0sment was produced and to say whether or not the shipment violates the law.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that, as a practical matter, such would be necessary?

out t Mr. Tном. I do.

город

The CHAIRMAN. Let us take a case in, say, the State of Pennsylvania. Do you believe that the Pennsylvania Railroad would have to go into Allentown and watch every shipment coming out of the it manufactures of Allentown to see and determine whether or not they are working the required number of hours? Every State would be supposed to work the same number of hours.

Mг. THOм. If a lot of innocent-looking goods were offered to the carrier, it would be obliged to accept them; and then, if it developed that they were produced contrary to this law, the carrier would be penalized, yet he knows nothing about the conditions attaching to their manufacture. I ask, why extend the penalty beyond the shipper, who knows how the goods were produced? He is the one that does the producing and he knows how many hours were expended in that production. Why not penalize the shipper, and not attempt to penalize the innocent carrier?

The CHAIRMAN. We have already provided for penalizing the shipper and the railroad. Having in mind what you said about the carrier being obligated to transport goods, is not the same regulation necessary by the Government on the shipper?

Mr. THOм. Is not the shipper in most instances the producer, who knows how long he works his labor?

The CHAIRMAN. It will be to his interest not to break the law, and there would be a double safeguard by holding the carrier also. Mr. THOM. I feel that such a procedure would be a grave injustice to the carriers. I am simply presenting my idea, and the committee may, of course, do as it sees fit. I think it would be a grave injustice to penalize a carrier and make it obligatory upon him, in order to avoid violation of the law, to determine how each article offered for shipment was made, as regards hours of work. If you can get the same result by penalizing the shipper, who in most instances is the producer, why penalize the carriers also?

The CHAIRMAN. As a double safeguard and to prevent an improper combination.

Mr. THOм. There is no need for it. If you make one man criminally liable there is no necessity of making two men liable, especially when a grave injustice would be done to the second man because he can not know in the very nature of things the hours of labor expended in the production of goods.

That is all I have to say.

The CHAIRMAN. You have made a very interesting statement, and we thank you for it.

STATEMENT OF HON. F. B. CONDON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

The CHAIRMAN. Let us next hear Congressman Condon, of Rhode Island.

Mr. CONDON. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I want to take just a few minutes to record myself in favor of this

159951-33- 8

bill, that is, in favor of the principle underlying the bill, which is a shorter work week and a shorter work day.

In this I think I express not only the desires of the laboring people but also the employers of labor in my State when I say that uniform laws governing hours of labor are necessary in this country. Both employers and employees in the State of Rhode Island desire such a law. This bill, if enacted into law and held to be constitutional, would do that very thing.

The CHAIRMAN. You are a very keen student of constitutional law.

Mr. CONDON. That is rather an unwarranted assumption.

The CHAIRMAN. No; that is true, because I know. What do you think about what Colonel Thom just said in regard to penalizing the railroad as well as the shipper?

Mr. CONDON. Would you mind if I should go on and tell why I believe in the underlying principle of this bill, and then talk on the other features later?

The CHAIRMAN. No; go right ahead.

Mr. CONDON. This depression is causing everybody, economists, financiers, and sociologists, to think of the question whether or not there is going to be sufficient work in this country for all the people who desire to be employed and need to be employed under present conditions and hours of labor.

It seems that it is necessary to cut down the hours of labor very radically if we are to employ the workers of our country. Even if we should get back to a reasonable degree of prosperity there are going to be a very great many persons unemployed. That is admitted freely on every hand. I do not think there is any dispute among economists about that. There will not be enough work to go around if we permit unlimited hours of labor. Some States have tried to meet this pressing problem by limiting the hours of labor, but, unfortunately, some of the States within the Union have not seen fit to do so, consequently we have had competition in our country between industrial States that have rigid labor laws limiting the hours of employment and those States which do not have such laws. This is so important at present that Governor Ely of Massachusetts has recently called a conference of the New England and eastern governors to see whether or not some method or plan may be devised whereby there will be uniformity in labor laws, particularly child labor laws and laws limiting hours of employment; and he intimated that, unless something like that is done, it would be necessary for him, a liberal and progressive governor, to recommend to the Legislature of the State of Massachusetts that at least temporarily the labor laws of the State be relaxed so that industry in that State may be able to compete successfully with other States.

It seems to me that we have here a problem that is peculiarly within the power and within the duty of the Congress to solve, so that States within our tariff wall shall not be confronted with unfair and unjust competition. If this bill is enacted into law, I think that particular problem will be largely solved, just as if the child labor law had been held constitutional the question of child labor would have been solved.

Some will say that the same fears with reference to persons not being able to obtain employment were expressed a hundred or a hundred and fifty years ago when England was on the verge of what was known as the industrial revolution and that since that time thousands and thousands of men and women have been employed greatly in excess of the number employed in those days when England was a country of seven or eight millions. That is true, but it seems to me that those who attempt to minimize the condition confronting labor to-day fail to appreciate this fact: That the kind of machinery that is displacing labor to-day is automatic. We are all familiar with the illustrations given. I recall reading recently about the mill in New Jersey that has looms running automatically and when the thread breaks the machine automatically stops, mends the break, and automatically goes on.

The CHAIRMAN. Robots?

Mr. CONDON. Robots, that is it. We are in a mechanical, robot age, not in the period of mechanization such as England experienced when the invention of the steam engine was made and there was great railroad change, or even when the introduction of electricity in manufacturing came on within 50 or 60 years. It is different now. We have automatic machinery now. There can not be any question about that this kind of machinery displaces men and women in industry to a far greater degree and with far less hope of replacing those men and women in employment than the improvements and machines we have known in the last 100 years of industrial history.

Consequently I feel that this legislation is not only desirable but is urgently necessary. There are many who are better qualified than I am to discuss this question from the economic and sociological standpoints; but I want to make this brief statement so that I may make clear to the committee why I, though being from an industrial State, am emphatically in favor of the bill and why I believe the people of my State would be overwhelmingly in favor of it.

Going to the chairman's question with reference to Mr. Thom's testimony as to the penalty provisions of this bill in so far as they affect railroads, the bill says that

Any person who ships, transports, or delivers, or causes to be shipped, transported, or delivered in interstate commerce any commodities or articles contrary to the provisions of section 1 of this act shall be punished by a fine of not less than $1,000 or by imprisonment for not more than three months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

If I am right, my recollection is that a statute of this kind should not be drawn in that way. It is unfair not only to the transporter, but it is also unfair to the shipper. Also, it is unfair to the intermediary, who may be the delivery man, to say that he shall subject himself to a penal offense because he carries something that may have been produced in violation of law. There is need in this bill, it seems to me, of a scienter. It seems to me that the word "knowingly" should be in the bill for the protection of the shipper and the carrier. You might say that such word would weaken the bill. I believe that criminal laws should not be so framed as to place too great a burden upon a man accused of crime in seeking to disprove the charge or defend himself against it.

Mr. LOVETTE. How would it do to say that the manufacturer shall not do this and then make another phrase "or the shipper shall not knowingly do it "?

Mr. CONDON. I think that would serve the purpose very well, because it will then only put the crime upon the man who must know the condition under which the goods were produced. When he manufactures the goods he must know that he is violating the law, but the shipper or the carrier may not know. Therefore, the word "knowingly" should be in the bill.

Mr. GRISWOLD. You are talking about the knowledge or intent being the gravamen of the offense. What would you do when the shipper himself manufactures and ships the goods, such as where the railroad itself is the manufacturer of, say, wheels in Washington and sends them to Baltimore for installation?

Mr. CONDON. I do not think you understand what I have said. I am not talking of general criminal intent; I am talking about a specific criminal intent.

Mr. GRISWOLD. It is placing the word "knowingly" where you say it would not give this law that interpretation.

Mr. CONDON. In so far as it affects those having nothing to do with the production of the goods and could not be presumed to know that the goods were manufactured in violation of law, it would serve the purpose. In so far as manufacture is concerned, it would not be necessary that the scienter be laid in any allegation against him, because he can fairly be presumed to know that he has violated the law in the manufacture or production of the goods. That is my opinion as a lawyer, and I give it for the benefit of the committee. You may think that proposal would weaken the bill; but whether it does that or not, the fact remains that when you enter into the field of criminal law and seek to draw a new criminal statute you ought to be careful that you do not put too great a burden upon the accused and subject him to prosecution when he is not fairly and justly liable to prosecution.

If you search the statutes of our States and the United States Statutes at Large you will find almost invariably in statutes of this kind a scienter.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you think there would be any difficulty in getting convictions with the word "knowingly" in the act?

Mr. CONDON. I do not think so. The passage of this law would have a very salutary effect upon manufacturers, producers, shippers, and transportation companies in bringing about an observance of the law.

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say from the reading of that last paragraph of H. R. 14105 that the manufacturer could be held under the wording" any person who ships"?

Mr. CONDON. Yes; a manufacturer must necessarily ship, unless the manufacturer sells to a distributor or a jobber within his own State, and then the jobber reships. The manufacturer is presumed to know that the goods he sells are going without the confines of his State.

The CHAIRMAN. And you could get the jobber.

Mr. CONDON. You could get the jobber; and if you can get the distributor or the jobber, if you can get the man or the corporation

whose success in business depends upon the sale of goods bought from the manufacturer, you will have accomplished your purpose, because a great wholesale and jobbing concern that ships across State lines will naturally want to observe this law.

The CHAIRMAN. This thought occurred to me since you spoke about the automatic thread-repairing of the machine, although the thought may be fantastic: If this bill is enacted into law, it seems that we may be able to place only 50 per cent of the unemployed back at work. By this proposed bill we would only solve the problem partially; we would still have the problem of mechanization of industry. I am wondering whether the time will come when the worker may be paid for the work of the robot instead of his own work.

Mr. CONDON. Anything along that line is speculative and not quite within the field of inquiry with reference to the bill.

The CHAIRMAN. We are going to come to the machine question remedy very shortly, because Mr. McMahon has testified that in 1900 one man took care of two looms and to-day a man is taking care of 36 looms.

Mr. STOKES. I think that is a matter for the States to handle. If the States place a high tax on that kind of machinery, high enough to discourage or prohibit its use, then the workers will have the benefit of it.

The CHAIRMAN. Perhaps the workers should remain at home and get paid for the work of the robot.

Mr. CONDON. I have tried to answer your question, Mr. Chairman, so far as I can.

Now, I want to speak about the constitutionality of the proposed law, and then I will be through. If for no other reason than to obtain a further test or another review of the question decided in the child-labor case, I should be in favor of the enactment of this bill. This question would go to the Supreme Court for a decision on its constitutionality. Mr. Thom said the other day that the United States Supreme Court had definitely decided this question and that the committee was considering an unconstitutional measure. I think that is true, but he said also that it was within the province of your committee to consider this question anew and send the bill out to Congress in view of present conditions, that you do have the right, notwithstanding the 5-hour decision of the Supreme Court, to send this bill up. There is no question about that.

I think that if this subject should go to the Supreme Court again, the court may decide the other way.

I want to call your attention to something that is not new, it having been cited by Senator Bankhead sometime ago in a speech in the Senate, but I want it in the record if you have not had it cited. I refer to the case of the United States v. Dougherty (70 Lawyers' Edition, 309), where the court made the following comment:

The doctrine approved in Hammer v. Dagenhart (247 U. S. 251), Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (259 U. S. 20), and Hill v. Wallace (259 U. S. 44), may necessitate a review of that question if hereafter properly presented.

That was the question decided in the child-labor matter, whether or not the Congress had the right to set certain limits around the production of goods intended to be transported in interstate com

merce.