Tennessee and the Counties and Municipalities Thereof," approved May 1, 1909 (Tenn. Acts 1909, chap. 479, pp. 1726, 1727, 1735), which provides: "Sec. 4. Be it further enacted, that each vocation, occupation, and business hereinafter named in this section is hereby declared to be a privilege, and the rate of taxation on such privilege shall be as hereinafter fixed, which privilege tax shall be paid to the county court clerk as provided by law for the collection of revenue.

the $100 tax; so of any domestic corporation, as well as foreign corporation, having its chief office out of the state. Any foreign corporation or citizen of another state, or firm, as well as domestic corporations, citizens of this state, and firms of this state having its or their chief office in this state, are all alike entitled to carry on a railroad construction business here on the payment of $25. There is no discrimination at all."

With this conclusion we are unable

to agree. Accepting the construction placed upon it by the supreme court, we think the quoted section does discrimi nate between citizens of Tennessee and those of other states by imposing a higher charge on the latter than it does on the former, contrary to § 2, art. 4, of the Federal Constitution: "The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states."

The power of a state to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation is clear and not questioned; but neither under form of classification nor [527] otherwise can any state enforce taxing laws which, in their practical operation, materially abridge or impair the equality of commercial privileges secured by the Federal Constitution to citizens of the several

states.

"Excise taxes, it is everywhere conceded, may be imposed by the states, if not in any sense discriminating; but it should not be forgotten that the people of the several states live under one common Constitution, which was ordained to establish justice, and which, with the laws of Congress, and the treaties made by the proper authority, is the supreme law of the land; and that that supreme

"Each foreign construction company, with its chief office outside of this state, operating or doing business [526] in this state, directly or by agent, or by any sub-letting contract, each, per annum, in each county $100. "Each domestic construction company and each foreign construction company, having its chief office in this state, do-law requires equality of burden, and foring business in this state, each, per annum, in each county $25. "The above tax shall be paid by persons, firms, or corporations engaged in the business of constructing bridges, waterworks, railroads, street-paving construction work, or other structures of a public nature."

Replying to the claim that the statute in effect discriminates against citizens of other states, the supreme court of Tennessee (138 Tenn. 145, 152, 153, 196 S. W. 488) said: "The determining feature in the legislation quoted is the having of one's chief office in this state. Any citizen of this state, as well as any citizen of a foreign state, who has his chief office out of the state, must pay

bids discrimination in state taxation when the power is applied to the citizens of the other states. Inequality of burden, as well as the want of uniformity in commercial regulations, was one of the grievances of the citizens under the Confederation; and the new Constitution was adopted, among other things, to remedy those defects in the prior system." Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 431, 20 L. ed. 449, 453; Guy v. Baltimore, 100 U. S. 434, 439, 25 L. ed. 743, 744; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 254, 43 L. ed. 432, 437, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165; I. M. Darnell & Son Co. v. Memphis, 208 U. S. 113, 121, 52 L. ed. 413, 418, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 247.

As the chief office of an individual is

action under the Federal Employers' gence, and, if applied to actions under Liability and Boiler Inspection Acts. Reversed. Petition for certiorari denied.

See same case below, 115 Miss. 285, 76 So. 265.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. J. Blanc Monroe argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Monte M. Lemann, Al bert S. Bozeman, L. E. Jeffries, S. R. Prince, and H. O'B. Cooper, filed a brief for plaintiffs in error:

In enacting the Employers' Liability Act, Congress. intended to establish a uniform rule which should govern the liability of interstate carriers for damages to interstate employees.

the Federal Employers' Act, deprives the defendant railroads of a substantive right, and burdens interstate commerce. Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Ferebee, 238 U. S. 269, 59 L. ed. 1303, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 781; Central Vermont R. Co. v. White, 238 U. S. 507, 59 L. ed. 1433, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 865, Ann. Cas. 1916B, 252,

N. C. C. A. 265; New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Harris, 247 U. S. 367, 62 L. ed. 1167, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 535; New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Hanna, 118 Miss. 40, 78 So. 953; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

Burnette, 239 U. S. 199, 60 L. ed. 226, R. Co. v. Devine, 239 U. S. 53, 60 L. ed. 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 75; Chicago, R. I. & P. New York C. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 Line R. Co. v. Mims, 242 U. S. 536, 61 142, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27; Atlantic Coast U. S. 147, 149, 61 L. ed. 1045, 1047, L. ed. 478, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 188; New L.R.A.1918C, 439, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546, York C. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1139, 14 N. C. C. A. 680; Erie R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 147, 61 L. ed. 1045, L.R.A.1918C, 439, 37172, 61 L. ed. 1004, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556, 14 N. C. C. A. 680; Southern R. Co. v. Sup. Ct. Rep. 546, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1139, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 662, 14 N. C. C. A. Gray, 241 U. S. 338, 60 L. ed. 1033, 36 957; Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Sup. Ct. Rep. 558; Louisville & N. R. Co. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 56 L. ed. 327, 38 L.R.A.. Kemp, 140 Ga. 657, 79 S. E. 558; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Rhoda, Fla. (N.S.) 44, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 1 N. C. -, 74 So. 19. C. A. 875; New York C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Tonsellito, 244 U. S. 360, 61 L. ed. 1194, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 620, 14 N. C. C. A. 1072. Under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, negligence on the part of the carrier is an essential prerequisite to

recovery.

New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. v. Harris, 247 U. S. 367, 62 L. ed. 1167, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 535; Southern R. Co. v. Gray, 241 U. S. 338, 60 L. ed. 1030, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 558; New York C. R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 150, 61 L. ed. 1048, L.R.A.1918C, 439, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 546, Ann. Cas. 1917D, 1139, 14 N. C. C. A. 680; Erie R. Co. v. Winfield, 244 U. S. 172, 61 L. ed. 1064, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556, Ann. Cas. 1918B, 662, 14 N. C. C. A. 957. Federal courts have always imposed on the employee the burden of proving the carrier's negligence.

Elliott, Railroads, § 1309; Patton v. Texas & P. R. Co. 179 U. S. 658, 45 L. ed. 361, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275; Nitroglycerine Case, 15 Wall. 524, 21 L. ed. 206; Southern Railway-Carolina Div. v. Bennett, 233 U. S. 80, 58 L. ed. 860, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 566, 10 N. C. C. A. 853; Richey, Federal Employers' Liability Act, § 148, p. 304; Re Federal Biscuit Co. 134 C. C. A. 431, 218 Fed. 753; Canadian P. R. Co. v. Thompson, 146 C. C. A. 401, 232 Fed. 353.

not defective, defendant was entitled to After proving that its couplers were have the jury understand that the burden of explaining how the accident happened, and showing negligence in the railroad, was on the plaintiff.

Patton v. Texas & P. R. Co. 179 U. S.

658, 45 L. ed. 361, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275.

Mr. Thomas G. Fewell submitted the cause for defendant in error. Mr. C. B. Cameron was on the brief:

The questions of inspection or due care or negligence have no sort of application to the company's liability.

St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 52 L. ed. 1061, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 616, 21 Am. Neg. Rep. 464; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U. S. 33, 60 L. ed. 874, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 482.

The proof of the happening and injury made out a case of liability as against the railroad company, under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.

Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Gotschall, 244 U. S. 66, 61 L. ed. 995, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 598, 14 N. C. C. A. 865.

Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the opinion of the court:

Scarlet was a fireman on the New Orleans & Northeastern Railroad. While engaged in the performance of his duties The Mississippi Prima Facie Statute he was injured by being thrown down imposes liability regardless of negli-between the engine and the tender. The