illuminating oil which has not been in-approved. Provision is also made (§ spected as provided for by the act, or 3626) for the inspection of gasolene "rewhich will ignite at a temperature below ceptacles" to keep them "free from water 120° Fahrenheit. A method is pre- and all other foreign substances," and scribed for making this "fire test," and the sale of "adulterated" gasolene is profor determining the gravity of such oils, hibited (§ 3627). Obviously this is, in and the results must be stenciled on each form, a not unusual type of inspection container of oil. law.

for general sale and distribution. And this in terms:

"That the testing of gasolene in the manner provided by the statute indicates to the public the degree of safety of such gasolene, and has a fair relation to the quality and value thereof. That such inspection protects the community, as applied to sales of gasolene in Minnesota, from frauds and impositions, and advises, informs, and warns the public of the volatile character of said gasolene and the relative degree of care to be exercised in handling, storing, and using the same."

On the case thus stated it is claimed that the supreme court of Minnesota erred in refusing to hold:

eral Constitution, as an attempt by the state to regulate interstate commerce; and

Second. That to the extent that the act applies to gasolene it is not a valid exercise of the police powers of the state, because it does not serve to protect or safeguard the health, morals, or convenience of the public, and therefore offends against the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution by depriving the plaintiff in error of its property without due process of law to the extent of the fees which it in terms exacts.

The principles of law applicable to the decision of the case thus before us are few, and they are perfectly settled by the decisions of this court.

centrated commercial feeding stuffs, of an inspection fee of 10 cents per ton on such products when sold or offered for sale within the state, or the exaction, in lieu thereof, in the case of "condimental, patented, proprietary, or trademark stock or poultry foods," of an annual license fee of $100, does not render the statute invalid as applied to sales by importers in the original packages. Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U. S. 540, 56 L. ed. 1197, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 784.

First. That the inspection fees im- In the exercise of its police power a posed were so excessive in amount as to state may enact inspection laws, which render the act a revenue rather than an are valid if they tend in a direct and inspection measure, and that as such it substantial manner to promote the puboffends against § 8, article 1, of the Fed-lic safety and [162] welfare, or to proman, 29 N. D. 236, 150 N. W. 576, on | ing the inspection and analysis of conthe one hand, and State v. Bartles Oil Co. 132 Minn. 138, L.R.A.1916D, 193, 155 N. W. 1035; State v. Pure Oil Co. 134 Minn. 101, 158 N. W. 723, and Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 94 Wash. 291, 162 Pac. 558, on the other, as to the proper construction of D. E. Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U. S. 494, 58 L. ed. 698, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 377, is no longer important, since the reversal of the case last cited in Standard Oil Co. v. Graves, 249 U. S. 389, post, 662, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 320, which holds that a state oil inspection law under which fees grossly in excess of the cost of inspection (the total receipts for ten years being $335,000,-more than four times the expense of administration) must be paid by the importers after inspection before the oils may be lawfully sold, even in the original receptacles or containers in which they were brought into the state, is unconstitutional as a direct burden on interstate commerce.

An inspection charge of 80 cents per hundred for stamps to be affixed to packages of concentrated commercial feeding stuffs, made by Laws 1907 (Ind.) chap. 206, is not on its face so unreasonably in excess of the cost of analysis, salaries of officials, and other necessary expenses, as to invalidate the statute, when applied to sales by importers in the original packages, as a disguised revenue measure. Savage v. Jones, 225 U. S. 501, 56 L. ed. 1182, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715.

The imposition by Iowa Code (Supp. 1907, §§ 5077-a6 to 5077-a24), govern

An inspection fee of 25 cents per ton on certain products such as cotton-seed meal, feeding stuffs, by-products of starch factories, food factories, breweries, etc., for the actual inspection of all such products sold within the state, is not a tax on interstate commerce. George H. Lee Co. v. Webster, 190 Fed. 353.

But a fee imposed for the registering of every brand of concentrated feeding stuff offered or held for sale or sold within the state, the registration being made, not from an examination of the goods themselves, or of a sample of the goods, but from a statement as to their is not an inspection fee, but a tax on ingredients and from whence obtained, the right to engage in the business of selling such products in the state, and is therefore unconstitutional and void. Ibid.

As to reasonableness of inspection fees generally, see note to State v. Standard Oil Co. L.R.A.1917D, 749.

tect the public from frauds and impo-,
sition when dealing in articles of general
use, as to which Congress has not made
any conflicting regulation, and a fee
reasonably sufficient to pay the cost of
such inspection may constitutionally be
charged, even though the property may
be moving in interstate commerce when
inspected. Patapsco Guano Co. v. Board
of Agriculture, 171 U. S. 345, 357, 358,
361, 43 L. ed. 191, 195-197, 18 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 862; New Mexico ex rel. McLean
v. Denver & R. G. R. Co. 203 U. S. 38,
51 L. ed. 78, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1; Asbell
v. Kansas, 209 U. S. 251, 52 L. ed. 778,
28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 485, 14 Ann. Cas. 1101;
Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501, 504,
24 L. ed. 1115, 1116; Savage v. Jones,
225 U. S. 501, 525, 56 L. ed. 1182, 1191,
32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715.

Specifically, state laws providing for the inspection of oils and gasolene have several times been recognized as valid by this court. Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U. S. 501, 24 L. ed. 1115; Red "C" Oil Mfg. Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 222 U. S. 380, 56 L. ed. 240, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152, and Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Deselms, 212 U. S. 159, 53 L. ed. 453, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 270.

But if such inspection charge should be obviously and largely in excess of the cost of inspection, the act will be declared void because constituting, in its operation, an obstruction to and burden upon that commerce among the states the exclusive regulation of which is committed to Congress by the Constitution. Postal Teleg.-Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192 U. S. 64, 48 L. ed. 342, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 208; D. E. Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U. S. 494, 504, 508, 58 L. ed. 698, 701, 703, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 377.

Plainly, the application of the principles thus stated leaves open for consideration only the question as to whether the inspection charge is so excessive as to render the act a revenue measure, as the plaintiff in error claims that it is, and not an inspection law enacted in good faith to promote the public safety and prevent fraud and imposition upon the users of oil and gasolene. In the consideration of this question the discretion of the legislature in determining the amount of the inspection fee will not lightly be disturbed. Its determination is prima facie reasonable, and the courts will not "enter into any nice [163] calculation as to the difference between the cost and collection; nor will they declare the fees to be excessive unless it is made clearly to appear that they are obviously and largely beyond what is needed to pay

for the inspection service rendered." D. E. Foote & Co. v. Stanley, 232 U. S. 494, 505, 58 L. ed. 698, 702, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 377, and Western U. Teleg. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U. S. 419, 47 L ed. 240, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 204.

The findings of fact give the following statement of receipts and expenses under the law assailed, from and including the year 1909, in which it was passed, to April 30, 1915, which includes the last day covered by the claim in suit, viz.:

This statement of expenses, however, does not include any charge for offices for the Oil Department, which were in the state capitol, for the services of the state auditor and treasurer in keeping accounts and making collections, for legal counsel, and for services of chemists, or for the Public Examiner's De partment, these not being susceptible of exact determination. The reduced percentage of expenses to receipts in several of the years was obviously due to the rapid expansion in the use of gasolene without a corresponding increase in the expenses of administration. This percentage, however, was rising in 1915, and doubtless has increased greatly since, under war conditions. We take judicial notice also of the fact that in 1915 the inspection [164] fee on oil and gasolene in tank cars was reduced by the legislature from 10 to 7 cents and in 1917 from 7 to 5 cents. It was obviously impossible for the state legislature to determine accurately in advance either what the receipts from or the cost of inspection would be, and having regard to the period of rapid increase in the use of gasolene, through which the country was passing in the years under consideration, and to the action of the legis lature in reducing the fee, we cannot consent to impute to that body a purpose other than to conform to the requirements of the Constitution when enacting this legislation.

The conclusion thus arrived at sustains the validity of the state law as an inspection measure and renders it unnecessary to consider the much argued question as to whether or not the oil and

gasolene in question were in interstate only for an ad valorem property tax, and transit when inspected. As an inspec- | where, acting under the statute, a state tion law, under the decisions cited, the board valued the company's personal propact is validly applicable, alike whether erty, tangible and intangible, used in its express business within the state, at a specthe property was in intra or in inter-ified sum per mile of line, it then being state commerce when inspected.

Neither is it necessary to consider whether the evidence sustains the contention that the inspection of gasolene provided for by the act was of a character such that it did not serve to promote the public safety or to protect the community against fraud and imposition. The finding of fact by the trial court, approved by the supreme court of the state, is accepted as conclusive by this court. Northern P. R. Co. v. North Dakota, 236 U. S. 585, 593, 59 L. ed. 735, 740, L.R.A.1917F, 1148, P.U.R. 1915C, 277, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 429, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1.

the duty of the local assessor to enter or list on the assessment roll at that valuation so much of the line as is in his county. [For other cases, see Commerce, III. d, 10, in Constitutional law - due process of law - valuation

Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

notice and hearing. 2. There is no want of due process of law in a tax assessment because the valuation was made without notice to the taxpayer, or without an opportunity afforded to be heard, where the mode of enforcing the tax is by a judicial proceeding wherein process issues, and an opportunity is afthere is a judgment sustaining the tax is forded for a full hearing, and only after

payment enforced.

[For other cases, see Constitutional Law, 725744, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

It results that the judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota must be Commerce -state taxation — foreign express company excessive valuation.

affirmed.

3. The valuation of the property of a foreign express company in the state of Nevada at $300 per mile of line is not

[165] WELLS FARGO & COMPANY, necessarily so excessive as to make the tax

Plff. in Err.,

V.

STATE OF NEVADA.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 165-169.)

Interstate commerce state taxation foreign express company

or property tax.

franchise

based thereon a burden on interstate com

merce.

[For other cases, see Commerce, III. d, 10, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.]

[No. 40.]

Argued November 14, 1918. Decided December 16, 1918.

IN

1. A tax assessed against a foreign express corporation doing principally an interstate business cannot be said to have been laid upon the privilege or act of engaging in interstate commerce merely because the local assessor, in making up his assessment roll, described the property as consisting of the right to carry on an express business in his county, where the stat-press company. Affirmed. ute under which the tax was imposed, as construed by the state courts, does not provide for a privilege or franchise tax, but

'N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada to review a judgment which affirmed a judgment of the District Court of Humboldt County, in that state, in favor of the state in an action to enforce a tax levied against a foreign ex

See same case below, 38 Nev. 505, 150
Pac. 836.

The facts are stated in the opinion.
Mr. Charles W. Stockton argued the

filed a brief for plaintiff in error:

The tax is laid upon the right to conduct business, and not upon the property employed in the business.

Note. As to state licenses or taxes, generally, as affecting interstate com-cause, and, with Mr. Harry S. Marx, merce-see notes to Rothermel v. Meyerle, 9 L.R.A. 366; American Fertilizing Co. v. Board of Agriculture, 11 L.R.A. 179; Gibbons v. Ogden, 6 L. ed. U. S. 23: Brown v. Maryland, 6 L. ed. U. S. 678; Ratterman v. Western U. Teleg. Co. 32 L. ed. U. S. 229; Harmon v. Chicago, 37 L. ed. U. S. 217; Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Backus, 38 L. ed. U. S. 1041; Postal Teleg. Cable Co. v. Adams, 39 L. ed. U. S. 311; and Pittsburgh & S. Coal Co. v. Bates, 39 L. ed. U. S. 538.

Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 194, 220, 41 L. ed. 683, 695, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 305, s. c. 166 U. S. 185, 218, 41 L. ed. 965, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 604; United States Exp. Co. v. Minnesota, 223 U. S. 335, 342, 56 L. ed. 459, 463, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 211; Flint v. Stone Tracy Co. 220 U. Š. 107, 55 L. ed. 389, On corporate taxation and the com- 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 342, Ann. Cas. 1912B, merce clause-see note to Sanford v. Poe, | 1312; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 60 L.R.A. 641. 44 L. ed. 969, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747.

The right of doing business, interstate as well as intrastate, as intangible property, is a proper subject of local taxa-curately gave the length of the line in