NEW AND SECONDHAND ARTICLES.
It is not unusual to apply rates one class lower than the classification basis on used returned articles. American Newspaper Publishers Asso. v. Bangor & A. R. Co., 729 (732).
The fact that burnt-out articles are broken up and remelted is not alone a sufficient justification for a lower rating on such articles than on the new articles, although of course reasonable ratings on burnt-out articles should not exceed those on new. General Alloys Co. v. Akron, C. & Y. Ry. Co., 733 (736).
OPERATING AND TRANSPORTATION CONDITIONS.
The commission has recognized the unusual transportation conditions exist- ing in New Mexico and Texas differential territory, and in consideration of such conditions has prescribed arbitrary amounts to be added to the rates for hauls within those sections. Artesia Alfalfa Growers Asso. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 50 (51). Transportation conditions throughout Arkansas, western Louisiana, Okla- homa, and eastern Texas are so similar as to warrant substantially the same level of rates. Southwest Utility Ice Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 146 (149).
The commission has found upon comprehensive records that transportation conditions are substantially uniform throughout the Southwest. Skelly Oil Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 410 (411).
Transportation conditions between Boston, Mass., or New London, Conn., and destinations on the New York, New Haven & Hartford in Massa- chusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, and New York do not differ in any material respect from those between Providence, R. I., and the same points. Blanchard Lumber Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 643. Transportations conditions and circumstances attending movements from Colorado and from Kansas to Evansville, Ind., are practically identical, and different bases of rates are not warranted. Mfg. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 724 (727). OPERATING AND TRANSPORTATION COSTS.
Because of the high cost of operation over the Rogerson-Wells cut-off, the carriers involved were found entitled to rates based on a constructive mileage which included 150 per cent of the actual mileage over the cut-off proper, between Rogerson, Idaho, and Wells, Nev. Idaho v. Oregon S. L. R. Co., 501 (505).
OUTBOUND TRAFFIC. See INBOUND AND OUTBOUND. OUT-OF-LINE AND BACK HAUL.
Where, due to an error on the part of carrier's agent in transmitting recon- signment orders, a back haul had been made of which complainant had not been advised and therefore the through rate had not been protected, the ap- plicable combination rates assessed were not unreasonable or otherwise unlawful, since the complainant gave no instructions to hold the shipment in the event the through rate could not be applied; nor did carrier's reconsignment tariffs contain a provision obligating them to notify a shipper where reconsignment at the through rate could not be effected. Chandler-Davis Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 749.
OVERCHARGES.
Commodities:
Cement: Lehigh Portland Cement Co. v. Chespeake & O. Ry. Co., 437. Cement, plaster board, and plaster: Texas Cement Plaster Co. v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co. of Tex., 181.
OVERCHARGES-Continued. Commodities-Continued.
Lumber: Peabody Lumber Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 56 (57).
Tanks, empty, storage: Skelly Oil Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 410.
Tools, oil-well: Dunn Mfg. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 798. See CONTAINERS AND PACKING.
The all-rail rate on canned salmon from Pacific-coast territory to the South- east was purposely made lower than a normal rate in an attempt to win back a portion of the traffic formerly moving over the transcontinental all-rail routes, the bulk of which now moves via the Panama Canal. Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 752 (755–756).
Continuance of the water service between Fort Bragg and other California ports authorized on application under section 5 of the interstate commerce act as amended by section 11 of the Panama Canal act, all rates, fares, schedules and regulations of the steamship company to be established by filing and posting as required by the act. Application of Union Lumber Co., 376.
A comparison with a rate under which no traffic moves is of little value. Valentine & Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 781 (783).
The shipper having paid the freight charges and deducted them from the invoices was entitled to bring the action and to any award of reparation found warranted, in the absence of objection by the party bearing the charges or the beignning of an action by such party. However, a copy of a written instrument which was dated after the complaint was filed and purported to assign to the complainant all choses in action which had accrued or might thereafter accrue to the Illinois Glass Company, based on shipments of glass bottles, was insufficient evidence to establish the complainant's right to reparation on shipments on which that company paid or bore the charges. Creomulsion Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 95 (99). Where an unreasonable joint rate has been collected, the liability of the carriers made parties defendant in a complaint is joint and several and reparation may be awarded although all of the carriers which participated in the transportation have not been named parties defendant. Ciresi Fruit Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 233 (234). The shipper, by assigning to complainant its interest, if any, in freight charges on goods sold by it, not only estopped itself from asserting any claim in respect to such charges, but relieved complainant of the neces- sity of making it a party to any proceeding in connection therewith. Sioux City Brick & Tile Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 405 (407). Although the seller, at the order of complainant, consigned goods which it had sold to the latter to a third party complainant was the real party in interest and the real consignor, since the consignee paid the freight charges on its behalf and deducted them from complainant's invoices. Id. (407). As it did not affirmatively appear whether certain complainants were corporations, firms, or individuals, the Rule V statements were to be accompanied with affidavits stating whether complainants were corpora- tions, firms, individuals, or partnerships; and if partnerships, the names of the partners were to be given. Brannon Coal Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 486 (488).
Rates assailed found not unreasonable in the past but for the future found unreasonable to the extent indicated:
Sumter Packing Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 137. Obermoller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 430.
United States Graphite Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 443 (444) Cancellation of Commodity Rates on Sewer Pipe, 514 (534).
The rate sought was part of the general revision of rates on brick in 107 I. C. C. 702, but no finding was made therein as to the past and the record in the case under consideration did not warrant giving a retroactive effect to the rates prescribed in that case. Sioux City Brick & Tile Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 405 (406–407).
Reparation was awarded, based on a finding in 140 I. C. C. 131, even though the rates found unreasonable in the latter decision were approved by the commission in 35 I. C. C. 187, as no order was enterd in that case requiring the maintenance of the approved rates for the future and the evidence in 140 I. C. C. 131, as well as in the case under consideration, was dissim- ilar thereto. Brannon Coal Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 486 (487). PEDDLER-CAR SERVICE.
The proposed cancellation of rates on fresh meats, packing-house products, and other articles in peddler cars from Illinois and Indiana points to destinations on branch lines of the Chesapeake & Ohio, diverging from the main line at Catlettsburg, Ky., and Barboursville, W. Va., applicable over the Southern to Louisville, Ky., and thence over the C. & O., found not justified as they were published to meet rates prescribed in 104 I. C. C. 641, between the same points, over a longer route over which transpor- tation conditions were not shown to have been more favorable. Fresh Meats and Packing-House Products, 121.
Under Rule 5, section 3, of the consolidated classification, whereby loose articles are rated three classes higher than the same articles packed in authorized containers, the rate assessed on wooden wall cases, or shelving, shipped loose in a mixed carload of store fixtures, consisting of the com- modity rate on furniture plus the penalty charge, was found not unreason- able although the classification was subsequently amended to permit ship- ments of the kind involved to move at furniture rates. Jackson Traffic Bureau v. Alabama G. S. R. Co., 327.
No finding for the future was warranted as to rates on petroleum products from Group 3, Oklahoma Points, to Paducah, Ky., as the rates were under consideration in a pending proceeding. Illinois Oil Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 381 (385).
Application for authority to charge on cotton and cotton linters from Okla- homa points on the St. Louis-San Francisco to southern and Carolina mill points, Virginia cities, and south Atlantic ports, over routes through Texas, thence via New Orleans or Baton Rouge, La., rates less than those in effect from intermediate Texas points was held in abeyance until a decision was rendered in a pending docket of broader scope. Routing and Transit on Cotton, 762 (763).
As the fruit and vegetable baskets and hampers were not shown to load to the minimum weight requested, that minimum was not justified, and the request for that minimum subject to the lumber rates was interpreted to mean that complainants desired a charge per car not in excess of that resulting from the lumber rate applied to the minimum weight sought. Verhalen Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 133 (135). PERCENTAGE RATES.
Rates on rough-quarried granite from Quincy, Adams, and West Quincy, Mass., and Barre and Ryegate, Vt., to Rochelle Park, N. J., found unrea- sonable to the extent that they exceeded 80 per cent of sixth-class rates, minimum 50,000 pounds. Riverside Monument Works v. Erie R. Co., 81. Commodity rates and class rates subsequently made applicable under an alternative provision on glass bottles from East St. Louis and Alton, Ill., to Griffin, Ga., found unreasonable to the extent that they exceeded rates equal to 38 per cent of the first-class rates under the distance scale pre- scribed in the southern class-rate investigation, that also being the per- centage relationship between commodity and first-class rates under the scale prescribed in Consolidated Southwestern Cases and applicable in the Southwest. Reasonable rates prescribed for the future and reparation awarded. Creomulsion Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 95.
Rates on excelsior from Hallsboro, Norfolk, and other points in Virginia to Louisville, Ky., St. Louis, Mo., and Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Colum- bus, Ohio, found unreasonable for the future to the extent that they exceeded or may exceed 27.5 per cent of contemporaneous first-class rates in effect from and to the points involved. Hallsboro Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 124.
Compared with the percentage of first-class rates on sewer pipe in central territory, class E ratings in the western and in Illinois classifications are less than 75 per cent of the central territory sixth-class rates. Cancel- lation of Commodity Rates on Sewer Pipe, 514 (524). Rates on vitrified-clay sewer pipe and on wall coping from Craigsville, Pa., to destinations in the eastern trunk-line territory and New England territories found unreasonable and unduly prejudicial for the future to the extent they exceed 90 per cent of the contemporaneous sixth-class rates, and rates from St. Marys, Brockway, Patton, and Clearfield, Pa., to the same destinations found unduly preferential to extent they exceed 90 per cent of the lowest sixth-class rates in effect from any one of the four points specified to the destinations involved. Reasonable rates prescribed for future. Id. (528).
Rates on vitrified-clay sewer pipe from Uhrichsville, Ohio, to Williamsville, N. Y., found not unreasonable in the past but unreasonable for the future to the extent that it may exceed 90 per cent of the contemporaneous sixth-class rate. Reasonable rate prescribed for future. Id. (534). Maintenance of the same rates on both rough and dressed limestone from points in the Bedford district of Indiana to Baltimore, Md., and Washing- ton, D. C., found unduly prejudicial, since the value of dressed limestone, its susceptibility to damage in transit, and its loading, as contrasted with the same transportation characteristics of rough limestone, establish that the rates on the latter should not exceed 80 per cent of the rates on the former. Reasonable rates prescribed for the future. O'Meara v. Balti- more & O. R. Co., 785.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE. See also ISSUE.
A motion to exclude lighterage and car-float service from the investigation of rail-water terminal facilities, switching costs having been excluded, was denied as the investigation included every service beyond the rail ends at the ports. Wharfage Charges at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 663 (671). The commission deemed it unnecessary to decide whether the examiner erred in sustaining the objection of the carrier to the introduction of evidence as to divisions and the denying the protestant's motion that the carrier be required to file a statement showing the revenue accruing to it under the proposed and existing routes, since the proposed rates appeared to be compensatory, and the matter of divisions to only one participating carrier was immaterial. Routing and Transit on Cotton, 762 (768). PORT DIFFERENTIALS AND EQUALIZATION.
Making rates to and from the nearest rate-making point applicable to and from ship side, with a segregation of uniform port rates, would not bring about equalization of rates to and from ports as carriers could still meet competition by shrinking the line-haul rates. If port charges were dif- ferent the carrier having the larger charge could shrink the line-haul rate to offset it. Wharfage Charges at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 663 (684). POWER OF COMMISSION. See JURISDICTION.
PRACTICES OF CARRIERS. See RULES, REGULATIONS, And Practices. PREFERENCES AND PREJUDICES. See also DISCRIMINATION.
There can be no undue prejudice under section 3 of the act unless it is within the power of the carrier charged with the prejudice to remove it by its own act. Hallsboro Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 124 (128).
The test of discrimination is the ability of a carrier participating in both the preferred and the prejudiced traffic to put an end to the discrimi- nation by its own act. Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 236 (239).
A common carrier may not unduly prefer one community or disadvan- tage another, and if it voluntarily chooses to meet competition at one point in respect to absorption of drayage, its obligation to other com- munities on its line is clear under past decisions of the commission. Rules Covering Freight at Bennettsville, S. C., 277 (278). Preference or prejudice under section 3, to be undue, must ordinarily be such that the difference in rates is in itself a source of advantage to the party alleged to be favored and a disadvantage to the other party. Watab Paper Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 335 (339). A carrier can not be charged with undue prejudice because of conditions not within its control. Lake Charles Harbor & Term. Dist v. Brim- stone R. & C. Co., 720 (723).
That portion of section 3 of the act which provides that carriers shall not discriminate in their rates, fares, and charges between connecting lines has application only to such connecting lines as are subject to regulation by the commission. Luckenback S. S. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 752 (759).
A carrier complaining of undue prejudice under section 3 of the act must be one which comes under the jurisdiction of the commission and to which the provisions of the act apply. Id. (759).
« PreviousContinue » |