pellant. Respondents derive their title to the half-lot through mesne conveyances from one Betsey Langhorn, to whom it was conveyed in January, 1868, by one Jacob Madden. In January, 1864, Madden, who then owned the whole of said lot 8, agreed in writing to convey it to W. B. Smith, A. B. Smith, and James Lodge upon the payment of their joint promissory note to Madden for $620, due in twelve months, with interest at two per cent per month. The Smiths and Lodge undoubtedly wanted the lot for the use of certain persons belonging to a religious society, who afterward formed the corporation appellant herein, and who intended to build a church upon the lot. The agreement to convey upon the payment of the note was never recorded; and respondents knew nothing of it until a few weeks before this action was commenced, which was years after they had acquired the westerly half of the lot. Now, appellant contends that when Mrs. Langhorn received her conveyance of the west half from Madden she took with the knowledge of and subject to the agreement of Madden to convey to the agents of the church society upon the payment of the said promissory note; that said note has been paid in full by appellant and its predecessors; and that respondents acquired the property subject to the trust, and should now convey to appellant. But the court finds that neither the respondents nor Betsy Langhorn ever held the legal title to the premises in trust for appellant, and finds that Betsey Langhorn bought the said west half for her own use and benefit, and paid for it with her own individual moneys. The court undoubtedly took as the truth the statement made. by the witness Judge John H. Moore, and corroborated by other evidence. Moore testified that he knew all about the history of the transaction; that he kept the account of the moneys paid by the church people to Madden; that at the time of the deed to Betsy Langhorn the said Smiths and Lodge proposed, as they were short LXXVI. CAL.-37 of money, and the high interest was accumulating, that Madden should sell the west half of the lot to her, and apply what she should pay for it to the note; that after this had been done, there was still some money due on the note, but that, upon the urging of Moore, Madden gave them a deed to the east one half of the lot on which the church building stands, and returned them their note; and that thus the whole transaction ended. These being the facts, we cannot see how any rights of appellant have been violated. The findings, we think, are sufficiently full, and we perceive no errors of law committed at the trial. Judgment and order denying a new trial affirmed. [No. 9876. Department One.-June 16, 1888.] JOHN MALONE, RESPONDENT, v. BIG FLAT GRAVEL MINING COMPANY ET AL., APPELLANTS. MECHANIC'S LIEN-STATEMENT OF CONTRACT IN NOTICE OF LIEN-VARIANCE. The contract stated in the notice of lien must be the same in all essentials as the contract stated in the complaint. It is a fatal variance if the complaint is on a quantum meruit, and the contract stated in the notice is for a fixed price. JOINDER OF CAUSES OF ACTION.-If several placer-mining claims are adjoining each other, and are owned by one company and worked as one mine, the liens of different persons upon different portions of the property may be joined in the same action, the counts being separately stated. NOTICE OF LIEN-STATEMENT AS TO PERSON BY WHOM CLAIMANT WAS EMPLOYED NOTICE TO BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED.-The requirement as to stating the name of the person by whom the claimant was em ployed is satisfied if the statement is sufficient to inform the owner whether the claimant is an original or a sub contractor. The notice is to be liberally construed. LIENABLE CLAIMS-WORK UPON TOOLS AND MACHINERY.-Tools and machinery used in the development of the mine are, while so used, to be considered as affixed to the mine; and work upon such tools and machinery is work upon the mine. ID.-CONTRACTOR FOR LABOR-STATEMENT IN NOTICE.-If the contract is that the contractor shall furnish so much labor, and receive a certain sum per man, the liability being directly to the contractor, he has a lien for the sum due, and the notice of lien properly states the contract as being with such contractor, instead of with the laborers individually; otherwise if such contractor simply acts the part of an employment office. ID.-LABOR-LIEN FOR TOO MUCH.-If labor has a legitimate connection with the working of the mine, it is sufficient. A claim for too much does not vitiate the lien for what is due. LABOR BY THE MONTH-TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT-TIME OF FILING LIEN. Where a laborer works by the month, the employment does not terminate at the end of each month; and separate notices within thirty days from the end of each month are not required. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Del Norte County, and from an order refusing a new trial. The facts are stated in the opinion. W. H. H. Hart, and William H. Fifield, for Appellants. The statute did not permit the joinder in this action of the several causes of action of the lienors, as their liens were against distinct parcels of land. (Code Civ. Proc., ed. of 1880, secs. 1183, 1188; Phillips on Mechanics' Liens, secs. 376, 377, 392, 401, 402; Jones on Mortgages, sec. 1284; Peck v. Hapgood, 10 Met. 172; Pierce v. Balkum, 2 Cush. 374; 2 Hill on Mortgages, 4th ed., sec. 124.) The liens were defective because they did not set forth the name of the person by whom the lienors were employed. (Code Civ. Proc. sec. 1187; Wood v. Wrede, 46 Cal. 637; Hooper v. Flood, 54 Cal. 218; McIntyre v. Trautner, 63 Cal. 429; McDonald v. Backus, 45 Cal. 262; Hicks v. Murray, 43 Cal. 515; Phelps v. M. C. G. M. Co., 49 Cal. 339.) Work done on the tools did not constitute work on the mining claim. (McCormick v. Los Angeles W. Co., 40 Cal. 185.) Daniel Titus, and L. F. Cooper, for Respondent. The lienors were entitled to liens on the entire mining ground, and the joinder of their causes of action was proper. (Dickenson v. Bolyer, 55 Cal. 285; Tredinnick v. Red Cloud M. Co., 72 Cal. 78; Phillips on Mechanics' Liens, sec. 369; Pennock v. Hoover, 5 Rawle, 291; Taylor v. Montgomery, 20 Pa. St. 443; Moran v. Chase, 52 N. Y. 346; Phillips v. Gilbert, 101 U. S. 721; Orr v. N. W. Mut. L. Ins. Co., 86 Ill. 260; Hall v. Sheelan, 69 N. Y. 618; Chadborn v. Williams, 71 N. C. 444; Marston v. Kenyon, 44 Conn. 349; Wall v. Robinson, 115 Mass. 429; Worthley v. Emerson, 116 Mass. 374; Batchelder v. Rand, 117 Mass. 176; Childs v. Anderson, 128 Mass. 109; Turner v. Wentworth, 119 Mass. 459; Paine v. Bonney, 6 Abb. Pr. 101.) The contractor to furnish men was entitled to a lien. (Palmer v. Uncas M. Co., 70 Cal. 614.) HAYNE, C.-Suit to foreclose laborers' liens. The plaintiff is the assignee of twenty-six liens for labor performed upon certain mining claims owned and operated by the Big Flat Gravel Mining Company. The proceedings arose under and are to be governed by the law as it stood in 1880. Each lien is set up in a separate count. The court below gave judgment for the plaintiff, and the appeal is by the company and one Paris, who held a judgment lien. 1. The contract set forth in the notices of lien are different from the contracts set forth in the complaint. The notices all set forth contracts for labor at a fixed rate. The lien of Heath, which is the first in the complaint, may be taken as a type of them all. Its statement of the contract is as follows, viz.: That the company "entered into a contract with said S. R. Heath, under and by virtue of which said labor was performed, and the following is a statement of the terms, time given, and condition of said contract: To work at general blacksmithing in and upon said premises for an indefinite time, at the rate of seventy-five ($75) dollars per month, payable on demand." In addition to the above, all the liens (except that of Heath) speak of "the contract price." Independent of these latter words, however, we think it is plain that the statement in the lien is that of a contract by which the rate of compensation is fixed. The statement in the complaint is of contracts by which the rate of compensation is not fixed. All the counts are similar in form. They allege in substance that the party performed labor upon the mine "to the extent and of the value of" so many dollars. If a promise had been alleged, it might have been argued that such allegation would cover the case either of an express or of an implied promise, and that the allegation as to value was surplusage. But no promise having been alleged, the only promise that can be inferred is the one implied by law to pay the reasonable value of the labor, which would leave the important question as to the amount unsettled. This is an essentially different contract from those set out in the notices of lien; and as we understand the law, the plaintiff can recover only upon the contracts stated in the notices of lien. We do not mean to say that a difference in the amounts stated and the amounts proved would be fatal; and it is possible that there may be other differences which would not be material. But we think that in all essentials the contracts must be the same. Such difference was a ground of demurrer for ambiguity. (Frazer v. Barlow, 63 Cal. 71.) The demurrer specified the ambiguity, and should have been sustained. In addition to this, the notices of lien, when offered in evidence, were objected to on the ground of a variance; and it was error to overrule said objections. The foregoing is sufficient to dispose of the appeal; but inasmuch as certain questions, which will arise upon a retrial, have been argued, we proceed to consider them. 2. It is contended for appellants that there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The facts are, that the company owned about five hundred acres of placer-mining ground, which (according to the map at page 380 of the |