cuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to review a decree which affirmed a decree of the District Court for the District of Montana, quieting title to a mining claim. Affirmed.

See same case below, 160 C. C. A. 509, 248 Fed. 609.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. William Wallace, Jr., argued the cause, and, with Messrs. T. L. Chadbourne and K. R. Babbitt, filed a brief for appellant:

The complaint states Federal questions.

Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 375, 37 L. ed. 209, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340; Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U. S. 486, 61 L. ed. 1270, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 711; Little York Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 24 L. ed. 656; United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 535, 57 L. ed. 333, 338, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 325, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 10 L. ed. 264; Shoshone Min. Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505, 44 L. ed. 864, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 726; FrenchGlenn Live Stock Co. v. Springer, 185 U. S. 47, 46 L. ed. 800, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 563; Kennedy Min. & Mill. Co. v. Argonaut Min. Co. 189 U. S. 1, 47 L. ed. 685, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 501; Colorado Cent. Consol. Min. Co. v. Turck, 150 U. S. 138,

37 L. ed. 1030, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35; Jim Butler Tonopah Min. Co. v. West End Consol. Min. Co. 247 U. S. 450, 62 L. ed. 1207, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 574; Hopkins v. Walker, 244 U. S. 486, 61 L. ed. 1270, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 711; Yosemite Gold Min. & Mill. Co. v. Emerson, 208 U. S. 25, 52 L. ed. 374, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 199; Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U. S. 119, 49 L. ed. 409, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211; Haggin v. Lewis, 66 Fed. 199; Cheesman v. Shreve, 37 Fed. 36; Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 61 L. ed. 791, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387; Parley's Park Silver Min. Co. v. Kerr, 130 U. S. 256, 32 L. ed. 906, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 511, 17 Mor. Min. Rep. 201; Spokane Falls & N. R. Co. v. Ziegler, 167 U. S. 65, 42 L. ed. 79, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 728; McCune v. Essig, 199 U. S. 382, 50 L. ed. 237, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 78; Reavis v. Fianza, 215 U. S. 16, 24, 25, 54 L. ed. 72, 76, 77, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; Calhoun Gold Min. Co. v. Ajax Gold Min. Co. 182 U. S. 499, 505, 45 L. ed. 1200, 1205, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 885, 21 Mor. Min. Rep. 381.

An action like the present one is composite, and carries causes other than the statutory one.

Montana Ore Purchasing Co. v. Boston

Mont. 289, 70 Pac. 1114, 22 Mor. Min. Rep. 471; Merk v. Bowery Min. Co. 31 Mont. 298, 78 Pac. 519.

The facts detailed in this complaint are not in the nature of anticipatory allegations as to what defendant may allege by way of defense (but constituting no part of the cause of action). If issue were joined thereon, each must be proved by plaintiffs to sustain the burden of proof that is on them to justify their claim to ores beneath the surface of another's claim.

St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co. v. Montana Min. Co. 194 U. S. 238, 239, 48 L. ed. 955, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654; Mammoth Min. Co. v. Grand Central Min. Co. 213 U. S. 72, 73, 53 L. ed. 702, 704, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413; Del Monte Min. & Mill. Co. v. Last Chance Min. & Mill. Co. 171 U. S. 91, 43 L. ed. 85, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 895; Lawson v. United States Min. Co. 207 U. S. 1, 52 L. ed. 65, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15.

Plaintiffs ought not to be permitted to gamble on the decisions of the lower courts, or to play fast and loose in this manner in judicial proceedings.

Cooke v. Avery, 147 U. S. 375, 37 L. ed. 209, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340; Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Bell, 176 U. S. 326,

327, 44 L. ed. 489, 490, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep.

399.

Our denial of a Federal question is immaterial.

Simkins, Fed. Eq. Suit, pp. 163–166. The trial court declared facts,-some in findings (so-called), and some in its conclusions, including in the latter its opinion as filed. Wherever found, if they be inherently findings of fact, this

court will treat them as such.

Eilers v. Boatman, 111 U. S. 356, 357, 28 L. ed. 454, 455, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 432, 15 Mor. Min. Rep. 471.

In challenging the trial court's finding of priority of location and superiority of mining rights for the Elm Orlu, we are not unmindful of the rule that a finding of fact by a trial court will not be disturbed in this court if there is any substantial evidence to support it. But that rule has no application when, as in this case, the evidence on which priority must depend is uncontradicted. Under such circumstances, if the law demands a different conclusion, the conclusion of the trial court is unsupported by the evidence, and this court will declare the proper result.

United States v. Clark, 96 U. S. 37, 40, 24 L. ed. 696, 698; Collier v. United

States, 173 U. S. 79, 43 L. ed. 621, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 330.

The claim having superior rights takes to the point of last departure on veins departing through a common side line, and takes all below union, in branch or other veins apexing one in each claim and uniting at depth.

St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co. v. Montana Min. Co. 56 L.R.A. 725, 44 C. C. A. 120, 104 Fed. 664, 21 Mor. Min. Rep. 57; 2 Lindley, Mines, 3d ed. § 614.

Such mining rights can only be acquired by segregation from the public domain through valid location actually made or conclusively presumed.

Belk v. Meagher, 104 U. S. 279, 26 L. ed. 735, 1 Mor. Min. Rep. 510; Del Monte Min. & Mill. Co. v. Last Chance Min. & Mill Co. 171 U. S. 77, 43 L. ed. 81, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 895, 19 Mor. Min. Rep. 370.

To an actual valid location, when the local statute requires a record, three steps are necessary, viz.:-discovery, marking of boundaries, and a sufficient record.

Ibid.

This court has held the order of these steps to be immaterial; but that until the last is actually taken, the location is not complete, and no grant from the government has been gained.

Creede &C. C. Min. & Mill. Co. v. Uinta Tunnel Min. & Transp. Co. 196 U. S. 337, 354, 49 L. ed. 501, 510, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 266.

An entry sustained by a patent is conclusive evidence that there had been, at the time of the entry, a valid location.

Creede & C. C. Min. & Mill. Co. v. Uinta Tunnel Min. & Transp. Co. 196 U. S. 337, 353, 354, 49 L. ed. 501, 510, 511, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 266; Last Chance Min. Co. v. Tyler Min. Co. 19 C. C. A. 613, 15 U. S. App. 456, 61 Fed. 557.

The patent and entry do not conclusively evidence the length of time before the entry that such location existed. The time when it was made is an open question of fact, provable like any other.

Creede & C. C. Min. & Mill. Co. v. Uinta Tunnel Min. & Transp. Co. 196 U. S. 337, 354, 49 L. ed. 501, 510, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 266; Calhoun Gold Min. Co. v. Ajax Gold Min. Co. 182 U. S. 499, 45 L. ed. 1200, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 885, 21 Mor. Min. Rep. 381; El Paso Brick Co. v. McKnight, 233 U. S. 250, 58 L. ed. 943, L.R.A.1915A, 1113, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 498; Lawson v. United States Min. Co. 207 U. S. 1, 52 L. ed. 65, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15; Last Chance

Min. Co. v. Tyler Min. Co. 9 C. C. A. 613, 15 U. S. App. 456, 61 Fed. 566; Hickey v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. 33 Mont. 46, 81 Pac. 806; Washoe Copper Co. v. Junila, 43 Mont. 178, 115 Pac. 917.

A right of possession secured by a valid location is a right of property which may be taxed, inherited, sold, mortgaged, and seized under attachment or execution.

Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U. S. 762, 24 L. ed. 313, 14 Mor. Min. Rep. 183; Gwillim v. Donnellan, 115 U. S. 45, 29 L. ed. 348, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1110, 15 Mor. Min. Rep. 482; Clipper Min. Co. v. Eli Min. & Land Co. 194 U. S. 220, 48 L. ed. 944, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 632.

Once vested, it cannot be lost save by abandonment, forfeiture or judicial process. It is impossible to narrow, impair, or destroy it by the after-action of another in seeking patent to independent surface ground.

Hickey v. Anaconda Copper Min. Co. 33 Mont. 46, 81 Pac. 806; Last Chance Min. Co. v. Tyler Min. Co. 9 C. C. A. 613, 15 U. S. App. 456, 61 Fed. 566.

The one who first completes a valid location, gains the first segregation and first mining right.

St. Louis Smelting & Ref. Co. v. Kemp, 104 U. S. 649, 26 L. ed. 879, 11 Mor. Min. Rep. 673; Cedar Canyon Consol. Min. Co. v. Yarwood, 27 Wash. 271, 91 Am. St. Rep. 841, 67 Pac. 749, 22 Mor. Min. Rep. 11.

In considering presumptions we must sharply distinguish between the doing of an act and the date when that act was done.

3 Lindley, Mines, 3d ed. § 783, p.

1920.

A dominant presumption always obtains in favor of the owner of the surface, whether locator or patentee, against other locators or patentees seeking to take vein areas or ores therein beneath the surface of the former.

Del Monte Min. & Mill. Co. v. Last Chance Min. & Mill. Co. 171 U. S. 55, 56, 43 L. ed. 72, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 895, 19 Mor. Min. Rep. 370; St. Louis Min. & Mill. Co. v. Montana Min. Co. 194 U. S. 235, 239, 48 L. ed. 953, 955, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654; Mammoth Min. Co. v. Grand Central Min. Co. 213 U. S. 72, 53 L. ed. 702, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 413.

The inquiry as to the sufficiency of notices of location of the claims invites the determination of a question of law which appears upon the face of the patent proceedings themselves, and as to the questions of law, the determina

St.

Louis Min. & Mill. Co. 204 U. S. 204, 51 L. ed. 444, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 254; Pressed Steel Car Co. v. Eastern R. Co. 57 C. C. A. 635, 121 Fed. 611; Salt Lake City v. Smith, 43 C. C. A. 637, 104 Fed. 462; United States Fidelity & G. Co. v. Woodson County, 76 C. C. A. 114, 145 Fed. 148.

Defendant was entitled to a decree fully quieting its title to the rainbow lode east of the 301-foot plane.

Birdwell v. Cox, 18 Tex. 535; Boston & M. Consol. Copper & S. Min. Co. v. Montana Ore Purchasing Co. 188 U. S. 632, 47 L. ed. 626, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 434; Brainard v. Morse, 47 Vt. 320; Burnley v. Rice, 21 Tex. 171; Callahan v. Hicks, 90 Fed. 542; Champion v. Ulmer, 70 Ill. 322; Detroit v. Detroit City R. Co. 55 Fed. 572; Clark-Montana Realty Co. v. Butte & S. Copper Co. 233 Fed. 549; Consolidated Wyoming Gold Min. Co. v. Champion Min. Co. 63 Fed. 540, 18 Mor. Min. Rep. 113; Crowell v. Harvey, 30 Neb. 570, 46 N. W. 709; Electrical Accumulator Co. v. Brush Electric Co. 44 Fed. 604; Giant Powder Co. v. California Vigorit Powder Co. 6 Sawy. 508, 5 Fed. 197; Grand Central Min. Co. v. Mammoth Min. Co. 29 Utah, 490, 83 Pac. 648; Heinze v. Boston & M. Consol. Copper & S. Min. Co. 30 Mont. 487, 77 Pac. 421; Henry v. Travelers' Ins. Co. 45 Fed. 299; Hyman v. Wheeler, 29 Fed. 347, 15 Mor. Min. Rep. 519; Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Story, 299, Fed. Cas. No. 7,267; Keely v. Ophir Hill Consol. Min. Co. 95 C. C. A. 99, 169 Fed. 602; Kenerdine v. Phelin, 1 Phila. 343; Lawson v. United States Min. Co. 207 U. S. 1, 52 L. ed. 65, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 15; Leadville Min. Co. v. Fitzgerald, Fed. Cas. No. 8,158, 4 Mor. Min. Rep. 380; 3 Lindley, Mines, §§ 780, 866; Mitchell v. Big Six Development Co. 186 Fed. 559; Mosgrove v. Kountze, 4 McCrary, 561, 14 Fed. 315; People v. Gold Run Ditch & Min. Co. 66 Cal. 155, 4 Pac. 1150; Pittsburgh Reduction Co. V. Cowles Electric Smelting & Aluminum Co. 64 Fed. 127; Quint v. McMullen, 103 Cal. 381, 37 Pac. 381; Pincus v. Puget Sound Brewing Co. 18 Wash. 108, 50 Pac. 930; 1 Whitehouse, Eq. Pr. 283; Work Min. & Mill. Co. v. Doctor Jack Pot Min. Co. 114 C. C. A. 392, 194 Fed. 628.

Mr. John P. Gray argued the cause, and, with Messrs. John L. Templeman and W. A. Clark, Jr., filed a brier for appellees:

A formal statement of the bill to that effect is not enough to establish that the suit involves a Federal question; but, to the contrary, it must appear by distinet averments, measured by the rules of good pleading, that the bill does actually present a Federal question.

Norton v. Whiteside, 239 U. S. 146, 60 L. ed. 187, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 97; Denver v. New York Trust Co. 229 U. S. 133, 57 L. ed. 1120, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 657.

Disregarding the allegations of diverse citizenship, does the bill of complaint state a Federal question eognizable in the courts of the United States?

St. Anthony's Church v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 237 U. S. 576, 59 L. ed. 1121, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729.

Whether this court has jurisdiction to entertain this appeal depends entirely upon the question whether, in the statement of the plaintiffs' cause of action, a Federal question was presented by the bill. If a Federal question was so presented by the bill, then this court has jurisdiction; but if not, then the deer e of the circuit court of appeals for the ninth circuit was final by the express terms of § 128 of the Judicial Code, as well after as before its slight amendment by Act of January 28, 1915. Any argument of the question is foreclosed by the many decisions of this court.

Norton v. Whiteside and St. Anthony's Church v. Pennsylvania R. Co. supra; G. & C. Merriam Co. v. Syndicate Pub. Co. 237 U. S. 618, 59 L. ed. 1148, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 708; Hull v. Burr, 234 U. S. 712, 720, 58 L. ed. 1557, 1561, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 892; Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74, 58 L. ed. 1218. 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 724; Shulthis v. MeDougal, 225 U. S. 561, 569, 56 L. ed. 1205, 1210, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 704.

own claim in the bill or declaration, unaided by anything alleged in anticipation or avoidance of defenses which it is thought the defendant may interpose. Taylor v. Anderson, 234 U. S. 74, 58 L. ed. 1218, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 724; Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U. S. 332, 50 L. ed. 776, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 478.

The plaintiff is not required under the Montana statute to set forth in his bill of complaint the nature of the defendant's claim or claims, but that duty devolves upon the defendant.

Woody v. Hinds, 30 Mont. 191, 76 Pac. 1; Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U. S. 313, 333, 50 L. ed. 1046, 1053, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652.

To make out a complete cause of action under the Montana statute, the plaintiff need only aver that he is the owner of and in the possession of the real property described, and that the defendant claims some adverse rights thereto, with prayer that the defendant be required to set forth the nature of his claims, that the same may be determined by the court.

Merk v. Bowery Min. Co. 31 Mont. 298, 78 Pac. 519; Pollock Min. & Mill. Co. v. Davenport, 31 Mont. 452, 78 Pac. .768.

It is, therefore, very patent to us now that the present bill contains many superfluous and unnecessary allegations; but it must be added that had the bill not sought the incidental relief of compensation for past trespasses, it would follow generally and particularly in Montana that plaintiffs never would be allowed to recover therefor in any subsequent suit.

Maloney v. King, 30 Mont. 414, 76 Pac. 939; Montana Ore Purchasing Co. v. Boston & M. Consol. Copper & S. Min. Co. 27 Mont. 288, 70 Pac. 1114, 22 Mor. Min. Rep. 471.

Whether the jurisdiction depended on diverse citizenship alone, or on other grounds as well, must be determined from the complainant's statement of his own cause of action as set forth in the bill, regardless of questions that may have been brought into the suit by the answers or in the course of the subsequent proceedings.

Colorado Cent. Consol. Min. Co. v. Turck, 150 U. S. 138, 37 L. ed. 1030, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35; Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U. S. 454, 38 L. ed. 511, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 654; Spencer v. Duplan Silk Co. 191 U. S. 526, 48 L. ed. 287, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 174; Devine v. Los Angeles, 202 U. S. 313, 333, 50 L. ed. 1046, 1053, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 652;

Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 569, 56 L. ed. 1210, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 704.

It is not enough that grounds of jurisdiction other than diverse citizenship may be inferred argumentatively from the statements in the bill, for jurisdiction cannot rest on any ground that is not affirmatively and distinctly set forth.

Hanford v. Davies, 163 U. S. 273, 279, 41 L. ed. 157, 159, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1051; Mountain View Min. & Mill. Co. v. McFadden, 180 U. S. 533, 45 L. ed. 656, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488; Bankers' Mut. Casualty Co. v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. Ste. M. R. Co. 192 U. S. 371, 383, 385, 48 L. ed. 484, 489, 490, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 325; Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 569, 56 L. ed. 1210, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 704.

A suit to enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those laws, for a suit does not so arise unless it really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction, or effect of such a law, upon the determination of which the result depends. This is especially so of a suit involving rights to land acquired under a law of the United States. If it were not, every suit to establish title to land in the central and western states would so arise, as all titles in those states are traceable back to those laws.

Little York Gold Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U. S. 199, 24 L. ed. 656; Colorado Cent. Consol. Min. Co. V. Turck, 150 U. S. 138, 37 L. ed. 1030, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 35; Blackburn v. Portland Gold Min. Co. 175 U. S. 571, 44 L. ed. 276, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 222, 20 Mor. Min. Rep. 358; Florida C. & P. R. Co. v. Bell, 176 U. S. 321, 44 L. ed. 486, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 399; Shoshone Min. Co. v. Rutter, 177 U. S. 505, 44 L. ed. 864, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 726; De Lamar's Nevada Gold Min. Co. v. Nesbitt, 177 U. S. 523, 44 L. ed. 872, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715; Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U. S. 569, 56 L. ed. 1210, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 704.

State or territorial legislation does not and may not control the ultimate disposal of the public lands.

Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 516, 10. L. ed. 273; Irvine v. Marshall, 20 How. 558, 15 L. ed. 994; Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92, 20 L. ed. 534; McCune v. Essig, 199 U. S. 382, 50 L. ed. 237, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 78; Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U. S. 389, 61 L. ed. 791, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387.

A United States mineral patent con