are

even more mischievous than combinations not to sell under an agreed price. Combinations of that character have been held to be against public policy, and illegal.

"Parties entering into contracts of this description must depend upon each other for their execution, and cannot derive any assistance from the courts, and the contract was held void." Salt Co. v. Gutteril, 35 Ohio St. 672, Craft v. McConoughy, 79 Ill. 349; and Morris R. C. Co. v. Beaslay C. Co., 68 Pa. St. 182, are to the same general effect.

In the case at bar the facts are, as we think, even stronger against the plaintiff than in Arnot v. Pittston and Elmira Coal Company.

Here, it entered into a contract with the object and view to suppress the supply and enhance the price of lumber in four counties of the state. The contract was void as being against public policy, and the defendants, as they had a right to do, repudiated the contract. Plaintiff, who has parted with nothing of value, now seeks to recover damages for non-delivery of lumber under this contract.

Plaintiff had an undoubted right to purchase any or all of the lumber it chose, and to sell at such prices and places as it saw fit, but when as a condition of purchase it bound its vendor not to sell to others under a penalty, it transcended a rule the adoption of which has been dictated by the experience and wisdom of ages as essential to the best interests of the community and as necessary to the protection alike of individuals and legitimate trade.

With the results naturally flowing from the laws of demand and supply, the courts have nothing to do, but when agreements are resorted to for the purpose of taking trade out of the realm of competition, and thereby enhancing or depressing prices of commodities, the

courts cannot be successfully invoked, and their execution will be left to the volition of the parties thereto.

2. It is claimed by appellant that the contract is divisible, and the first part can stand though the latter be illegal.

If the whole vice of the contract was embodied in the promise of the defendants not to sell lumber to other persons, the illegality would lie in the promise alone, and it might be contended with great force that this promise was divisible from the agreement to sell. Under the findings of the court, however, the illegality inheres in the consideration.

The very essence and mainspring of the agreement— the illegal object-"was to form a combination among all the manufacturers of lumber at or near Felton for the sole purpose of increasing the price of lumber, limiting the amount thereof to be manufactured, and give plaintiff control of all lumber manufactured," etc.

This being the inducement to the agreement, and the scle object in view, it cannot be separated and leave any subject-matter capable of enforcement, as was done in Granger v. Empire Co., 59 Cal. 678; Treadwell v. Davis, 34 Cal. 601; and Jackson v. Shawl, 29 Cal. 267.

The case falls within the rule of Valentine v. Stewart, 15 Cal. 404; Prost v. More, 40 Cal. 348; More v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251; Forbes v. McDonald, 54 Cal. 96; Arnot v. Pittston and Elmira Coal Co., supra.

The good cannot be separated from the bad, or rather the bad enters into and permeates the whole contract, so that none of it can be said to be good, and therefore the subject of an action.

We fail to see any inconsistency between the eighteenth finding and the first or sixth.

The first finding declares that plaintiff and defendants entered into the contract set out in the amended complaint.

- The sixth finding is to the effect that the contract has not been rescinded, abrogated, or modified.

The eighteenth finding is as to the real object and purpose of the contract.

The judgment of the court below is affirmed.

MCKINSTRY, J., and PATERSON, J., concurred.

[No. 12378. Department Two.-June 5, 1888.] ROSINA BERNIAUD, RESPONDENT, v. J. L. BEECHER, APPELLANT.

EVIDENCE-TITLE TO LAND-GENERAL REPUTATION AS TO OWNERSHIP. -Evidence of general reputation as to ownership is inadmissible to prove title to land.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Joaquin County.

The action was brought to quiet the title of the plaintiff to the west half of block 229 in the city of Stockton. Judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff, from which the defendant appealed. The further facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

J. A. Loutitt, 8. D. Woods, and A. L. Levinsky, for Appellant.

L. W. Elliott, and John C. Byers, for Respondent.

THORNTON, J.-The court erred in allowing the following question to be put to one Daniel Meader, who was called as a witness for plaintiff: "Do you know, by general reputation, who owned the west one half of block 229?" The question was answered by witness that it was by general reputation said to be the property of Mrs. Rosina Berniaud. Mrs. Berniaud is the person for whom this action is prosecuted by J. M. Hogan, her guardian

ad litem. We find no other error in the record. Judg ment reversed and cause remanded.

MCFARLAND, J., and SHARPSTEIN, J., concurred.

Hearing in Bank denied.

[No. 11077. Department Two.-June 5, 1888.] WILLIAM BURRIS ET AL., RESPONDENTS, v. MARY A. FITCH ET AL., APPELLANTS.

BOUNDARIES-ACQUIESCENCE IN FENCE AS DIVISION LINE. The acquiescence by an owner of land, manifested by silent assent or submission, with apparent consent, for a period of upwards of sixteen years, in the location of a fence as the dividing line between his land and that of the adjoining proprietor, operates to estop him from questioning the correctness of the location.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sonoma County.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

R. B. Tappan, and Van Duzer & Teare, for Appellants.

The plaintiffs, having acquiesced in the fence as erected, are estopped from questioning the correctness of the location. (Adams v. Rockwell, 16 Wend. 285; McCormick v. Barnum, 10 Wend. 104; Majors v. Rice, 57 Mo. 385; Columbet v. Pacheco, 48 Cal. 395; Jackson v. Ogden, 7 Johns. 238; Jackson v. Freer, 17 Johns. 29; Dibble v. Rogers, 13 Wend. 536; Van Wyck v. Wright, 18 Wend. 157; Boyd's Lessees v. Graves, 4 Wheat. 513; see Code Civ. Proc., sec. 1962, subd. 3; Thomas v. Pullis, 56 Mo. 211; Reed v. Farr, 35 N. Y. 113; Brown v. Baldwin, 16 N. Y. 359.)

George Pearce, for Respondents.

Sharpstein, J.-This appeal is from a judgment recov ered by the plaintiffs against the defendants in an action of ejectment. The contention of appellants is, that the findings of fact do not justify the conclusions of law or the judgment. The controversy is as to the boundary line between two tracts of land, one of which is owned by plaintiffs and the other by defendants. The plaintiffs settled upon the tract claimed by them in the year 1851, and procured a conveyance of it in 1858. Defendants' grantors procured a conveyance of the tract claimed by them in 1851. Both conveyances are from the town or city of Sonoma. The lot conveyed to defendants' grantors is described as lot No. 554, which is bounded on the east by a line known as the Trancas line, an indeterminate line, run by O'Farrell and Hudspeth in 1847. Defendants' grantors, Lyon and Sneed, to whom said town or city of Sonoma conveyed said lot 554, inclosed with it a small strip of land east of said Trancas line, on which they had previously hauled a small dwelling-house. Between 1855 and 1858 Lyon built a small barn to the eastward of his dwelling, and east of the fence built by him and Sneed, and inclosed about half an acre, on which the barn stood. In January, 1868, one Stanley purchased said lot No. 554, and built a fence on the easterly line of the demanded premises, and occupied said premises from the date of his purchase until 1873, but never claimed eastward beyond the Trancas line. Stanley built the fence at his own expense, without saying anything to the plaintiffs on the subject. After completing the fence, he requested plaintiffs to convey to him (Stanley) the demanded premises, which they refused to do. In 1873 Stanley, when about to sell lot No. 554 to one Yates, pointed out to Yates the situation as he (Stanley) understood it, but told Yates that he (Stanley) did not know where the true east line of lot No. 554 was; but he supposed from what he had been told that it ran between the dwelling-house and the